The initial hopes of a negotiated political solution stand belied, at least partly, if not fully, as yet.
After the proclamation of the ceasefire on February 22, 2002, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, at an international press conference held at his headquarters in Wanni, in the Northern Province, had clearly indicated that his organisation was prepared to seek a political solution within a federal set-up.
However, as the talks continued, it became obvious that what the LTTE was not seeking a final definitive solution to its political demand, based on a compromise, but an interim political arrangement under which, it would acquire de facto and de jure control of the Northern and the Eastern Provinces, in the form of an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA), headed by it, as a pre requisite to its participation at a fresh round of negotiations, for a final solution. It was seeking an interim arrangement similar to that of the Palestinian Authority, headed by Yassir Arafat, which has acquired a certain political legitimacy in the West, while negotiating with Israel for a final solution.
The SL Army's continued presence in Jaffna was a bulwark to its de facto control of the Northern Province. Therefore, the withdrawal of the SL Army and the dismantling of the Government's high security zones, became a pre condition for further progress in the talks. Consolidating its de facto control of the Eastern Province, depended on its ability to keep its officials and troops within the Province supplied by its naval wing. Therefore, it raised the question of the Government agreeing to grant de facto status to its Navy, a demand which, to the surprise of the Government and not-openly-expressed concern of the government of India, enjoyed the tacit support of the Norwegian facilitators.
Its overseas procurement network continued to indulge in the clandestine procurement of arms and ammunition abroad and its naval wing ,their transport into the areas controlled by it, particularly in the Eastern Province. This was a serious violation of the ceasefire accord. The failure, or reluctance, of the Norwegian ceasefire monitoring mission, to take serious notice of it, came in for criticism from President Chandrika Kumaratunga, though not so expressively from then Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe.
Differences developed between the LTTE and the Government, even as to the nature of the process of negotiations. What the LTTE had apparently in mind was a two-stage process. The first stage would be between the government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the LTTE as a militant organisation, to pave the way for the enthronement of the LTTE as the interim ruler of the Northern and Eastern Provinces and, the second would be between the GSL and this interim government, to reach a final agreement on, how Sri Lanka would be constituted into a federal set-up and, what powers the Tamil component of the federation would have.
The expectations of the LTTE became clear after it released to the public on October 31, 2003, the details of its proposal for an ISGA. It contained some disturbing features---some open, some hidden--- from the point of view of the Sinhalese majority. Firstly, its intention to retain its military and naval capability without agreeing to its disbanding or merger with the Sri Lanka Armed Forces, as part of a final solution. Secondly, its determination to retain its political primacy in the two provinces and, any role for other Tamil parties and the Tamil-speaking Muslim minority of the Eastern Province subject to their acceptance of its unchallenged supremacy. It was at this stage that the hopes initially evoked by the ceasefire and the start of the negotiations started evaporating and the differences between Chandrika Kumaratunga and her then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, as to his handling of the political process, led to a final parting of the ways between the two, leading to the exit of his government, the suspension of its facilitation process by Norway in November, 2003, (since resumed after the elections of April, 2004) till the political situation in Sri Lanka clarified itself, fresh elections and the coming into power of a new coalition called the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) consisting of Chandrika Kumaratunga's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the left-oriented Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) as its principal constituents.
After having successfully achieved the induction into office of a coalition led by her party, Chandrika Kumaratunga softened her anti LTTE and anti Norway rhetoric and, made a number of overtures to the LTTE leadership, to persuade it to return to the negotiating table. Her efforts have not succeeded so far. The first reason being, the yet irreconcilable differences between her government and the LTTE, as to the nature of the negotiating process. Her government insists on two parallel negotiations--- one on the formation of an interim ruling authority in the Northern and Eastern Provinces as demanded by the LTTE and, the other on the main features of the final solution regarding the future of the Tamil-majority areas.
Her position, that any interim arrangement should fit into the overall final solution, enjoys the support of the government of India. The LTTE, on the other hand, is not prepared to embark on talks for a final political solution unless and until, an ISGA headed by it, is set up in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, with full powers and capability for the autonomous administration of the area and, with an assured role in the conduct of its external economic relations in matters such as, the re-negotiation of the agreements relating to the economic resources of the Tamil-majority areas, entered into in the past by the GSL, with foreign powers or institutions.
It seems to be having in mind agreements, particularly relating to the exploitation of the fisheries off the coastal areas of the North and East and, the lease of the oil storage tanks in Trincomalee, in the Eastern Province, to the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC). Blame for the present stalemate has to be shared by the various political combinations of the Sinhalese majority, as well as by Chandrika Kumaratunga and Ranil Wickremesinghe. There cannot be a negotiated political solution acceptable to the Sinhalese majority, unless it has the support of Chandrika Kumaratunga's SLFP, Ranil Wickremesinghe's UNP and the JVP. Keeping this in view, the initiation of the political process should have been preceded or, at least accompanied, by an effort at reaching a national consensus, among these parties, on the nature of the political process, on the acceptable contours of a final solution and, on how the negotiations would be conducted.
The historic rivalry between the SLFP and the UNP and, ego clashes between Kumaratunge and Wickremesinghe came in the way of such an attempt at a national consensus. Instead of presenting a united front to the LTTE, the three political formations, as well as Kumaratunge and Wickremesinghe indulged in shadow boxing among themselves over the political process, thereby undermining one another's credibility.
Wickremesinghe committed four major tactical errors. First, he sought to deny any meaningful role for the country's anxiety for peace, he embarked on the political process without first working out a road map, which would be acceptable to the Sinhalese majority. As a result, his negotiating style was more reactive than proactive. He, unwittingly created an impression that it was the LTTE, which was calling the shots. Third, he kept his eyes closed to the violations of the cease-fire accord by the LTTE lest open articulation of his concerns made the LTTE even more recalcitrant than it was. His reactions to the various demands and proposals made by the LTTE either at the negotiating table or through the media after the LTTE withdrew from the talks were ad hoc and ill-considered.
So long as he was the Prime Minister, he even failed to openly express the position of his government on the LTTE's detailed proposal for an ISGA. Fourth, he believed, mistakenly as it was found to be in retrospect, that international pressure on the LTTE would make it more amenable for a compromise acceptable to the Sinhalese majority. Peeved at her being kept in the dark about the political process by her then Prime Minister, Kumaratunge hit back from time to time with open statements and reactions, which were often abrasive and tended to weaken the hands of Wickremasinghe while he was engaged in a delicate political process in an attempt to bring to an end the LTTE's militancy. Two new complicating factors have arisen since the beginning of this year, which do not bode well for the success of the political process in the foreseeable future. The first was the revolt in March, 2004, of an unestimated number of the cadres of the LTTE in the Eastern Province, led by "Col". Karuna (real name Vinayagamoorthy Muraleetheran ), a legendary leader of its military wing in the Batticaloa district of the Eastern Province, against the allegedly discriminatory policies of the organisation's North-dominated political leadership towards the Tamils of the Eastern Province.
Ever since the inception of the militancy in the early 1980s, the LTTE has had two faces---as a ruthless and dreaded terrorist organisation and as a well-motivated and well-trained conventional army, which has had many successes to its credit in its military operations against the Sri Lankan Armed Forces. While Prabhakaran has the dubious credit for the creation of its terrorist face, considerable credit for the creation of its conventional military capability should go to Karuna and his Eastern recruits. The revolt was triggered by the feeling among large sections of the Tamils in the Eastern Province that their valour and sacrifices in the conventional battles of the LTTE against the SL Army have not been adequately recognised by the North-dominated leadership and reflected in the decision and policy-making organs of the LTTE, where they were under-represented.
For Prabakaran, the real heroes were his suicide bombers and others who participated in spectacular acts of terrorism, and not those who fought in conventional battles against the SL Army. Moreover, while more than two years of the cease-fire have brought a certain peace dividend to the Northern Province in the form of a flow of funds from the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in the West and non-governmental organisations for its economic reconstruction, the Eastern Province has not had the benefit of any such peace dividend.
Thirdly, in view of his orchestration of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, India's former Prime Minister, at Chennai in May,1991, and his figuring as an absconding accused in the case in India relating to the assassination, the governments of India and Tamil Nadu would find it difficult to do business with any ruling dispensation in the Northern and Eastern Provinces led by him. So far, no thought would seem to have been given in the government of India to the question of the political and national security implications of an LTTE government headed by Prabhakaran one day coming to power in the Tamil-majority provinces and also to the question as to what would be the options available to India and how to get over this dilemma. To be continued. (The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt.of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter).
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt.of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow and Convenor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter.)
