Tuesday, November 02, 2004

Indo-Lanka defence agreement finalized by Harischandra Gunaratna

The proposed Indo-Lanka Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) has been finalised. The controversial agreement will be signed when President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga visits New Delhi early shortly.

This was revealed by the Indian Army Chief General N.C.Vij when he paid a courtesy call on the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Naval Chief of Sri Lanka Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri at the Navy headquarters. He is here on a four day official visit and is scheduled to visit Mannar and Vavuniya during his stay.

It was only two months ago that Indian Naval Chief Arun Prakash, who was here on an official visit, expressed concern about the build up of the LTTE bases in the east of Sri Lanka during a tour of Trincomalee.

He stressed the importance of this agreement for both countries and said it would be more beneficial for Sri Lanka.

Gen Vij, explaining the crucial Defence Cooperation Agreement, said Sri Lanka would be immensely benefited by way of training and the country’s defence will be a key issue that would be looked into under this agreement.

He also said where regional cooperation was concerned similar agreements would be signed by India with other countries in the region and greater emphasis would be laid on the security of the region. Already the ground work had been laid for such bilateral agreements, he added.

He assured that there would be greater cooperation between the countries in the region and said that the signing of the much awaited Defence Pact was a great victory for both countries.

Last week the "Voice of Tigers" quoted LTTE’s political advisor Anton Balasingham as saying that the proposed DCA would tilt the balance between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the LTTE and further strain the fragile peace process.

Answering questions, the Indian Army Chief said discussions were being held with regard to patrolling of the territorial waters between Sri Lanka and India and the Indian Coast Guard and the Indian Navy was cooperating with the Sri Lanka Navy.

Chief of Defence Staff and Navy Commander Admiral Daya Sandagiri said no decision had been arrived yet on the problem of the Indian fishermen poaching in Sri Lankan waters, but authorities from the two countries were discussing the matter.

Sandagiri said ties with India would be further strengthened with the signing of the DCA.

Asked about the position of the proposed ‘Sethu Samudram’ project, he said it was a threat to Sri Lanka’s National Security and many of the natural marine resources would be destroyed if India goes ahead with the project. However he said he had submitted a four page report to the Foreign Ministry.

He appreciated India’s assistance in providing training to the Sri Lankan armed forces and said 90 percent of the country’s military personnel had been trained with the assistance provided by India over the years.

SLMC asks LTTE to shed its intransigence By Zacki Jabbar

The SLMC on Monday called on the LTTE to shed its intransigence and participate in peace talks despite the apparent contradictions within the government.

SLMC leader Rauff Hakeem told journalists that internal contradictions within the government could be the cause for the LTTE’s reluctance in engaging in peace talks but it should nevertherless get to the negotiating table.

Hakeem emphasised that the Muslims should be represented by a separate delegation at government `F1 LTTE peace talks.

"The Muslims who have been caught in the middle of the North-East conflict are the ones who have suffered the most and therefore it is necessary that a separate Muslim delegation should be included in the talks".

Hakeem said that he had expressed his concern to the Special Japanese peace envoy Yasushi Akashi about the internecine warfare in the North-East.

Asked about the Kattankudy incident where two Muslim sects had clashed, Hakeem said that Muslims at large had been affected by the actions of a few.

"The majority of Sri Lankan Muslims belong to the Sunni sect but I think it has to be resolved through dialogue. Frustrations have apparently boiled over, but it is certainly not Islamic fundamentalism as some sections of the media might like to project it. Sri Lankan Muslims have always resolved issues through dialogue and not violence", he added.

SLMC quits NACPR, accuses CBK of "buying over" defectors by Zacki Jabbar

The Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), on Monday pulled out of the National Advisory Committee on Peace and Reconciliation (NACPR), alleging that President Chandrika Kumaratunga was destabilising the SLMC by "buying over three of its parliamentarians who have agreed to vote for a Constituent Assembly".

The SLMC on Friday said it would participate in the NACPR, but decided to suspend participation on eve of the first meeting on Monday on being informed that Kumaratunga had got the three defectors to function as an alternate group in the NACPR .

Leader of the SLMC Rauff Hakeem, addressing a well attended news conference at ‘Darussalam’, the partys headquarters in Vauxhall Lane, said they were suspending participation because Kumaratunga was trying to humiliate the SLMC by promoting various structured groups against it.

He said that the three defectors Abdul Majeed, Ameer Ali and Rishard Baduideen had also given their written consent to vote for a Constituent Assembly which would enable Kumaratunga to circumvent the law and change the constitution.

Hakeem, launching what he said was an attack on Kumaratunga’s actions, said they were willing to take her on and would stage mass protests in the North and East of the country to expose her and traitorous actions of the three defectors whose only concern was self glorification.

"We will not allow the President to circumvent the law with a view to reducing minority representation in parliament so that her hold on power could be prolonged".

Hakeem described the three defectors as "traitors", who had let down the Muslim community.

Asked if his leadership was the cause for defections, Hakeem said that it could not be, because all the defectors had been attracted by portfolios dangled at them by Kumaratunga.

"We are a democratic party and issues can be thrashed out within the party. The three Parliamentarians would be asked to show cause for their actions. If they really care about the Muslims, then they would not resort to such traitorous actions. If they want to talk unity then then they should return after relinquishing their positions. It is only then that we could believe they are principled politicians".

Hakeem said that regardless of the defections the SLMC will grow in strength as successive elections results have shown.

"Our vote base has continued to increase despite the so called defections.The people recognise the SLMC and will continue to vote for it", he added.

India’s credibility rests on Lankan peace: Historian by by PK Balachanddran

The credibility of India's notion or ambition of being the regional power will depend critically on the success or failure of its bid to bring peace and stability to Sri Lanka without directly intervening in the ethnic conflict there, says the Indian historian, Avtar Singh Bhasin.

After the political and military debacles of the 1980s, when it directly and brazenly intervened in Sri Lanka, only to retreat in ignominy, India sulked and chose to recede into the background.

But given its size and strategic imperatives, and the possibility of hostile powers gaining a foothold in the island, India could not, for very long, be indifferent to the goings on in the troubled island, just 30 kms away from its southern shores.

India has, therefore, chosen a rather peculiar policy of influencing the events in the island to suit its ideological and geopolitical needs without being a direct participant in the ethnic-imbroglio there.

"If India, without being interventionist, succeeds in stabilising the Sri Lankan situation, she would establish her credibility in the region," says Bhasin in his latest book: "India in Sri Lanka - between the Lion and the Tigers," (Colombo, Vijitha Yapa, pages 353, October 2004).

Bhasin, who has several publications on India`EDs relations with its neighbours, was in the historical division of the Indian ministry of external affairs for three decades, and had been a Senior Fellow at the Indian Council for Historical Research in New Delhi.

According to him, one of the critical differences between the past and the present is the absence of Tamil ethno-nationalism in Tamil Nadu now. Ethno-nationalism in Tamil Nadu was the main trigger for direct intervention in Sri Lanka in the 1980s - a policy which proved to be an unmitigated disaster.

"New Delhi is no longer burdened with the baggage of Tamil ethno-nationalism. Tamil public opinion in India, except for some stray voices, would be indulgent to denying any space to the LTTE in Sri Lanka," Bhasin claims.

And this has been so since the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE in May 1991. Even the DMK, which went out of the way to support the LTTE in its confrontation with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) between 1988 and 1990, backed out. Bhasin quotes the DMK chief, M Karunanidhi, as telling anti-LTTE Sri Lankan Tamil leader Douglas Devananda on May 2, 1996: "We have had enough of the LTTE and we are now fed up with them."

The author's line is that the field is now clear for India to pursue a policy of promoting peace and stability in Sri Lanka which would be conducive to India's political, economic and strategic interests, untrammeled by the shrill demands of ethnocentric forces whether in Tamil Nadu or in Sri Lanka.

Holistic approach

But India is not oblivious to the need for a just solution of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, which will meet the aspirations of all the communities in the island. India knows that this is the bedrock of peace and stability not only in Sri Lanka, but in India and the region as well.

Bhasin considers the joint communique issued in October 2003, at the end of the visit of the then Sri Lankan prime minister Ranil Wickremesinghe to New Delhi, as being the bedrock of India's policy on Sri Lanka.

In that communique, India made it clear that it supported a "negotiated settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society within the framework of a united Sri Lanka and consistent with democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights."

India also said that any "interim arrangement" for the administration of the Tamil-speaking North Eastern Province (NEP), the area which the LTTE claims, should be "an integral part of the final settlement and should be in the framework of the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka."

India went on to make it clear that it expected the LTTE's response to the Wickremesinghe government`EDs July 2003 proposal for an interim administrative set up in the North Eastern Province to be "reasonable and comprehensive."

Bhasin points out that while India has been addressing all the parties to the dispute, the LTTE is a special target. The point to be noted is that while New Delhi has made up with the Sri Lankan state, overlooking the very bitter experiences of the past, it has been reluctant to patch up with the LTTE. Memories of September-October 1987 when the LTTE took on the IPKF; of 1988-90 when the LTTE joined hands with the anti-India Preamdasa-led Sri Lankan government to oust India; and of 1991 when the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi on Indian soil, seem to be indelibly etched in New Delhi's mind.

India has been warning LTTE that it does not expect it to cross the threshold whereby the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka is compromised. India has explicitly said that it has an "abiding interest" in the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka.

India and ISGA

Bhasin thinks that the LTTE`EDs proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) for the North-Eastern Province will not be acceptable to India because it does not come within the parameters set by it.

As he puts it: "India cannot look benignly to an emergence of an ISGA-type administration in close proximity to Tamil Nadu and controlled by an organisation wedded to terrorism. Its control over the waters where the Indian fishermen operate on a daily basis would be most unpalatable."

"The recent arrest of some Indian fishermen by the LTTE Sea Tigers brought home to India the possibility of such a situation emerging routinely. A state within a state that ISGA would be, and given its lack of accountability to international law and community, it is the last thing that India would wish in her neighbourhood," Bhasin says.

The LTTE’s proposal for an ISGA has "defied all canons of federalism," he feels. It has denied any role to the Sri Lankan government with regard to important matters like international agreements, natural resources, police and judicial administration, auditing of accounts, finance, taxation and land administration. The ISGA will have "plenary powers" outside the jurisdiction of the Sri Lankan constitution, he notes.

"The ISGA, instead of creating an interactive society would unbind whatever links there were between the Tamils and other communities in the region," Bhasin says.

According to him the LTTE's proposal belies "hopes raised as a result of the agreement arrived at in December 2002 at Oslo, when the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE pledged to explore a federal solution within a united Sri Lanka acceptable to all communities."

Prabhakaran and LTTE

The Indian commentator and analyst has very sharp views on dictatorially-run organisations, which may be reflecting the Indian establishment's stand. For such organisations, Bhasin says, sharing power is not just a political concession, but blasphemous.

"It (sharing power) represents total defeat `F1 the loss of a lifetime`EDs accumulation of power as well as the complete deflation of what is often a megalomaniacal sense of pride and self importance."

"The LTTE has been in that unfortunate state since its inception, where the word of Prabhakaran had been the consecrated gospel. Those who dared to differ were not thrown out but simply wiped out," he says.

There is little chance of any change coming about in the decision making process in the LTTE so long as Prabhakaran heads the organisation. And there is no chance of his being replaced in his lifetime," he concludes.

Bhasin hints that an ISGA-like set up under the full control of the LTTE could well impact on Tamil Nadu. Rajiv Gandhi, he said, understood the implications of the existence of a LTTE-controlled area under Prabhakaran for south of India.

In his address to the All India Congress Committee in July 1990, Rajiv Gandhi had said that if the LTTE had succeeded in its separatist agenda in 1987-90, separatist tendencies in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu could have sprung up.

"Rajiv Gandhi wished to drive home the point that the IPKF's fight in Sri Lanka was for the unity of India," Bhasin says.

Colombo-Delhi rapprochement

The LTTE's proposal for an ISGA brought the Sri Lankan government closer to India than perhaps ever before. As Bhasin puts it: "Colombo too is quite conscious that the emergence of an ISGA-type administration would be anathema to India and to that extent it would be advantageous to take India on board since the interest of both converged."

The Wickremesinghe Government's 2003 proposal for a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) was taken up in the second half of 2004 by the new United Peoples' Freedom Alliance (UPFA) regime led by President Chandrika Kumaratunga.

However in March 2004, even prior to the coming of the UPFA to power, India had removed Sri Lanka from the negative list in regard to the supply military equipment.

The DCA, the final draft of which is now being considered by the political leaderships in the two countries, will formalise existing cooperation and enable cooperation in the future.

Bhasin says that even as early as April 2000, when India had chosen not to offer military aid to Sri Lanka to beat back the LTTE then knocking at the doors of Jaffna, it did give Colombo a credit of US$ 100 million "leaving vague the areas for which it could be utilised."

The hint is that it could be used to purchase urgently needed military equipment. Giving his own views on the DCA, Bhasin says: "Since India cannot be present at the negotiating table, the agreement if signed, would be a significant message to the LTTE to behave. India needs to do every bit to make sure that Colombo gains all the confidence it needs to deal with the Tigers, whose morale and self-esteem is somewhat shaken by the developments in the East."

By "developments in the East", the author means the revolt of the Batticaloa LTTE commander Col Karuna in March-April this year, which triggered a Northern Tamil-Eastern Tamil divide, which is continuing to plague the LTTE.

The DCA is also expected to see that the strategic vacuum in Sri Lanka is not filled by forces inimical to India, Bhasin says. In this context he notes: "The appointment of a former Chief of Pakistan intelligence, Col. Bashir Wali, as High Commissioner in Colombo, has already raised the hackles of the Indian security establishment. Pakistan's every move in India's neighbourhood is well calculated and meaningful. Wali’s appointment could not be dismissed lightly as innocuous."

Consensus on India

Bhasin points out that the two main political formations in Sri Lanka, the United Peoples' Freedom Alliance (UPFA) led by Chandrika Kumaratunga, and the United National Front (UNF) led by Ranil Wickremesinghe, may not see eye to eye on the ethnic issue and the LTTE, but both want India to play an "active" role in the peace process.

Both want close ties with India. Both are keen on keeping India's strategic interests in view. Both want to keep India informed at every step. Interestingly both appreciate India’s reasons for not wanting to be involved directly. Realising that the political space was closed (because of bitter experiences in the recent past), India decided to look at economic cooperation and investment as means of making its presence felt in Sri Lanka. And this, according to Bhasin, took place quite early in the 1990s (perhaps with the coming into power of the more pragmatic Narasimha Rao regime).

A Joint Commission was set up in July 1991. In March 1995, President Kumaratunga addressed the chambers of commerce and industry in New Delhi. In 1997 came the agreement on promotion and protection of investments. To cap it all, there was the Free Trade Agreement in 1998. There is a move towards a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). The Wickremesinghe government started giving Indians visas on arrival unilaterally. India adopted an open skies policy following his October 2003 visit to New Delhi. Bhasin describes as a development of "far reaching importance" Wickremesinghe's suggestion of integrating Sri Lanka's economy with that of South India.

(Hindustan Times)

Abandoned LTTE camp found

The Naval troops over the week end found an abandoned LTTE camp at Palampata in the Trincomalee District.

Navy HQ said that LTTE cadres responsible for collecting kappam from people engaged in illicit tree felling in the area operated from this camp

Tigers snub Akashi peace bid, demand speedy Japanese aid

The LTTE on Monday dismissed the new government blueprint for peace without even seeing it, dashing hopes that stalled peace talks will resume soon, a Reuters report filed from Kilinochchi said.

The report added: "Even as visiting Japanese peace envoy Yasushi Akashi voiced optimism both sides would soon return to talks, Tiger political wing leader S.P. Thamilselvan said the rebels would settle for nothing less than interim self-rule in the war-torn north and east.

"We shall not accept any alternative proposals, neither will our people accept any alternative proposals discarding the interim self-governing authority," Thamilselvan told reporters after talks with Akashi in the rebels’ northern stronghold of Kilinochchi.

"Mr. Akashi did not bring any realistic or productive message from the government. The present climate does not facilitate a permanent solution, because the government is making different statements every day."

Thamilselvan was speaking hours after returning home from a month-long tour of Europe, from Oslo to Dublin, to seek funding and support for the rebels."

At the same time AFP quoted S. P. Thamilselvan as saying on an LTTE website that the guerrillas wanted Japan to hasten aid delivery.

"Mr. Akashi agreed with the Tamil concern on an unattained peace dividend in a situation of no-war but no-peace and assured them that he will interact with the donor community in devising ways and means of humanitarian delivery without waiting for a final resolution which is time-consuming." the website said.

Tokyo Oslo vs LTTE JVP

From the explicit statements contained in the Oslo Declaration, the Oslo Communique and the Tokyo Declaration it was evident that there was clear aggeement between the Government and LTTE to explore a federal solution as the basis of a political solution for the ethnic conlfict, UNP MP Prof. G. L. Peiris said.

In a statement issued to media by the UNP. "The basic structure of the solution had been identified, and the details were to be worked out in the discussions which were to follow. For the first time, therefore, a framework had emerged for the pursuit of a just and viable political solution as an alternative to war."

Full text of the statement :

The framework for a political settlement of the North East conflict is contained in three documents - the Oslo Declaration, the Oslo Communique and the Tokyo Declaration.

1. The Oslo Declaration in support of the Peace Process in Sri Lanka. This Conference was held in Oslo on 25th November 2002. Representatives from the Asia-Pacific region, North America and Europe participated at this Conference together with the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE.

The Declaration states: "A lasting peace must be built upon renunciation of violence and respect for the principles of human rights, democracy, rule of law, and recognition of the rights of minorities, and must address the needs of all communities all over Sri Lanka, in order to combat poverty and foster ethnic harmony."

2. The Oslo Communique - This is a statement by the Royal Norwegian Government issued in Oslo on 5th December 2002, at the end of the third session of Peace Talks between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE.

Paragraph 3 states: "Responding to a proposal by the leadership of the LTTE, the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principles of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. The parties acknowledged that the solution has to be acceptable to all communities."

3. The Tokyo Declaration on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka issued on 10th June 2003, where 51 countries and 22 international organisations participated. This included the Government of Sri Lanka.

The Declaration among others stated the following:

i "The Conference commends both parties for their commitment to a lasting and negotiated peace based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka." (Paragraph 9).

ii "The international community remains committed to supporting humanitarian relief and human rights protection, and takes the opportunity to encourage the parties to reach agreement on an innovative administrative structure for the reconstruction and development of the North and East." (Paragraph 13).

iii "The Conference also urges the parties to move expeditiously to a lasting and equitable political settlement". (Paragraph 16).

iv "Participation of a Muslim delegation as agreed in the declaration of the fourth session of peace talks in Thailand. (Paragraph 18 (c)).

- "Effective inclusion of gender equity and equality in the peace building..." (Paragraph 18(g)).

v "Agreement by the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE on a phased, balanced, and verifiable de-escalation, de-militarization, and normalisation process at an appropriate time in the context of arriving at a political settlement." (Paragraph 19 (j)).

It is evident from the explicit statements contained in these documents that there was, indeed, clear agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE to explore a federal solution as the basis of a political resolution of the ethnic conflict. This is the effect of the Oslo Communique issued by the Royal Norwegian Government on 5th December 2002 and signed by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Norway as well as by the leaders of the two delegations.

The basic structure of the solution had been identified, and the details were to be worked out in the discussions which were to follow. For the first time, therefore, a framework had emerged for the pursuit of a just and viable political solution as an alternative to war.

The public is well aware that the JVP is attempting to raise a non-issue as a means of distracting attention from burning issues relating to the cost of living, which is the central problem in the country today.

Akashi briefs Dhanapala on talks with LTTE

The Japanese peace envoy Yashushi Akashi on Monday called on the Secretary General of the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) Jayantha Dhanapala to discuss the current situation of the peace process.

"Dhanapala was briefed on Akashi’s meeting with the LTTE political wing leader S. P. Thamilselvan and undertook to convey this the the President," SCOPP said.

Lankan and Tamilnadu Muslims by Anti-humbug

My recent articles on the origins of Sri Lankan Muslims engaged howls from expected quarters in the past few days. I suggested that the claim of a small number of Muslims here they came from Arabia and elsewhere is not consistent with history because almost all of them have South India origins. The Island (7/9/04) carries and article (Page 3) that puts the question to rest through the scholarly pronouncements of visiting academics from India - namely Prof Farazeen Sulthana, S. Sheik Dawood and Abdur Rahman - who are all in unison as to where our Muslims came from. Not denying this historical reality former Minister for Muslim Affairs AHM Azwer states, quite interestingly "it is politically, and in other ways, advantageous to have a separate identity as Muslims here". So, we are now faced with a situation while historical facts being what they are, it is sometimes "politically and in other ways advantageous" to be otherwise.

SLMC leader Rauf Hakeem in the same report say "conditions" in Tamilnadu and Sri Lanka are different. In other words, whatever the historical reality is one must also play by the present "conditions". I am informed way back in the early 1970’s Dr. Badi-udin-Mahmud, who was a Minister in Mrs. Bandaranaikes UF government - took the incredible position that the language of the Sri Lankan Muslims was not Tamil but Sinhalese and added the colour of their flag is not green but black. There was a howl of protests then from other Muslim leaders here - all then with the UNP.

However Dr. Mahmud changed positions thereafter. In Madras after the 1983 events in Sri Lanka and Tamilnadu came from the same stock and therefore will have to take care of each other. "After all" he said, "we are due to his own perceptions then of "advantages" and "right conditions." O tempore! O mores!

LTTE has breached MoU more than 2,000 times by Bhikku C. Mahinda

Prabhakaran will not attack so long as he thinks that he can get his ISGA proposals accepted through the peace process. He will get in peace what he could not get through war.

He will also not attack so long as the Karuna faction continues to trouble him.

Once he knows that his ISGA proposals will not be accepted and the threat from Karuna’s faction is eliminated he will attack.

No notice will be given but some justification can be given for the attack. Hitler justified his invasion of Poland by saying that the Poles had attacked him first. He staged a mock attack for the purpose. In any case, the LTTE has breached the MoU more than 2,000 times according to news reports to him, it will be just another breach.

He will attack us because he thinks that he can win. Ever since the MoU was signed, he has made feverish preparations to boost his military strength and capability. "Coming events cast their shadows before." War-like noises can even now be heard from the LTTE camp.

Prabhakaran like Hitler will never be satisfied. If he is granted ISGA, he will target the hill-country next in the pretext that they are Tamil speaking people and are being oppressed as Hitler targeted the portion of Czechoslovakia that contained German speaking people the rest is history.

SLN claim of destroying LTTE camp, a fabrication- Elilan [TamilNet, November 02, 2004 11:16 GMT]

"The SLN has fabricated the story of destroying a LTTE camp in Palampoddaru area along Trincomalee-Kandy road to justify its false claim that LTTE had constructed several new camps in Trincomalee," Mr. Elilan, LTTE Trincomalee district Political Head tod TamilNet, reacting to media reports Monday that Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) had destroyed a Liberation Tigers camp.

" There is no truth in the SLN's claim. Because the LTTE at no stage had old or new camps in the particular place which is located close to army and navy camps," said Mr.Elilan.

The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission did not inform the LTTE about the SLN claim that it had located a LTTE camp in Palampoddaru area," Mr.Elilan said.

The SLN in its report said the LTTE camp was destroyed by government troops in the presence of SLMM monitors.

Mr.Elilan Tuesday met with the acting head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) in Trincomalee regarding the claim of SLN destroying LTTE camp in the presence of SLMM monitors.

SLMM monitors in Trincomalee are reported to have maintained silence when Mr.Elilan pointed out that LTTE had no camps in the particular area before and after ceasefire agreement.