Sunday, May 27, 2007

Tamil Tigers strike Sri Lanka capital, naval base

Tamil Tiger rebels blew up an army bus in Sri Lanka's capital Thursday, killing at least one soldier, just hours after the guerrillas said they had stormed a naval base and killed 35 sailors.

The escalation in violence came days after the Tigers, who have been fighting for a separate state since 1972, vowed they would never return to peace talks unless the government halted a military campaign against them.

Initial investigations suggested that a Tiger suicide bomber on a rigged motorcycle had rammed into the army bus, but a police spokesman said the bomb could have been detonated by remote control.

"We are now looking at the possibility that the motorcycle was placed by the side of the road and detonated as the bus passed," the spokesman said from the scene of the blast, just outside the capital's sea port.

National Hospital spokeswoman Pushpa Soysa said the army driver of the bus died from his injuries and another soldier was in a critical condition. Four soldiers and three civilians were brought in for treatment.

The attack came just hours after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) staged a pre-dawn raid on a strategic naval base at Delft, an islet off the northern Jaffna peninsula.

"During a search operation, we found 35 bodies of Sri Lankan sailors and weapons," Tiger spokesman Rasiah Ilanthiriyan told AFP by telephone from the rebel-held Wanni region.

Four rebels were killed in the operation, he said, adding the Tigers had captured two anti-aircraft guns, two machine guns, one rocket-propelled grenade launcher and eight automatic assault rifles.

Sri Lanka's defence ministry, however, said in a statement that the attack was resisted and that 18 rebels were killed for the loss of four sailors.

"Intercepted LTTE communications revealed that 18 Sea Tiger cadres, including four leaders, had been killed and another large number injured," the ministry said.

Each side is known to discount casualty figures claimed by the other. There is no independent verification because foreign truce monitors have little or no access to combat areas.

The Tigers meanwhile accused the military of setting off a mine attack inside rebel-held territory Thursday and killed a civilian woman and her brother.

"An internally displaced woman and her brother were killed on the spot by a Sri Lanka army Deep Penetration Unit (DPU)-triggered Claymore mine targeting their motorbike," an LTTE statement said.

Further north, local officials said a curfew had been imposed in Delft, which has a small population of fishermen.

In another attack, the Tigers killed three constables from the police homeguard unit in the northern district of Vavuniya early Thursday, the defence ministry said.

It said troops had also killed two Tiger rebels in a separate confrontation in the east of the island late Wednesday.

Fighting has intensified across the island in recent days, and on Wednesday the International Committee of the Red Cross said it had pulled its staff away from northern frontlines dividing government and rebel forces.

Sri Lankan troops and Tamil rebels have been locked in combat following the breakdown of a 2002 Norwegian-arranged truce.

Nearly 5,000 people have died in the past 18 months, and the 35-year-long separatist conflict has claimed 60,000 lives.

The Tigers' political wing on Sunday said a return to peace talks was out of the question if government attacks continued.

Tit-for-tat attacks have left the February 2002 truce in tatters, and both sides are apparently convinced there is a military solution to the conflict.

(http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=177890)

Will new war be in the east?

With tensions between the Sri Lanka military and the Liberation Tigers on the rise, Tamil Guardian staff writers examine popular thinking in the Tamil areas with regards to a renewed conflict.

DESPITE the signing of the tsunami aid distribution mechanism between the Liberation Tigers and the Sri Lankan government other developments have once again raised the prospect of a resumption of the armed conflict on the island. The adamant stance by the ultra-right Sinhala nationalists that there should be no agreement with the Liberation Tigers on even tsunami-related aid has only served to solidify Tamil doubts about whether a Sinhalese-led government will be willing - or able - to give the Tamil people political space.

In particular, Tamil skepticism goes thus: "the LTTE has gone from asking for independence to considering a federal solution, to asking for a five year interim administration, to demanding a one year agreement for distributing aid, and even this is being vehemently opposed. What chance then of a lasting political solution being agreed?"

Meanwhile tensions simmer over the provocative building of religious icons on what used to be shared communal spaces. The construction of Buddha statues in bus depots and at crossroads in areas in the east (Trincomalee being the prime example) and some parts of the north (most recently Vavuniya) have stirred acrimony in those areas and inflamed ethnic sentiments across the island.

But it is the continuing 'shadow war' that is corroding the peace platform the quickest. Using the paramilitaries as cover, the Sri Lanka military continues to target members and supporters of the Liberation Tigers. Recent deaths in the east and Colombo suggest that both protagonists have stepped up their military activities, with targeted killings becoming the norm rather than the exception.

Under these circumstances, the prospect of a recommencement of a full on military conflict seems closer than at any time over the past three years.

The Tamil publication Eelanatham argued recently, "the veil of peace that had occupied the minds of people for the past few years in the name of ceasefire, talks and interim administrations is slowly lifting as the conditions for war starts to take over." Reflecting growing Tamil disillusionment, it bluntly added: "whatever it may be, it is certain that the Sri Lanka armed forces have decided to resume the war. What demands thought now is how they are going to prosecute this war against the Tamils."

Thus, amid the pessimism, -speculation about the shape that war will take and the areas it will focus on has already begun.

One theory gaining increasing credence is that if the war commences in the near future, the main theatre will be in the east, rather than the north. Sri Lanka military strategists consider control of the east as critical to winning the war against the Tigers as the separation of the north and east cuts fundamentally through the concept of a Tamil homeland, destroying one of the pillars of the Tamil struggle. In other words, 'No Eelam without the east.' It has also long been felt amongst Sri Lankan leaders and commanders that while Jaffna and Vanni are considered to be the head of the 'Tamil terrorist problem,' its heart lies in the east.

The Thimpu principles, which enshrine the soul of Tamil aspirations, argue that "any meaningful solution to the Tamil national question must be based on the … cardinal principles [of recognition of the Tamils as a nation, recognition of the existence of an identified homeland, recognition of the right of self-determination of the Tamil nations and recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils]." The Tamil homeland, fundamental to the Tamil nation, is the contiguous territory of the north and east of Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka military strategists therefore feel that if they are successful in capturing and dominating the east entirely, this would fundamentally shatter the unified territorial claim of the Tamils and weaken their position at any future negotiating table, if not undermining their aspirations to nationhood entirely.

An examination of the Sri Lanka military's strategic efforts over the past twenty years reveals the importance it gives to bringing the east under its control and separating it from the north.

The massive effort to colonise the Manal Aru (now renamed Weli Oya) region and the establishment of several military complexes in the area are both an ideological effort to dismember the Tamil homeland, but to position an insurmountable obstacle to its reunification.

Apart from the ideological compulsion to focus on the east, there are also practical considerations, not least with the military feeling that there are some specific advantages to it in the east that are not available in the north.

Firstly, with the Tamil armed struggle emerging in Jaffna in the eighties the epicenter of the conflict being the northern peninsula, before it shifted to the Vanni in the late nineties. The LTTE therefore does not have in the east the well-developed military infrastructure it has built in the Vanni.

Furthermore, whilst the Sri Lankan military controls much of the Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai coasts, and has abandoned large tracts of the interior, particularly in Batticaloa, to the Tigers, the Army feels the LTTE will not be able to resist a major push into these areas.

On the other hand, the Army itself does not have the troop numbers and firepower to sustain (i.e. invade and hold) the large tracts of LTTE controlled territory.

This, in turn, has spurred the Army's development of deep penetration' units capable of waging guerrilla style campaign against the LTTE in its controlled areas.

In keeping with 'traditional' counter-insurgency CI) models, military analysts argue that the Sri Lanka's Sinhala-dominated Army and police (which serves in a CI role in the east) will be more successful in combating the Liberation Tigers in the east if they have a path into the Tamil community. The long-standing presence of anti-LTTE Tamil paramilitaries in the eastern theatre has become a key tool in this strategy.

The unwillingness of the Sri Lankan military to disarm and disband paramilitaries, in defiance of the requirements of Ceasefire Agreement and calls by international donors, has to be viewed in this context. Indeed, according to reports in the Tamil press, the reverse is currently underway, with the Army's Military Intelligence stepping up its efforts to strengthen and unify the disparate paramilitary elements, including cadres of the Karuna Group and Eelam Peoples' Democratic Party (EPDP) into a coherent force.

An incident in Vavuniya on June 11, when an Army intelligence officer was killed and another injured in an attack on the Kurumankadu EPDP camp is one of many recent indications of the strengthening links between the military and the paramilitaries. Press reports suggest that the camp had initially belonged to another paramilitary organization and had converted to an EPDP site only a few weeks before the attack.

Similarly, another camp attacked by the LTTE in April was revealed as a base shared by cadres of the Karuna Group and the India based ENDLF. Such collaboration among paramilitary cadres are indicative of decisive moves to unify strategy and coordination of local tactics, if not a precursor to the physical merging of these organisations.

Meanwhile, the Special Task Force (STF), the paramilitary wing of the Sri Lanka Police has also been strengthened with its commandos undertaking new training in jungle warfare.

Press reports earlier this month said that STF units had completed trained in advanced jungle warfare' in the jungles of Pottuvil in the latter half of May.

The Commandant of the STF, Deputy Inspector General of Police Nimal Lewke was quoted as saying: "the particular exercise involved small teams where they had to survive in the jungles for 14 days with minimum food and water and under hard conditions," mirroring tactics developed by the Army's Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) unit.

In the event of a new war, Sri Lankan military is expected to deploy small, paramilitary led units inside LTTE territory to target the movement's leadership and field commanders, a strategy which it feels was vindicated in the closing stages of the last period of conflict, especially by the killing of Colonel Shankar in September 2001 and the narrow escapes of Colonel Karuna and other senior leaders. In the past year, exploiting Karuna's defection to the Army, and citing 'internal infighting' with the LTTE as a cover, Sri Lanka's military intelligence has stepped up the activities of the paramilitaries and its own operatives.

The results, the Tamil press says, can be seen in the deaths of a number of LTTE cadres and prominent Tamils, including the massacre of the head of the LTTE's political wing in Batticaloa-Amparai, E. Kousalyan, and his team in February and the abduction and murder in Colombo of wellknown Tamil columnist Dharameratnam Sivaram.

The volatile east, with its hazy frontlines, the sprawling expanses contested by both sides, and the remoteness from the capital Colombo provides an ideal theatre for the shadow war. Paramilitary-related violence is increasingly taking place in the Trincomalee region north of Batticaloa-Amparai as well.

But there are other developments indicative of manoeuvres ahead of a possible renewed war.

Citing the tension created by the provocative erection of a Buddha statue in the centre of Trincomalee town, the Sri Lanka Army has moved a whole new brigade of troops into the area, rolling back the withdrawals it had been compelled to effect under the terms of the ceasefire agreements. Troops are digging into the town, building new bunkers and camps. Under cover of providing security in the wake of or ahead of anticipated communal violence, Sri Lankan troops have expanded their positions, building new checkpoints and camps. The Navy has established more coastal camps in several areas, including the Jaffna peninsula.

In the wake of Karuna's rebellion and amid the escalating shadow war with, the LTTE too has been rebuilding its military and civil administrations in the east.

The Sunday Times defense correspondent Iqbal Athas warned Sri Lanka's establishment in his column in mid May that the LTTE is 'regaining' the east. Citing various incidents in early May, Athas quoted 'intelligence sources' as saying that whilst on the road to successfully gaining control of the East in the shadow war, the Tigers have already made plans to put into place their own administrative machinery.

The appointing to the east of two of the LTTE's most combat-experienced commanders, Colonel Sornam (to Trincomalee) and Colonel Banu (Batticaloa- Amparai) are indicative of the movement's increasing focus on the east, as is the redeployment of battle-hardened fighting units and stepped up recruitment new ones.

Reports in the Tamil press indicate that the LTTE is also expanding its deep penetration operations. Existing commando units being expanded, while other specialist forces, trained in new weapons, are being raised they say.

Despite both sides' emphasis on preparing on deep penetration operations, considerable efforts are being put into strengthening conventional capabilities also. Tamil press reports have claimed the LTTE has expanded its artillery corps acquiring 130mm howitzers.

The Army has doubled its artillery firepower and tripled the size of its battle tank force since signing the truce in February 2002.

The Navy has also expanded to double its size to 20,000 officers and sailors and is planning major new acquisitions.

The Air Force has doubled its fleet of attack helicopters and also doubled numbers.

Curiously, the massive build up is not deterring Tamil belligerence, as reflected in the Tamil press for example, as much it might appear it ought to.

The Eelanathan, for example, was notably sanguine: one can see that the strength of the Tamils' side has always increased during the lulls between each stage Eelam War. Although the Sri Lanka armed forces themselves increased their manpower, technology and tactical ability during each one these lulls, they could not overcome the strength and ability of the Tamils' forces. In fact, each time they have been defeated by the tactics and the better use of armaments by the Tamil forces."

Yet any war in the east likely to be hard fought and bloody. Unlike the north, where the Sinhala soldiers are contained in camps surrounded by an 'alien' Tamil populace, with little motivation to fight, in the east many soldiers have their homes and families nearby, amongst the patchwork quilt ethnic enclaves resulting from decades of state-sponsored colonisation, conflict related displacement and ethnic cleansing by all communities.

Conversely, unlike the north, where the Army was able to fall back on scorched earth strategies and indiscriminate use of heavy weapons to contain the LTTE's onslaught, it will have close with any Tiger advance.

Again reflecting widely held sentiments in the Tamil areas, the Eelanatham newspaper argued: "although the government of Sri Lanka and its armed forces may see the coming war as another stage to weaken the Tamils and bring them to their knees we can firmly expect the Tamils' armed forces will fight it as the ultimate war."

(http://69.94.47.118/tools/print.php?id=3370)

LTTE Intelligence Wing leader for Trincomalee, "Barathi" Killed

TRINCOMALEE: LTTE Intelligence Wing leader for Trincomalee, "Barathi" was killed yesterday along with two other rebels in the Illupukulam jungles North of Trincomalee.

Navy personnel had confronted a group of terrorists including "Barathi" in the jungles close to Nilaweli last morning and in the ensuing gun battle three terrorists were killed as the other LTTEers fled the area carrying the injured, Navy sources said. No casualties were reported from the Navy.

A haul of weapons including a 01-micro pistol, magazines, ammunition, a binocular, clothes, phones, ID cards and other utensils were recovered.

Security forces are conducting search operations in the area.

18 STF personnel wounded in Kudumpimalai


Map of Korallaipattu South DS Division

Eighteen elite commandos of Sri Lankan Special Task Force (STF) were wounded Saturday when the STF launched an offensive into Liberation Tigers controlled Kudumpimalai (Thoppigala) jungles, 36 km northwest of Batticaloa city, Sri Lankan police officials in Batticaloa said. The STF has been intensifying offensive operations into the LTTE controlled areas in Kudumpimalai jungles in recent weeks.

11 STF personnel wounded in LTTE mortar and artillery attack were rushed to Ampaarai hospital and a further 7 were admitted at Mahoya. LTTE is yet to release details on the clashes in Kudumpimalai.

(http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=22284)

DPU Claymore attack kills 2 civilians in Vavuniya

An Internally Displaced woman and her brother were killed on the spot Thursday morning when a Sri Lanka Army Deep Penetration Unit (DPU) triggered a Claymore mine targeting their motorbike near Kugnchukku'lam in Vavuniyaa (Vavu:niyaa) - Mannaar (Ma:n:naar) border, according to Tamileelam Police officials in Liberation Tigers controlled Vavu:niyaa North.

The two members of the same family were on their way from Naddangka'ndal to Kungnchukku'lam to check their vacated house.

The victims were identified as Nathiya Selvarajah, 22, and her 24-year-old brother, Kobi Selvarajah.

The Claymore attack took place at 9:30 a.m.

(http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=22262)

Saturday, May 26, 2007

Cops and killers: Who reigns?

Can the Police Department cope with the ever increasing crime rate in the country? This is the question that is foremost on everyone’s mind as the country witnessed some of the most gruesome multiple killings in recent history and incidents of extortion and abductions have become almost routine.

Last year recorded the highest number of grave crimes committed within a period of 30 years and the trend appears to be continuing, though official statistics are not available.

In the first nine months of last year, more than 45,000 grave crimes were recorded including abductions and kidnappings, rape, incest, homicide and drug related offences. Of these 15,840 were disposed of, investigations of 24,160 cases are pending while another 6,453 are before courts.

The highest crime trend had been reported from Nugegoda, Kelaniya, Gampaha, Colombo, Ratnapura, Mt. Lavinia and Anuradhapura.

A senior Deputy Inspector General of Police who spoke on grounds of anonymity said one of the main reasons for the increase in crime was that the police force lacked expertise and facilities to fight crime.

“We need to provide better training to the police force in local police stations. The criminals can get away because they have learnt the techniques and methods used by the local police stations to fight crime. The only way the police can reduce crime is by upgrading themselves,” he said.

Last Saturday’s brutal killings in Delgoda where five members of the same family were hacked to death and another was injured was followed by an incident on Thursday where a homeguard went berserk killing four and injuring another. These incidents came less than three weeks after two incidents where a father and two sons were killed over a land dispute in Akuressa and the other where a father killed his wife and three children and dumped their bodies in a paddy field in Ganemulla.

Last Saturday’s Delgoda massacre was seen as one of the goriest crimes in recent years where two little children and three other members of one family were hacked to death while they were asleep in their home in a small village off Meegahawatta.

The motive behind this multiple murder is believed to be a land dispute between two relatives. The dispute had been taken up in the Gampaha District court and its judgment was expected soon.

Police investigations have revealed that the land in question was a five acre plot of land in Kanduboda. The victims were identified as K.W.M Tilakaratne, his wife S.A Ramyalatha, their sons K.W.M Dilshan (4), K.W.M Lakshan (3) and the children’s grandmother S.A.D Pamavathi.

The only survivor was Tilakaratne’s twelve year old daughter K.W.M Dinusha who was cut by a sharp sword and is being treated at the National Hospital. Her condition is still critical.

By Sunday morning the police had apprehended the two prime suspects who were said to have been involved in the massacre. The two were identified as E. A. Amaradasa and his brother E.A Upasena.

Both of them were said to have been prominent JVP activists. Amaradasa had also contested the Biyagama Pradeshyasabha in the last local government elections but had lost. Tilakaratne’s older brother K.W.M Wimalaratne said that Amaradasa and Upasena had come to see the bodies on Saturday morning and had gone into hiding for a few hours when the police began their hunt for them.

“We don’t know how they could come and look at the bodies after committing the murder. These two brothers lead a solitary life and they don’t usually go for funerals. This is the first time I have seen them in a funeral in our village,” he said.

Amaradasa had come that morning and had looked at the bodies and had said, ‘Meka karapu unta henagahanna ona (may lightning strike those who did this)’.

According to neighbours in the area, after the killing, an angry mob of about 300 had come in trucks and torched the house in which Amaradasa had been staying. They had blocked the police and the fire brigade from coming to the vicinity. Police say vital evidence that might have helped in the investigations had been destroyed in the fire.

The two brothers who were taken into custody were later gunned down by a police team from Meegahawatta. The shooting took place when the police were taking the suspects to a house in Delgoda, where police claimed the suspects had hidden some of the weapons used to commit the murder.

The police told the Gampaha Magistrates court on Friday that they shot them as an act of self defence as the suspects had tried to lob a grenade at the officers.

The Magistrate had then given the judgment as “justifiable homicide in the act of self defence”. However questions surround the shooting of the suspects as well as the inability of the police to stop villagers from torching Amaradasa’s house.

“How did the police come to the conclusion that the suspects were definitely involved in the massacre without producing them in a court of law and proving the case beyond reasonable doubt,” is a question raised by some of the villagers who condemned the brutal massacre as well as the shooting of the suspects.

However, Delgoda Senior Superintendent of Police, Nihal Samarakoon told The Sunday Times that the police have no choice but to gun down suspecta if their lives are in danger.

Commenting on the torching of the house he said, “When we are involved in a high profile murder case we cannot give protection to their land too. We could have looked for more clues in the house but it is now burnt down. When the suspects try to do something desperate this puts police officers in danger and they have to act accordingly,” he said.

Another suspect, Jayasinghe, who is also a prominent JVP activist, has been taken into custody for questioning. Police detectives believe that he could be a key witness to the massacre as he was a close confidant of Amaradasa.

Hard on the heels of this gruesome murder, a home-guard who suspected his wife of cheating on him had gunned down his wife and three others last Thursday in Kebitigollawa. The home guard is now said to be in hiding.

What the IGP said last month
In April this year Police Chief Victor Perera declared that the Police may even have to go beyond the law to combat crime.

Addressing the news conference he said, they would maintain law and order by “hook or by crook”.

“I’m not deterred by influences. I’m ready for anything. By hook or by crook we will maintain law and order. We will try our best to work according to the law.

“Therefore, what I have to tell you is that we won’t allow things like extorting ransom from people, intimidating, threatening people with weapons to continue.

“We will not be deterred by those who are involved in these acts, whether they are from the underworld or persons with big names. We are also armed with weapons.

“We will not back down in fear of their weapons. Though you don’t have weapons we have sufficient number of weapons and also a cadre of about 77,000 to 80,000. For us the place doesn’t matter.

“If one police station cannot handle a matter I will bring police from some other area. There are people in this police force who can work.”


Tale of two wars: Ground battle and media battle

  • News management of Delft attack worsens crisis of credibility
  • Undeclared war takes fearful turn as purchases worth billions are made in exclusive secrecy
  • Was Reclamation Road bomb meant for military bus or some other target?

The island of Delft (Nedun Theevu or Long Island), off the northern Jaffna peninsula, was known centuries ago under Portuguese rule as Cow Island. There were plenty of cattle there. Yet the mortality rate was high because they sometimes fed on the venomous herbs that grew wild.

The Portuguese had a fort there. The ruins are still evident. During that period, they brought some horses into the island. A historian later recorded "multiplying in time produced a certain kind of horses that are very small, but hardy and very fit to travel on stony and rocky grounds."

The descendants of the Portuguese horses, ponies as they call them now, are perhaps the only living remnants of that era that remain in Delft Island. It is 35 square miles (seven miles long and five miles wide). The island is the largest among the seven located off the peninsula. The main occupation for some 6,000 civilians is fishing. Located some 18 nautical miles from the Jaffna peninsula, access is only by boat from the Kurikattuvan jetty in the Kayts island. Another is the Kayts jetty. The area was under the control of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP). After the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement of February 2002, a Navy detachment was positioned there to supplement a Police Station that existed.

Six months ago, a sub unit of this detachment was located in the southernmost corner of Delft Island to guard a Radar facility. That was to monitor movements of Sea Tigers, the ocean going arm of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It became necessary following reports of increased sea traffic between the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu and guerrilla-held Wanni area. The radar is placed near the disused Queen's Tower beacon that existed many years ago.

Last Thursday, Delft Island was world news. Just before crack of dawn, Tiger guerrillas mounted a surprise attack on the sub unit. It came after they had smuggled in weapons and infiltrated the island. Whilst the attack got under way, Sea Tiger boats awaited and later engaged Navy re-inforcements that rushed in. These boats had come from guerrilla bases in Viduthaltivu and Pooneryn. The guerrillas overran the area and held it for three hours. It was only after the crack of dawn that sailors managed to re-capture and restore normalcy. By then, the guerrillas had withdrawn with two .50 calibre guns (point five zero calibre heavy weapon used in many roles including anti-aircraft), two machine guns, one Rocket Propelled Grenade launcher and two T-56 assault rifles among other items. Air Force Mi-24 helicopter gunships joined in the battle and destroyed at least two guerrilla boats.

During that period, another drama was being enacted in Colombo. Officials at the Media Centre for National Security (MCNS) had the unenviable task of disseminating information on the incident to the local and foreign media. Faster than the speed of bullets fired by re-inforcements to re-take the Radar facility, the casualty counts were changing. At one point, officials at the MCNS said sailors who took over the island had seen six bodies of sailors lying in the area. It later rose to seven.

Then suddenly apologetic MCNS officials explained they were under orders from top brass at Navy Headquarters to give a lower casualty count. Strange but true that meant some of those found dead had been resurrected by the top brass. They declared only four sailors had died and four more were wounded. Five others had reported to the main Navy detachment in the Delft Island. All others reported missing had also turned up. Besides officials at the MCNS, separate accounts were also being given by a Navy spokesman. It was not so long ago that one such spokesman talked of a Sea Tiger attack on a Navy patrol. It later turned out that the number of Sea Tiger boats he announced as being destroyed far exceeded those engaged in the sea battle.

The Sunday Times learnt from authoritative Navy sources that contrary to claims by the top brass, eight sailors were killed in the incident and three others wounded. The dead sailors are: T. Jayatilleke, K.N. Weerakulasuriya, I.D.U. Silva, R.A. Prasanna, K.S. Weeraratne, W.I.D. Ratnayake, W. Wickremasinghe and W. Pushpakumara. Their last rites are to be accompanied by full Navy honours.

It became clear that Navy top brass were not only directing operations by re-inforcements at Delft Island tasked to re-capture the area overrun by the guerrillas. They were also at the same time engaged in news management to give the Sri Lankan public and the world at large an entirely different picture. This is what prompted me to once observe that there are two separatist wars in Sri Lanka. One is in the theatre of conflict in the North and East. The other is the media release war in Colombo.

Even the Security Forces Headquarters in Jaffna, which is the overall authority for Security Forces deployed in the peninsula, was unable to report to Army Headquarters in Colombo on the casualty count in the Delft incident. Both the Navy and the Air Force in the peninsula come under the operational command of the SFHQ (Jaffna).

It is no secret that co-ordination and co-operation at the highest levels between the Army and the Navy have not been very smooth. This week, Security Forces Commander (Jaffna), Major General G.A. Chandrasiri, the senior most officer in the peninsula, sought a report from the Northern Naval Area Commander, Rear Admiral S.R. Samaratunga. Until yesterday, he had not received the account.

Ironic enough, managing the news has become a distinct characteristic feature of the ongoing undeclared Eelam War IV. The Delft incident is the latest to clearly illustrate this phenomenon. In an era where communications have advanced and the flow of information cannot be forever curtailed, news management by those spearheading the "war on terror" is only bringing the Government's credibility into further question. Apologists may argue it is necessary in order not to demoralize troops. This is nothing more than a myth, for it is troops in the operational areas who learn from the grapevine the exact casualty counts in military encounters. Moreover, to claim that four sailors have died when eight sacrificed their lives is a grave act of injustice by the men who die. Not even in their death is their sacrifice for the nation recognized.

Another equally disturbing factor is the reaction of the public who support the Security Forces and the Police engaged in battles with the Tiger guerrillas. Will not their morale be affected when they learn that some top brass engineer and doctor the news to economise on the truth? Therefore, will not such actions reflect badly on the leadership of the Government? In fact, some of the official claims after military encounters, particularly in a string of battles in the East, come into serious question. Reportage of such claims raises high public expectations but crumble no sooner the truth is discovered. Unlike during the previous phases of the war, there is little or no control by the Ministry of Defence over these matters. The result is news management going on unabated at various levels.

Strange enough they reach levels where the intelligence of the public is insulted by some of the claims. One example is the ease with which some spokesman describe flotilla of guerrilla boats coming into attack Navy patrols. The numbers of the "suicide boats" and the others are frequently spelt out though it is not clear how it is possible to exactly identify the "suicide boats''. They do not carry name boards. It is known that on some occasions the guerrillas have dived into the water after directing a suicide boat to a target. Other times, a single cadre had been deployed. But the boats used in attacks look much the same and any difference is often unnoticeable.

Within hours of the attack on Delft Island, a directional claymore mine fixed to a motorcycle exploded on Thursday morning at Reclamation Road that runs outside the boundary wall of the Colombo Port. It hit an Army bus killing a soldier and wounding three more soldiers.It also injured three civilians. It is not still clear whether the Army bus was the target.

Intelligence operatives believe the mine may have been detonated by a guerrilla cadre using a remote-controlled device. This is after they found it difficult to move it to the Fort area for fear of being checked. Various aspects are now being probed. This includes possible plans to attack trucks carrying ammunition expected to exit from a nearby gate (near the Khan Clock Tower). A vessel had been unloading military hardware in the Colombo port. Another aspect is whether it was intended for a VIP.

The two incidents on Thursday, after a brief lull, make clear Tiger guerrillas are girding themselves for fresh attacks. This is whilst the Security Forces have started limited operations both in the North and the East against guerrilla positions.

Against this backdrop, the Government's move to acquire four MiG-29SM multi-role combat aircraft (together with a trainer) from Russia on long-term credit, revealed exclusively on this page last week, generated a controversy. The opposition United National Party sought and obtained a debate on the matter on Thursday afternoon. However, on Wednesday President Mahinda Rajapaksa told his Ministers the Government wants to go ahead with the purchase. Besides the purchase of five MiG-29SM, including the trainer, the Air Force sources confirmed yesterday plans were afoot to buy three new Mi-35M helicopters and to upgrade four more Mi-24 helicopters in the SLAF possession as Mi-35 variants. These sources also said an overhaul facility for helicopters will also be set up at the Sri Lanka Air Force. These, no doubt, will entail heavy expenditure.

The MiG-29 and other accompanying deals are to be concluded by the newly formed company Lanka Logistics and Technologies Limited. It is a company incorporated under the Companies Act (no 17 of 1982). Its primary objective is declared as "to procure equipment and services for the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Police and any other State institution from time to time in terms of the policy guidelines, regulations and other direction as stipulated by the Government with regard to procurement such as guidelines on tender procedure." The Cabinet approved the proposal for setting up the company on a proposal made by President Mahinda Rajapaksa as Minister of Defence, Public Security, Law and Order.

Despite this approval, the Cabinet has not granted any authority to deviate from policy guidelines on procurement laid down by the Government. One is the document titled "Policy Guidelines - 2006" approved by the Cabinet. President Rajapaksa in a preface to the Guideline in January 2006 noted, "….it is imperative to ensure speed, transparency and integrity in all the development spheres and in regard to which the procurement function of goods, works and services plays a critical role."

President Rajapaksa added: "….the National Procurement Agency has been established under Presidential directive. The institution which functions directly under my purview is mandated to study, revise and adopt the procedures and processes in order to govern this vital aspect. The effort taken by the National Procurement Agency, within a period of one year from its inception, to study the several procedural documents which prevail in the sphere of public procurement and to formulate a single harmonized procurement guideline applicable to over the different funding agency procedure is a significant and commendable achievement."

The National Procurement Agency formulated guidelines to "enhance the transparency of Government procurement process to minimize delays and to obtain financially the most advantageous and qualitatively the best services and supplies to the nation."

The NPA did formulate a set of procedures. They are lengthy but some of the highlights include giving maximum publicity to a procurement notice to ensure maximum competition. This is not only in print and electronic media but also in relevant websites. Direct contracting, the NPA has said, should only be under exceptional circumstances.

Lanka Logistics and Technologies Limited have received proposals for very high value military equipment and services directly from manufacturing arms and trading organizations. They have been dealt with on the basis that the entities in question are state owned and have been recommended by heads of diplomatic missions abroad. That move also enhances official claims that the deals would thus be Government to Government. What of private foreign suppliers, whose products may, in some instances, turn out to be better than ones manufactured by State owned enterprises? Does that mean they are out of the race and thus shut out? For example a military item from the United States where the defence industry is in private hands? Thus single offers are being accepted for consideration as against several. Will that obviate competition that leads to competitive prices and better products?

The single proposals, however, have been subjected to either Cabinet appointed or Ministry approved Tender Boards. This is a significant departure from the past where there was fierce competition from various bidders. Of course local agents also benefited from fat commissions for lobbying with connected "promoters" including some in uniform.

Despite claims that the newly set up company has stemmed corruption, many questions still arise. The first is the question of transparency. Another important one is whether a good product and a better price could be obtained. The others, some of the recent procurements have shown, has not eliminated the role of local agents. Suppliers have due to Government insistence "dropped" their agents but "take good care" of them when the deals are through. The agents are most helpful to obtain the required business intelligence and whom to lobby. Hence, what are the total benefits arising from a State owned company where the shareholders are the armed forces commanders, the Police Chief and the Secretary to the Treasury. Have they ever been explained to the public?

Though still undeclared, the Eelam War is not only heightening further but taking a frightening dimension. As billions worth of military equipment is being procured, this time through an exclusive state company chaired by Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, the cost of war is soaring.

It is the public who will be called upon to further sustain the burdens placed on the economy by this undeclared Eelam War IV. The least that could be done by the Government is to tell the truth over incidents and win their support and co-operation. Military top brass may, to cover their shortcomings, conceal or exaggerate events. It could be argued that in the national interest both these measures may become necessary sometimes. But that should be left to the Government and not in the hands of the top brass. It is not them but President Rajapaksa and his Government which has to bear the brunt of it at the end. That is when the expectations they raise do not match the ground realities. That is not fair by the troops and policemen who have placed their lives on the firing line. There is a lesson in this from the Delft incident which the Government should not ignore.

(http://www.sundaytimes.lk/070527/Columns/sitreport.html)

Two LTTE cadres and Three Homeguards killed - Vavuniya and Batticaloa

The Homeguards manning the security post at Thiruvegama village on Madhu Kanda road in Vavuniya successfully defended nearby villages against a terrorists attack on Thursday (24th). According to the defence sources the terrorists had attempted to infiltrate in to the villages around 1:45a.m. but were forced withdrew amid heavy resistance from the Homeguards. Three Homeguards died in the confrontation.

Separately, in Batticaloa the security forces in the Thoppigala area killed two LTTE terrorists on Thursday (24) morning. The matter was confirmed by the intercepted radio communication among the LTTE cadres. The incident took place around 5:10 a.m. on Thursday when the security forces on a foot patrol came under an LTTE attack.

(http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20070525_02)

LTTE hit Delft for anti-aircraft guns, Delft navy officers frantically asked for SLAF air strikes but Colombo did not give it

"The LTTE attacked the Delft Island Naval base islet to capture anti-aircraft guns and to dismantle its anti-aircraft defences. During the two hour raid, officers at the base frantically kept asking for an air strike against the raiding Sea Tigers and their boats, but the Sri Lanka Air Force did not come to their help. Later, SLAF claimed it went into action and attacked the Sea Tiger boats as they were withdrawing but there has been no corroboration of this so far" wrote the well known Indian Defence Analyst B. Raman on May 26.

Writing his Paper No 2255 to South Asia Analysis Group, B. Raman added: "Capture of anti-aircraft guns and dismantling Delft anti-aircraft defences came as part of the LTTE objective of identifying military posts where anti-aircraft defences are set up, raiding them and capturing the anti-aircraft weapons supplied to them."

LTTE rebels raided Delft, an islet off the northern Jaffna peninsula, shortly after midnight on May 24,2007, dismantled its anti-aircraft defences and took away two anti-aircraft guns with ammunition, two Israeli machine guns, one rocket-propelled grenade launcher and eight assault rifles.

Mr. B. Raman's Paper 2255 is given below in full:

1. Till March 26,2007, the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) enjoyed the command of the skies. There was no opposition to its punitive strikes against the positions held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTW) in the Eastern and Northern Provinces and to its intimidatory strikes against the Sri Lankan Tamil population, inflicting a large number of civilian casualties. The LTTE faced difficulty in countering the punitive and intimidatory air strikes of the SLAF. This was due to a serious depletion of its anti-aircraft capability and the difficulties faced by it in procuring anti-aircraft guns and ammunition and surface-to-air missiles.

2. As a result of this, the Sri Lankan authorities did not consider it necessary to provide strengthened anti-aircraft defences to their army, naval and air force stations in the Tamil areas. They feared only land-based threats to them. They did not anticipate any threat from the air.

3. The position has since changed as a result of the LTTE's Tamil Eelam Air Force (TAF) going into action since March 26,2007, and demonstrating its capability for conventional air operations on ground-based targets and to evade the anti-aircraft defences. The TAF has already carried out three successful air strikes on ground targets of a strategic significance----two in the Colombo area and one in the Jaffna area.

4. The psychological and economic impact of these strikes has unnerved the Sri Lankan authorities. The psychological impact has been in denting the self-confidence of the Sri Lankan security forces and affecting their credibility in the eyes of the public. The economic impact has been on tourism. Flights of nervous international airlines were affected and there was a decline in tourist arrivals.

5. The expected operations of the armed forces to recover territory under the control of the LTTE in the Northern Province have not yet materialised. The SLAF has not been as active as it used to be before the TAF went into action. Fearing more strikes by the TAF, the Government of President Mahinda Rajapakse has given priority to strengthening the anti-aircraft defences in Colombo and Jaffna. Apart from taking conventional measures such as providing anti-aircraft guns and ammunition to all major military posts in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, it has also entered into negotiations with Pakistan and China for the purchase of surface-to-air missiles.

6. Taking advantage of this, the LTTE has embarked on a policy of identifying military posts where anti-aircraft defences have been set up, raiding them and capturing the anti-aircraft weapons supplied to them. It was in pursuance of this tactics that the LTTE raided a strategic naval base at Delft, an islet off the northern Jaffna peninsula, shortly after midnight on May 24,2007, dismantled its anti-aircraft defences and took away two anti-aircraft guns with ammunition, two Israeli machine guns, one rocket-propelled grenade launcher and eight assault rifles. They badly damaged the base infrastructure and withdrew after killing over 20 sailors of the Sri Lankan Navy. The raid lasted about two hours. The officers at the base frantically kept asking for an air strike against the raiding Sea Tigers and their boats, but the SLAF did not come to their help. Later, it claimed that the SLAF went into action and attacked the Sea Tiger boats as they were withdrawing and inflicted casualties and damage. There has been no corroboration of this so far.

7. The Government has not yet been able to remove the nervousness caused in Sri Lankan and foreign business circles----particularly among those in the civil aviation and tourism sectors---in the wake of the TAF's air raids in the Colombo area. Fear of an LTTE retaliation from the air continues to have a negative impact on the Government and the Security Forces.

(http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/5883)

Karuna group adopts Prabhakaran’s terror tactics to suppress Tamils of the east

Sivarasa Uthayakumar (19 years) from Araiyampathi, a former member of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal led by Colonel Karuna was shot dead yesterday in broad daylight in the Kaluwanchikudi market, Batticoloa, located in the east of Sri Lanka.

Sivarasa Uthayakumar was a former militant cadre in the TMVP military wing. When TMVP split into two and factional fighting erupted in the first week of May, he left the outfit for good and was living with his parents at Ariyampathi.

Yesterday he went to Kaluwanchikudi market to buy vegetables and other provisions for the family. In the market he was arrested by Veera, TMVP organizer for Kaluwanchikudi.

Veera confronted Sivarasa Uthayakumar and shot and killed him in the broad daylight in the Government controlled area. After shooting the ex-militant cadre he dragged the dead body and handed over it to the Kaluwanchikudi hospital.

Reports reveal that hundreds of people were there in the market witnessing this act of TMVP terror. Furthermore, Asian Tribune learnt that letters are sent by the political offices of the TMVP to all those who left the outfit after the split with former commander Pillaiyan urging them to return and join their respective arm units on or before 29 May.

The letter also insists that in case the former TMVP cadre fails to turn up, parents should turn up and present themselves to the political offices for inquiry. If the cadres who had left fail to rejoin, then the family should provide another member of the family to the TMVP as a substitute, states the letter.

“The irony is that the Tamil people, whether in the east or in the north, have no way of escaping the terrorist,” said a government official. “Also when one set of terrorist are chased out another set steps in to take over. Karuna group is now adopting Prabhakaran’s terror tactics. The Tamils abroad who pay for this terror must answer for these crimes,” he added.

(http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/5882)

WHY LTTE ATTACKED DELFT NAVAL BASE?

Till March 26,2007, the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) enjoyed the command of the skies. There was no opposition to its punitive strikes against the positions held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTW) in the Eastern and Northern Provinces and to its intimidatory strikes against the Sri Lankan Tamil population, inflicting a large number of civilian casualties. The LTTE faced difficulty in countering the punitive and intimidatory air strikes of the SLAF. This was due to a serious depletion of its anti-aircraft capability and the difficulties faced by it in procuring anti-aircraft guns and ammunition and surface-to-air missiles.

2. As a result of this, the Sri Lankan authorities did not consider it necessary to provide strengthened anti-aircraft defences to their army, naval and air force stations in the Tamil areas. They feared only land-based threats to them. They did not anticipate any threat from the air.

3. The position has since changed as a result of the LTTE's Tamil Eelam Air Force (TAF) going into action since March 26,2007, and demonstrating its capability for conventional air operations on ground-based targets and to evade the anti-aircraft defences. The TAF has already carried out three successful air strikes on ground targets of a strategic significance----two in the Colombo area and one in the Jaffna area.

4. The psychological and economic impact of these strikes has unnerved the Sri Lankan authorities. The psychological impact has been in denting the self-confidence of the Sri Lankan security forces and affecting their credibility in the eyes of the public. The economic impact has been on tourism. Flights of nervous international airlines were affected and there was a decline in tourist arrivals.

5. The expected operations of the armed forces to recover territory under the control of the LTTE in the Northern Province have not yet materialised. The SLAF has not been as active as it used to be before the TAF went into action. Fearing more strikes by the TAF, the Government of President Mahinda Rajapakse has given priority to strengthening the anti-aircraft defences in Colombo and Jaffna. Apart from taking conventional measures such as providing anti-aircraft guns and ammunition to all major military posts in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, it has also entered into negotiations with Pakistan and China for the purchase of surface-to-air missiles.

6. Taking advantage of this, the LTTE has embarked on a policy of identifying military posts where anti-aircraft defences have been set up, raiding them and capturing the anti-aircraft weapons supplied to them. It was in pursuance of this tactics that the LTTE raided a strategic naval base at Delft, an islet off the northern Jaffna peninsula, shortly after midnight on May 24,2007, dismantled its anti-aircraft defences and took away two anti-aircraft guns with ammunition, two Israeli machine guns, one rocket-propelled grenade launcher and eight assault rifles. They badly damaged the base infrastructure and withdrew after killing over 20 sailors of the Sri Lankan Navy. The raid lasted about two hours. The officers at the base frantically kept asking for an air strike against the raiding Sea Tigers and their boats, but the SLAF did not come to their help. Later, it claimed that the SLAF went into action and attacked the Sea Tiger boats as they were withdrawing and inflicted casualties and damage. There has been no corroboration of this so far.

7.The Government has not yet been able to remove the nervousness caused in Sri Lankan and foreign business circles----particularly among those in the civil aviation and tourism sectors---in the wake of the TAF's air raids in the Colombo area. Fear of an LTTE retaliation from the air continues to have a negative impact on the Government and the Security Forces.

(http://saag.org/%5Cpapers23%5Cpaper2255.html)

Ambassador Goonetilleke and Prof. Bandarage rips Saravanamuttu’s ‘kuttus ‘ apart in Washington

Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, the director of Colombo-based think tank, Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA), who spoke at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC, on May 24, 2006, was supposed to discuss “Sri Lanka's Elusive Peace Process – a Role for the United States Government?” but talked about “Sri Lanka’s Human Rights and Humanitarian situation” as the board at the CSIS indicated.

In fact, there were two main points that Dr. Saravanamuttu referred to US involvement in Sri Lanka. One was that there should be a curtailment of US military aid and assistance. He did not outright say such assistance should be stopped but implied it in the statement that such assistance should be tied to benchmarks.

Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke, who was present at the meeting responded that the military assistance the US gives Sri Lanka is mostly limited to training and limited military sales. He added that when such is the case, curtailment of military assistance is not going to be a very effective tool. He said that if the government’s back was pushed against the wall, Sri Lanka would seek military purchases from other countries which do not impose conditions.

Dr. Saravanamuttu commented that when Sri Lanka veered toward the west in the late 1970s, New Delhi was concerned. He added that in the contemporary global political arena, given the current relationship between the US and India, both these countries look upon Sri Lanka’s relationship with China, with much wariness. However, Ambassador pointed out that Sri Lanka has had a stable relationship with China for over 50 years. Furthermore, China has no intention of getting involved in Sri Lanka’s conflict or in filling an existing vacuum. He illustrated his point with a very potent Chinese adage which says that if one’s house is on fire, one should seek water, not in the neighbor’s well, but in one’s own well. In other words, a country needs to look within to resolve a national conflict.

Dr. Saravanamuttu also complained that there was a duality in the US policy on the ground in Sri Lanka and added that his present visit to the US was an attempt to raise awareness and to seek support for an international human rights monitor. He labeled Sri Lanka as “the worst place in the world for civilians, in the past 15 months.”

Ambassador Goonetilleke replied that he had personally been involved with the human rights situation in Sri Lanka since 1986, and what is true of all armed conflicts in the world is that it is the civilians who suffer the most, not the combatants. He commented on Dr. Saravanamuttu’s reference to LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s statement in Novemebr 2005 that he would give the newly-elected president time to solve the conflict. Despite that, within two weeks of President Mahinda Rajapaksa assuming office, Prabhakaran had started attacking security forces and civilians. He said that the first time the government responded to LTTE violence was after the assassination attempt on the Army Commander inside Army headquarters on April 25, 2006. Thereafter, as the number of terrorist attacks increased, government’s strategy changed and with the current heightened violence, it would be difficult for the government to control the situation in the short term. He added that when there is a peace-like situation in the country, the human rights violations reduce substantially. However, with the conflict in its present proportions, the situation naturally gets out of control. He also commented that the figures of internally displaced persons (IDP) he possesses are much less than the 300,000 Dr. Saravanamuttu stated.

Dr. Saravanmuttu spoke of the unviability of a military solution to the conflict and the need to negotiate with the LTTE. Ambassador Goonetilleke very pertinently asked what kind of negotiations he is speaking of – whether they would be the kind of negotiations we have had with the LTTE thus far, where peace talks are limited to day-to-day logistical issues of the Tamil people and which they abandon the moment they are ready to restart the war, or whether they would be meaningful discussions of a substantive nature to arrive at a durable solution, that have never taken place before. Having been involved in the peace process during 2002-2003, as head of the Peace Secretariat, Ambassador explained that at that time the government delegation was not allowed to raise any substantive issues. Are peace talks to go the same way the next time too? he asked.

Dr. Saravanamuttu said that the merger of the northeast being overturned in the current context had potentially ominous long term consequences. Professor Asoka Bandarage of George Town University who was in the audience, asked if such a merger was fair to the Muslims and the Sinhalese in the east. She asked if the Muslims should then ask for a separate state for the Muslims. She also very pertinently commented that large numbers of Tamils in the north and the east have fled to the south to live peacefully among the Sinhalese and the Muslims. In such a situation, she pointed out, there was no justification for the LTTE to wage war seeking secession.

Dr. Saravanamuttu was very clear on the point that there was no way the LTTE could claim to be the sole representative of the Tamil people. He added that that there will never be a majority opinion among the Tamil community in Sri Lanka for secession. He believes that the best option for conflict resolution is the exploration of a federal solution within a united Sri Lanka and he emphasized that negotiations should not end up with a compact between the LTTE and the Government.

(http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/5880)

Monday, May 21, 2007

Tigers suffer setback at sea, but land war drags on by Our Defence Correspondent

As the LTTE this week suffered yet another defeat, this time at the hands of the tiny navy of the Maldives, the ground war in the Northeast continued to drag on with no end in sight.

Over the last two months, the nation has been captivated by the spectacle of the LTTE Air Wing engaging in daring bombing raids and getting away scot-free. But while everyone's attention has been diverted by the hysterical response to a few bombs being dropped on Colombo with little effect, what has largely escaped notice is that there has been little progress towards bringing the war to a rapid close.

More than a year after full-scale operations began, the Tigers remain secure in their Northern lair, while the armed forces continue to fool themselves into believing that the capture of parts of the East have been crippling blows to the LTTE, which it is not.

The fact is that the longer the Army allows the Tigers, the stronger the LTTE will become, rearming itself and recruiting to recover from losses it has suffered.

Thursday's sinking of the Indian trawler Sri Krishna in the Maldives was the end of a two-month saga surrounding the vessel. Registered in Tuticorin, it had set off from Kanyakumari on the southern tip of India on March 7 and been hijacked by the Sea Tigers along with several other Indian fishing vessels. The Indian Coast Guard recovered some of the vessels, but the Sri Krishna disappeared.

The Tigers had reportedly taken its 12-member crew to the Wanni where they are still believed to be held captive. Only one crew member was kept on board due to his knowledge of the ship's engines.

The 75-foot vessel had then taken on a stock of ammunition, believed to be from another ship west of the Maldives, and was proceeding towards Sri Lanka when it was sighted by a Maldivian fishing boat MV Tuna whose crew challenged the Sri Krishna believing it was manned by Sri Lankan fishermen poaching in their country's waters.

The Tiger cadres had fired at the MV Tuna, which had fled back to the port of Vilingili in the Maldives and reported the incident. The Maldivian Defence Force gunboat 'Hurayee' had then set off in pursuit and intercepted the Sri Krishna several hours later.

Near Gaaf Alif Atoll, the Hurayee had ordered the Sri Krishna to halt, only to receive gunfire from small arms as a response. At the time, the last Indian crew member had taken his chance and jumped into the water, to be rescued by the gunboat.

The Hurayee had then fired on the Sri Krishna with all its guns and set it ablaze. Four LTTE cadres had jumped overboard and were captured. The Sri Krishna sank soon afterwards. The suspects are now in Male and face charges of piracy which will doubtless bring them long prison terms under Maldivian and Indian laws.

While isolated incidents like this week's sinking of a gun-running ship by the Maldives Defence Force are setbacks to the LTTE, this does not mean that many more arms shipments are not getting through

Indeed, the LTTE's use of smaller ships such as the one that was destroyed on Wednesday clearly shows that the Tigers are bring in shipments in many smaller vessels, instead of risking having large shipments detected and destroyed.

The Army's reluctance to take on the Tigers in their den in the Wanni have proved what this column declared several months ago: That the misadventures in the Eastern Province will leave the Army's resources stretched so far that it will lack the manpower and the confidence to boldly go on the offensive in the North.

Instead, the Army continues to launch small 'limited operations' that last at most a day or two, and succeed only in killing a handful of Tigers.

On March 11 this column was headlined: 'Is the Army getting bogged down in the East?'

We said at the time: 'More than nine months after the armed forces began their Eelam War IV campaign in response to LTTE aggression, the Army remains mired in operations in the Eastern Province, and has been unable to spare the resources for a major offensive in the North.

'The continued operations in the Batticaloa District have dampened hopes for a rapid move to take on the Tigers in the North and achieve a major victory in order to push Tiger Leader Velupillai Prabhakaran back to the negotiating table. Any hopes for a rapid end to Eelam War IV have now vanished, and the country is clearly in for a long hard war.

'One of the main problems facing the armed forces is the over-reaction of the government and the top brass to minor attacks in the Batticaloa District, which has given more strength to the determination to rid the entire East of the Tigers before launching major operations in the North.

'However, this is playing straight into the Tigers' hands, and the forces need to focus on the LTTE's current strategy and come up with a proper plan that will undermine the Tigers. The Tigers are at present battling for time, in order to recruit more cadres and bring in more ammunition by sea.

'But what does matter in the long run is that the forces are committing large resources towards these operations, and the top brass is reluctant to take on major operations in the North while at the same time having such Eastern operations going on. Operations such as Marvil Aru, Sampur, Vakarai, and Muhamalai did in fact take a heavy toll on manpower.

'As this column has repeatedly pointed out, the LTTE can only be decisively defeated in the North. The East has always been a sideshow. Even clearing every single LTTE cadre from the East would not serve to bring the Tigers back to peace talks. Only by achieving at least one major victory on the ground in the North, can the forces bring the Tigers back to the table. The sooner that is achieved, the faster Eelam War IV will be brought to a successful close.

Two months down the road, the Northeast battlefield remains almost exactly the same as it was when we warned about the problem.

We have repeatedly warned that the war is going towards a stalemate due to the Army's wrong strategy. As far back as November 25 of last year this column was headlined 'Government being fed the wrong strategy'. We warned then that:

'The unimaginative and lackluster strategies adopted by the armed forces in Eelam War IV,.... continue.

'Troops once again conducted small scale operations this week in the Eastern Province, which resulted in some desultory skirmishes .... But nothing was achieved in strategic terms to give either the armed forces an advantage on the ground or the government an advantage in dealing with the Tigers. Meanwhile operations in the Northern Province have been dismal.

'What the President and his advisors must understand is that the Jaffna Peninsula and the Eastern Province are battlefields that have been chosen by Prabhakaran, and not by the Army. To continue fighting only in these areas does not put pressure on the LTTE. An LTTE defeat in these areas is of little consequence to the Tiger leadership, who are sitting in the Wanni. Colombo, where thousands of troops are deployed to protect against infiltration attacks, is also a battlefield that was chosen by Prabhakaran.

'The only way to bring direct pressure on the Tiger leadership is to attack the Wanni. This will also serve to immediately ease the pressure on government areas in Jaffna and the East, as the LTTE will immediately withdraw almost all cadres to defend the Tiger strongholds. The Wanni also offers the Army the chance to choose its target and achieve the element of surprise and seize the initiative. For example, an attack could be launched from Mannar, or Vavuniya, or at Madhu, or Weli Oya, or Pooneryn, or even by sea at Mullaittivu.

The nation has so far been fortunate. The offensives the LTTE has launched in the past year have been largely unsuccessful. Even the air raid on Colombo, Katunayake and Palali achieved little in material terms for the Tigers except to temporarily regain some lost prestige. But while the Army dawdles, the LTTE will be doing its utmost to inflict a serious defeat on government forces, either in the Northeast, or somewhere else in the country. The current 'Phoney War' cannot go on forever.

(http://www.island.lk/2007/05/20/defence.html)

Friday, May 18, 2007

Burying the peace process along with federalism by Col R Hariharan (Retd.)

The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led by President Mahinda Rajapaksa after discussing its devolution proposals at the party executive meeting on May 14, 2007 has clarified that it would propose a unitary state in its submission to the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) on devolution. On May 1, 2007, the SLFP had circulated its proposal for public scrutiny and discussion. The SLFP proposal is claimed to emanate from the President's platform of "an undivided country, national consensus and an honourable peace," though in its present form it makes a mockery of all these three considerations.

The SLFP proposal includes three aspects of devolution at different levels: abolition of executive presidency, abolition of provinces and creation of district as the basic unit of devolution, and the creation pradeshiya and grama sabhas at the municipal and village level. As the SLFP led coalition has a majority in the parliament, the final form of devolution proposal accepted by the parliament is likely to conform more to the SLFP scheme of things regardless of APRC recommendations.

The SLFP proposal bypasses three key basic engines of ethnic conflict: autonomy for Tamil majority areas, northeast merger, and parity of status for Tamil language with Sinhala. Unless these three issues are addressed no lasting solution can be arrived at, regardless the semantic nuances of the proposal. The SLFP proposal unfortunately appears to have failed to understand this home truth. The SLFP proposal circulated earlier had drawn flak from all quarters the main opposition United National Party (UNP), anti LTTE Tamil parties and other coalition supporters, particularly on the issue of abandoning a federal concept as the basis for working out a solution. The members of the Tokyo Donors Conference (the EU, Japan, Norway, UK, and USA) and India have also expressed their concern either publicly or privately at the SLFP's proposal as it cuts at the very roots of the present peace process in which both sides had agreed to find a solution within a federal format. More importantly the SLFP proposal puts the clock back on the substantial progress made among the Sinhala polity and people in understanding the sources of Tamil ethnic conflict. This could impact future negotiating process also because the proposal also fails to evoke a sense security and trust among the Tamil population. These have been echoed by Sinhala intellectuals and politicians who find a greater future in prosecuting peace rather than war. .

On other hand, the hardliners had considered the original SLFP proposal a little soft and wanted a clear emphasis on a 'unitary state.' The party executive has apparently deferred to this lobby and clarified its stand for a unified state. This indicates the strong control the President exercises on the party apparatus, because earlier President Chandrika Kumaratunga who led the SLFP was clearly in favour of a federal solution.

Richard Boucher, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, who visited Sri Lanka last week made an explicit reference on the need for the devolution proposal finding favour with the Tamil community. He said: "I spent a lot of time during my visit talking about the devolution discussion: the prospects of having a set of proposals from this side of the island that can give a perspective to the Tamil community to show them that they have a place of respect, that they have a place on the island, that they have a role in society where they can control much of their own affairs only when we have that consensus can we have a basis for peace talks." The SLFP's clarification timed so soon after his statement should send clear signals to the international players (as Boucher would prefer to call the Donors) of things to come on all fronts in Sri Lanka - war, peace and politics at home and abroad- in the coming months.

Three strategic elements appear to be guiding the government's actions at present. These are military objectives driving political decisions, impact of military successes of 2006, and total focus on the President's agenda. The focus on President's agenda is understandable because that was the basis on which people voted him to power. But it has downgraded the importance of international opinion in decision making, marginalized Norway's mediatory role and sidelined the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. In simple terms, this means the end of the peace process, though for cosmetic reasons the government will continue to talk about peace. The disregard for international opinion has in a way encouraged human rights violations to proliferate, child recruitment to continue, and blunted the rule of law so that dissenters can be muzzled and the media intimidated with impunity. The results of this attitude came out loud and clear when the international community did not respond strongly to the recent attacks by LTTE air arm. There had been a progressive hardening in the attitude of international players towards Sri Lanka despite their acceptance of the need to control LTTE violence and safeguard national security. Germany and UK have frozen part of the aid to Sri Lanka. Recently the British Parliament discussed the Sri Lanka (internal) situation for four hours and the Minister for Middle East Dr Kim Howells indicated that he might consider lifting the ban on LTTE, if necessary! There is a move afoot to invite the LTTE spokesman SP Tamilchelvan to address the British parliament members. The influential US watchdog body Freedom House's caution to Sri Lanka sounded more ominous: "Freedom House is deeply troubled by the actions of the government which has imposed restrictions on freedom of expression, harassed non governmental organisations (NGOs) that question government policy, and committed serious ongoing human rights abuses. The serious human rights abuses and excessive restrictions on freedom of speech and association by the government of Sri Lanka merit the country's removal from a list of eligible recipients for Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) assistance." Boucher during his visit had revealed that the USA had decided to postpone MCA projects in Sri Lanka "in view of the unfavorable security situation." All this is happening despite actions taken by international players to curb LTTE's extortion rackets and prevent its efforts to procure arms and weaponry. It is clear that the international players, while respecting Sri Lanka's sovereignty to take appropriate action to safeguard its security, expect the country to show more positive action to put the peace process back on the rails.

The Sri Lanka government's reaction to the friendly foreign governments' comments had been paranoid, if not hostile. The basic problem in Sri Lanka is the change of priorities since 2006. During the first three years of peace process, political objectives were driving military decisions. However, now this process has been reversed with military objectives driving political decisions. This is evident from President Mahinda Rajapaksa's stand during his talks with Boucher as reported in the state media. The President had declared that "the ongoing war with Tiger guerrillas will continue until they are defeated. If they want the Security Forces to stop the war the LTTE should lay down arms and come for peace talks. Otherwise, the Government was willing to hold peace talks while fighting Tiger guerrilla terrorism." This makes clear the peace process and the political issues connected with it have no place in the President's scheme of things at present. The military successes of 2006 appear to have made the state confident of pursuing a military agenda, abandoning the peace process. This belief got further reinforced after security forces wrested control of the east from the LTTE. As opinion polls indicate the military successes have also strengthened the lobbies supporting a military solution. This makes the military option as the more popular and therefore politically attractive course for the President to adopt. Another attraction is that each success at the war front depletes the mass support base of other political contenders potential and actual like the UNP and the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna.Though the President spoke of a flexible approach on the proposals before the APRC to converge on a consensus, the President is likely to be firm on two issues:unitary format and district level devolution. This is evident from his statement that "the main significance of this whole exercise is that power should remain with the people in a systematic and proper process, that the people of the Grama Rajya hold power." In other words, the devolution would be at the decentralized local level and not at the federal level.

As peace appears only in the distant horizon, it is not difficult to foresee the emerging military picture with the following elements on the canvass:

nTo compensate its weakened conventional war capability, LTTE is likely to step up its commando operations in Jaffna peninsula. Recovery of small number of weapons in numerous incidents indicates that such infiltrations are already underway. The focus now would be to carryout decentralized operations to keep the troops from dominating the areas around their defences and forward defended lines. Senior commanders are also likely to be targetted.

nLTTE attacks in the north are more likely to be based on infiltration. Formation headquarters, and storage dumps containing self destructive materials are likely to be the favoured targets. LTTE is likely to continue to fiercely resist any security forces attempt to breach its forward line Omanthai-Madhu-Mannar. This is to safeguard LTTE's sea lanes of supply along Mannar coast. Already in the first two weeks of May, over 7500 litres of diesel destined for LTTE has been seized. These were probably smuggled from Tamil Nadu coast despite tightening of coastal security measures in Tamil Nadu.

nColombo port and airport are likely to continue to figure in the priority list of targets for sneak air and commando raids in depth areas. Of course, VIPs of the government will also continue to remain in the high risk list.

nIn the east, Karuna despite his problems with Pillaiyan the pretender trying to steal the thunder, will become more powerful as he takes over the task of containing LTTE in Thoppigala and flexes his political and military muscles. This could cause further apprehension among the Muslims of the area. So we can expect a period of social instability in the east.

nGiven the military agenda now in operation, Sri Lanka -India relations are likely to come under more stressful times. However, security measures in Tamil Nadu to curb LTTE activity are likely to be further tightened rather than weakened regardless of stresses in India-Sri Lanka relations.

Tom Lantos, Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs has articulated a sensible way of salvaging the situation. He said: "I urge all parties to stay true to the Ceasefire Agreement and come back to the negotiating table. A military solution will not end this circle of violence and further escalation will only worsen the already gross human rights abuses. I call upon the international community including Diaspora groups, to push all parties towards dialogue rather than destruction." But given the present strategic setting, nobody appears to have time for such a nuanced approach. This is clear from the SLFP proposal which is essentially a political document to strengthen the hands of the party particularly in the south. It is likely to influence the final devolution proposal much more than any other deliberation.

Thus its singular achievement will be to bury the peace process along with the concept of federalism that forms the backbone of the Oslo Accord. So even if the devolution proposal is presented in the final form as per the President's design, the island nation is likely to continue to struggle along with the ebb and flow of military conflict in the coming months, particularly after the monsoon. (South Asia Analysis Group)

(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2007/05/19/opinion/1.asp)

CSF members eligible to join as police constables: IGP

Police Chief Victor Perera yesterday said select band members of the Civil Security Force (CSF - former Home Guard Department), would be able to join the Police service as Police Constables directly.

“The Police Commission has given the approval for members of the Civil Security Force (CSF), who are under 30 years of age to directly become Police Constables in the Police Department,” IGP Perera said.

The police Chief made this comment addressing a passing out ceremony at the Higher Training School of the Civil Security Force in Galkiriyagama, where some 156 trained personnel of the CSF completed their two months training.

Speaking at the event, Director General of the CSF Rtd. Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera said members of the CSF can now enjoy facilities similar to other forces. “One of the main facilities is, if a CSF member dies, the next of kin will receive the CSF member’s monthly salary until the member is 55 years of age,” he said.

“These personnel will be deployed in their own villages and will work together with security forces and Police personnel,” he said.

The newly passed out members underwent training during the last two months. Accordingly, these personnel are experts in deep penetration operations, small group operations etc.

Currently there are 35,000 CSF members serving in several areas in the Northern and Eastern provinces.

(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2007/05/19/news/17.asp)

Police raise upper age limit for recruitment

GALAKIRIYAGAMA: The National Police Commission has given approval to increase the age limit for recruitment of personnel up to 30, IGP Victor Perera said.

Qualified personnel from the Civil Security (Home Guard) Service and Police Assistants will be recruited to the Police service under this new move.

The IGP made this remark addressing a ceremony at the Galakiriyagama Advanced Training School of the Civil Security Department, where 156 Civil Security personnel from various parts of the North-East who had undergone advanced weapons and combat training passed out.

This was the first batch of Home Guards who had undergone this specialised training after they were taken under the Civil Security Department.

They will be deployed as four man and eight man tams to guard their villages ahead of the bunker lines.

According to CCD Chief Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekara, the number of Home Guards has been increased from 19,200 to 35,400 after the formation of the CCD.

“We have improved the quality of their service by providing them advanced training and more facilities,” Rear Admiral Weerasekara added.

Steps have also been taken to provide compensation for the Civil Security personnel wounded or killed while on duty, as in the Security Forces.

(http://www.dailynews.lk/2007/05/19/news13.asp)