The cadre was on duty at the time of the incident, he added.
LTTE's Batticaloa political head further said that the gunmen withdrew to Mavadyvembu Sri Lanka Army base following the incident.
The incident took place at the Mayilavedduvan, 3 km west of Sithandy in Eravur.
(www.tamilnet.com)
Around 15 heavily armed men moved beyond the no-man zone in Vavunathivu attempting to target an LTTE convoy moving along the border.
LTTE sources said that their cadres launched a counterstrike at the group which withdrew towards Vavunathivu SLA camp.
Meanwhile, Sri Lanka Army sources, denying their involvement, said that the ambush targeted LTTE's Special Commander Col. Bhanu.
Continous firing was heard for more than 10 minutes, according to civilians in the area.
(www.tamilnet.com)
COLOMBO, SEPT. 20. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has brought in top level changes in the two troubled eastern districts — Batticaloa and Amparai — by replacing its Special Commander, Ramesh, with the rebel group's head of heavy mortar division, Bhanu.
According to sources in eastern Sri Lanka, `Col.' Ramesh, who was named as the Special Commander after the rebellion by the former Special Commander, V. Muralitharan (`Col.' Karuna) earlier this year, handed over charge of the two eastern districts to `Col.' Bhanu, who is from northern Sri Lanka. `Col.' Ramesh is scheduled to leave for rebel-held Kilinochchi in northern Sri Lanka.
The LTTE has not made any official statement on the situation and could not be reached for comment. According to security sources in eastern Sri Lanka, there has been no official intimation but ``ground reports'' confirmed the change in the eastern leadership.
`Shrinking space'
While sources close to the LTTE say that a person from Jaffna was brought in ``at the request of some senior eastern functionaries,'' critics of the LTTE say that the latest appointment points to the ``shrinking space for accommodation'' by the Tigers to `Col.' Karuna's rebellion.
After `Col.' Karuna's revolt in March, he was expelled from the organisation. Ramesh, his unranked deputy who hails from the eastern districts, was named as the Special Commander and was subsequently promoted to the rank of a `Colonel,' in the rebel fighting force.
After holding out for just over a month, `Col.' Karuna left Batticaloa for Colombo when the LTTE launched its Good Friday operation to ``get rid'' of its former military commander.
Since then, ``unidentified gunmen'' killed several LTTE senior functionaries, including the Batticaloa town political leader, Senadhi. The Tigers blamed Karuna's supporters and armed groups backed by sections of the military intelligence for the killings. The latest in the string of killings of senior LTTE functionaries was the gunning down of the Amparai district political leader, Bawa, last month.
The Government, which initially denied any involvement, subsequently conceded that ``sections of the armed forces'' could have played a role, but maintained that there was nothing official about it.
`Internal affair'
In the absence of any official statement by the LTTE, which is considering the leadership change as ``an internal affair,'' there has been intense media speculation in Colombo. Some reports suggest that `Col.' Bhanu was appointed to neutralise the supporters of `Col.' Karuna, while others indicate that `Col.' Ramesh was ``ineffective'' and hence the change.
Security sources in eastern Sri Lanka said there was no independent confirmation of these media reports.
Effigies burnt
Meanwhile the anti-LTTE Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) today protested against the ``continued killing'' of its political activists and burnt effigies of the LTTE leader, V. Prabakaran, and its political wing leader, S.P. Tamilchelvan, and blamed the Tigers and the Norwegian facilitators for the killings. The immediate reason for the protests is Saturday's killing of one of its senior functionaries — Sivakumaran — by unidentified gunmen in the northwestern Puttalam district. Sivakumaran had moved a fundamental rights case against the recently concluded Parliamentary elections in the northeast.
``The LTTE is treating the ceasefire agreement as a license to kill everybody, so we burnt their effigies,'' an EPDP spokesperson said.
The demonstrators, who carried a coffin to the Norwegian Embassy, raised slogans condemning the facilitators and the Tigers.
``Norway stop the killings or leave the peace process,'' said a slogan, while another said ``peace talks and internecine killings — two sides of the same coin.''
The EPDP, which has been a vocal critic of the LTTE, has been a major victim of internecine killings, and its leader, Douglas Devananda, escaped from an aborted suicide bomb attack this July.
(http://www.thehindu.com/2004/09/21/stories/2004092101891401.htm)
THE military balance in Sri Lanka's Tamil-dominated Northern Province has undergone a drastic transformation after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) seized the vast military complex in the area around Elephant Pass, or Aanai Iravu as it is know n in Tamil. The Elephant Pass isthmus was of strategic importance as it linked the northern mainland known as Wanni with the Jaffna Peninsula. Both the Jaffna-Kandy road, the A-9 Highway, and the railway line to Jaffna run through Elephant Pass, and the narrow strip of land was in a sense the gateway to Jaffna.
The fall of Elephant Pass marked the first time in the history of the "Tamil Eelam war" that the area had come under the LTTE's control. The Dutch colonialists first built a small fortress in 1776, which was converted in modern times into a resthouse for tourists. After Independence a permanent garrison was set up there to check illicit immigration, smuggling and unlawful transport of timber. As the intensity of the ethnic conflict escalated, the strategic importance of Elephant Pass also increased. The small camp gradually expanded into a sprawling complex. At one time, the Elephant Pass base and the satellite camps covered an area about 23 km long and 8-10 km wide.
To celebrate the capture of Elephant Pass, the LTTE organised a flag-raising ceremony at 9 a.m. on Sunday, April 23. According to Tiger media outlets, hundreds of LTTE cadres and a large number of Tamil civilians who serve as members of an auxiliary forc e known as "Thunaippadai" watched as the crimson-and-gold LTTE flag was hoisted by 'Colonel' Bhanu. As Bhanu, 38, stepped back and saluted the flag, LTTE fighters fired ceremonially in the air, and seven artillery field guns fired three shells each. Ther eafter, Bhanu addressed the gathering.
In his speech, Bhanu said this was only the first step in "the war to liberate our homeland" and there would be "many more battles". The valour and sacrifices of the LTTE fighters, he said, had made it possible to realise the "dream of annihilating Aanai Iravu". The camp, established by the Dutch over 200 years ago, had for long remained "a symbol of alien domination" and divided the Tamil people of the peninsula from the mainland, Bhanu said, and added: "Now it is no more. After we transport all that n eeds to be removed from here we will raze this place to the ground except for a small structure to remind ourselves of this oppressive symbol... Our enemies will not be allowed to return and occupy this place in the future."
Paying tributes to the memory of "all our comrades who laid down their lives in this battle and the campaigns before," Bhanu said that the LTTE fighters had succeeded because of the "very intricate attack plan drawn by our national leader and commander-i n-chief (Velupillai Prabakaran), the smooth execution of the plan by his lieutenants and the courageous fighting done by the cadres." The victory, he said, was a sign of "more things to come". Sweets were then distributed.
What followed immediately afterwards was rich in symbolism, and marked a defining moment for the LTTE. Groups of hand-picked civilians and some Tiger cadres in uniform walked along the Elephant Pass causeway on the isthmus that links the Wanni area with the peninsula. One group walked northwards from the mainland to the peninsula, and another went southwards from the peninsula to the mainland. The significance of this "walk" was that for the first time in living memory there were no barriers or men in k haki to stop the people crossing to and from the peninsula. For the Tamil civilians, a symbol of oppression had been eradicated.
Ten years ago Bhanu had been in a similar situation. On September 26, 1990, the 350-year-old Fort in the heart of Jaffna town had fallen to the LTTE; triumphant Tiger cadres led by Bhanu raised the LTTE flag at the Fort. Bhanu, who hailed from Ariyalai, was then Jaffna district commander. He had earlier served as Mannar commander. However, when an operation led by him against an army outpost at Thachan Kadu failed, resulting in the death of many LTTE cadres, Prabakaran demoted him. Bhanu was sent to the Wanni area for a while, but a few years later his position was restored and he was entrusted with a crucial assignment.
Bhanu was ordered to raise an artillery unit for the LTTE, and this he did competently. Initially, the LTTE depended on artillery seized from the army after successful raids; later the LTTE procured artillery equipment on the black market and transported them by sea to Wanni. The LTTE allegedly recruited foreign mercenaries on a contract basis to teach them the finer points of artillery deployment. Today, the LTTE's artillery unit is named after former Jaffna commander Kittu, and is still commanded by B hanu.
Pleased with Bhanu's work, Prabakaran is believed to have directed him to establish an armoured unit. Again, in the initial stages the LTTE could use only a few armoured cars and tanks seized from the armed forces. It is also rumoured that a renegade Sin hala army officer imparted some rudimentary training to the Tigers on the use of armoured vehicles. Later vehicles were purchased in the international arms market and shipped to Wanni. The armoured unit, named after former Mannar commander Victor and com manded by Bhanu, is still in a fledgling state.
The artillery and armoured units played a crucial role in the fighting in the Wanni region. They were responsible for checking the advances of the armed forces. In recent times the style of LTTE fighting in positional warfare situations has undergone a d ramatic transformation. Owing to their artillery power and armoured vehicles, the Tigers can hold off the army from afar with the minimum number of casualties. The nature of the war is increasingly becoming conventional, with heavy reliance on stand-off weapons.
In the recent fighting around Elephant Pass, the LTTE's artillery and armoured units again played a big role and enabled the LTTE to seize control within a short period with relatively few losses. In fact, Bhanu was given the honour of raising the flag a s an acknowledgement of the contribution of the Kittu and Victor units. Interestingly, Prabakaran does not hoist the flag or pose before the LTTE's video cameras after a victory. He lets his deputies who fought on the battlefield take the credit. It is, however, stated that it is Prabakaran who plans and coordinates operations.
THE recent LTTE victory at Elephant Pass was the result of an elaborate but simple strategy drawn up by Prabakaran. It is said that Prabakaran analyses the LTTE's military defeats for mistakes and draws lessons from them for use in subsequent campaigns. In that respect, a failed attempt by the LTTE to capture the Elephant Pass camp in July-August 1991 must have yielded many lessons. That campaign was codenamed "Tharai, Kadal, Aahayam" (Land, Sea and Air) and lasted 53 days. The LTTE, by its own admissio n, lost 573 cadres; more than 1,500 others were injured. In terms of manpower and morale, these were crippling losses.
The Sri Lankan armed forces were able to beat back the LTTE that time owing to two factors. The first was the tenacity of the besieged troops led by a talented officer Sarath Fonseka and the grit with which they held on despite the overwhelming odds. The second was Operation Balavegaya, led by the late Generals Denzil Kobbekaduwe and Vijaya Wimalaratne. They established a beach-head at Vettilaikerny on the east coast and then fought their way through to the army personnel trapped inside the Elephant Pas s camp. Thereafter the camp was converted into a large base by absorbing almost all the buildings in the vicinity, including the salterns and the school. Satellite camps were established at Vettilaikerny, Kattaikadu and Pullaveli. Thus, a safe supply rou te by sea and land was ensured. After Operation SathJaya in 1996, Paranthan and Kilinochchi, to the south of Elephant Pass on the mainland, too were linked up with Elephant Pass. The Kilinochchi-Elephant Pass-Vettilaikerny base became a sprawling complex that housed an entire division and was considered impregnable.
Given these circumstances, Prabakaran resorted to a strategy to take Elephant Pass by gradually encircling and enfeebling the troops inside by cutting off supplies and strangulating the base. The idea was to avoid a frontal assault that would have led to the loss of many lives, since the armed forces had numerical and logistical superiority.
The LTTE strategy was made easier by the second phase of Operation Oyatha Alaigal (Unceasing Waves) in September 1998, in which Kilinochchi was taken. Thereafter the LTTE began to creep in on Paranthan, to the south of Elephant Pass on the mainland. In a series of short, swift campaigns that went unreported in the Colombo media, the camps at Karadipokku, Paranthan Junction, the Paranthan Chemical Corporation complex and finally at Umaialpuram, between Paranthan and Elephant Pass, were taken. Umaialpuram and Iyakachchi were the two points where the troops at Elephant Pass could get drinking water. (The water within the Elephant Pass base was too brackish for consumption.)
THE first stage of the LTTE campaign to take control of the peninsula was launched on December 11, 1999 (see "Tactical Shift", Frontline, January 7, 2000). The camps at Vettilaikerny and Kattaikadu on the east coast and Pullaveli to the north of E lephant Pass were taken in a land-sea joint campaign. An unsuccessful assault was conducted on the western flanks of Iyakachchi, but no direct attack was launched on the main base at Elephant Pass. The Iyakachchi camp, five km to the northwest of Elephan t Pass, is situated along a bend on the A-9 Highway. With the fall of Vettilaikerny, Kattaikadu and Pullaveli, the land-sea supply routes to Elephant Pass were cut off, and the only way through was along the A-9 Highway from Chavakachcheri. The LTTE cond ucted some limited operations that were aimed at stepping up the pressure on Iyakachchi without achieving any breakthrough.
Meanwhile, the 53rd Division of the Sri Lanka Army was brought in to relieve the pressure on the 54th Division deployed in the Elephant Pass sector; it was stationed at the Pachilaippalli and Vadamaratchy East Pradeshiya division camps. The 53rd Division was an elite force that had been trained by the United States and Pakistan.
The second stage of the LTTE campaign, a multi-pronged assault, unfolded on March 26, 2000 (see "Another offensive", Frontline, April 28). A joint operation led by Vasanthan of the Charles Anthony Infantry division and Veerendran of the Sea Tigers took control of the Chembiyanpattru-Maruthankerny-Thalaiady complex that housed the 3rd operational headquarters on the Vadamaratchy east coast. These were on the land strip between the Bay of Bengal and the Jaffna Lagoon. The army then vacated the camp s at Maamunai and Amban; the soldiers relocated to positions to the west of the lagoon.
Simultaneously, a squad from the LTTE "Siruthai" (Leopard) Commando brigade raided Pallai, the largest junction to the north of Iyakachchi on the A-9 Highway, and decommissioned at least 11 pieces of artillery. A contingent led by the LTTE's deputy milit ary chief Balraj then took a swathe of the Jaffna-Kandy road between Pallai and Eluthumattuvaal. These included the areas around Arasakerni, Ithavil, Indrapuram. Muhamaalai and Kovil Kadu. With this, the LTTE effectively cut off the main road link betwee n the Elephant Pass/Iyakachchi camps and Jaffna. On April 10, the armed forces recaptured a major portion of the road but failed to dislodge the Tigers completely.
There was, however, a circuitous route that helped maintain a road link. At Pallai, a road branched off westwards from the A-9 Highway towards Kilali via Puloppalai and then headed north towards Kachchai and Allippalai; from there it ran east towards Kod ikamam, at which point vehicles could get back onto the Jaffna-Kandy road again. However, this route came under intense pressure from the LTTE which fired artillery barrages at Kilali from Pooneryn across the lagoon.
Also on March 26, the LTTE's Kilinochchi commander Theepan led a team of men across the dried-up Chundikulam lagoon on the southeast of the peninsula and established positions in the Mullian and Vannankulam region. But the team ran into the Forward Defen ce Lines and was prevented from advancing towards Elephant Pass in the Vathirayan area.
The third and decisive stage of the LTTE campaign was played out around noon on Tuesday, April 18. A Leopard commando raid saw the LTTE take control of the Maruthankerny causeway, which enabled it to proceed westwards on the Maruthankerny-Puthukadu Junct ion road, which links the east coast and the A-9 Highway. The Puthukadu Junction is between Iyakachchi and Pallai. The LTTE proceeded along the southern areas of Muhavil, Soranpattru and Maasaar, after demolishing a 40-foot bund put up by the army as a d efence measure. The Tigers headed south on the A-9 Highway and reached the northern sector of the Iyakachchi camp. In effect, Elephant Pass and Iyakachchi were marooned.
Thereafter, the LTTE mounted a fierce attack on the Iyakachchi camp from Kovil Vayal and Sangathaar Vayal. As the fighting intensified, the Tiger cadres to the southeast of Elephant Pass broke through and began assailing the camp. The armoured and artill ery units led by Bhanu pounded the base and inched forward. The telecommunication tower in the Elephant Pass base was damaged; all telephone lines to the north were severed.
At a critical juncture the bulk of LTTE cadres led by Balraj abandoned the A-9 Highway and joined the fighting around Iyakachchi after setting up two "cut out" posts to the north of Pallai and south of Eluthumattuvaal to prevent an army advancement. Heav y fighting in and around Iyakachchi began on April 20. The Tigers positioned themselves to the south of the camp and cut it off from Elephant Pass.
Iyakachchi fell on April 21. The LTTE entered the camp and destroyed ammunition dumps and buildings. Thereafter, the theatre of war shifted to Elephant Pass. The LTTE advanced on Elephant Pass from the north, northeast and southeast. There was heavy exch ange of fire all through that long night, and even as the fighting was on, the army began to move out. By 11-30 a.m. on April 22, the large garrison at Elephant Pass "vacated" it. The LTTE marched in at 2-30 p.m. the same day. The flag was hoisted on Apr il 23.
AFTER the LTTE's stage-by-stage build-up against Elephant Pass, the abrupt capitulation by the security forces came as an anti-climax. Curiously, however, the LTTE, which had until then put out news at each successful stage of the campaign, did not annou nce the fall of Iyakachchi on April 21; it announced that news along with news of the fall of the Elephant Pass camp. This perhaps implies that after taking control of Iyakachchi, the LTTE was supremely confident that Elephant Pass would fall soon or had advance knowledge that the troops there would withdraw within hours of the Iyakachchi debacle.
The security forces vacated Elephant Pass only after they received orders to that effect from the defence establishment. Army commander Srilal Weerasooriya instructed Chief of Staff Lionel Balagalle to issue the order, which was sent by personal courier to Elephant Pass. Commanding Officer Brigadier Egodawela received it at 10 p.m. on April 21.
The retreating troops initially started moving out to Pallai, 14 km away, along the A-9 Highway, but when the LTTE thwarted them, they took to a disused rail track and a sandtrack to its west. From Pallai, the soldiers headed west for the relative safety of Kilali. But when Tiger mortars pounded this route, the army used another circuitous route - a dirt track going northwest from Elephant Pass to Kilali through Kurinchatheevu, Oorvanikanpattru and Thanmankerny. On this longer route, however, many soldi ers succumbed to heat and dehydration, apart from the unceasing LTTE shells.
Nevertheless a good number of the troops moved out from Elephant Pass, mostly on foot. Before leaving, they spiked some artillery pieces, but even so the LTTE seized some powerful guns, including 152-mm artillery guns, and a number of tanks and armoured cars, besides other arms and ammunition. A preliminary list released by the LTTE reveals a mind-boggling armoury. Elephant Pass was in many ways a military debacle for Colombo.
ALTHOUGH there were more than 15,000 troops in the Elephant Pass base and there are fewer than 5,000 LTTE cadres in the peninsula, the army was defeated because it was a demoralised force. Many factors had contributed to the lowering of troop morale. The frequent change of commanding officers was one factor, and the LTTE's repeated victories against the elite 53rd Division, the "Pride of the Army", were another. The haphazard manner in which the 53rd Division was plunged into combat caused many problems at the top. One dissenting commanding officer, Brig. Gamini Hettiaratchy, was transferred. Another officer, Gen. Sisira Wijeysinghe, went on sick leave. Brig. Sivali Wanigaseker was sent in as acting command.
The defence establishment's decision to move the troops out of the Elephant Pass base was, however, forced on it primarily by a shortage of drinking water. The camp was equipped with machinery for desalination of water, but it had broken down and not bee n repaired. The availability of potable water in Umaialpuram and Iyakachchi had perhaps lulled the forces into complacency. However, when Iyakachchi came under siege, the water crisis in the overcrowded base became unmanageable. Ironically, the Elephant Base base had ample quantities of canned food and dry rations; after taking over the camp, the LTTE distributed these to civilians in the Wanni area.
Defence Ministry sources estimate that over 1,000 LTTE cadres were killed in the three phases of fighting from December 11, 1999. The LTTE claims that only 303 of its cadres were killed, including 35 casualties in the battle for Elephant Pass. The Tigers further claim that over 1,000 soldiers were killed; the Army, however, says that only 80 of its men were killed and over 100 are missing in action. Subsequently the Tigers returned through the Red Cross the bodies of 126 soldiers, of which 28 were ident ified. Among the top Army officers who were killed were Brig. Percy Fernando, Col. Bhatiya Jayatilleke, Col. Neil Akmeemana and Lt. Col. Hewage Hewawasam. On the Tigers' side, the women's brigade chief, 'Lt. Col.' Lakshiya, was reported killed.
The Elephant Pass debacle shocked people across the country. Sri Lankan Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte, however, sought to put a brave face on the defeat. Addressing a ministerial function, he said that the "setback" at Elephant Pass ought to be seen as a "natural phenomenon in wars of this nature... We have to accept both victories and setbacks in the same manner."
In a televised address to the nation, President Chandrika Kumaratunga stated that her Government "has unequivocally decided to protractedly and relentlessly pursue with the military operations". Kumaratunga had made some abrupt changes in the defence str uctureure barely days before the fall of the Elephant Pass base, and established a National Security Council. Retired Chief of the Army Staff Rohan Daluwatte was placed in overall charge of the three Services. Gen. Janaka Perera was made Northern Provinc e Commander and General Sarath Fonseka the Jaffna Commander.
After a brief lull following the LTTE's taking of Elephant Pass, fighting erupted again. The LTTE called on all civilians from Pallai to Kodikamam, including Eluthumattuvaal and Mirusuvil, to relocate to safe areas. Thereafter, LTTE cadres moved along th e A-9 Highway and seized the camps at Pallai and Soranpattru north, which the armed forces abandoned after a brief show of resistance. The LTTE units then linked up on the A-9 Highway from the north of Pallai to the south of Eluthumattuvaal.
The Tigers then launched a two-track assault on Kilali. One column proceeded on the 18-km dirt track from Elephant Pass to Kilali along the coast. Another moved westwards from Pallai to Puloppalai and then on to Kilali. Both columns reached the Kilali ar ea, but as on May 5 they had not made further progress. A rumour, however, spread in Colombo, and a few newspapers carried reports, that Bhanu had been killed at Kilali. However, there has been no reliable confirmation of this.
The LTTE also opened another flank with an attack on Nagar Kovil on the Vadamaratchy east coast. The Tigers as well as the army were engaged in heavy exchange of fire in the Kilali, Nagar Kovil and Pallai-Eluthumattuvaal areas.
MEANWHILE, the armed forces have begun constructing massive defences along a diagonal line from Kilali on the west through Eluthumattuvaal to Nagar Kovil in the east. Further, several small camps like those at Varany, Mathagal, Chankanai, Vaddukkoddai, M ahiyapiddy, Navaly, Chulipuram and Kandarodai have been closed. Troops are being redeployed in the frontline areas. The army's immediate priority is to prevent the LTTE from advancing to Jaffna town or the Palali-Kankesanthurai tri-Services base complex.
There is intense speculation about how the LTTE will advance further. Will it head north on the A-9 Highway? Or will it proceed from Kilali to Chavakachcheri through Kachchai or Kodikamam? After reaching Chavakachcheri will it head for Jaffna or for Pala ly? Will it move north along the Vadamaratchi coast via Nagar Kovil and take control of Point Pedro, Velvettithurai and Thondamanaru? From Thondamanaru will it go for Palaly through Valalai or Jaffna through Atchuvely? Or will it move to Jaffna or Chavak achcheri from Ariyalai or Thanankilappu after bringing in the 1,000-plus reserves stationed under Karuna's command in the Pooneryn region on the mainland? All these questions trouble not only the army but also the civilians who do not want to be caught i n the line of fire. Given the intense artillery barrages, the civilians' plight is precarious.
The anticipated progress of the LTTE has also raised concerns about the future of around 35,000 troops in the peninsula. The fear is that the Tigers, with their rapid mobility and artillery firepower, could quickly take over the entire peninsula includin g Jaffna and Palaly and besiege the Palaly-Kankesanthurai complex. If that happens, there may not be time enough to evacuate troops from the peninsula. The Sea Tigers and the LTTE's anti-aircraft unit, which possess missiles, could restrict the troops' s ea and air movement. This would leave the troops marooned and defenceless. A "Dunkirk-like evacuation" may then become necessary and the possibility of securing India's assistance for this purpose is being explored.
There is however another view -that although the situation is quite bleak, the hysteria and panic about the necessity for a rescue operation are unfounded. Those who subscribe to this view believe that if troop morale is restored and adequate countermeas ures are taken, the LTTE juggernaut can be halted, and eventually pushed back. In any event, the belief is that there is no immediate cause for alarm about the fate of Palali. By May 6, Colombo appeared to be veering around to the position that the troop s were rallying gamely and that it would be possible to stop the LTTE's advance.
Whichever way the situation unfolds in the coming weeks, one thing is certain: while the guns around the gateway of Elephant Pass may have fallen silent after a long time, the Jaffna Peninsula will not see peace in the immediate future.
(http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1710/index.htm)
With the fall of Elephant Pass and with Jaffna threatened, there has got to be a paradigm shift for an end to the war.
THE day the Sri Lanka Army lost its massive Elephant Pass military base in the Jaffna peninsula, a group of 30 Sinhalese journalists from the south met 60 Tamil journalists from different parts of the north-east.
This civic bridge-building exercise was in the eastern town of Batticaloa which was quiet and relaxed that fateful day. Young women were to be seen cycling within the town, even as dusk fell at 7 p.m. It was impossible to think that elsewhere in the nort h-east, there was carnage taking place.
While the brigade commander of Batticaloa has come in for praise from people for his effective handling of the situation, there are also some structural reasons for the positive environment in the town. One is that it has some 60 non-governmental organis ations, many of them foreign, who would invariably perform a restraining function on human rights abuses. Second is the fact that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) appears to be concentrating its forces at this time in the north. The fact that only handfuls of soldiers were manning the checkpoints, bunkers and mini-camps by the side of the road was a reminder of how tenuous and temporary Batticaloa's peace could be.
The first information about the fall of the Elephant Pass base came from the Tamil journalists who had been listening to the international radio broadcasts. Most people in Batticaloa listen to international radio to get information about what is happenin g on the war front. The Sri Lankan radio is neither trusted for its veracity on war reporting, nor does it have the latest news from the war front.
The Tamil journalists who broke the news to the Sinhalese media persons did so tentatively, undoubtedly sensitive to the high loss of life. But some of the younger Tamil journalists present could not hide their happiness at the news. They locked hands wi th one another. The Sinhalese journalists talked of the soldiers they knew at Elephant Pass.
The forced withdrawal of the Sri Lanka Army at Elephant Pass, the gateway to Jaffna, is a huge blow to the Government and its military-led strategy of finding a solution to the ethnic conflict. Whether the Government can, and should, continue to hold Jaf fna under the present circumstances is a question that will be answered very soon. But whether Jaffna is kept by or lost to the Government, the war will not end.
IT was only a little more than five years ago that the LTTE lost Jaffna after having held it for five years. At that time the wresting of Jaffna from LTTE control was viewed as a blow from which the LTTE could not recover. With the loss of the wealthiest and most densely populated part of the north-east, the LTTE's ability to raise resources and recruit personnel was believed to have been crippled.
Likewise, the series of military debacles suffered by the Sri Lanka Army in the past six months may be seen as the end stage of the Sri Lankan state's military resistance to Tamil separatism. But this is unlikely to be the case if the past is going to be any guide to the future. Unless there is a radical shift in thinking away from a primary reliance on military means of conflict resolution to that on a political solution, new forms of military escalation will be found and new theatres of war opened. Th ere has got to be a paradigm shift for an end to the war.
In this context, it is interesting to recall that when the Sri Lanka Army was approaching Jaffna in November 1995 and encircling it, there were some who called on the Government to cease its advance and to negotiate a political solution with the LTTE. Th ese calls were construed by sections of the media and general population to be the voices of traitors seeking to cheat the Government of a decisive victory over the LTTE.
A group of non-governmental organisations meeting at that time in the seaside resort of Bentota at their annual meeting that had been planned out much in advance were accused of conspiring to cheat the Government of victory and were set upon by Governmen t-backed thugs while the police kept away.
Shortly thereafter the Sri Lanka Army entered Jaffna and in Parliament the Government politicians leading the Sri Lanka military presented a scroll to the President announcing the capture of Jaffna, just like they might have thought a feudal prince would have done to a monarch in the ancient period.
Somewhat differently a few weeks ago when Tamil peace activists attempted to mobilise Tamil middle class persons to publicly support the Norwegian mediation effort, the response was lackadaisical. Perhaps scenting victory in the air, the preference was t o let the LTTE continue with its military action and bring about a military solution. By their similar responses, the Sinhalese and Tamils have shown themselves to be mirror images of each other.
THE loss of faith in political means of resolving the problem of conflicting interests, and the preference for military means to impose one's unilateral will upon the other, are features of Sri Lankan public life at this time.
It is important that the political leadership of the country should join together to restore faith in the political process. They need to undo the suspicion that even a catastrophe as enormous as that of the fall of Elephant Pass will be used by the poli ticians to further their electoral prospects in one way or the other.
For instance, there is an apprehension that the Government will use the present crisis to seek a postponement of the impending general elections with the support of a section of the Opposition. Instead of these backstage manoeuvres, there needs to be a d eepening and accelerating of the Government's dialogue with the United National Party (UNP) to find a non-military and democratic path out of the desperate situation.
With the fall of Elephant Pass and with Jaffna threatened, thousands of lives will be at stake in the coming weeks, and funeral homes will be dotting the country. At a time like this, there will be a temptation to angrily find scapegoats who conducted th e war in a corrupt manner and who weakened the morale of the soldiers through inept leadership. There will also be a temptation to go in for retaliation and military victory at any cost, human or otherwise.
Such sentiments are not unique to Sri Lanka. Just over a half century ago, they prevailed in Europe as well, on a vastly greater scale. But the scale of the destruction forced a paradigm shift in thinking that has served Europe well in the decades that h ave followed. Likewise in Sri Lanka, it would be more positive to recognise two realities and to work out a solution based on them.
The first of these realities is that the Sri Lanka Army cannot control the whole of the regions inhabited at one time predominantly by Tamils, although they may be able to control parts of it. It is evident that the Sri Lankan troops cannot muster the sa me degree of fervour and dedication that the LTTE cadres can, fighting in the vicinity of their villages and homes.
The second reality is that the LTTE cannot gain international recognition for a separate Tamil state and acquire the economic and diplomatic resources that flow from it. At best they can expand the de facto separate state they already have achieve d in the "uncleared" areas.
There are surely a variety of mutually beneficial solutions that can be negotiated within these limits. The alternative would be a further military escalation and more rivers of blood.
(A Letter That appeared in www.asiantribune.com)
Colombo, 13 October, (Asiantribune.com): Two leading college principals from Jaffna were brutally shot and killed in succession within the last two days by the pistol group of the Tamil rebel outfit, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Fratricidal killings continue unabatedly and those who open their mouth against the Tamil Tigers are virtually living in mortal fear of being killed as rule of the jungle prevails.
The Principal of Kopay Christian College, Kopay, Nadarajah .Sivakadadcham (59) was first to be shot and killed on Tuesday.
This was followed by the killing of Kanpathy Rajadurai (58), the Principal of the Jaffna’s leading educational institution – Jaffna Central College.
Sivakadacham was at his home at Manipay Road, Kopay North, and Kopay with his eight year child and wife, when the two Tiger pistol men stormed his house and shot him at close range.
The principal fell dead on the spot inside his home after pistol men struck him in front of his child and wife.
Preliminary investigations confirmed that Sivakdadcham, Principal of Kopay Christian College was throughout opposed to LTTE's practice of child conscription.
On Wednesday afternoon around 3.45 PM, Rajadurai, Principal of Jaffna Central College was on his way to attend a cultural festival held at the Weerasingham hall and while he was reaching the entrance of the hall, gunman fired three shots at him.
According to reports, gunmen alleged to be from the LTTE shot and fatally wounded Rajadurai. He was shot in front of his students, when he was on his way to attend a religious function. The assassin fired several shots at Rajadurai and fled the scene. Eyewitnesses said there were at least four gunmen at the scene, but only one fired the shots.
Rajadurai was critically wounded and was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit of the Jaffna Hospital. Later he succumbed to his injuries after he was admitted in the hospital.
Rajadurai was alleged to be a member of the Eelam People Democratic Party led by Tamil Minister Douglas Devananda MP.
Reports revel that Rajadurai had received death threats from LTTE in the past.
Recently, according to reports, a letter was sent to him by Ellalan Army, the an auxiliary force of the LTTE and it was published in the Nitharsanam.com, an LTTE web-site operated from Norway. In May this year, Nitharsanam.com published a warning to Rajadurai that he would face dire consequences, without any further warnings, if he continued to ignore the edicts of the LTTE.
Jaffna which is under the control of the Sri Lanka Government and it is feared that Sri Lanka Government has failed to maintain law and order and safeguard the citizens from the ruthless attacks of the Tamil Tigers.
- Asian Tribune -
Date : 2005-10-13
Date : 2005-10-13
“Right now, it is the Tamils who are mainly getting killed by the Tamil Tigers. It is easy for me to say, "Good, go after your bloody Tamils and keep killing your own people.", but I will not. I am saddened by the whole brutal skullduggery and terrorism by the Tamil Tigers, who target the Tamils, their own flesh and blood. That is sick, ” Asoka Weerasinghe from Canada writes.
He underlines in a letter written to “Asian Tribune” that the Jaffna man and woman are now begun to realize that this is not what they bargained for in the Eelam campaign
The Editor
Asian Tribune
Sir:
When Makenthiran tries to classify opposing Tamil terrorists and the armed forces as good guys and bad guys, then he begins to loose it and it becomes a mugs shell game. A wanton war forced by the Tamil Tigers with no rules and little pity is turning the Sri Lankan world, bit by bit, into a free fire-zone.
Makenthiran thinks that " the Tamil Tigers carried out some daring attacks against the army and police and the Sinhalese began to fear and respect them.
The young Tamils are a new breed of angry and fearless youth." No kidding!
Isn't Makenthiran angry at these youth who have started killing his own people, extorted cash and jewellery, kidnapped Tsunami orphaned Tamil children and trained them as cyanide-necklace suicide bombers, and shot and killed Tamils if they do not agree with their demands.
Right now, it is the Tamils who are mainly getting killed by the Tamil Tigers. It is easy for me to say, "Good, go after your bloody Tamils and keep killing your own people.", but I will not. I am saddened by the whole brutal skullduggery and terrorism by the Tamil Tigers, who target the Tamils, their own flesh and blood. That is sick. The Jaffna man and woman are now begun to realize that this is not what they bargained for in the Eelam campaign.
It is a pity that Makenthiran decided to leave Ceylon in 1972, after the first three ethnic riots in which Tamils, according to him got the brunt of it. Who knows, in retro, if he had stayed back he could have been one of the many Tamil millionaires in Colombo, living in harmony with the Sinhalese and owning a house in Wellawatte, a posh suburb in the capital Colombo, where 85 per cent of the land is owned by the Tamils.
The question is, can I as a Sinhalese own one-square-inch of land in the Jaffna peninsula? No way hozey! That is where the Thesvalamai Law kicks in. So for Makenthiran who is sobbing that he as a minority Tamil has been discriminated by the majority Sinhalese and yet, can buy one-square-inch of land anywhere in the island - north to south, and east to west, but I as a Sinhalese is barred to buy even one-square-inch of land in the northern Jaffna peninsula. What is going on? That is a reality check for all your readers, especially the non-Sri Lankans. They can be judge and jury on the Tamil complaints.
The majority Sinhalese have discriminated the minority Tamils he complaints. What nonsense! It is interesting for your reading panel of judges and jurists to figure this one out, and ask the simple question, what the heck are these Tamils weeping about?
It is interesting to note that colonial favoritism towards the Tamils carried on to the post-independence years. Schools in the Jaffna (North) Educational district, which the Tamils claim to be their 'homeland’, were well supported and qualitatively superior in comparison with the situation elsewhere in the island. Even in 1981, 33 years after independence, and two years prior to the 1983 riots, the Jaffna Educational District had 555 Government Schools for a student population of 207,524, whereas the capital Colombo in the west had 251 such schools for 231,690 students. In 1981, the Sri Lankan Tamils enjoyed a literacy rate of 88.3%, compared to 86.5% for the majority Sinhalese. Makenthiran, what the heck are you weeping about? Makenthiran cut it out and wean yourself out of your unconvincing complaints.
The privileged position of the Jaffna Educational District schools was evident from school facilities and amenities such as approved science laboratories. They were available in 41% of Jaffna schools compared to the all island average of 19.6%. With these statistics, the minority Tamils who complain about discrimination by the Sinhalese should hang their heads in shame. One wonders why the heck these Tamils are fighting for. Are they insane? Give me a break Makenthiran. Now you know why I call you Tamils who came to Canada after the 1983 incident as a bunch of 'economic refugees' and not 'convention refugees', when you were indeed the 'privileged minority' and I from the 'wrong majority’.
It is amazing that Makenthiran says that the Dollar and Kent Farm massacres by the Tamil Tigers were tit -for-tat retaliation. Ouch! That hurts!! This is what 28 year old D.H.Somapala, who survived the attack on Dollar Farm in November 30th, 1984, said.
"At about 5.30 a.m. on the morning of Friday 30th November 1984, about 100 terrorists, some of them dressed in army uniforms and others wearing ordinary shorts and longs and shirts and a few of them even wearing sarongs and banians, circled our entire farm from various sides and began firing at us and also throwing bombs at some of the huts in which we were living. A few of us were able to escape by running into the jungle and I was one of those who survived. When inside the jungle I hid myself and tried to see what was happening.
Within a few minutes the terrorists rounded up all the civilians who wee unable to escape and herded them into one circle. Thereupon they threatened them with their sub-machine guns and asked them to lie down and while some of the terrorists held guns at the heads of the civilians who had laid down, other terrorists quickly began to tie the hands and legs of each civilian. Then they started jumping on the bodies on the ground and kicking them with their feet. Some terrorists even urinated on these live bodies on the ground. When all the civilians’ legs and hands were tied, the terrorists made them stay on the ground with their faces downwards, next to each other. Once this was done, at one given signal they kept guns at the head of each of the civilians who lay on the ground with their legs and hands tied and shot them through their heads and necks. When I saw them commence firing I fled and could see nothing more".'privileged minority' and I from the 'wrong majority’ If Makenthiran's unholy reasoning for this brutal killing was a tit-for-tat response by the Tamil Tigers, then don't whine with your arms stretched out to the world seeking pity about the killings of Tamils by the armed forces, as if the Tamils are the victims. The armed forces will shoot in defence and to bring law and order in this unsavory and unnecessary war.
Makenthiran questions why the Sinhalese did not go to Bangladesh or to Buddhist Burma after the 1983 riots. That is simple. The Sinhalese did not believe that they were persecuted or in danger from the minority Tamils, thus wanting to sneak out of the country and land themselves in foreign lands claiming to be refugees like the Tamils. And the only common denominator between the Burmese and the Sinhalese is that both groups are Buddhists compared to the Sri Lankan Tamils and Tamil Nadu Tamils. The Sri Lankan Tamils are immigrants from Tamil Nadu, both groups have a common culture, both speak the same language, eat the same spicy foods, and go down on their knees in front of the same idols Ganesh and Paththini, and the Sri Lankan Tamils consider India as their 'Mother India.' And the only commonality between the Bangladeshis and the Sinhalese from Sri Lanka is that both countries now play Test cricket, and nothing else.
Makenthiran complaints under his breath about the Indian Tamils being sent back to India. Here are the facts. The British planters imported cheap and amenable indentured labor from Southern India to work in coffee and tea plantations. With the emergence of popular politics in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) after the First World War, a controversy developed as to whether these people were bona fide Ceylonese, or whether they were mere birds of passage looking towards India as their motherland.
Before Independence, all residents of Ceylon, India and Pakistan were British subjects. Citizenship of these states after Independence adopted a new status determined by new laws enacted for the purpose.
It was acknowledged that each country had the right and duty to prescribe the qualifications for citizenship after Independence. The Indians in Ceylon had only a limited franchise even under the British rule.
After Independence in 1948, the Ceylon (Citizenship) Act of 1949, and the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act of 1949 were enacted. It was against this scenario that the then Prime Ministers D.S. Senanayake of Ceylon and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru of India met to solve the citizenship problems of these Indian indentured laborers. And during the latter years, India did acknowledge that these Indian indentured laborers were indeed Indian and penned the agreement to have them back and languish in their favored, rightful Motherland - India. There was no discrimination. So what's the complaint?
Makenthiran's complaint that the police and army have very few Tamils is a mischievous observation. If the Tamil are refusing to join the police force, then I will not blame them, as the Tamil Tigers have a habit of bumping them off.
The first killings of Tamil policemen happened in the 70s. Police Constable Karunanidi was executed by the Tamil Tigers at Maviddhapuram on Valentines Day in February 1977. On May 18th 1977 two constables bearing the name Shanmuganathan were shot dead at Innuvil by Tiger terrorists who approached them on bicycles. On April 7th, 1978, Inspector Bastianpillai, and Sub-Inspector Perampalam were gunned down near Murunkan. Do I blame the Tamils not wanting to recruit themselves into the Government Police Force in droves? I understand their predicament.
As I said earlier, Makenthiran's indictment against Sri Lanka has no honest substance to be based on. Forget it Makenthiran. You seem to be intelligent, so don't let emotions get hold of you and reduce yourself to be an irrational and a silly person!. Asoka Weerasinghe
- Asian Tribune -
(A Letter that appeared on www.asiatribune.com)
Decision on Tehelka tapes soon: U.S. Misra
MADURAI: The Central Bureau of Investigation will take up the extradition of the prime suspects in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case and Mumbai serial blasts through Interpol, according to U. S. Misra, its director.
In an interview to The Hindu here on Tuesday, Mr. Misra, who is also the vice-president of Interpol, said: "Extradition is not an exclusive domain of the CBI. Extradition treaty and legal assistance arrangements have to be looked into. The delay lies there."
On the delay in apprehending LTTE chief V. Prabhakaran, his associate Pottu Amman, Dawood Ibrahim and Memon brothers, he said the issue would also be taken up at the executive body meeting of Interpol in February. The United Nations had declared 158 suspects as global terrorists, including Dawood Ibrahim. "Until and unless these criminals are handed over, investigation is not complete. The Special Investigation Team led by the former CBI Director, D.R. Kaarthikeyan, did wonderful work in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case."
Defence deals
The CBI, he said, was examining the Tehelka tapes in the defence deals. "The tapes have been sent for examination to the Andhra Pradesh Forensic Science Laboratory. We will take a decision soon."
On the Kargil war-related complaints, the Defence Ministry had sent the report of the CAG to the agency. While registering four cases, the investigating officials had initiated preliminary enquiry into two deals. "Of the 47 complaints, we have referred some back to the Ministry, recommending departmental action. On the charges in the Denel defence deal, we have completed local verification. A letter rogatory is being sent to South Africa to enable a team's visit for further investigation."
Asked how senior officials against whom cases were registered on charges of corruption during recent raids escaped the surveillance of vigilance officials within their organisations, Mr. Misra said tackling corruption was the primary duty of any head of department.
"Unfortunately many Chief Vigilance Officers (CVOs) are not working properly in most of the public sector undertakings and Government departments. If they function well, corruption will definitely go down. This is because a person can be easily thrown out through disciplinary proceedings than dragging him to the court for 20 long years."
The CVOs/HODs were empowered to initiate departmental action against corrupt officials. "Usually somebody in the rank of Deputy Secretary or Joint Secretary is made in charge of vigilance and there is no appointment of regular senior officials for these posts. The CVOs need more autonomy to carry on with their job independently."
The CBI Director expressed serious concern over the huge pendency of cases in courts. Senior officials in the CBI were made accountable for delay in investigation or filing charge sheets.
"But about the court and trial, it is in a very bad position. Cases are taking a long time. There are so many factors contributing to this delay. It is not the cases of CBI alone. The number of cases pending trial in different courts in the country is mind-boggling."
Volkswagen deal
On the Volkswagen deal, he said there was information that Helmuth Schuster, former Head of Volkswagen (India), was in Germany.
"We will be writing to the German authorities seeking his extradition".
Mr. Misra said there was a shortage of investigation officers.
The Centre was seriously considering a proposal to provide special pay and housing facilities to attract officials on deputation.
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