Thursday, August 04, 2005

Tigers attack SLA at Kokkuthoduvaai

Thirteen Sri Lanka Army (SLA) soldiers were killed and 24 wounded when the Liberation Tigers attacked forward defence lines of the Kokkuthoduvaai camp south of Mullaithivu, in the north-eastern coast, around 3 a.m Thursday. Ten SLA soldiers have been reported 'missing' in the attack, army sources said. Six LTTE members were killed in the fighting, the sources added.

The Tigers simultaneously shelled Janaka Pura Army camp in the near by Manal Aaru (Weli Oya) region, the sources said.

The Liberation Tigers used tanks and mortars in the predawn attacks on the SLA camps at Janakapura and Kokkuthoduwaai, military spokesman Brigadier Sarath Karunaratne said.He admitted two SLA bunkers at Kokkuthoduwaai were in the control of LTTE for about one hour.

Meanwhile the Liberation Tigers attacked the jetties at Gurunagar and Colombagam in Jaffna town, around 3 a.m. Thursday, Police in the northern town said.

A large number of LTTE members participated in the attack, said Jaffna's Senior Superintendent of Police W.Kudahetty. The police recovered the bodies of two LTTE members killed in this fighting, he said.

Further details of the fighting were not known. The Tigers have not yet commented on the fighting.

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Tigers attack Weli Oya FDL -radio

The Voice of Tigers said in its night news broadcast that the Liberation Tigers attacked and destroyed the Forward Defence Lines of the Sri Lanka army between Mankindi Malai and Akkarai Weli in the Weli Oya region in the early hours of Friday morning around 2.30 a.m. The radio said ten bunkers on the FDL were overrun by Tiger troops and that four SLA soldiers were killed.

A Rocket Propelled Grenade Launcher, ammunition and other military items were recovered from the overrun positions, the VOT said.

Mankindi Malai was renamed Janakapura by Maj.Gen. (ret) Janaka Perera, currently Sri Lanka’s high commissioner to Australia, after Tamils living here were forcibly evacuated by SLA troops in 1984.

The Sri Lankan government settled Sinhala civilians in the abandoned Tamil villages of this region (by now officially referred to in Sinhala as Weli Oya, a translation of Manal Aaru-sand river) and set up a string of SLA camps in and around it.

Maj. Gen. (ret) Perera (then a brigadier) was posted for two years in Janakapura as the commander of the SLA’s Special Forces which were then under the army's Independent Birgade.

Mankindi Malai or Janakapura was one of the key army camps here. It was rebuilt after the Liberation Tigers overran and burnt it down in 1993.


Operation Yal Express Derailed - October 1993

The Sri Lankan Army's grandiosely codenamed 'Operation Yal Devi ' (after yesteryears express train to Jaffna) was stopped in its tracks by determined resistance by the Liberation Tigers after four days of heavy fighting in late September/early October.

The Sri Lankan offensive was launched at the crack of dawn on 28 September and was accompanied by indiscriminate bombing of civilian population centres in the Jaffna peninsula. (see back page: report on Eelam Tamil protest before the office of the European Parliament in London.)

The Sri Lanka offensive, which was reportedly on the drawing boards for about three weeks, was launched in the aftermath of the successful attack by the Sea Tigers on the 300 million rupee Sri Lankan DVRO Fast Attack Craft on 29 August and the loss of more than 50 million rupees worth of weapons and ammunition to the LTTE in Janakapura Camp attack on 24 July.

The objective of the offensive as spelt out in the operations order, was to destroy the fleet of boats and the Sea Tiger base in Kilali from which the LTTE moved men and material for its guerilla campaign in the East. In the end, the Sri Lanka Army, unable to hold Kilali, retreated back to its Elephant Pass Base.

It was a case of back to square one for the Sri Lanka army - but with more than a hundred Sinhala soldiers dead, almost two hundred wounded and millions of rupees of weapons and ammunition lost to the LTTE.

The Defence Correspondent of the Sinhala owned Sri Lanka Sunday Times commented:

''Day one (of the offensive), with little or no resistance from the (LTTE) buoyed hopes and fuelled visions of a major victory. So much so, media accounts are glowing. But, just, the second day suffered a major set back. Colonel Sarath Fonseka was advancing with an infantry column from Pooneryn towards Chavakacheri when they faced an unexpected ambush. This was after they had moved four kilometres out of Elephant Pass.

They were attacked in strength. The men who moved on foot protecting the advancing Czechoslovak built Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) were fired upon, many of them at close quarters.. As they dropped dead, the Tigers took on the isolated MBTs. As women LTTE cadres provided fire support, their male colleagues fired Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs).

Two tanks were soon ablaze with the men inside. One more was damaged but was still battle worthy. This single encounter left more than 70 soldiers, all from the same battalion, dead. An equal number including Col. Fonseka were wounded. As the battle hotted up, Tigers also attacked a moving column from the flank...

Besides the two MBTs that were destroyed, security forces lost among others, ten machine guns, four light machine guns, 72 personal weapons, four RPGs, two 16mm mortars, grenade launchers, grenades and a large quantity of ammunition... With the serious debacle on the second day... top brass at the command room were soon rethinking on the original aims... The result was a withdrawal at 6 p.m. on 4 October.

At midnight on the same day, the LTTE resumed activity at Kilali. The next day SLAF reconnaissance flights spotted more than 300 boats. It is now known that the Tigers had removed a large number of boats from the area presumably on the advance knowledge that they would come under attack...

The security forces expedition to Kilali has been at the expense of 111 dead, 187 wounded and seven missing in action. Apart from human casualties, they have lost equipment worth several million rupees. The loss of equipment is costly not only in terms of money but also of the gain to the enemy.''

The Editorial Comment of the Sinhala owned Sri Lanka Sunday Times revealed the concerns of the Sinhala establishment:

''The main question that is being asked by the people is why this operation was launched... When the troops finally reached Kilali on Thursday (30 September) and temporarily sealed the LTTE sea route, the army faced the option of proceeding to Chavakacheri or returning to base at Elephant base because it lacked the men and material to hold captured territory.

Military analysts say that the army command had asked for more brigades from the East to join the force on the thrust to Chavakacheri. But the political decision was that troops could be transferred from the East only if the army could guarantee that the East would continue to be safe for proposed elections in February next year. Due to lack of man power, the army could not give such a guarantee for the East...

Consequently Operation Yal Devi was called off and the troops returned to Elephant Pass. There is information that another factor which led to the derailing of Operation Yal Devi was the presence and possibly some pressure from the European Parliamentary delegation now in Sri Lanka.

While we appreciate their concern for human rights and peace in Sri Lanka, we would like to ask them why West European Governments have joined the United States in playing political games while hundreds are massacred in Bosnia.''


DVRO Debacle and Foreign Aid - September 1993

The Sri Lankan Navy lost a 300 million rupee DVRO fast attack patrol craft in a sea battle with the LTTE off the coast of Point Pedro on August 29. The Liberation Tigers seized the weaponry on the DVRO before it sank.

This follows upon the Sri Lanka army's loss of more than fifty million rupees worth of weapons and ammunition to the LTTE in the Janakapura Camp attack on July 24.

The Israeli built super DVRO fast patrol craft, one of the most efficient vessels in the Sri Lanka Navy's fleet was surrounded by four Sea Tiger boats off the N-E coast near Point Pedro in the Indian Ocean, on Sunday, 29 August 1993 at about 9.30 a.m.

The four Sea Tiger boats were mounted with fifty calibre (five zero) guns. In the gun battle that ensued, one of the Sea Tiger boats, packed with explosives, and with two Black Sea Tigers, Major Puvindran and Captain Manirasan on board, surged ahead and rammed the super Dvro and blew it up. The two Black Sea Tigers died as martyrs in the Tamil struggle for freedom.

It is reported that those who perished with the Dvro were its captain, Lt.Wimalaweera, his 8 member crew and four other officers including Lt.J.G.Punch-ihewa who was the Captain of a sister Dvro craft The weaponry seized by the Liberation Tigers from the DVRO included two 23 mm cannons, one fifty calibre (five zero) gun, personal weapons and ammunition..

The front page of the Tamil tabloid Eela Natham published in Jaffna on the following day, 30 August, carried a photograph of the LTTE leader, Velupillai Pirabaharan inspecting the captured weapons on Sunday afternoon. This was the second Dvro to be sunk by the LTTE. The other was blown up by sea mines last year. This latest sinking comes in the wake of the sinking of two other Sri Lanka inshore Patrol Crafts during the previous week.

The Defence Correspondent of the Sinhala owned Sri Lanka Sunday Times commented on 5 September:

''The past month of the Eelam War II appears to have taken a somewhat serious turn compared to many previous months. This is particularly (sic) in terms of the prohibitively costly losses for the security forces and the correspondingly high gains of weaponry for the (LTTE) ... First it was on the ground at Janakapura Camp on 25 July. An estimated Rs.50 million worth of military hardware and other material were lost... And now the loss of the super DVRO alone is over Rs.300 million not to mention the cannons, fifty calibre guns, personal weapons and the patrol craft...''

The current joke doing the rounds in informed circles is that Sri Lanka needs foreign aid not only to finance its war effort but the resistance of the LTTE as well! The more serious question that is being increasingly asked by certain non governmental organisations is whether foreign aid and arms to Sri Lanka will secure stability in the island.

The DVRO debacle, however, was not without benefit to the growing number of Sinhala business concerns with vested interests in the prolongation of the war.

The Sinhala owned Sri Lanka Sunday Island reported on 5 September:

''The Navy which lost three patrol vessels last month will take delivery of two French built Fast attack Craft (FAC) within the next six weeks. The two vessels built by a private French ship building firm in a joint venture with Colombo Dockyard (Pvt) Ltd will be delivered to the Navy... Colombo Dockyard plans to obtain the technology and build two more FACs and deliver them to the Navy early next year.''

Those Sinhala business interests who feel that they have not had a fair share of the lucrative defence contracts have not hesitated to blow the whistle on those who are on the inside track of the gravy train..

The Sinhala controlled Sri Lanka Sunday Times, commented editorially on 5 September:

''Speaker M.H. Mohamed told a news conference in the Parliamentary complex this week that some bureaucrats, politicians and business men were like vultures thriving on the bodies and blood of the North-East war. These fortune building individuals and vested interests do not want the war to end and will invoke hell-fires to further their devilry... Shady deals and dubious transactions have been plaguing this country .. with AIDS acquired illegally and deposited in Switzerland... ''

Sinhala SLFP Chief Minister of Western Province, Ms. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaranatunga, with an eye on the next General Election was quick to exploit the situation. In a speech reported in the Sinhala controlled Sri Lanka Sunday Times, on 5 September she said:

''Forty percent of foreign aid is used for corrupt and wasteful practices.''

The response of those in power in Sri Lanka to all this was predictable. On the one hand, President D.B.Wijetunge as Commander in Chief, upbraided the top army brass and made it clear that he was not amused. The Lanka Guardian reported on 15 August:

''In a one and a half talking to after the July 25 debacle at Janakapura, President D.B. Wijetunge told the services chiefs that he was not happy with their performance.''

On the other hand Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe sought to pre empt the adverse publicity of any future debacles by turning soothsayer. Speaking to the Foreign Correspondents Association in Colombo on Thursday 2 September he said:

''We can expect another Janakapura, another attack on another navy boat in the next three months.''

At the same time, the government threatened to attack Point Pedro. Brigadier Nalin Angammana used the excuse of the DVRO debacle several miles off the coast of Point Pedro to declare: ''We have told the ICRC that if there are attacks 'in the area', we might have to respond.''

In consequence, the ICRC was compelled to suspend operations at Point Pedro pier. Brigadier Angammana exposed the intentions of the government when he added: ''If the ICRC is not in Point Pedro, government food ships might not want to go there.''

After all, some ten years ago, a Sinhala President had given expression to his perception of the feelings of the Sinhala people: ''Really, if I starve the Tamil people out, the Sinhala people will be happy.''

The implied threat was that unless assurances were given by the LTTE that that there would be no DVRO type attacks, food ships may not reach Jaffna.

The Government also launched a fresh recruitment drive urging Sinhala youth to join the army. In June, the Sri Lanka Parliament passed a Bill approving conscription. The Bill was proposed by the opposition SLFP and adopted by the ruling UNP, demonstrating yet again that though Sinhala political parties may have their differences and conflicts, they do share a common purpose, and that is to crush the Tamil struggle for freedom.

Indeed when they joust with each other to capture power in the Sinhala South, it is to anti Tamil, Siinhala chauvinist sentiment that they always appeal.

Here it is not without interest to note that, when the SLFP moved the conscription Bill two years ago, the Government rejected it. At that time, the Government was wary of the political complexion of the Sinhala youths who may join up.

Now that it has secured the disappearance of around 60,000 Sinhala youth in the South during the period 1989 to 1991 it believes that it can recruit without risk of subversion.

Also, 3 years after the commencement of Eelam War II, the Government has found that thousands have deserted the armed forces. But whether conscription and fresh recruitment drives will stop the desertions is, ofcourse, another matter. And weapons in the hands of deserters may serve to increase instability and the threat of contract killings which has become so much a part of the Sri Lanka political scene.

Yet another Sinhala contender for power, Sinhala Opposition DUNF leader Gamini Dissanayake in his anxiety to exploit the Government's predicament uttered some home truths in the Sinhala controlled Sri Lanka Sunday Times on 5 September :

''The cost of living (in the Sinhala South) has become unbearable for most people. Housing and accommodation is not available to the needy. This is a society bursting at the seams. Our educational policy is a mess. The public service is not functioning. The private sector is rigged and interfered with at every level. Decision making is very slow, if decisions are made at all. Crime and contract killings are rampant.

The privatisation program including that of the plantations has been handled without taking the macro socioeconomic factors into account. It has been adhoc and slipshod. With all this the political structure succeeds in erecting an artificial atmosphere that all is well... I do not think the government has a strategy at this stage to solve these problems. The coming year is election year. What is possible is to make readjustments in the hierarchy of priorities.''

However, foreign aid donors may be increasingly sceptical about assertions that stability in the coming election year will come from so called 'readjustments in the hierarchy of priorities' - Sinhala chauvinism's euphemism for allocating all resources to an all out effort to quell Tamil resistance. They are well aware of the fate of ex President J.R. Jayawardene's grandiloquent order to the Army Commander in June 1979 to quell Tamil resistance in six months!

14 years later Tamil resistance has grown to such proportions that the Sri Lankan Government's writ does not run in the North and with difficulty and intermittently in the East.

The hard political reality is that stability will not come to the island without justice and justice demands that the Sri Lanka government recognises the Tamil struggle for self determination, sit and talk with the leaders of that struggle, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and structure a polity where both the Tamil people and the Sinhala people may freely associate with each other on equal terms.