Thursday, January 04, 2007

SRI LANAKA EXPRESS CHARGES THAT “RANIL WICKRAMASINGHE ASSASINATION” WAS A PLANT BY THE LTTE TO OBTAIN ARMY SECRETS By Walter Jayawardhana

A Los Angeles based newspaper said that the terrorist group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam , was successful in obtaining details of the covert operators of the army with the help of the police, by planting a story on an assassination plot to kill the Sri Lankan Prime Minister by the army.

The Los Angeles based Sri Lanka Express charged that if dots were properly connected in the Athurugiriya affair that had severely compromised Sri Lanka’s military intelligence operations it would most likely show that the LTTE planted the Ranil Wickremesinghe assassination story in the first place, waited for it to take root then reported and editorialized it.

The editorial charged without lifting a finger the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was able to get all the details regarding the covert operation of the army delivered right to its door.

In a signed editorial by its editor Hassina Leelarathna the bi-weekly newspaper said, it was the mischief the LTTE routinely resorted to knowing full well that Sinhalese politicians who placed their personal interests above all else, were easy and willing prey.

In a police raid allegedly instigated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam with the help of the United National Party hierarchy, described by many as the most foolish raid ever conducted in the history of Sri Lanka’s Police, Superintendent of Police, Kulasiri Udugampola, broke into a highly secretive army safe house, arrested six detainees of a very successful deep penetration unit of the army and treated them in the most humiliating way on the charge they were plotting to kill Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. On a frantic search for publicity by the Police raiders the identities of the army unit was also revealed to the media. They were later released by a special order of the Defense Minister, Tilak Marapana, following the vehement protests of the army hierarchy.

The following is the full text of the editorial:

“In the latest development in the Athurigiriya affair that has severely compromised military intelligence operations, police handed over the six detainees they were holding to the military police in Kandy.

“ The six detainees, including a Tamil civilian and a commissioned officer in the army, were all part of a ‘deep penetration unit of the army’ and were involved in intelligence operations.

“The men were arrested January 3 following the highly publicized raid on a house in Athurigiriya where a special police unit led recovered arms and ammunition. The raid was conducted by Kandy Crimes and Operations division, which is handling the ongoing inquiry into the Udathalawinna murders. The unit had been tipped off that one of the suspects in the Udathalawinna, son of former deputy minister Anuruddha Ratwatte was hiding at the location. The detainees included Muslims, Sinhalese, and Tamils. Weapons and military paraphernalia were also hauled away.

“ Despite protests by military officials, the police raiding party not only went ahead with the operation but also came out with the accusation that the house was being used by the military to carry out a plot to assassinate Prime Minister Wickremesinghe. Local newspapers, some of which are owned or managed by relatives and friends of the prime minister, sensationalized the story.

“The Island even went to the extent of sniveling up to the LTTE, headlining the story: “Plot to Assassinate PM and Incriminate LTTE Uncovered.” Sri Lankan news websites immediately flashed the story to their worldwide readers, apparently without any independent verification.

“As The Island reported it: “… Investigators said that they firmly believe the so called covert operations unit was involved in an abortive plot to assassinate UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe during run - up to the December 5 parliamentary elections. A few weeks before the elections, the UNP leader claimed that he was aware of a plot to mount a claymore mine attack on the bus he used on the campaign trail.

“The then UNP Chairman Charitha Ratwatte and the Vice Chairman Daya Palpola wrote to Army Commander Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle claiming men under his command were planning to assassinate the UNP leader. Balagalle promptly denied the allegation. Police said that they have information to suggest that the group arrested on Wednesday was involved in the earlier plot. However, following the UNP led United National Front’s victory next to the parliamentary elections, the group operating under the directions of the Military Intelligence and the Directorate of Military Intelligence [DMI] was apparently making plans to sabotage the ongoing peace process.”

“The so-called army plots to assassinate the UNP leader received publicity in the LTTE organ Tamil Guardian (November 21, 2001). If the dots are properly connected, it will most likely show that the LTTE planted the story in the first place, waited for it to take root, then reported and editorialized it. It is the kind of mischief they routinely resort to, knowing full well that Sinhalese politicians, who place their personal interests above all else, are easy and willing prey.

“The pieces have now been put together. Army Provost Marshal Ivan Dassanayake who headed the inquiry has handed over a report which absolves the detainees of wrongdoing. There is no evidence to link the Athurigiriya home and the operations conducted there to the Udathalawinna (Teldeniya) murders (in which the two sons of former Deputy Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte have been implicated).

“From what we have been able to independently gather from our military sources, the raid was in part an extension of the feuding between two controversial politicos, each trying to outdo the other in their petty turf wars and, in part, the result of some top police officers trying to score brownie points with the new government. Also to blame are the politicians who gave the police a freehand to conduct the raid and publicize the so-called ‘assassination plot,’ improbable though it should have seemed. Lastly, the sycophantic local press must take its share of the blame. Everyone involved, except the military, had their own agendas with no regard for national security. Without lifting a finger, the LTTE was able to get all the details regarding the covert operation delivered right to its door!

“A senior military official told SLE that the damage is irreparable. “It took us many years to put together an operative that could so successfully penetrate enemy intelligence. Needless to say, many innocent lives were saved due to this success.”

“The LTTE, trying to maximize on their role of victim in the new Ranil area, are accusing the DMI unit of killing several senior LTTE cadres including a self-styled colonel who had been a member of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran’ S inner circle. The unit is also accused of making a bid on the life of Thamilchelvam, a prominent LTTE leader.

“Members of the unit have been recalled to Colombo due to the enforcement of the ceasefire beginning December 24. Their future is uncertain. As is the fate of the six intelligence men arrested and held like common criminals in appalling conditions. Will they be given protection by the government now that their cover has been blown sky high?

“Summing up, the military source told SLE: “With the current need to appease the Tigers, I suppose we have to be thankful that the government is not charging the unit with murder or something like that over the accusations [the LTTE is making].”

(http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items02/260102-1.html)

Some thoughts on Millennium safe house by a Military Analyst

The proper military concept of a safe house is a secret operational base within an enemy area or in close proximity there to, and dominated by the enemy. The Millennium City Safe House must be the first safe house ever, in a safe area. In fact as the description itself implies that safe houses are only established in unsafe areas. The description "safe" is in relation to an enemy threat of an imminent nature. It could be said that Athurugiriya was even safer than Colombo. An intelligence cell and a safe house are both secret bases, the former being for purposes of obtaining information and intelligence by secretly meeting informants and the latter for varied secret operations such as sabotage, destructions, assassinations, raids and even espionage etc. The main differences being the location and the concerns of secrecy.

A safe house has to be behind enemy lines or in close proximity there to, and absolute secrecy is a must. According to the statement of the Director Military Intelligence [D.M.I.] Capt. Nilam on being recalled to Colombo was initially attached to the "Forward Intelligence Cell", which was then located at the army camp at Kohuwela. This same intelligence cell and not a "safe house" was shifted to the house belonging to Capt. Nilam's wife, within a housing scheme at Athurugiriya. The reference to this secret intelligence cell as a safe house confuses the issues consequent to the discovery of the storage of high explosive materials and lethal weapons therein.

An issue arises of the storage and the establishment of unauthorised arsenal, however temporary, without due regard for the safety and security of the said stores and the neighbourhood too. According to established Military procedure the minimum requirement was the provision of an armed guard at least as a temporary measure until these high explosive materials were transported to and returned as ordered by the D.M.I. These measures would not have been necessary, if in keeping with the usual army procedure, that arrangements were made to return these explosives without delay on the arrival of Capt. Nilam with these lethal stores.

This should also have been the response particularly in view of the very serious allegation that army had plans to blast the bus with the Prime Minister in it, with a thermobaric rocket; and also the Army Commander's assurance denying the existence of such a plan.

The relocation of this "Forward Intelligence Cell" at Athurugiriya from the army camp at Kohuwela as described above cannot be said to be appropriate as the decision to lease the house belonging to Capt. Nilam's spouse as it would also amount to a conflict of interest.

But, there are important requirements for an intelligence cell. That is the assurance of secrecy, security and convenience to those informants visiting this intelligence cell at the new location at Athurugiriya. In fact such informants must be made aware of the risks and other dangers that they may expose themselves to, which also applies to intelligence officers as well. It is most important that the identities of informants are secret and that even from the other informants too. Such exposure would be only if it is a necessity. These requirements appear to have been meaningless as access to this Millennium Park cell was subject to one's identification by the civilian security staff at the gates of The Millennium Park. Further, the informants would be conspicuous on their ethnicity and social status being mostly Tamil LTTE deserters.

According to the D.M.I. Capt. Nilam was at that point of time under "serious threat" from the L.T.T.E. and therefore had to be under the active surveillance of L.T.T.E. agents. According to Capt. Nilam, his information was that he was to be targeted by a suicide bomber. In this context the move from the Kohuwela army camp to Athurugiriya with Capt. Nilam in charge of this intelligence cell is not only inexplicable, but perhaps even suicidal.

It is said that Capt. Nilam and his men were based at this cell to engage in long-range reconnaissance patrols [L.R.R.Ps], and deep penetration fighting patrols. Such patrols are a special task of well trained infantrymen and sometimes of the commandos. Troops from services and non-combatant units are not deployed on such tasks or roles. The D.M.I. and Captain Nilam are both from non-combatant units.

Fighting patrols engage in offensive operations such as ambushes, raids, destruction or attacks on enemy installations, gun position and emery outposts and even abductions of enemy cadres for purposes of interrogation to obtain intelligence etc. These operations and the planning of such operations are the function and responsibility of the combatant formations on the ground in forward positions. Intelligence officers are attached to such formations to furnish the necessary information for the planning of such operations.

The responsibility and function of the Directorate of Intelligence is to obtain and furnish timely and accurate intelligence to the respective operational formations, which is a very important requirement to ensure properly planned successful operations both offensive and defensive. It is not understood, therefore how a group of simple informants were engaged in deep penetration and long-range reconnaissance patrols.

These patrols require a high degree of infantry skills in addition to mental and physical toughness as they are dangerous and risky. The planning of such deep penetration patrols have to be meticulous and provision has to be made for several contingencies, sometimes even for rescue or even betrayal by accompanying informants on some occasions. These patrols may be over several days and communication with the base would be mostly by code requiring a high degree of communication skills too. It would take quite some time to condition even trained infantrymen for such patrols. These patrols are beyond the scope and functions of The Directorate Of Military Intelligence but are under the authority and responsibility of The Directorate Of Operations And Planning. These patrols are launched from forward positions nearest to the enemy area to be patrolled, and not from alleged "Safe Houses" very many miles away.

Covert Operations are also a very important form of military operations particularly in the context of anti-terrorist action. These operations have to be handled with caution. There is always the risk of infiltration by L. T. T. E. agents etc. It has been reported that once these agents entrusted with explosives for such a mission had straight away taken the entire lot of explosives and handed them over to the L.T.T.E. The L.T.T.E. would have obtained a wealth of information too from this agent. The handling of such "informants" or more appropriately "agents" is a skilled and a dangerous task. There was also the exposure of the training of an informant in the firing of thermobaric rockets at the Panaluwa Range. The bane of our military effort against the L.T.T.E. terrorists over the last twenty years has been the lack of accurate and timely information. This was also a finding by the Court of Inquiry into the debacles at Pooneryn. This was also undoubtedly a factor in the subsequent debacles at Mullaitivu and Elephant Pass. Good timely and accurate intelligence is an all-important factor in military operations against terrorists.

Furthermore, the expenditure on intelligence is secret and also not subject to audit. In addition to the requirements mentioned it is desirable that the Director of Intelligence is an officer with a combatant background and operational experience. It should be so in respect of the other officers too as far as possible. Such officers would be better equipped to assess and evaluate the intelligence in the correct perspectives, and exploit them to the best advantage.

There was an alleged involvement of army personnel in election violence particularly at Udathalawinna, where several civilians have been killed by shooting. The suspects are mostly serving soldiers, and there was some information or perhaps speculation that of one the suspects was hiding in Millennium City hideout, which by then had become an open secret.

What is not understandable is this thermobaric rocket and other explosive materials being still retained in an unauthorised location and readily available for use in spite of the assurance to the UNP hierarchy by the Commander of the Army that there was no such preparation to blast the bus with the prime minister in it. According to the D.M.I., he had ordered that the explosives be removed on the 28th of December 01.

This had not happened, although it should have been a first priority task. The police raid was on the night of 2nd January 02. What did eventually happen should be viewed in the light of the possible dangers such as a fire even accidental, or sabotage or even betrayal similar to the fate of the Police Inspector at the Dehiwela Police Station. In that context Capt. Nilam would need to have been mindful of the threat to him by a suicide bomber as the "cease-fire" had been proclaimed only a couple of weeks ago.

(http://www.southasianmedia.net/index_opinion4.cfm?id=20997)

Army officers in illegal Safe House raid sacked by Ranil Wijayapala

Army Commander Lieutenant General Lionel Balagalle with Defence Ministry approval on Friday stripped the commissioning ranks of two Army officers and ordered the premature retirement of another senior Army officer for their alleged connections with the Athurugiriya Safe House raid.

The Army Commander also ordered Department level disciplinary action against two soldiers for their alleged connections with the Safe House raid, Army sources said yesterday. Defence Secretary Cyril Herath told the Daily News that the Ministry approval was given to Lt. General Balagalle to take disciplinary action against the three officers.

He said President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga in her capacity as the Defence Minister approved this action following the recommendation by the one man Presidential Commission headed by retired Appeal Court Judge D. Jayawickrema to probe the Athurugiriya Safe House raid.

"The disciplinary action is also based on the recommendations by the Army Commander to the President," he added.

Disciplinary action against another set of officials are to be announced in the coming days, sources added.

Major General Ivan Dassanayake, Adjutant General of the Sri Lanka Army was the most senior officer subjected to disciplinary action.

The Army Commander has ordered General Dassanayake, the Provost Marshal of the Army at the time of the Safe House raid, a pre-mature retirement from March 31, 2004. He has been ordered pre-mature retirement on the charges for not informing the Army Commander about the raid.

Major General Dassanayake can remain in the Sri Lanka Army until June 30 this year when his extension expires.

Colonel Parakrama Dissanayake, the Deputy Commandant of the Army Training Centre Diyatalawa and Major Najith Karunaratne, Head of Military Intelligence in Jaffna have been relegated to civilian status from January 30, 2004 after being stripped of their commissioned ranks in the Army.

"All military installations will be out of bounds to them from January 31," Army sources added.

Colonel Dissanayake was the former Commanding Officer of the Military Intelligence Corps and a staff officer at the Directorate of Military Intelligence at the time of the Safe House raid.

The officers have been charged for attempting to obtain the Safe House address.

The raid of the safe house at Millennium City, Athurugiriya on January 2, 2002, had serious repercussions on the Army intelligence units specially those involved in the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol operations in the North-East. Police raided the Army Safe House on January 2, 2002 in the guise of arresting few army deserters for their alleged involvement in the Udathalawinna massacre.

The Presidential Commission ruled in its findings that the raid on the House was a betrayal and absolute treachery on the nation.

In response to "Whether there was any information given by any personnel of the Armed Forces disclosing the existence of a Safe House at Athurugiriya," the Presidential Commission report stated:

"The existence of the Safe House operated by the Sri Lanka Army at No. 844 Millennium City, Athurugiriya is beyond any doubt. Except a retired Lieutenant Colonel, Jayavi Fernando, all other witnesses including the Army Commander and other officers, the Inspector General of Police and the other senior Police Officers who gave evidence as witnesses before this Commission accepted that this was a legally maintained Safe House by the Sri Lanka Army.

Even Jayavi Fernando expressed the view that there was an Army sub-unit at this house and that it was not a safe house.

"There is strong evidence that Col. D. P. Dissanayake, USP psc, made attempts to obtain the address of this Safe House before the 2001 December General Election, and also just a few days before the raid through Major M. B. de S. Jayatilleke, RSP MIC - GSO 1 DMI, and Corp. M.P. Anura Peiris, MPA MIC. The evidence of these officers themselves proves this fact. "Knowing Capt. Nilam very well there was no necessity for Col. D. P. Dissanayake to find out the address and the whereabouts of Nilam through his junior officers. If we wanted he could have directly contacted Capt. Nilam and got whatever information he wanted. Col. Dissanayake's explanation was that he wanted to contact Capt. Nilam to get his assistance in respect of the house Col. Dissanayake was building at Malabe.

"The evidence before this Commission further discloses the fact that Lt. Col. Padmasiri Udugampola, SLCMP, brother of ASP Kulasiri Udugampola, Major General Ivan Dassanayake and Colonel K.H.N.S.S. Dharmaratna, Major A.C.A. de Soysa, SLCMP, Major A.S.P. Podiralahamy, SLCMP, Major K.U. Jayanetti, SLCMP, Major B.M.A.N.S.K. Karunaratne MIC Corps, J.H.A.P. de Silva, JHAT-MIC, Corp. M.P.A. Peiris, JHAT-MIC were all aware of the impending raid and have directly and indirectly assisted Kulasiri Udugampola in raiding this Safe House.

"If these officers had any doubts about the Safe House they should have brought it to the notice of the Army Commander and moved the Military Police to investigate. But these officers, without doing so, have conspired with Kulasiri Udugampola to raid this Safe House for their own personal benefits. Moreover, none of these officers have informed the Army Commander or the Director, DMI, about the raid before the raid."

(http://www.dailynews.lk/2004/01/26/sec01.html)

Athurugiriya "Safe House", – UNP explains

The article by the Defence Correspondent on the assassination of Lt. Col. Nizam Muthaliff of the Intelligence Unit of the Military in last Sunday’s Island contain several factual inaccuracies which need to be corrected in the public interest, states a press release issued by Tissa Attananayake, Deputy General Secretary UNP.

The overall impression this article seeks to portray is that the UNF Government’s operation against the "Safe House" at Athurugiriya which sheltered elements of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) made members of the Intelligence Unit vulnerable to LTTE attack.

The raid on a house at Millennium City", Athurugiriya, was made by the Police on an order issued by the Magistrate Teldeniya in respect of the inquiry relating to the Udathalawinna massacre. The search was made after informing the Commander of the Army, and the Police party was accompanied by an Army officer. The raid revealed the name of one Army officer — Capt. Nilam, 2 Sergeants and 2 Corporals, who belonged to the Military Intelligence. No list of Intelligence Operatives belonging to the Military Intelligence was found in this house at Millennium City, Athurugiriya. Brigadier Kapila Hendawitharana, Director Military Intelligence was present at the Military Police Headquarters, Narahenpita, when the Police party arrived from Athurugiriya.

Capt. Nilam was identified by the LTTE in 2000. He was therefore transferred to Colombo in 2001 and was attached to the Forward Intelligence Cell which operated from a "Safe House" at Battaramulla. This "Safe House" at Battaramulla was exposed and within a few months the Cell was relocated at the Kohuwela Army Camp. A month before the incident, 3 Operatives belonging to Capt. Nilam’s Intelligence Unit were killed in Batticaloa by a suicide bomber while at the "Safe House". Therefore the LTTE was aware of Capt. Nilam’s operations long before the Ceasefire. It is for this reason, that the Ministry of Defence instructed the Army Commander to ensure the safety of the Officers.

Major Muthaliff did not belong to the Military Intelligence at that time. Major Muthaliff belonged to the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) which was part of the Commandos/Special Forces another arm of the Army fighting establishment, and was engaged in operations in the North.

The fact is, that at no stage was the existence of Units engaging in covert operations against the LTTE brought to the notice of either the then Prime Minister or the Minister of Defence who had the official authority and responsibility to Parliament for such an initiative however productive it might have been. The fact again is that these Units covered covert operations unknown to the new government which was engaged in recommencing the peace process. The Army Commander at that time, when the Christmas ceasefire was announced on 24th December 2001, had instructed these Units to call off the covert operations. Details of this order were not given to the then Prime Minister or Defence Minister.

Indeed the informative Editorial titled "Unanswered Question" in the Sunday Island of 5th June 2005, makes the point that,

"there had been a massive failure on the part of the Military establishment of the day, that following the election of a new government, neither the Prime Minister nor the Defence Minister had been briefed of ongoing covert operations".

The Editorial continues that:

"If the government, at its highest levels, was aware of what was going on, the kind of blunders that were committed might arguably have been avoided."

I totally deny the veracity of the story that is incorrectly repeated whenever the Athurugiriya incident is reported, that lists of Intelligence operatives names were passed on to the LTTE. At no stage during the raid of the "Safe House" were any written or digital records of intelligence operatives found. Each Cell/Unit operated independently and was unaware of other Cells/Units operating in other parts. Only the Commander of the Army and the Director Military Intelligence were aware of all of the intelligence and covert operations. Nobody in their right minds would keep such a vital piece of covert operations in what was a ‘civilian’ location outside the Army Headquarters.

Indeed the present Defence Ministry, the Army and the Police Departments should be challenged to let the public know of the investigations made by those institutions into whether, and if so how, the names of the intelligence operatives ended up in the hands of the LTTE, if indeed this was the case.

What is of utmost importance today in the context of what happened to Major Muthaliff on 31st May, is to have the Government explain why in the course of the last 20 months of their administration, i.e. from 4th November 2003 when the Ministry of Defence was taken over by the President, nothing has been done to give protection to the Intelligence officers who have provided such a valuable and decisive service to the country. This is a matter of the gravest importance requiring an explanation from the government of the day.

(http://www.island.lk/2005/06/12/features9.html)

Safe house raid: heads roll as Army Chief cracks the whip

The sequel to the Police raid on the Army Safe House at Athurugiriya two years ago, which brought disastrous consequences to Sri Lanka's national security interests, began to unfurl last Friday.

That morning, Major General Ivan Dassanayake, Adjutant General, walked into the electronically secure office room of the Army Commander in the now shut down Baladaksha Mawatha. There, whilst Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Shantha Kottegoda watched, Army Chief, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle, broke the news.

He told Maj. Gen. Dassanayake he would have to retire from his post on March 31, this year - three months ahead of his scheduled date of retirement. This is upon reaching his mandatory maximum period of three years in the rank on June 30.

However, Maj. Gen. Dassanayake was eligible to appeal for an extension of service until December 16, this year, when he would have reached 55 years. That premature exit from service was being imposed on him for his role in the raid; he was told by Lt. Gen. Balagalle. Maj. Gen. Dassanayake is learnt to have strongly denied complicity and pleaded innocence over allegations made against him.

At the time the Police raided the Safe House run by the Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), Maj. Gen. Dassanayake was the Provost Marshal of the Army. In this capacity the Sri Lanka Corps Military Police (SLCMP) was his responsibility. Since then, he has assumed office as the Army's Adjutant General and Colonel Commandant of the SLCMP. As Adjutant General, he is a Principal Staff Officer and is responsible for the directorates of Personnel Administration, Welfare, Medical Services, Pay and Records, Rehabilitation, Humanitarian Law, Recruiting, Legal and Provost Marshal.

Later that same afternoon, Colonel Parakrama Dissanayake, Deputy Commandant of the Army Training College at Diyatalawa appeared before the Army Chief and his deputy. Also present was Military Secretary, Maj. Gen. K.B. Egodawala.

Lt. Gen. Balagalle told this one time Commanding Officer of the (first) Military Intelligence Corps and Staff Officer at DMI, that his commission as a Colonel in the Sri Lanka Army was being withdrawn. He said he was being dismissed with effect from January 30, this year.

As Col. Dissanayake walked out of the Army Commander's office after learning the bad news, walking in was Major Najith Karunaratne, head of military intelligence in the Jaffna peninsula. He was also told that his commission as a Major in the Sri Lanka Army was being withdrawn and he was expelled from service with effect from January 30, this year.

Col. Dissanayake was summoned to Colombo from Diyatalawa. Security Forces Headquarters, Jaffna, was advised to direct Maj. Karunaratne, who was on leave, to report to Army Headquarters by Friday. These were done on Thursday evening by Military Secretary Maj. Gen. Egodawala.

The disciplinary action against the two would mean that after January 30, they will be forbidden from holding their ranks. In other words they would be reduced to civilian status and will not be entitled to any Army pension. In addition, all military installations would also be out of bounds for the two.

This disciplinary action against the three officers is the Army's main response to the findings of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Safe House raid. They were determined by Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Balagalle upon a directive from President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga as exclusively revealed in The Sunday Times (Situation Report - January 18). She had directed that the commissions of those Army officers who were directly or indirectly involved be withdrawn. She had also directed that other ranks involved be discharged from service.

President Kumaratunga's directive, The Sunday Times learnt, came after her advisers made two separate detailed studies of the report submitted by former Appeal Court Judge, D. Jayawickrema. He was the one man Presidential Commission that probed "into the disclosure of the existence of and the raid on the Safe House operated by the Sri Lanka Army at Athurugiriya."

Lt. Gen. Balagalle is learnt to have forwarded to President Kumaratunga last Monday his own recommendations on how punishment should be meted out to those on whom indictments were made by the Commission. After obtaining her approval to initiate such action, he is learnt to have also sought and obtained a written directive on Friday from Defence Secretary, Cyril Herath to enforce them. The move meant that both the Commander-in-Chief and the Defence Secretary have formally endorsed the action determined by Lt. Gen. Balagalle as Commander of the Army.

Although President Kumaratunga was expected to review the Army Commander's recommendations with her own advisers, before giving instructions for a go ahead, the move did not materialise.

Besides the disciplinary action on the three officers on Friday, another officer, Lt. Col. Padmasiri Udugampola, is to be marched before Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Kottegoda, in the coming week. He is to be warned for refusing to testify before an Army Court of Inquiry that probed matters connected with the raid. He is also to be deprived of any promotions or extensions of service. Two more officers are also to face disciplinary action and their performance kept under observation for a year. Corporal Anura Peiris of the DMI who had attempted to obtain the address of the Safe House is also to be dismissed from service.

The Presidential Commission of Inquiry findings went into nine separate aspects. In response to "Whether there was any information given by any personnel of the Armed Forces disclosing the existence of a Safe House at Athurugiriya," the Commission report said:

"The existence of the Safe House operated by the Sri Lanka Army at No.844 Millennium City, Athurugiriya is beyond any doubt. Except a retired Lieutenant Colonel, Jayavi Fernando, all other witnesses including the Army Commander and other officers, the Inspector General of Police and the other senior Police Officers who gave evidence as witnesses before this Commission accepted that this was a legally maintained Safe House by the Sri Lanka Army. Even Jayavi Fernando expressed the view that there was an Army sub-unit at this house and that it was not a safe house.

"There is strong evidence that Col. D.P. Dissanayake, USP psc, made attempts to obtain the address of this Safe House before the 2001 December General Election, and also just a few days before the raid through Major M.B. de S. Jayatilleke, RSP MIC - GSO 1 DMI, and Corp. M.P. Anura Peiris, MPA MIC. The evidence of these officers themselves proves this fact.

"Knowing Capt. Nilam very well there was no necessity for Col. D.P. Dissanayake to find out the address and the whereabouts of Nilam through his junior officers. If he wanted he could have directly contacted Capt. Nilam and got whatever information he wanted. Col. Dissanayake's explanation was that he wanted to contact Capt. Nilam to get his assistance in respect of the house Col. Dissanayake was building at Malabe.

"The evidence before this Commission further discloses the fact that Lt. Col. Padmasiri Udugampola, SLCMP, brother of ASP Kulasiri Udugampola, Major General Ivan Dassanayake and ColonelK.H.N.S.S. Dharmaratna, Major A.C.A. de Soysa, SLCMP, Major A.S.P. Podiralahamy, SLCMP, Major K.U. Jayanetti, SLCMP, Major B.M.A.N.S.K. Karunaratne MIC Corps, J.H.A.P. de Silva, JHAT-MIC, Corp. M.P.A. Peiris, JHAT-MIC were all aware of the impending raid and have directly and indirectly assisted Kulasiri Udugampola in raiding this Safe House.

"If these officers had any doubts about the Safe House they should have brought it to the notice of the Army Commander and moved the Military Police to investigate. But these officers, without doing so, have conspired with Kulasiri Udugampola to raid this Safe House for their own personal benefits. Moreover, none of these officers have informed the Army Commander or the Director, DMI, about the raid before the raid."

After the Commission ruled that the raid "was a betrayal and absolute treachery to the nation" and concluded that Mr. Kulasiri Udugampola, then SP in charge of Operations in the Kandy Police Division "backed up with political patronage" stalled these covert operations and "betrayed this gallant unit," there was considerable public outrage. This is particularly after state run media, both electronic and print, gave wide publicity to the Commission's findings and recommendations. There was many an interview with the man on the street where private citizens voiced deep concern over how national security interests were compromised and demanded deterrent action.

In this context, the question naturally arises whether the actions ordered by President Kumaratunga, Commander-in-Chief in meting out punishment to those involved have been carried out justly and fairly. The question is being asked not only because there have been many pressure moves to sweep the whole issue under the carpet. In fact, for two long years after the raid, the United National Front Government ignored the entire episode though more than 44 persons - intelligence operatives, informants and the like - have been murdered since the raid on the Safe House - the result of its secret activities becoming public.

Captain Mohamed Nilam, who led Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) operations from the Athurugiriya Safe House together with a team of other Army men have gone to Supreme Court to complain their fundamental rights have been violated. The judgement in this case is pending. It is known that some very influential personalities in the UNF tried to persuade Captain Nilam and party to withdraw their case. They were offered attractive cash rewards and promised employment cum refuge in a country of their choice together with their families. When such persuasion failed, some of these personalities began hurling frivolous accusations at the men and challenged their roles as LRRP operatives.

Since the Presidential Commission of Inquiry has noted that the raid was an act of treachery that harmed Sri Lanka's security interests, the question is raised in the national interest. The Sunday Times learnt that Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Balagalle, had explained to the authorities concerned the reasons why he has personally determined the punishment to be meted out to only some and left out others on whom strictures have been made by the Presidential Commission. He may well be quite right in saying so.

On the other hand, several important questions arise. It was Lt. Gen. Balagalle who was Commander of the Army on January 2, 2002 when the Police raided the Safe House. At the behest of then Minister of Defence, Tilak Marpana, he appointed an Army Court of Inquiry to go into the matter. This Court was constituted by him in consultation with then Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando.

This Court of Inquiry was headed by Maj. Gen. Ivan Dassanayake and comprised Brigadier M.R.W. de Zoysa, Colonel K.A.N.S.K.A. Dharmaratne and Col. J. Pathirana. This inquiry concluded that the Safe House run by the DMI was engaged in legitimate counter terrorist activity. It also determined that all the military equipment found in this Safe House was obtained legitimately and after laid down procedures were followed.

Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe, later studied the findings of this Court of Inquiry. He was satisfied that only legitimate counter terrorist activity was conducted from the Safe House. He therefore directed then Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, to order the Army Commander to appoint another Court of Inquiry. This was mainly to ascertain how the information about the existence of the Safe House leaked thus causing colossal damage to security interests.

This second Court of Inquiry was headed by Maj. Gen. Jayantha Ranaweera and comprised Maj. Gen. Sivali Wanigasekera, Brig. M.R.W. de Zoysa and Col. AW.J.C. de Silva. Here is what this second Court of Inquiry was called upon to go into by Lt. Gen. Balagalle:

a. Whether any member of the Army obtained, or sought to obtain, without authority and did cause a leak of any information relating to the existence of the Intelligence Cell, otherwise referred to as the "Safe House" at Athurugiriya, or any, or all, authorised activity carried out thereat:

b. Whether by obtaining, and or, leaking such information, did any member of the Army, wilfully and or deliberately, exercise spiteful and traitorous motives by:

1. Leaking secret and operationally lethal military information regarding the existence of the Int Cell (or Safe House) and its activities.

2. Whether such acts were calculated to bring into ridicule the Army in general and the DMI in particular.

3. Whether there were any attempts, wilfully or otherwise, to tarnish the reputation of any senior officer or officers.

c. Whether any unauthorised action by any member of the Army has:

1. Affected the nation's National Security Interests.

2. Compromised covert operations which brought great honour and success to the Army's counter terrorist operations.

3. Exposed the identities of members of the Int Cell (or Safe House) at Athurugiriya and consequently endangered their lives.

4. Assisted the enemy by providing inside information of covert operations of the DMI, which the enemy otherwise would not have had access to, and thereby traitorously assisted the enemy to formulate counter measures.

5. Exposed the identities of informants and thus placed their lives at risk.

6. Caused a completely erroneous and wrong image about the Army in the minds of Political Leaders, Security Forces, Police and General Public.

7. Other matters arising from above or incidental thereto.

The second Court of Inquiry findings brought out answers to all the above issues. Based on that, Lt. Gen. Balagalle, gave his own opinion in a four page document forwarded to the Ministry of Defence. In this, he noted that national security was severely affected and declared that the Police raid severely affected future counter terrorist operations of the Army.

In this report, he recommended action against Col. D.P. Dissanayake, Col. P. Udugampola, Major Najith Karunaratne, Major H.B. de S. Jayatithilaka, Maj. K.V. Jayanetti, Corporal Anura Peiris, and Corporal J.H.A.P. de Silva. The only exception to such action was in respect of Maj. Gen. Ivan Dassanayake. However, why such action was was not taken immediately thereafter is not clear. Whether this was because Ministry of Defence approval was not forthcoming is also not clear. However, the Army Commander is fully empowered to act on disciplinary matters without seeking recourse to the Ministry of Defence. That includes findings of Courts of Inquiry appointed by him.

All this was when the subject of defence was in the hands of the UNF. And more than two years went by. Nothing at all was done. It seems ironic that action against the Army officers and men had to await the outcome of a Presidential Commission of Inquiry - a matter initiated by the President Kumaratunga as Commander-in-Chief. Since she had been responsible for ordering this probe, it would have been better if she used her prerogative and directed the course of action to be taken instead of the Army Commander being called upon to report on what such action should be.

The fact that he did so raises more questions than it answers. After all, she knew all the reasons why a Commission of Inquiry had to be appointed to probe the matter. She was in the know of the findings of the two Army Courts of Inquiry that sat earlier.

But it seems hilarious if not ridiculous. Once the Commission's findings are made known, the Army Commander is called upon to recommend courses of action. He makes them and awaits the approval of the President (who is Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence). Thereafter, once approval is given, he seeks and obtains a directive from the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. That is to go ahead with the same action.

This is all the more intriguing because the findings of the two Courts of Inquiry (appointed by the Army Commander himself) legally empowered him to act on them much earlier, more than two long years before. Why was this not done? In that context, calling upon him to recommend measures after the Commission's findings makes matters much worse.

In fact it raises questions on why a Presidential Commission of Inquiry had to be appointed at all to probe the Police raid on the Safe House? What purpose has its recommendations, which were highly publicized, served? Was not the Commission of Inquiry much wider in scope and content than the limited focus of the Army Courts of Inquiry?

Therefore was not the Presidential Commission of Inquiry an exercise in futility? It now amounts to only a sham exercise used to gain political mileage and to point the finger at political opponents. For this purpose millions of tax payer's money has been wasted. The long winding process of the Commission began in August 2002 and ended in November 2003. The Commission heard 69 witnesses. Thousands of pages of evidence was recorded and now lay at the Government Archives.

This unfortunate situation further illustrates the acute lack of any mechanism at the Ministry of Defence or the President's Office to monitor vital matters relating to national security interests. Defence Secretary, Cyril Herath, is inexperienced. It appears that he is still learning through a trial and error process. President Kumaratunga is far too busy with many significant political developments. There is no Minister of Defence and no Deputy. Hence, it is not surprising, that like in this instance, many matters defence and security continue to drift day by day whilst some succeed effortlessly in furthering their own agenda.

Round one of the Athurugiriya episode, one that concerns a vital aspect of Sri Lanka's security appears to have ended in virtual comedy. That is after much fanfare and talk of treachery and betrayal. Now the public wait for round two. That is when Police Chief, Indra de Silva names a team to probe the raid by former SP and now ASP, Kulasiri Udugampola. Would that also mean taking departmental action that has already been recommended? That is after another long winding, time cousuming probe is over. We will soon know !!

(http://www.sundaytimes.lk/040125/columns/sitrep.html)

Army traitors face death penalty

Keheliya urges media to act with responsibility

Military perturbed by radio updates on road checks

The government yesterday urged the media to act with responsibility and avoid divulging information which could threaten national security even as an army Major who is facing a military court martial for alleged treason may face the death penalty.

Already three army officers have been taken to custody for allegedly providing information to the LTTE in return for large sums of money, among them a Major who allegedly assisted the rebels to assassinate Maj .Gen. Parami Kulatunga.

Military spokesman Prasad Samarasingha said of the three army officers detained, two were being investigated by the CID while one was facing a court martial, with the next hearing due on January 8.

“If the officer facing the court martial is found guilty he can be given the maximum punishment – the death penalty - for treason under the army act 133/1. But that is upto the courts,” Brigadier Samarasingha told the media yesterday.

The Brigadier said the military was perturbed with certain Radio stations which often alerted listeners when lightning road search operations were conducted in the city thus giving possible terrorist suspects the opportunity to use alternate routes and avoid being apprehended.

“This may not be intentional but the repercussions might bring massive destruction,” Government Defense spokesman Keheliya Rambukwelle said.

Responding to a question raised by a journalist on the alleged attempt to arrest the Sunday Leader newspaper editor Lasantha Wickramatunga last week, Minister Rambukwelle said the lead story in question could indirectly aid the terrorists.

The report headlined “President to get Rs 400 million luxury bunker” created a stir in the defense circles resulting in an attempt by the CID to arrest Mr. Wickramatunga, a move which ultimately did not materialise.

Minister Rambukwelle said if the report for example was to divulged security sensitive details relating to the weight of the metal plating to be used for such a bunker it would educate the LTTE on the weight of the explosives needed to successfully target the bunker.

“It may not be direct but it may aid terrorism. Ranil Wickremesinghe, Karu Jayasuriya and Tamil leaders like V. Anandasangaree are also under threat, so this is not political. It should come from the heart,” the Minister said.

Referring to yesterday’s Daily Mirror report headlined “2006 worst story for journalists”, Minister Rambukwelle said terrorism played a part in the threats faced by journalists and as such terrorism must be eradicated from the world.

“According to the report 81 journalists were killed world over. In Sri Lanka it should be brought to zero. We are happy about the role played by journalists in Sri Lanka but at the same time journalists should act with responsibility,” the Minister said.

(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2007/01/03/front/2.asp)

A shameful betrayal by J. P. NANAYAKKARA

Our little country has been very unfortunate that from ancient times there had been people who resorted to acts of treachery against the motherland for personal gain.

The most recent of such acts is the Police raid on the Military Intelligence Safe House at Athurugiriya where the LRRP who was engaged in covert operations against the LTTE was based.

How this raid came to pass in given in detail in the report of the Presidential Commissioner of Inquiry, former Judge of the Court of Appeal D. Jayawickrama.

He declared that the Police raid was a "total betrayal and absolute treachery to the nation". The government, Prime Minister and Ministers are found to deserve blame on the incident. As a result of this highly publicised raid on the safe house the LTTE who was hitherto in the dark about its existence began to search and kill those who had connections with the LRRP.

Up to now 44 individuals have been killed and the hunt for others is going on. The government has to take the responsibility for these killings because it is due to political patronage that Kulasiri Udugampola ASP took the law into his own hands and raided the Army Safe House at Athurugiriya even without due permission from his superiors. In view of this position, government has a responsibility to see to the welfare and sustenance of the families whose bread-winners had given their life for the country.

The Defence Ministry was under the Government when the Safe House raid took place but strangely no investigation was launched on this very irregular incident to find out the true facts.

The LRRP team with its leader Captain Nilam were taken into custody by Kulasiri Udugampola ASP who raided the Safe House and took them to Kandy where they had been treated in a humiliating manner.

When they were released from the Police cell on the orders of the then Minister of Defence, Captain Nilam and his men filed a Fundamental Rights petition against the Police in the Supreme Court to the great embarrassment of the Government.

To persuade them to withdraw the F.R. petition they had been offered foreign employment and comfortable life with family all of which were turned down. They now stand vindicated in view of Supreme Court verdict given this day.

After the President took the Defence Ministry under her, action was taken to give effect to the recommendations of the Presidential Commission. The Army high ranking officers proved to have conspired to raid the Safe House are given their just desserts to the acclamation of the public at large.

This is a glaring instance where the government has badly let down its own Army in order to favour the enemy. It is said to have been reported in Strait Times of Singapore that the Parliament of Sri Lanka comprised crooks and criminals. What a shame!

(http://www.dailynews.lk/2004/02/17/letters.html#4a)

Sri Lanka renegade group says kills 30 Tiger rebels

COLOMBO, Dec 30 (Reuters) - A breakaway faction of Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers overran three rebel camps in the east of the island on Saturday, killing at least 30 guerrillas in one of the biggest attacks in recent months, the group said.

About 200 members of the renegade group, which is led by former Tiger eastern commander Karuna Amman, attacked the camps in Toppigala, about 40 km (25 miles) from the town of Batticalao.

"Our intelligence reports said there were top LTTE commanders there, 30 cadres were killed on the spot," said Asad Maulana, a spokesman for the Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, the political wing of the Karuna faction.

Two members of Karuna were wounded in the attack, he said.

There was no immediate comment from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which says the Sri Lankan military is backing the renegade group.

The attack comes at a time when fighting between the LTTE and the military has intensified in the north and the east.

More than 3,000 people have been killed this year in suicide bombings, air and naval raids, and clashes, and international monitors say a 2002 ceasefire now exists only on paper.

(http://mobile.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SP136188.htm)

Sri Lanka warplanes, renegades attack Tigers, 30 die By Sanjeev Miglani

COLOMBO, Dec 30 (Reuters) - Sri Lanka's air force bombed Tamil Tiger rebels in the island's east on Saturday, the military said, hours after a renegade group announced it overran rebel camps and killed at least 30 militants.

The military, stepping up an offensive in the east, said a Tiger artillery gun position was destroyed in an air strike in Vakarai, one of the last major rebel strongholds on the coast.

Another strike was carried out on a Sea Tiger base in the nearby Pudukudiyirippu area, the military said in a statement.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), fighting for a separate homeland for minority Tamils in the north and east, said at least four civilians, three of them from one family, were wounded in the air strike.

Fighting between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan military has intensified in recent weeks. A 2002 truce is now in tatters and thousands have died in violence this year.

Earlier on Saturday, a splinter LTTE group said 200 of its members attacked Tiger camps in the jungles of Toppigala about 40 km (25 miles) from the town of Batticaloa in one of the biggest raids in months.

"Our intelligence reports said there were top LTTE commanders there, 30 cadres were killed on the spot," said Asad Maulana, a spokesman for the Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, the political wing of the Karuna faction.

Karuna Amman, a former Tiger eastern commander, split from the LTTE in early 2004, taking an estimated 6,000 fighters with him. He accused the rebel leadership of discriminating against Tamils in the east -- his traditional stronghold.

The LTTE says the renegade group is backed by the military.

Two members of the Karuna group were wounded in the 90-minute attack, Maulana said. The three camps, including one for women fighters, were destroyed and a large quantity of ammunition including two rocket launchers was found.

Three Tiger rebels were killed in another attack on Saturday in Paththiruppu, about 16 km from Batticaloa, Maulana said. Two members of the Karuna group were killed in the fighting.

REPULSED

The LTTE said the attacks were repulsed and that only four of its cadres were wounded. It said the attack in Toppigala was carried out with the support of the Sri Lankan military firing mortar bombs.

"They came to attack our camps around midnight and tried to infiltrate, but we counter-attacked," LTTE defence spokesman Rasaiya Ilannthirayan told Reuters.

"They dispersed in the jungles along with a SLA (Sri Lankan army) group which was working in the background."

He said the body of one member of the Karuna group was found in the jungle while another was captured alive.

"They had dreamed they would kill our leaders, they had dreamed 30 of our cadres would be killed, but it did not happen," the spokesman said.

Independent verification of the fighting in the remote area is not possible, and the military, the Tigers and the Karuna group are known to exaggerate rival casualties while playing down their own losses.

More than 3,000 people have been killed this year in suicide bombings, clashes and air and naval raids.

Tens of thousands of people have been displaced by the renewed conflict, including many who were made homeless by the tsunami that battered the eastern coast in 2004. (Additional reporting by Ranga Sirilal)

(http://mobile.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SP24910.htm)

Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate Athurugiriya Safe House raid by Deepal Warnakulasuriya

The Government last week countered the damning Presidential Commission report on the Athurugiriya Millennium City Safe House details with a statement that a Parliamentary Select Committee would be appointed to investigate the same incident. The Select Committee will be appointed next month through a resolution passed in Parliament and will comprise no more than 12 members, Cabinet Spokesman G. L. Pieris revealed last week.

A team of police directed by ASP Udugampola raided the Army safe house at No. 844, Kaduwela road, Athurugiriya on January 02, 2002 without a court order to search the place. The safe house was used by Army intelligence personnel (Directorate of Military Intelligence) for covert action to infiltrate LTTE cadres and eliminate some of the LTTE leadership.

However, the police team subsequent to the raid, revealed the media that a number of weapons, explosives, and other military equipment which were in the house, claiming them to be illegal and unsafe.

They also had later confessed that they raided the place with a tip off of an assassination attempt on former Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe.

The Presidential Commission report revealed last week deemed the raid on the safe house by ASP Kulasiri Udugampola and several others as illegal.

The one member Commission chaired by retired Supreme Court judge D. Jayawickreme in his report had said that the ASP had rejected the statement of the Army Commander about the safe house functioning under his approval and had proceeded on the legal course of action. Therefore, the Commission Report said that 'The action taken by ASP Udugampola in the manner he did in taking into custody several Army personnel was illegal, immoral and in violation of all the rules and regulations of the police'.

The Commission had also said that "the Government, the Prime Minister and the ministers concerned, the then Inspector General of Police L. Kodituwakku, his successor T. E. Anandarajah and all other senior officers should be held responsible for the illegal act of ASP Udugampola".

The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) team, housed at the Kohuwala Army Camp and was relocated to Athurugiriya in December 2001. When the safe House was raided the LRRP team led by Captain Nilam had conducted a number of Deep Penetration operations in the North and had accounted for nine LTTE high rankers including Mano and Ganesh. They have also killed another 10 regional level leaders.

The Commission to probe into the incident was appointed in August 16, 2002 by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. However, the requested equipment had been provided the Commission in September.

A government lawyer had been released in October after several requests and enough police officers had not been provided by the government till March this year.

Subsequent to the exposure of the safe house in Athurugiriya, a pistol gang was created by the LTTE to hunt down and kill Army informants. Allegations were made that, exposing the activities carried out from the safe house, would have also exposed covert intelligence operations and operators enabling the LTTE to identify the informants.

Several informants were killed in Batticaloa, Trincomalee and even at Dehiwala, Pepiliyana and Mount Lavinia. One informant, Pulendrarasa was killed on January 03 in Batticaloa and Vidayakaran and Nimalan were killed in Batticaloa on January 16 and 21 respectively by the LTTE pistol gang. Raghupathi Kadiragamnathan and Devarasa Lingasamai were killed in Colombo in April.

The Presidential Commission Report also said that the arbitrary action of the police had jeopardized the security of the State and neutralised the Military strategy. It also said that since, the raid more than 23 informants and civilians had been killed by the LTTE and a number of persons had been seriously injured.

(http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2003/12/21/new18.html)

Who is HE? We owe HIM

Your alarm goes off; you hit the snooze and sleep for another 10 minutes
He stays up for days on end

You take a warm shower to help you wake up
He goes days or weeks without running water

You complain of a "headache", and call in sick
He gets shot at as others are hit, and keeps moving forward

You put on your anti war/don't support the troops shirt, and go meet up with
your friends
He still fights for your right to wear that shirt

You talk trash about your "buddies" that aren't with you
He knows he may not see some of his buddies again

You walk down the beach, staring at all the pretty girls
He walks the streets, searching for insurgents and terrorists

You complain about how hot it is
He wears his heavy gear, not daring to take off his helmet to wipe his brow

You go out to lunch, and complain because the restaurant got your order
wrong
He doesn't get to eat today

Your wife/mother/maid makes your bed and washes your clothes
He wears the same things for weeks, but makes sure his weapons are clean

You go to the mall and get your hair redone
He doesn't have time to brush his teeth today

You're angry because your class ran 5 minutes over
He's told he will be held over an extra 2 months

You call your girlfriend and set a date for tonight
He waits for the mail to see if there is a letter from home

You hug and kiss your girlfriend, like you do everyday
He holds his letter close and smells his love's perfume

You roll your eyes as a baby cries
He gets a letter with pictures of his new child, and wonders if they'll ever
meet

You criticize your government, and say that war never solves anything...
He sees the innocent tortured and killed by their own people and remembers
why he is fighting

You hear the jokes about the war, and make fun of men like him
He hears the gunfire, bombs and screams of the wounded - and of the
innocents who have no one to stand up for them

You see only what the media wants you to see
He sees the broken bodies lying around him

You stay at home and watch TV
He takes whatever time he is given to call, write home, sleep, and eat

You crawl into your soft bed, with down pillows, and get comfortable
He crawls under a tank for shade and a 5 minute nap, only to be awakened by
gunfire

You sit there and judge him, saying the world is probably a worse place
because of men like him
If only there were more men like him!

WHO is HE?

If you support him, then please re-send this to everyone you know...
Perhaps people will change their attitude and behavior to support HIS
worthy cause... HE is sacrificing his today for our future Sri Lanka!!!


In dedication of the true Valiant Sri Lankan Men and Women in the Army,
Navy, and Air Force!

Karuna says kills 35 Tiger rebels at Thoppigala

Karuna faction of Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers overran three LTTE camps in the east Thoppigala, on Saturday, killing at least 35 LTTE members in one of the biggest attacks in recent months, the Karuna group said.

About 200 members of the renegade group, which is led by former Tiger eastern commander Karuna Amman, attacked the camps in Toppigala, about 40 km (25 miles) from the town of Batticalao.

"Our intelligence reports said there were top LTTE commanders there, 30 cadres were killed on the spot and captured 17 RPGs, 70 weapons," said Asad Maulana, a spokesperson for the Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, the political wing of the Karuna faction. Two members of Karuna were wounded in the attack, he said.

There was no immediate comment from the LTTE, which says the Sri Lankan military is backing the renegade group.

The attack comes at a time when fighting between the LTTE and the military has intensified in the north and the east.

(http://www.lankaenews.com/English/news.php?id=3552)

LTTE Posses 3 Single Engine Helicopters

The government defense spokesperson minister Keheliya Rambukwella warns, of a possible air strike on the Parliament or the Presidents house, based on the information received by the security forces about 3 single engine helicopters said to be in the possession of the LTTE.

He was answering a question raised by a journalist whether there were plans of arresting the Editor of the Sunday Leader Lasantha Wickremetunga on charges of writing about a bunker, said to be built for the President.

When the minister categorically stated that Lasantha Wickremetunga was not arrested, the journalist requisitioned as to whether there were any plans of doing so. "There are many plans but they cannot be disclosed now", the Minister also said that the paper had mentioned about a luxurious bunker that is being built for the President, with details of the materials used, by which any such attacker could strength it.

He cautioned journalists about writing such reports adding that the lives of Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, Deputy Leader of the UNP Karu Jayasuriya and Ananda Sangaree are also faced with threats.

"We should decide whether we are going to live in a country without leaders" Rambukwella said.

86 journalists were assassinated during 2006 globally, including 2 in Sri Lanka, the minister said measures should be taken to stop such assassinations.

( http://www.lankaenews.com/English/news.php?id=3562)

Commanding officer of the Charles Anthony squad "Veeramani" killed

Commanding officer of the LTTE's Charles Anthony squad, which has been named after LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakaran's son, has been killed in a Karuna faction attack.

Veeramani had been reportedly traveling in a double cab in the LTTE controlled Thoppigala area when it caught a claymore bomb set up by the Karuna faction.

A spokesperson from the Karuna faction confirmed that Veeramani was killed by a claymore set up by their organization on Sunday (31).

However, the LTTE denies the attack and claims that Veeramani was killed in a road mishap.

(http://www.lankaenews.com/English/news.php?id=3557)

Karuna loyalists crush LTTE camps in Baron's Cap

The LTTE's breakaway Karuna faction loyalists claimed today (Saturday the 30th of December) that they have overran three LTTE camps located in Thoppigala (Baron's cap) jungle.

Many local and international news agencies quoting Mr. Asad Maulana, a spokesman for the Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, the political wing of the Karuna faction have reported that at least 30 LTTE cadres were killed and over 25 others were injured in these attacks.

According to Reuter's news reports, "About 200 members of the renegade group, which is led by former Tiger eastern commander Karuna Amman, attacked the camps in the jungles of Toppigala about 40 km (25 miles) from the town of Batticaloa. Two members of Karuna's group were wounded in the attack. The three camps, including one for women fighters, were destroyed and a large quantity of ammunition including two rocket launchers was found"

The aim of the attack was to liberate the eastern Tamils form the clutches of the LTTE, the TMVP spokesperson reported to have said.

However, pro LTTE websites responded to Karuna's claim that the LTTE has successfully repulsed the attack. According to those reports the LTTE have killed one Karuna loyalist, captured another alive and suffered only four casualties.

The defence sources in the East also said that they have received reliable information from civilian sources that such clash had occurred in the aforesaid area. However, the sources were unable to provide any further details on the indent since the clash had occurred far beyond the security personnel forward defence lines.

Karuna Amman, spilt form the LTTE terrorists in early 2004, taking a stance that the Tamil's struggle for equal rights to be separated form brutal terrorism. He accused the LTTE's leadership for inflicting the greatest destruction on the Tamil community in gratifying his personal lust for power during decade old separatist war.

(http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20061230_06)

Rebels Have Their Backs to the Wall

January 3, 2007: The LTTE is trying to protect its military assets (artillery, supplies, headquarters) by placing them in residential neighborhoods, and daring the government to attack, The air force bombers and army artillery often, but not always, attack anyway, and civilians get killed. The LTTE makes as much propaganda out of this as they can, but the LTTE cannot win hiding behind civilians. In the east, in the town of Vakarai, the LTTE is believed to be forcing up to 8,000 civilians to stick around and serve as human shields. The LTTE is also resorting more to forcing Tamil teenagers to join, and serve as fighters or support personnel. More of these kids are getting away and surrendering to police or army troops.

January 2, 2007: The LTTE is depending more on terrorist attacks, because the army has pinned down LTTE infantry units around towns like Vakarai and Trincomalee. The army wants to avoid taking a lot of casualties, so no major attacks are contemplated. The LTTE used to be able to make large, bloody attacks, but it has suffered a big decline in morale of late, and does not believe such attacks would work now.

Over the last four months, three army officers have been accused to selling the LTTE information, for money. One of these officers, a major, is being prosecuted. Apparently an LTTE spy network has been broken up.

January 1, 2007: The government is buying $100-200 million in weapons and ammo from Pakistan in the next 18 months.

December 31, 2006: In the east, LTTE dissidents (the Karuna) group are now attacking LTTE camps. The Karuna rebels are moderates, willing to accept more autonomy, while the mainline LTTE want independence. There are at least several thousand Karuna gumen in the east. The main Karuna strength is in the east, and they are believed cooperating with the army. The air force is bombing LTTE targets around the eastern town of Vakarai.

December 30, 2006: The increased violence is expected to slow economic growth. Projections for 7 percent growth in 2007, have now been trimmed back to six percent, or less.

December 29, 2006: Vakarai, the last LTTE stronghold on the east coast, is about to fall. The place is almost surrounded by army troops, and navy gunboats make escape, or reinforcement, by sea difficult.

(http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/srilank/articles/20070103.aspx)

Defeat in the East

December 28, 2006: In the east, the government has reduced LTTE control to a 22 kilometers stretch of coastline, and is closing in on the port of Trincomalee. Some 30,000 civilians (mostly Tamils) have fled the fighting, which consists largely of mortar and artillery attacks, plus air raids by the air force, and lots of skirmishing by infantry. The LTTE, because of poor troop morale, and superior government firepower, have fallen back, rather than make a stand. In addition, the LTTE has to worry about a dissident faction within its ranks (the "Karuna Group") in the east, which complicates operations and hurts morale. It appears that the LTTE will lose control of the east, although there may be some tough fighting as the hard core LTTE fighters make a last stand. However, most of the senior leaders in the east have already gone off to join the larger LTTE forces in northern Sri Lanka. Thus deprived of leadership, the hard core LTTE fighters may just hide their weapons and blend in with the civilian population. So far this year, there have been at least 10,000 casualties, including about 3,500 dead. Fighting intensified later in the year, and daily casualties now range from a few dozen to several hundred.

December 27, 2006: Sri Lanka has purchased a lot of its bombs and artillery shells from Pakistan. But the quality control of that stuff is low, and about a third of the shells and bombs fail to explode because of defective fuzes. This is not surprising, as the Pakistanis built their munitions industry with Chinese help. The Chinese, in turn, learned their weapons manufacturing from the Soviets, who traditionally produced stuff with a 30-40 percent failure rate.

December 26, 2006: In the north, there is constant skirmishing along the front lines, and some guerilla attacks by individual LTTE fighters, or small groups of them. There is some artillery fire, and occasional air raids.

December 25, 2006: Germany has suspended its aid to Tsunami victims in Sri Lanka because of the fighting in the area where the Tsunami hit two years ago, and killed 30,000 people. Germany has been providing about $200 million a year to the aid effort. But government and LTTE officials have been stealing much of the aid, and the renewed fighting was the last straw. There had been a ceasefire since 2002, but peace negotiations broke down over the issue of establishing a separate Tamil state for the 2.5 million Tamils.

December 23, 2006: About fifteen kilometers off the northern coast, the crew of a Jordanian ship was rescued, by the LTTE, at gunpoint. The ship was having engine trouble, and radioed that it was under attack by pirates. The ship had dropped anchor in order to make repairs. A boatload of LTTE gunmen came aboard, forced the crew to up anchor, forced the crew off, then looted the ship (taking anything light enough to carry, like electronics). After two days of protests by the Jordanian government, the LTTE released the crew. The ship, meanwhile, drifted toward the shore and ran aground. The ship was carrying 14,000 tons of rice from India to South Africa. The LTTE insisted they had done a good deed, and refused to return all the looted equipment.

December 22, 2006: The LTTE is suffering a cash shortage because of its increasingly negative image in the foreign media, and with the governments of nations with large Tamil migrant populations. This has hurt fund raising and, oddly enough, the recruiting of troops. That's because the practice of forcing high school students to job the LTTE combat forces, is now under constant scrutiny by the foreign media. To avoid more bad press, the LTTE has had to either refrain from "recruiting", or release kids it already has. This, in turn, brings kids out of the jungle with stories of threats, getting military haircuts and beginning combat training. Parents of kidnapped children are finding foreign journalists to tell their story to, and the LTTE can't afford to manhandle the foreign journalists too much either.

(http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/srilank/articles/20061228.aspx)