Cabinet Spokesman Reginald Cooray yesterday, in answer to a query regarding Wednesday’s slaying of a Police Intelligence operative, allegedly by the LTTE near the Batticaloa Hospital, said he denounced the act
He was addressing the media at the Information Department.
Responding to a question on what measures the government would take in this matter, Cooray said, "unfortunately, the truce monitors too are ineffective and unable to control this menace. The last UNF government kept mum over the spate of killings in the past. We are at least totally denouncing these gruesome acts of violence against the intelligence operatives".
It is presumed that the killing spree, where over 40 members of the Intelligence units have been killed by the LTTE, had commenced following a raid conducted on an Intelligence Safe House at Millennium City in Athurugiriya, during the last UNF regime.
A Presidential Commission of inquiry into the raid had held the former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, Former Defence Minister Tilak Marapane and former Interior Minister John Amaratunga responsible for the raid, and thereby exposed many intelligence operatives.
The 23rd victim had been Police Inspector Nimal Thabrew, who was gunned down at the Dehiwela Police Station in December last year.
(The Island , May 21, 2004 - 01:34)
Tuesday, September 14, 2004
Military Sleuths Gunned by LTTE Trigger Concern in Sri Lanka by Champika Liyanaarachchi
COLOMBO, May 2 (OneWorld) - Following a spate of killings of military intelligence (MI) operatives by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Sri Lankan government has appointed a three-member committee to suggest security measures to guard persons attached to the sensitive unit.
The committee comprises Army Commander Lionel Balagalle, Defence Secretary Austin Fernando and Defence Adviser, Meril Gunaratne.
The decision follows the recent murder of Lingasami Devarasa, 32, the twentieth intelligence operative to be gunned down by the LTTE since the ruling United National Front (UNF) government assumed power in December 2001.
Murdered in the capital, Colombo, Devarasa is the eleventh intelligence personnel to be killed there.
Altogether 20 intelligence personnel have been killed in Sri Lanka since December 2001.
The adviser with the government's Peace Secretariat, coordinating the peace process between the government and the LTTE, Nanda Godage says there was a long felt need for such a committee.
As he emphasizes, "While it is important to have a rapport with the LTTE to sustain the peace process, that does not mean we should keep quiet about matters that threaten national security."
The government's appointment of the committee early this week followed growing disillusionment within the military and the people over its steadfast silence on the relentless killings.
As Chief Opposition Whip in the Sri Lanka Parliament and People's Alliance (PA) spokesperson, Mangala Samaraweera accuses, "The government was silent about the killings because, being in the LTTE's good books was more important to it than national security."
The identities of most of the intelligence operatives were revealed due to a glaring blunder made by a senior police officer a few days after the UNF government came to power.
While tracking the culprits of an election related mass murder, he stumbled upon a safety house in the Colombo suburbs, used by the deep penetration unit or the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) of the Sri Lanka Army.
The presence of the LRRP was such a well-kept military secret that even the defense minister of the new government, was unaware of its existence.
In its eagerness to implicate politicians of the previous regime, the government announced the deputy defense minister of the previous regime was using it for criminal activities.
Ironically, it went on to imprison soldiers of the LRRP.
By the time the government realized its mistake, it was too late. By then, the identities of the commandoes and the intelligence personnel had been publicly revealed.
This was followed by a series of murders of persons attached to the LRRP.
A former Army Commander says the Army had laboriously worked to create an expert military intelligence network for the LRRP. In the light of this, the government's failure to crack down on the LTTE's Colombo based pistol gang, accused of frequent killings of intelligence personnel was a major letdown.
Significantly, he stresses that the government cannot afford to ignore the killings, as the personnel are highly vulnerable after information about the LRRP's ammunition dump in Athurugiriya leaked out.
The timing was crucial too, with the LRRP poised to nab many of the LTTE's top leaders at that time.
In September 26, 2001, three months before the blunder, Shankar, the head of the LTTE military intelligence wing and founder commander of the LTTE Sea Tiger division, was killed by the elite commandoes of the LRRP.
Months before that, the LRRP had managed to kill three senior leaders of the LTTE - deputy chief of the Sea Tigers, political head of the eastern province and the communication chief of the eastern province.
The man who led the LRRP team, Captain Nilam, who would have otherwise been honored as a war hero, is currently in hiding. He happens to top the LTTE's hit list.
In a recent interview with a Sri Lankan newspaper, LTTE police chief P. Nadesen said one of the prime duties assigned to him by LTTE leader Prabhakaran, was to identify personnel attached to the LRRP.
Due to the LTTE's continuing elimination of informants and intelligence personnel, retired servicemen too have begun to fear being targeted by the rebels.
A retired military official confesses that several senior Army officers have expressed fears about their safety.
Interestingly, the controversial ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the rebels in February, 2002, allows the LTTE to enter government controlled areas unarmed.
But government troops are prohibited from entering LTTE controlled areas.
Sri Lanka's leading opposition party, the PA, alleges that this advantage is being misused by the Tigers to collate more information on intelligence operatives and movements of politicians in Sri Lanka.
(OneWorld South Asia , Fri May 2, 7:39 AM ET)
The committee comprises Army Commander Lionel Balagalle, Defence Secretary Austin Fernando and Defence Adviser, Meril Gunaratne.
The decision follows the recent murder of Lingasami Devarasa, 32, the twentieth intelligence operative to be gunned down by the LTTE since the ruling United National Front (UNF) government assumed power in December 2001.
Murdered in the capital, Colombo, Devarasa is the eleventh intelligence personnel to be killed there.
Altogether 20 intelligence personnel have been killed in Sri Lanka since December 2001.
The adviser with the government's Peace Secretariat, coordinating the peace process between the government and the LTTE, Nanda Godage says there was a long felt need for such a committee.
As he emphasizes, "While it is important to have a rapport with the LTTE to sustain the peace process, that does not mean we should keep quiet about matters that threaten national security."
The government's appointment of the committee early this week followed growing disillusionment within the military and the people over its steadfast silence on the relentless killings.
As Chief Opposition Whip in the Sri Lanka Parliament and People's Alliance (PA) spokesperson, Mangala Samaraweera accuses, "The government was silent about the killings because, being in the LTTE's good books was more important to it than national security."
The identities of most of the intelligence operatives were revealed due to a glaring blunder made by a senior police officer a few days after the UNF government came to power.
While tracking the culprits of an election related mass murder, he stumbled upon a safety house in the Colombo suburbs, used by the deep penetration unit or the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) of the Sri Lanka Army.
The presence of the LRRP was such a well-kept military secret that even the defense minister of the new government, was unaware of its existence.
In its eagerness to implicate politicians of the previous regime, the government announced the deputy defense minister of the previous regime was using it for criminal activities.
Ironically, it went on to imprison soldiers of the LRRP.
By the time the government realized its mistake, it was too late. By then, the identities of the commandoes and the intelligence personnel had been publicly revealed.
This was followed by a series of murders of persons attached to the LRRP.
A former Army Commander says the Army had laboriously worked to create an expert military intelligence network for the LRRP. In the light of this, the government's failure to crack down on the LTTE's Colombo based pistol gang, accused of frequent killings of intelligence personnel was a major letdown.
Significantly, he stresses that the government cannot afford to ignore the killings, as the personnel are highly vulnerable after information about the LRRP's ammunition dump in Athurugiriya leaked out.
The timing was crucial too, with the LRRP poised to nab many of the LTTE's top leaders at that time.
In September 26, 2001, three months before the blunder, Shankar, the head of the LTTE military intelligence wing and founder commander of the LTTE Sea Tiger division, was killed by the elite commandoes of the LRRP.
Months before that, the LRRP had managed to kill three senior leaders of the LTTE - deputy chief of the Sea Tigers, political head of the eastern province and the communication chief of the eastern province.
The man who led the LRRP team, Captain Nilam, who would have otherwise been honored as a war hero, is currently in hiding. He happens to top the LTTE's hit list.
In a recent interview with a Sri Lankan newspaper, LTTE police chief P. Nadesen said one of the prime duties assigned to him by LTTE leader Prabhakaran, was to identify personnel attached to the LRRP.
Due to the LTTE's continuing elimination of informants and intelligence personnel, retired servicemen too have begun to fear being targeted by the rebels.
A retired military official confesses that several senior Army officers have expressed fears about their safety.
Interestingly, the controversial ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the rebels in February, 2002, allows the LTTE to enter government controlled areas unarmed.
But government troops are prohibited from entering LTTE controlled areas.
Sri Lanka's leading opposition party, the PA, alleges that this advantage is being misused by the Tigers to collate more information on intelligence operatives and movements of politicians in Sri Lanka.
(OneWorld South Asia , Fri May 2, 7:39 AM ET)
EXPOSED BY A CLUMSY POLICE RAID ON ARMY SAFE HOUSE - ONE INTELLIGENCE CHIEF KILLED; TWO SPIES KIDNAPPED By Walter Jayawardhana from Los Angeles
Thanks to the wide publicity given to a clumsy police raid on a safe house of the military intelligence unit of the Sri Lanka Army at Athurugiriya at least one person serving that unit had been killed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Batticaloa, and many more are in mortal danger, army sources revealed.
The same sources said two more spies serving the unit had been also kidnapped by the Tamil Tigers as a result of the exposure of the raid conducted by Police Superintendent Kulasiri Udugampola backed by the Interior Minister John Ameratunga.
The premises in Millennium Park, Athurugiriya, where the raid took place were rented by the Sri Lanka Army, as a safe house for a unit of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) run under the Directorate of Military Intelligence. A police team led by Udugampola raided on the house and arrested the army captain who was in charge of the unit and five soldiers including a former member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who had now joined the unit. The unit was part of a highly successful program by the Sri Lanka Army to penetrate deep into the Tiger territory and assassinate LTTE leaders. Many such as the self-styled Colonel Shanker, a confidante of the Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran had been killed by the LRRP.
Army commander Lt. General Lionel Balagalle dispatched his Director of Military Intelligence Brigadier Kapila Hendavitharana to avoid the clumsy arrest of the very efficient long-range unit from being taken away to be locked up. Hendavitharana reportedly arranged a telephone conversation between Inspector General of Police Lucky Kodituwakku and Udugampola to stop the embarrassing situation. Kodituwakku requested the SP to consider what the army intelligence man had to say. But the SP with alleged UNP connections instead phoned up Interior Minister John Ameratunga and complained there were pressures on him. To back Udugampola Ameratunga sent a senior officer of his ministry. Udugampola then arrested all men and took all weapons in to his custody. They were arrested on a charge of a plot to assassinate Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, now found to be baseless. After all the damage done and under growing protests of the army the UNF government released the arrested.
All this talk about a plot to kill Ranil Wickremesinghe was first published in the official organ of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Tamil Guardian during November of last year. It was complained to the army commander more or less the same time by the then UNP chairman Charitha Ratwatte and his deputy Daya Pelpola. Many consider it as a plant by the Tamil Tigers with the help of the UNP to destroy the LRRP unit of the army. Both the CID and the Army have found the assassination story baseless.
After details of the highly secretive unit was divulged to the police the Tamil Tigers killed the civil intelligence unit chief of the army in Batticaloa. The man, an ex-PLOTE member , Vidhyadharan was gunned down by LTTE assassins at Kottiyapula near Batticaloa on January 16. On January 21, the LTTE also kidnapped two more spies working for the same unit.
By January 4, the LTTE intelligence unit, apparently after receiving information from Police or political sources close to the Police had launched a crackdown on Tamil civilians suspected to have helped the LRRP teams in the Eastern province. The Sunday Times, a pro-government weekly in Colombo reported that an unknown number of civilians had been taken into custody for interrogation by LTTE intelligence cadres. Many of them could be dead by now.
The Lakbima newspaper quoted army commander Lt. General Lionel Balagalle of having said that the killing and the kidnapping took place because this meaningless police raid had exposed details of army intelligence. Lt.General Balagalle reportedly charged that because of a politically motivated police officer the patriotic and brave officers and their secret operations were unceremoniously exposed and now the army was finding it difficult to provide adequate security to army men thus exposed and their families.
Meanwhile, the Sunday Times, a pro-government weekly owned by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe' S cousin, Ranjith Wijeyawardene said the arrest of the members of the LRRP unit has turned out to be illegal and all those who were arrested would soon file a fundamental rights case against the government. (EOM)
(27/01/02 Go2lanka.com)
The same sources said two more spies serving the unit had been also kidnapped by the Tamil Tigers as a result of the exposure of the raid conducted by Police Superintendent Kulasiri Udugampola backed by the Interior Minister John Ameratunga.
The premises in Millennium Park, Athurugiriya, where the raid took place were rented by the Sri Lanka Army, as a safe house for a unit of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) run under the Directorate of Military Intelligence. A police team led by Udugampola raided on the house and arrested the army captain who was in charge of the unit and five soldiers including a former member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who had now joined the unit. The unit was part of a highly successful program by the Sri Lanka Army to penetrate deep into the Tiger territory and assassinate LTTE leaders. Many such as the self-styled Colonel Shanker, a confidante of the Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran had been killed by the LRRP.
Army commander Lt. General Lionel Balagalle dispatched his Director of Military Intelligence Brigadier Kapila Hendavitharana to avoid the clumsy arrest of the very efficient long-range unit from being taken away to be locked up. Hendavitharana reportedly arranged a telephone conversation between Inspector General of Police Lucky Kodituwakku and Udugampola to stop the embarrassing situation. Kodituwakku requested the SP to consider what the army intelligence man had to say. But the SP with alleged UNP connections instead phoned up Interior Minister John Ameratunga and complained there were pressures on him. To back Udugampola Ameratunga sent a senior officer of his ministry. Udugampola then arrested all men and took all weapons in to his custody. They were arrested on a charge of a plot to assassinate Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, now found to be baseless. After all the damage done and under growing protests of the army the UNF government released the arrested.
All this talk about a plot to kill Ranil Wickremesinghe was first published in the official organ of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Tamil Guardian during November of last year. It was complained to the army commander more or less the same time by the then UNP chairman Charitha Ratwatte and his deputy Daya Pelpola. Many consider it as a plant by the Tamil Tigers with the help of the UNP to destroy the LRRP unit of the army. Both the CID and the Army have found the assassination story baseless.
After details of the highly secretive unit was divulged to the police the Tamil Tigers killed the civil intelligence unit chief of the army in Batticaloa. The man, an ex-PLOTE member , Vidhyadharan was gunned down by LTTE assassins at Kottiyapula near Batticaloa on January 16. On January 21, the LTTE also kidnapped two more spies working for the same unit.
By January 4, the LTTE intelligence unit, apparently after receiving information from Police or political sources close to the Police had launched a crackdown on Tamil civilians suspected to have helped the LRRP teams in the Eastern province. The Sunday Times, a pro-government weekly in Colombo reported that an unknown number of civilians had been taken into custody for interrogation by LTTE intelligence cadres. Many of them could be dead by now.
The Lakbima newspaper quoted army commander Lt. General Lionel Balagalle of having said that the killing and the kidnapping took place because this meaningless police raid had exposed details of army intelligence. Lt.General Balagalle reportedly charged that because of a politically motivated police officer the patriotic and brave officers and their secret operations were unceremoniously exposed and now the army was finding it difficult to provide adequate security to army men thus exposed and their families.
Meanwhile, the Sunday Times, a pro-government weekly owned by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe' S cousin, Ranjith Wijeyawardene said the arrest of the members of the LRRP unit has turned out to be illegal and all those who were arrested would soon file a fundamental rights case against the government. (EOM)
(27/01/02 Go2lanka.com)
From the eyes of a soldier on the front line by Spc. Kenneth McBean With the Rakkasans in Iraq
Back on June 22nd I had written my first story on people should be more proud of our nation, support us troops, and what us soldiers go through on deployment. I had written that at the time I was in Baghdad, at a time when we just went through hard times traveling from Kuwait all the way north through Baghdad so we could link up with the 3rd Infantry Division and support them on any attacks againsy Saddam's Fedaieen ("fed-a-heen" - meaning "commanders") regime, who later called themselves the Death Squad. Corny name if you ask any of us, but definitely dangerous.
No matter where we went we left in a platoon size element, or sometimes even the whole company, to patrol sectors of Baghdad, set up traffic control points (TCPs) to seize weapons from Baath Party members or just civilians who could eventually harm U.S. soldiers. Every now and then we also did raids on homes or buildings where we were tipped off by local Iraqi's of possible weapons caches or where enemy personnel might be. Most of the time it was just someone wasting our time. However, when we came across the enemy they never knew we were coming or where. Or they tried to ambush us. We never lost anyone from the few firefights we were in. We always prevailed.
There were lots of talk too that the enemy stopped attacking us because they thought everything we wore was bulletproof, including our DCU tops, bottoms, and boots. Also, wherever we went eventually people were either scared of us or happy to see us. We were like celebrities... all because of our patch that we wore. Not just the 101st "Screaming Eagles" patch, but our Rakkasan "Tori" patch that's worn on our helmets.
No one really knows much about the Rakkasans because not much publicity went towards us during this war. The Rakkasans, 3rd Brigade of the 101st, are probably the best unit the Army has when it comes to light infantry. We have been compared sometime to Rangers, Special Forces, even Delta Force, because we've been deployed to just about every conflict in the world since around 1941-42 when they were sent into WWII. At that time they were just called the 187th Infantry Combat team and that was the size of a battalion. You might remember Hamburger Hill during the Vietnam War, that was the Rakkasans who took over that hill. I know we lost it the day after, but we still went down in history for that battle. To those who wonder what the Rakkasan stands for, it all started in WWII when the Airborne Combat Team jumped out of the sky and the Japanese didn't know what they saw exactly, so they called out "Rakkasan", which means, "Falling Umbrellas." Rakkasans have gone down in history to the call of the world to make sure the job gets done.
That's why we're still here in Iraq during this peacekeeping time. We're making sure medical supplies and hospitals are working, electricity and water are running, the police departments are fully operational and are making sure things aren't getting out of hand, plus doing other humanitarian projects all throughout Iraq.
For some reason though, no matter how much we help the Iraqi people with their problems, we still get attacks against us from terrorist groups, those with the Baath Party, or anyone else who wants to start a conflict with us. The only political party that has been supportive of us is the PDK, the People's Democracy of Kurdistan. The Kurd's are real supportive. Right now we have three former Iraqi
No matter where we went we left in a platoon size element, or sometimes even the whole company, to patrol sectors of Baghdad, set up traffic control points (TCPs) to seize weapons from Baath Party members or just civilians who could eventually harm U.S. soldiers. Every now and then we also did raids on homes or buildings where we were tipped off by local Iraqi's of possible weapons caches or where enemy personnel might be. Most of the time it was just someone wasting our time. However, when we came across the enemy they never knew we were coming or where. Or they tried to ambush us. We never lost anyone from the few firefights we were in. We always prevailed.
There were lots of talk too that the enemy stopped attacking us because they thought everything we wore was bulletproof, including our DCU tops, bottoms, and boots. Also, wherever we went eventually people were either scared of us or happy to see us. We were like celebrities... all because of our patch that we wore. Not just the 101st "Screaming Eagles" patch, but our Rakkasan "Tori" patch that's worn on our helmets.
No one really knows much about the Rakkasans because not much publicity went towards us during this war. The Rakkasans, 3rd Brigade of the 101st, are probably the best unit the Army has when it comes to light infantry. We have been compared sometime to Rangers, Special Forces, even Delta Force, because we've been deployed to just about every conflict in the world since around 1941-42 when they were sent into WWII. At that time they were just called the 187th Infantry Combat team and that was the size of a battalion. You might remember Hamburger Hill during the Vietnam War, that was the Rakkasans who took over that hill. I know we lost it the day after, but we still went down in history for that battle. To those who wonder what the Rakkasan stands for, it all started in WWII when the Airborne Combat Team jumped out of the sky and the Japanese didn't know what they saw exactly, so they called out "Rakkasan", which means, "Falling Umbrellas." Rakkasans have gone down in history to the call of the world to make sure the job gets done.
That's why we're still here in Iraq during this peacekeeping time. We're making sure medical supplies and hospitals are working, electricity and water are running, the police departments are fully operational and are making sure things aren't getting out of hand, plus doing other humanitarian projects all throughout Iraq.
For some reason though, no matter how much we help the Iraqi people with their problems, we still get attacks against us from terrorist groups, those with the Baath Party, or anyone else who wants to start a conflict with us. The only political party that has been supportive of us is the PDK, the People's Democracy of Kurdistan. The Kurd's are real supportive. Right now we have three former Iraqi
Be proud of nation and support troops by Spc. Kenneth McBean With the Rakkasans in Iraq
The following is a letter written by Spc. Kenneth McBean of California, now serving with the 187th Infantry Regiment ("Rakkasans") of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). This letter first appeared in the June 22, 2003 issue of the Inland Valley Daily Bulletin, and comes to us through the generosity of Kenneth's mother, Tina, who is fiercely proud of her son and his fellow soldiers, and of what they are accomplishing in Iraq... as we all are. God's Speed, Kenneth, we look forward to the day we can thank you in person for what you've done.
When people watch the news and read the papers about war or what is going on in a war, they get scared about what is going on. Families are afraid and worried about those they love and know that are at war. They don't know all that is going on, where they are at and how they are doing.
From a soldier's eyes at the front line, we always think about our families and friends and those we are with, always waiting for a letter, a package or just something from back home. Those are the things that lift our morale more than TV, the Internet, or games. We always wait to use a phone to call our loved ones, but we never know when that chance will come.
This is my second deployment overseas to a major conflict. The first was to Afghanistan/Pakistan. However, I was only there for about 2-1/2 months. It was an honor going there to help defend my country, to die for it if I had to.
It's the same way with this conflict. It's what I signed up to do... infantry. However, it's not all that wonderful at times. A lot of "hurry up and wait" going on. I don't regret it one bit.
I'm doing my three years and I'm getting out, going back home to good old California, going to college, starting work and hopefully to finally get into acting just like I've dreamed of since high school. I'm 21 years old, loving life, missing my family and enjoying things one day at a time, no matter how bad it could be. After all, it could always be worse. Expect the worst, hope for the best.
On another note, I don't appreciate hearing about people of my nation degrading us or what we do for a living, protecting you all from this kind of crap happening again. They sent in the best to make sure the job gets done this time. We're here now so our children and your children or yourselves don't have to go in the future.
Also, as retired Lt. General Hal Moore once said (and in We Were Soldiers), "American soldiers in battle don't fight for what some president says on TV, they don't fight for mom, apple pie, the American flag... they fight for one another."
I respect the President and his decisions greatly, but he is not here by our side fighting and killing the enemy; we are. We sleep on the ground, in buildings when we get the chance, eating those terrible MREs (meals ready to eat). We are always on the move, having to spoon with each other on those cold nights; we depend on each other when it comes to fighting side by side.
This is what we've been trained to do. We deserve some respect from those who have never had the guts to join, who are too scared or too lazy.
As far as we all see it now, everyone should be made to join some service for a minimum of two years at some point in their life. Two years go by real fast. I reach my two year mark on August 20 of this year. It's been a blast. You travel for free and get paid for it. You get to do a lot more than you could ever think.
For soldiers on the front line - don't discriminate against us, congratulate us and thank us for what we are doing. Support us 100% all the way. We support you by dying for you and the rest of our country.
Wave the American flag high and be proud of us and our country.
When people watch the news and read the papers about war or what is going on in a war, they get scared about what is going on. Families are afraid and worried about those they love and know that are at war. They don't know all that is going on, where they are at and how they are doing.
From a soldier's eyes at the front line, we always think about our families and friends and those we are with, always waiting for a letter, a package or just something from back home. Those are the things that lift our morale more than TV, the Internet, or games. We always wait to use a phone to call our loved ones, but we never know when that chance will come.
This is my second deployment overseas to a major conflict. The first was to Afghanistan/Pakistan. However, I was only there for about 2-1/2 months. It was an honor going there to help defend my country, to die for it if I had to.
It's the same way with this conflict. It's what I signed up to do... infantry. However, it's not all that wonderful at times. A lot of "hurry up and wait" going on. I don't regret it one bit.
I'm doing my three years and I'm getting out, going back home to good old California, going to college, starting work and hopefully to finally get into acting just like I've dreamed of since high school. I'm 21 years old, loving life, missing my family and enjoying things one day at a time, no matter how bad it could be. After all, it could always be worse. Expect the worst, hope for the best.
On another note, I don't appreciate hearing about people of my nation degrading us or what we do for a living, protecting you all from this kind of crap happening again. They sent in the best to make sure the job gets done this time. We're here now so our children and your children or yourselves don't have to go in the future.
Also, as retired Lt. General Hal Moore once said (and in We Were Soldiers), "American soldiers in battle don't fight for what some president says on TV, they don't fight for mom, apple pie, the American flag... they fight for one another."
I respect the President and his decisions greatly, but he is not here by our side fighting and killing the enemy; we are. We sleep on the ground, in buildings when we get the chance, eating those terrible MREs (meals ready to eat). We are always on the move, having to spoon with each other on those cold nights; we depend on each other when it comes to fighting side by side.
This is what we've been trained to do. We deserve some respect from those who have never had the guts to join, who are too scared or too lazy.
As far as we all see it now, everyone should be made to join some service for a minimum of two years at some point in their life. Two years go by real fast. I reach my two year mark on August 20 of this year. It's been a blast. You travel for free and get paid for it. You get to do a lot more than you could ever think.
For soldiers on the front line - don't discriminate against us, congratulate us and thank us for what we are doing. Support us 100% all the way. We support you by dying for you and the rest of our country.
Wave the American flag high and be proud of us and our country.
Life Publicizes One Week's Dead in Vietnam 1969
The faces shown on the next pages are the faces of American men killed in the words of the official announcement of their deaths "in connection with the conflict in Vietnam." The names, 242 of them, were released by the Pentagon during the week of May 28 through June 3, a span of no special significance except that it includes Memorial Day. The numbers of the dead are average for any seven-day period during this stage of the war.
It is not the intention of this article to speak for the dead. We cannot tell with any precision what they thought of the political currents which drew them across the world. From the letters of some, it is possible to tell they felt strongly that they should be in Vietnam, that they had great sympathy for the Vietnamese people and were appalled at their enormous suffering. Some had voluntarily extended their tours of combat duty; some were desperate to come home. Their families provided most of these photographs, and many expressed their own feelings that their sons and husbands died in a necessary cause. Yet in a time when the numbers of Americans killed in this war - 36,000 - though far less than the Vietnamese losses, have exceeded the dead in the Korean War, when the nation continues week after week to be numbed by a three-digit statistic which is translated to direct anguish in hundreds of homes all over the country, we must pause to look into the faces. More than we must know how many, we must know who. The faces of one week's dead, unknown but to families and friends, are suddenly recognized by all in this gallery of young American eyes....
On the back of a picture he sent home shortly before his death near Saigon, Sgt. William Anderson, 18, of Templeton, Pa., jotted a wry note: "Plain of Reeds, May 12, 1969. Here's a picture of a 2-star general awarding me my Silver Star. I didn't do anything. They just had some extra ones. "His family has a few other recent photographs of the boy, including one showing him this past February helping to put a beam into place on his town's new church. His was the first military funeral held there.
Such fragments on film, in letters, in clippings and in recollection comprise the legacies of virtually every man shown in these pages. To study the smallest portion of them, even without reference to their names, is to glimpse the scope of a much broader tragedy. Writing his family just before the time he was scheduled to return to the U.S., a California man said, ''I could be standing on the doorstep on the 8th [of June1.... As you can see from my shakey printing, the strain of getting 'short' is getting to me, so I'll close now." The ironies and sad coincidences of time hang everywhere. One Pfc. from the 101st Airborne was killed on his 21st birthday. A waiting bride had just bought her own wedding ring. A mother got flowers ordered by her son and then learned he had died the day before they arrived. A Texan had just signed up for a second two-year tour of duty when he was killed, and his ROTC instructor back home remembered with great affection that the boy, a flag-bearer, had stumbled a lot. In the state of Oregon a soldier was buried in a grave shared by the body of his brother, who had died in Vietnam two years earlier. A lieutenant was killed serving the battalion his father had commanded two years ago. A man from Colorado noted in his last letter that the Marines preferred captured NorthVietnamese mortars to their own because they were lighter and much more accurate. At four that afternoon he was killed by enemy mortar fire.
Premonitions gripped many of the men. One wrote, "I have given my life as have many others for a cause in which I firmly believe." Another, writing from Hamburger Hill, said, "You may not be able to read this. I am writing it in a hurry. I see death coming up the hill." One more, who had come home on leave from Vietnam in January and had told his father he did not want to go back and was considering going AWOL, wrote last month, "Everyone's dying, they're all ripped apart. Dad, there's no one left." "I wish now I had told him to jump," the boy's father recalled. "I wish I had, but I couldn't."
Such despair was not everywhere. A lieutenant, a Notre Dame graduate, wrote home in some mild annoyance that he had not been given command of a company ("I would have jumped at the chance but there are too many Capts. floating around") and then reported with a certain pleasure that he was looking forward to his new assignment, which was leader of a reconnaissance platoon. In an entirely cheerful letter to his mother a young man from Georgia wrote, "I guess by now you are having some nice weather. Do you have tomatoes in the garden? 'A' Co. found an NVA farm two days ago with bananas, tomatoes and corn. This is real good land here. You can see why the North wants it."
There is a catalogue of fact for every face. One boy had customized his 13-year-old car and planned to buy a ranch. Another man, a combat veteran of the Korean War, leaves seven children. A third had been an organist in his church and wanted to be a singer. One had been sending his pay home to contribute to his brother's college expenses. The mother of one of the dead, whose son was the third of four to serve in the Army, insists with deep pride, "We are a patriotic family willing to pay that price ."An aunt who had raised her nephew said of him, "He was really and truly a conscientious objector. He told me it was a terrible thought going into the Army and winding up in Vietnam and shooting people who hadn't done anything to him.... Such a waste. Such a shame."
Every photograph, every face carries its own simple and powerful message. The inscription on one boy's picture to his girl reads:
To Miss Shirley Nash
We shall let no Love come between Love.
Only peace and happiness from Heaven Above.
Love always.
Perpetually yours,
To fully appreciate this reading it is strongly suggested that students view the actual article (June 27, 1969) .
From Life, 66 (June 27, 1969). Copyright 0 1969 Time. Inc
LZ SWINGER - A BATTLE ABOVE THE PLEI TRAP VALLEY BY LEE THOMPSON
Note: LZ Swinger was on top of Chu Hing Mountain. A 729-meter (2187 ft.) perch overlooking the Plei Trap Valley approximately 10 kilometers from the Cambodian border.
Moving In
They told us it was a "cold LZ"...right!
It was a cold, drizzly morning...late February 69 when we huddled on the chopper pad at LZ Bass, waiting to head out for LZ Swinger. Six Huey's full of "hard-fisters" were set to fly into Swinger and clean up the deserted NVA FSB and get it ready for Charlie Battery, 1/92. We were moving out near the Cambodian border to help prevent NVA infiltration into Vietnam. The initial plan called for elements of the 4th Infantry Division to meet us there and supply perimeter support. Our mission was to provide support to the 4th Infantry while they swept the valley looking for spooks.
I was scheduled to board the 3rd or 4th bird. All of the six were to take off at 5min intervals. I don't remember why. So, 10 minutes after the first bird left, I was preparing to head out. It was then that the plan went south in a hurry. The pilot from the first chopper called back and said the guys on Swinger were under heavy fire. The first bird had landed and off-loaded. As it was on its way back...and the 2nd bird hovered to land...the hill came alive with small arms fire.
Many of you will recall that Swinger is a long narrow hilltop, shaped like an hourglass. The hilltop sloped softly to the south so the chopper pad was on the high end to the north. That end fell off steeply into the jungle on the north and west, and sloped off in a narrow trail into the jungle to the east. The Redlegs on the first bird had decided to wait on the pad and smoke until more birds arrived. Obviously, no adult leadership! Well, as the 2nd bird approached they got up to make way, moving southward down the gentle slope of the hilltop. As the 2nd bird off-loaded, NVA regulars opened up with ferocious fire. One KIA for the good guys immediately. The rest of the birds were held at LZ Bass until somebody could figure out what to do.
For about an hour, our brave cannoneers acted like grunts, and stood their ground. I wish I could recall the names of those heroes. After intense, close quarter fighting, they achieved victory, and the initial fighting was over.
32 NVA bodies were recovered. As my bird landed, the dust was finally settling. Talk about adrenaline! Some guys were still pumped when I arrived. I discovered a 51mm anti-aircraft gun off the edge of the hill in a bunker. It was aimed in the direction our birds had flown, but had jammed and was useless. What an act of God!
The Ivy Division moved in to provide security, and we settled into a routine. Hulus Key, Sugar Bear and Woody Anderson were my closest friends on that hill. Lou Monaco used to come by frequently to shoot the breeze and talk about home. Captain Gill was CO, Lt. Allin was XO, and some cherry 2nd Lt. had just moved into FDC. Lt. Livingston I presume. We called him "Sheila," which infuriated him.
Settling Down
A couple of days after we arrived, we began getting sniper fire from the tree line off the east side of the north end off the hill. The grunts sent a four-man team down to smoke him out. I was sitting on a pile of sandbags...fascinated. About 3 minutes after they entered the tree line I heard "POP, POP, POP!" I assumed we fired up the bad guy until a minute later two grunts came tearing out of the tree line yelling. TWO DOWN!
The Infantry NCOIC was standing next to me when the two guys came running up to him in a panic. He settled them down, grabbed another couple of grunts and sent them down to extract the downed soldiers. Four went in...it seemed like and eternity. I hear another couple of "POP, POP, POPs" and soon saw the four grunts dragging two wounded guys out of the tree line. As they dragged them up to where I was sitting, the NCOIC yelled at another four men to gear up and go down after that sniper. Meanwhile, their medic was attending to the wounded. I recall one was shot in the knee, and was crying in extreme pain, "I don't want to die!" The other kid was silent and pale. He had a bullet in his chest. He looked into the sky with a vacant stare, and breathed with severe difficulty.
I knew he was dying. I wondered why a chaplain wasn't there to pray with him. I believe it was at that precise moment that God called me to serve Him as a military chaplain.
The third team was down in the trees and got fired up. One went down, and the other three scrambled back up the hill to the NCOIC. As he surveyed the situation, he looked at me and said "Go down with this guy and get that guy out of there." I responded..."I'm a Redleg!" He said, "not now, you're not!"
I told him I didn't have my gun (weapon, for you lifers) or helmet. I nearly puked as he handed me an M-16 and helmet, both drenched in blood. "Here," he shouted, "now, get going!" As I slowly made my way down the trail to the trees, I looked at the kid with me. He had to be at least 12! I asked, "Have you ever done this before?" He responded hesitantly, "no." GREAT!
I said "You watch the ground, I'll watch the trees, kill anything that moves!" With that strategy, we picked our way down the trail till it came to a sharp bend. I had a hunch, there was trouble so I got down and slowly crawled to the bend in the trail. As I peeked around, I saw our grunt...down, but alive...not moving. The big decision now was...how do I get him without becoming a statistic myself? The other kid and I finally decided we had to just do it. We couldn't see any sign of a bad guy so I asked him to cover me while I crept forward...nothing. The bad guy was apparently gone. I scurried up to the downed guy to see if I could drag him back. He must have weighed 300lbs! I was 120lbs, so it wasn't gonna happen! I sent the other kid back up for some help and I waited. That entire time, the WIA never moved. He was unconscious.
A few minutes later, three guys arrived with a stretcher. We loaded the WIA up and hauled him back up the hill. By the time we got him there...he was KIA. And, I was no longer a 20 year old kid from Minnesota. I'd aged years! That was my baptism under fire and I'll never forget it. I knew why I liked being a Redleg!
The Air Force arrived shortly and saturated the trees with napalm. The sight was mesmerizing. I'm on record as saying, "thank God for DOW Chemical!" No bad guy could survive that, long enough to hurt me!
THE DAILY GRIND
Within days we started getting "incoming" every time a chopper would try to set down on the pad. It took its toll. Two or three rounds and silence. Virtually every time we took casualties. We all were getting jumpy. Eventually we got into the habit of dropping into a bunker as soon as a bird got close. Even that didn't always help. One morning, after an incident I saw the medic leaning against some sandbags puking his guts out. He was white as a sheet. I, of course, figured something happened. When I asked him, he explained that two of our infantry guys had jumped into a bunker for cover, and a mortar jumped right in behind them. They couldn't even figure out who they were at first. I remember feeling good when I found out they weren't my Redlegs.
Another morning we took casualties. I don't remember how it all happened...it went so quickly. I vividly recall a "cherry" jumping off the slick...with a bewildered look...just as a mortar round impacted. He took some shrapnel in the chest and they just threw him back in the chopper. He was in country what? Three days? And he was going home...if he survived.
The Infantry sent out LP's (Listening posts) every night. In FDC we would monitor their radio. They would key their radio mikes every hour to let us know they were OK. One particular night...about 0300...we stopped getting signals from the LP down south. When the infantry went down, after sunup to check, they found all four with their throats slit. Everybody freaked. It hadn't occurred to us that anybody was interested in getting that close. The next night we got movement on the wire, and it all hit the fan. We called in Spooky (now, there's a beautiful sight!) for air support and just threw as much lead out as we could. I had an M-79 and was popping rounds as fast as I could. When the silence set in we were all terrified. All we could think about was sappers. Nothing...just silence. Just as the sun was coming up I heard some distant moaning outside the wire. It took ages before we got permission to go out and investigate. We found a wounded NVA soldier. We brought him in and tried to nurse his wounds. He had obviously taken some WP in the face 'cause it looked like his flesh was melting off. He was conscious, and scared to death. All I could think about was "how do I explain to this guy that I don't want to hurt him?" We fed him some applesauce out of our C-rats and shipped him back to Pleiku.
My worst day on Swinger was Mar 10, 1969. It was early, and a resupply bird was inbound. I got a call in FDC that "Sugar Bear" was on board. He and I had been close friends before he went back to the rear. Funny thing...I don't even remember his given name. He was being shipped home so was taking one last trip out to say goodbye. As soon as I heard the bird, I jumped out of FDC and headed up to the pad. The slick was settling in and I was almost on the pad. For some reason my eye caught sight of something in a bunker. It was a brand new Time Magazine. "Huh?" I immediately dove in to get it. It would never be there when I got back. Just as I landed in the bunker, two rounds impacted on the pad. Six casualties.
"Medic!" was being screamed immediately. I popped my head up and peered toward the helo pad. There was dust, and confusion everywhere. All of a sudden I thought "where's Sugar Bear?" I saw a guy jump in next to me and I asked him. He didn't know anything. I jumped out of the bunker and ran to the pad. There were four guys sitting there in all states of damage. I remember one kid's shirt was off and his back looked like hamburger. He was crying. Another kid had crapped in his pants. I thought he must be embarrassed. I looked over next to some empty canisters and saw Sugar Bear. His helmet was off and half his head was missing. His eyes had blown out of their sockets and both his hands were scraped clear to the bones. They looked like skeleton hands. I checked for vital signs and he was breathing so I began to attempt first aid. But...where do you begin? Out of nowhere somebody handed me a breathing tube. I put it down his throat so he could breathe easier. I worked on him for 45 minutes. Carefully bandaging all his wounds, always checking his vitals. Shallow breathing...weak pulse. But he never quit. Eventually his breathing was so shallow I could barely detect it and I could no longer feel a pulse. By this time the "Dust off" birds were coming in and I had Sugar Bear covered with a poncho to keep the dust and sand off him. A grunt colonel came up to me and asked me if I wanted to put him on a bird. I knew the drill: Casualties with likelihood of surviving were first. I asked the colonel if there was any space left, and he said "no, but I can make space." With tears in my eyes I told him we could wait for the next bird.
I was awarded a Bronze Star w/ "V". For what? I didn't do anything the rest of you wouldn't have done. Still...My head told me, I made the right decision, but some days my heart still wonders. The Lee Thompson who came down off that hill, was not the same Lee Thompson that went up a month earlier.
THE BRIGHTER SIDE
Everything wasn't always such a downer. We'd often play poker at night in FDC. Different players would come and go, but Lt Livingston seemed to always want to play. Over time I was very lucky. I had built up savings of over $3,000. I was saving to by a new car when I got home. One night Lt Livingston was having bad luck. We were playing Black Jack for $5 a hand. He was down $50 and was getting angry. He decided we should play for $10 a hand. I said "it's a bad idea Sheila...you're just gonna lose twice as fast." He hated being called Sheila, but it's how we felt about him. Like an obedient Sp4, I complied. $150 later he asked me if he could have his money back. No, he wasn't kidding! Sheila asked me what I was going to do with my money. I told him I was dreaming of a Dodge Charger. I showed him pictures, and he got all excited. He told me he was gonna get one too. On Lt.'s pay I figured he could swing it. A few days later he got a letter from his wife. The car died and she bought a new Dodge Dart. He was all bummed. "Now I can't get a Charger" he whined. "are you kidding?" I cried. "Tell her to take the damned car back. She never got your permission to by a DART!" Sheila whipped off an angry letter to his wife. (Who was the kid who owned the GTX?) A couple of weeks later he got another letter from his wife. She basically said "sit on it and spin!" I wonder if he ever found out who popped purple smoke in his hootch. I don't think it was me...I'm not sure. But, I was there and it was hysterical. Actually...I got a little nervous when he came screaming out of his hootch coated with purple...gasping for breath! We got a new Lt., Sheila moved on. This guy had a screw loose. One night I was working up H&I fire. A sixteen point grid. The book says to compute the mission one column at a time...top to bottom, left to right. One of you gun bunnies asked me why they couldn't be shot left to right...for some reason it was easier. It seemed good to me. Anyway, back to the Lt. He asked me what I was doing and I told him "H&I's." "You're doing it wrong" he said. "You're supposed to do it up and down, left to right." I explained how it was easier on the gun bunnies this way and he basically said "Screw the cannon-cockers! You do it the way I tell you." I patiently said I wouldn't...He was new and I knew what I was doing. You've gotta hear this..."If I tell you to do this in red ink...you'll do it in red ink! I'm the Lt!" Well, I laid my pencil down and said "I quit" I walked out of FDC and went down to see Lt Allin, the XO. After listening to me he gave a chuckle and said "I don't really think you can quit, Hardcore." I know two things about that. I never did a mission in red ink, and I never computed an H&I the way the book said. I wonder what ever happened to that cherry Lt?
(The 1/92nd Field Artillery Association - Vietnam)
Moving In
They told us it was a "cold LZ"...right!
It was a cold, drizzly morning...late February 69 when we huddled on the chopper pad at LZ Bass, waiting to head out for LZ Swinger. Six Huey's full of "hard-fisters" were set to fly into Swinger and clean up the deserted NVA FSB and get it ready for Charlie Battery, 1/92. We were moving out near the Cambodian border to help prevent NVA infiltration into Vietnam. The initial plan called for elements of the 4th Infantry Division to meet us there and supply perimeter support. Our mission was to provide support to the 4th Infantry while they swept the valley looking for spooks.
I was scheduled to board the 3rd or 4th bird. All of the six were to take off at 5min intervals. I don't remember why. So, 10 minutes after the first bird left, I was preparing to head out. It was then that the plan went south in a hurry. The pilot from the first chopper called back and said the guys on Swinger were under heavy fire. The first bird had landed and off-loaded. As it was on its way back...and the 2nd bird hovered to land...the hill came alive with small arms fire.
Many of you will recall that Swinger is a long narrow hilltop, shaped like an hourglass. The hilltop sloped softly to the south so the chopper pad was on the high end to the north. That end fell off steeply into the jungle on the north and west, and sloped off in a narrow trail into the jungle to the east. The Redlegs on the first bird had decided to wait on the pad and smoke until more birds arrived. Obviously, no adult leadership! Well, as the 2nd bird approached they got up to make way, moving southward down the gentle slope of the hilltop. As the 2nd bird off-loaded, NVA regulars opened up with ferocious fire. One KIA for the good guys immediately. The rest of the birds were held at LZ Bass until somebody could figure out what to do.
For about an hour, our brave cannoneers acted like grunts, and stood their ground. I wish I could recall the names of those heroes. After intense, close quarter fighting, they achieved victory, and the initial fighting was over.
32 NVA bodies were recovered. As my bird landed, the dust was finally settling. Talk about adrenaline! Some guys were still pumped when I arrived. I discovered a 51mm anti-aircraft gun off the edge of the hill in a bunker. It was aimed in the direction our birds had flown, but had jammed and was useless. What an act of God!
The Ivy Division moved in to provide security, and we settled into a routine. Hulus Key, Sugar Bear and Woody Anderson were my closest friends on that hill. Lou Monaco used to come by frequently to shoot the breeze and talk about home. Captain Gill was CO, Lt. Allin was XO, and some cherry 2nd Lt. had just moved into FDC. Lt. Livingston I presume. We called him "Sheila," which infuriated him.
Settling Down
A couple of days after we arrived, we began getting sniper fire from the tree line off the east side of the north end off the hill. The grunts sent a four-man team down to smoke him out. I was sitting on a pile of sandbags...fascinated. About 3 minutes after they entered the tree line I heard "POP, POP, POP!" I assumed we fired up the bad guy until a minute later two grunts came tearing out of the tree line yelling. TWO DOWN!
The Infantry NCOIC was standing next to me when the two guys came running up to him in a panic. He settled them down, grabbed another couple of grunts and sent them down to extract the downed soldiers. Four went in...it seemed like and eternity. I hear another couple of "POP, POP, POPs" and soon saw the four grunts dragging two wounded guys out of the tree line. As they dragged them up to where I was sitting, the NCOIC yelled at another four men to gear up and go down after that sniper. Meanwhile, their medic was attending to the wounded. I recall one was shot in the knee, and was crying in extreme pain, "I don't want to die!" The other kid was silent and pale. He had a bullet in his chest. He looked into the sky with a vacant stare, and breathed with severe difficulty.
I knew he was dying. I wondered why a chaplain wasn't there to pray with him. I believe it was at that precise moment that God called me to serve Him as a military chaplain.
The third team was down in the trees and got fired up. One went down, and the other three scrambled back up the hill to the NCOIC. As he surveyed the situation, he looked at me and said "Go down with this guy and get that guy out of there." I responded..."I'm a Redleg!" He said, "not now, you're not!"
I told him I didn't have my gun (weapon, for you lifers) or helmet. I nearly puked as he handed me an M-16 and helmet, both drenched in blood. "Here," he shouted, "now, get going!" As I slowly made my way down the trail to the trees, I looked at the kid with me. He had to be at least 12! I asked, "Have you ever done this before?" He responded hesitantly, "no." GREAT!
I said "You watch the ground, I'll watch the trees, kill anything that moves!" With that strategy, we picked our way down the trail till it came to a sharp bend. I had a hunch, there was trouble so I got down and slowly crawled to the bend in the trail. As I peeked around, I saw our grunt...down, but alive...not moving. The big decision now was...how do I get him without becoming a statistic myself? The other kid and I finally decided we had to just do it. We couldn't see any sign of a bad guy so I asked him to cover me while I crept forward...nothing. The bad guy was apparently gone. I scurried up to the downed guy to see if I could drag him back. He must have weighed 300lbs! I was 120lbs, so it wasn't gonna happen! I sent the other kid back up for some help and I waited. That entire time, the WIA never moved. He was unconscious.
A few minutes later, three guys arrived with a stretcher. We loaded the WIA up and hauled him back up the hill. By the time we got him there...he was KIA. And, I was no longer a 20 year old kid from Minnesota. I'd aged years! That was my baptism under fire and I'll never forget it. I knew why I liked being a Redleg!
The Air Force arrived shortly and saturated the trees with napalm. The sight was mesmerizing. I'm on record as saying, "thank God for DOW Chemical!" No bad guy could survive that, long enough to hurt me!
THE DAILY GRIND
Within days we started getting "incoming" every time a chopper would try to set down on the pad. It took its toll. Two or three rounds and silence. Virtually every time we took casualties. We all were getting jumpy. Eventually we got into the habit of dropping into a bunker as soon as a bird got close. Even that didn't always help. One morning, after an incident I saw the medic leaning against some sandbags puking his guts out. He was white as a sheet. I, of course, figured something happened. When I asked him, he explained that two of our infantry guys had jumped into a bunker for cover, and a mortar jumped right in behind them. They couldn't even figure out who they were at first. I remember feeling good when I found out they weren't my Redlegs.
Another morning we took casualties. I don't remember how it all happened...it went so quickly. I vividly recall a "cherry" jumping off the slick...with a bewildered look...just as a mortar round impacted. He took some shrapnel in the chest and they just threw him back in the chopper. He was in country what? Three days? And he was going home...if he survived.
The Infantry sent out LP's (Listening posts) every night. In FDC we would monitor their radio. They would key their radio mikes every hour to let us know they were OK. One particular night...about 0300...we stopped getting signals from the LP down south. When the infantry went down, after sunup to check, they found all four with their throats slit. Everybody freaked. It hadn't occurred to us that anybody was interested in getting that close. The next night we got movement on the wire, and it all hit the fan. We called in Spooky (now, there's a beautiful sight!) for air support and just threw as much lead out as we could. I had an M-79 and was popping rounds as fast as I could. When the silence set in we were all terrified. All we could think about was sappers. Nothing...just silence. Just as the sun was coming up I heard some distant moaning outside the wire. It took ages before we got permission to go out and investigate. We found a wounded NVA soldier. We brought him in and tried to nurse his wounds. He had obviously taken some WP in the face 'cause it looked like his flesh was melting off. He was conscious, and scared to death. All I could think about was "how do I explain to this guy that I don't want to hurt him?" We fed him some applesauce out of our C-rats and shipped him back to Pleiku.
My worst day on Swinger was Mar 10, 1969. It was early, and a resupply bird was inbound. I got a call in FDC that "Sugar Bear" was on board. He and I had been close friends before he went back to the rear. Funny thing...I don't even remember his given name. He was being shipped home so was taking one last trip out to say goodbye. As soon as I heard the bird, I jumped out of FDC and headed up to the pad. The slick was settling in and I was almost on the pad. For some reason my eye caught sight of something in a bunker. It was a brand new Time Magazine. "Huh?" I immediately dove in to get it. It would never be there when I got back. Just as I landed in the bunker, two rounds impacted on the pad. Six casualties.
"Medic!" was being screamed immediately. I popped my head up and peered toward the helo pad. There was dust, and confusion everywhere. All of a sudden I thought "where's Sugar Bear?" I saw a guy jump in next to me and I asked him. He didn't know anything. I jumped out of the bunker and ran to the pad. There were four guys sitting there in all states of damage. I remember one kid's shirt was off and his back looked like hamburger. He was crying. Another kid had crapped in his pants. I thought he must be embarrassed. I looked over next to some empty canisters and saw Sugar Bear. His helmet was off and half his head was missing. His eyes had blown out of their sockets and both his hands were scraped clear to the bones. They looked like skeleton hands. I checked for vital signs and he was breathing so I began to attempt first aid. But...where do you begin? Out of nowhere somebody handed me a breathing tube. I put it down his throat so he could breathe easier. I worked on him for 45 minutes. Carefully bandaging all his wounds, always checking his vitals. Shallow breathing...weak pulse. But he never quit. Eventually his breathing was so shallow I could barely detect it and I could no longer feel a pulse. By this time the "Dust off" birds were coming in and I had Sugar Bear covered with a poncho to keep the dust and sand off him. A grunt colonel came up to me and asked me if I wanted to put him on a bird. I knew the drill: Casualties with likelihood of surviving were first. I asked the colonel if there was any space left, and he said "no, but I can make space." With tears in my eyes I told him we could wait for the next bird.
I was awarded a Bronze Star w/ "V". For what? I didn't do anything the rest of you wouldn't have done. Still...My head told me, I made the right decision, but some days my heart still wonders. The Lee Thompson who came down off that hill, was not the same Lee Thompson that went up a month earlier.
THE BRIGHTER SIDE
Everything wasn't always such a downer. We'd often play poker at night in FDC. Different players would come and go, but Lt Livingston seemed to always want to play. Over time I was very lucky. I had built up savings of over $3,000. I was saving to by a new car when I got home. One night Lt Livingston was having bad luck. We were playing Black Jack for $5 a hand. He was down $50 and was getting angry. He decided we should play for $10 a hand. I said "it's a bad idea Sheila...you're just gonna lose twice as fast." He hated being called Sheila, but it's how we felt about him. Like an obedient Sp4, I complied. $150 later he asked me if he could have his money back. No, he wasn't kidding! Sheila asked me what I was going to do with my money. I told him I was dreaming of a Dodge Charger. I showed him pictures, and he got all excited. He told me he was gonna get one too. On Lt.'s pay I figured he could swing it. A few days later he got a letter from his wife. The car died and she bought a new Dodge Dart. He was all bummed. "Now I can't get a Charger" he whined. "are you kidding?" I cried. "Tell her to take the damned car back. She never got your permission to by a DART!" Sheila whipped off an angry letter to his wife. (Who was the kid who owned the GTX?) A couple of weeks later he got another letter from his wife. She basically said "sit on it and spin!" I wonder if he ever found out who popped purple smoke in his hootch. I don't think it was me...I'm not sure. But, I was there and it was hysterical. Actually...I got a little nervous when he came screaming out of his hootch coated with purple...gasping for breath! We got a new Lt., Sheila moved on. This guy had a screw loose. One night I was working up H&I fire. A sixteen point grid. The book says to compute the mission one column at a time...top to bottom, left to right. One of you gun bunnies asked me why they couldn't be shot left to right...for some reason it was easier. It seemed good to me. Anyway, back to the Lt. He asked me what I was doing and I told him "H&I's." "You're doing it wrong" he said. "You're supposed to do it up and down, left to right." I explained how it was easier on the gun bunnies this way and he basically said "Screw the cannon-cockers! You do it the way I tell you." I patiently said I wouldn't...He was new and I knew what I was doing. You've gotta hear this..."If I tell you to do this in red ink...you'll do it in red ink! I'm the Lt!" Well, I laid my pencil down and said "I quit" I walked out of FDC and went down to see Lt Allin, the XO. After listening to me he gave a chuckle and said "I don't really think you can quit, Hardcore." I know two things about that. I never did a mission in red ink, and I never computed an H&I the way the book said. I wonder what ever happened to that cherry Lt?
(The 1/92nd Field Artillery Association - Vietnam)
Do Soldiers Cry in War ?
Do soldiers cry in war? Before, during and after ... emotions, smoke, dust, fear, sadness ... as a Viet Nam historian, I know you've heard of the Krimea River in the southern providence ... of our minds.
Laws Of Combat Survival
Don't look conspicuous, it draws fire.
When in doubt, empty your magazine.
Never share a foxhole with anyone braver than you.
Never forget your weapon was made by the lowest bidder.
If your attack is going well, it's an ambush.
No plan survives the first contact intact.
Five second grenade fuses burn down in three seconds.
Look unimportant, the bad guys may be low on ammo.
If you are forward of your position, artillery will fall short.
The enemy diversion you are ignoring is the main attack.
The important things are always simple.
The simple things are always hard.
The easy way is always mined.
If you are short of everything except the enemy, you are in combat.
When you secure an area, don't forget to tell the enemy.
Incoming fire has the right-of-way.
Friendly fire -- isn't.
If the enemy is in range, so are you.
No combat ready unit has ever passed inspection.
Beer math is: two beers times 37 men = 49 cases.
Body count math is: 2 guerrillas plus 2 pigs = 37 enemy KIA
Things that must work together are not shipped together.
Radios will fail as soon as you need them.
Anything you do will get you shot, including doing nothing.
The only thing more accurate than incoming fire is incoming friendly fire.
Make it tough for the enemy to get in and you can't get out.
When both sides are convinced that they are about to lose, they are both right.
Professional soldiers are predictable, but the world is full of amateurs.
Sincerly yours, Sgt."Smokey Robinson" Reser
I am glad and you should be glad to that there are some of us out there that know what you are troubled by. The first time I came across this syndrome was when my father told me about his time spent in a German concentration camp. He was captured in the Battle of the Bulge with General Patton. He told me they use to march the Jews out to the pits and make them all watch as they machine gunned them down and bulldozed them over . Really busting their balls. My father carried a picture of a friend who was shot in front of him for many years. The second time I was talking to my best friend when he was in Nam . We sent tapes back and forth instead of letters. One nite he was talking to me and they came under attack. He left the tape running and thank GOD 20 min. later came back and he was crying, so was I as I was listening. I am just guessing but I think it is safe to say that a lot of MEN cried and still do.
Peace, Jim Bopp
Well, I would say about 95% or more.
Jan Scruggs
I don't know how scholarly this is, but from my families experience.... My dad flew R&R flights out of Vietnam during the war. One trip fell over his birthday, so my mom had a cake snuck on the plane. Half way through the flight, one stewardess (in on the secret) brought the cake out and had the whole flight sing happy birthday to my dad and passed out cake to everyone. Not only were many of the soldiers crying by the end, the stewardess told my mom several of them asked her if it was ok if they ate their cake before their meal.
Deborah Campbell
My uncle Larry, 80, lives in Seaside, California and he was in the Normandy Invasion then walked across Europe in an INFANTRY UNIT till they met the Russians coming from the other direction ... HE NEVER TALKS ABOUT IT MUCH ....
Ron Cabral
Some do, some don't, just like real life.
Bill Elmore
Well from my experience, the answer is yes. In my year with the 101st. I saw a full range of emotions, from laughing to crying. All in the extreme moods, out of control. This would usually be in short bursts and then it was back to business. I broke down in a fire fight once. We were operating in Cambodia in January 68, just before the Tet. We had been in contact all day, we walked into an NVA base camp, which realy annoyed the people there. After things calmed down and the shooting stopped, my platoon moved out to link up with the rest of the company. My point element, I was a squad leader now and not on point any more. But I was still up front 4th man back. The point man missed a turn in the trail, and went the wrong direction. In doing this we cut off an NVA machine gun team trying to get out of the area, and they just lit us up.
They did not hit anyone, but now we were cut off from our platoon and could not move. The NVA could not move either and it was shoot till you hit someone. We had been in constant contact for over two weeks, every day, and everyone’s nerves were shot, including mine. We were cut off by about 30 to 40 yards from the rest of the platoon, which might as well be on the far side of the moon. The NVA was tearing up the area with their machine gun, rounds going every where, and it was only a matter of time before someone was hit. The 4 of us were also rearranging the landscape as best we could. I looked down the trail, saw the radio operator, and yelled, "Somebody do something," and I was crying, totally out of control. Nobody could do anything for us, it was our ball game. This outburst was short and left me shaken, but I regained control of my mind and went back to the business at had. I put my weapon on full auto, and was about to stand up and go for it. Seeing how I thought I was going to die, might as well take some of them with me, when a round cracked right by my right ear. This gave me a whole new outlook, I got the attention of the rest of the point element, and gestured with my hand to move back and out of the area. You see Joe, we were not trained to do that, and didn't do that. When fired on we attacked and overran the people shooting at us. That's why the NVA did not like running into the 101st. Retreat was not in our dictionary, so no one including myself thought, "Hey let's get the fuck out of here and maybe these assholes will stop shooting." As soon as we moved back and out of the line of fire, they stopped shooting and moved out of the area also. I bet they were just as scared as we were. Funny how that works, now isn't it. Once back with the platoon and safe, I felt completely drained emotionally. The radioman never said a word about my crying, that was between us. But I still can see that trail and the whole thing as if it was yesterday. And at the time I was embarrassed at my outburst. I was seasoned veteran, a squad leader, and had to be in control at all times or else people may die. That's a nice trip to lay on a 21 yr. old kid from E. Oakland ... me.
A few days before I had to deal with my machine gunner in my squad. As I said we were in so much shit for so long that people were coming apart at the seams. What the Army had done, without telling us, (it's a need to know thing) was drop us right in the middle of the NVA supply base camps in Cambodia, west of Song Be, 2 1/2 years before the US ever admitted going there. They knew the Tet was coming and wanted to disrupt the NVA supply lines. There was about 2,00 troops involved in this operation. So for a month and a half we were hip deep in NVA. On this day we were in contact and my machine gunner froze on the gun. He just stared down the barrel and mumbled, "Where do I shoot," over and over. I just yelled in his ear, "I don't give a fuck, just fire to the front." He snapped out of it and started working the gun again. This guy was a Pima Indian, and a seasoned vet also. But by this time everyone’s nerves were gone. We were taking heavy casualties, and people were just completely exhausted. In fact the worst scene happened the night before all this. We were in our fire base, it was dark, and this black guy from Baltimore just goes ballistic. He had gotten a letter from his woman, saying she was going to have his kid, and the guy went nuts. He started to run at the wire, firing his weapon, and screaming, "You ain't going to kill me, I'll get you first." He was also crying, just gone. Three of us come up behind him and knocked him down, took his weapon, and carried him back into the fire base. We sat him down and stayed with him all night. I sat there on the ground with his head in my lap and just held him. The whole squad stayed with him saying, "It's ok man, we're here." When the medics came to get him, they were going to sedate him, we would not let them take him. I told them he would be fine and we would stay with him all night. The next morning he was fine, which is a relative term, and nothing was said about the night before. Such is war, such is humanity, and the two don't mix well. But we have been doing this shit as long as we have been walking upright. Makes us look real stupid, now doesn’t it!
Airborne, Steve
I've seen guys cry out of anger, frustration, loss, and hate ... and I've done my share. But then that ain't the image that most folks know or like it seems. The worst leaders I ever saw in 30 years in uniform were those "every hair in place," fish eye cold, by the book martinets who had only the force of law behind them. It was doubly worse if they were stupid. I never saw or heard of them expressing any emotion much less a genuine drop of tear. Yeah, real soldiers cry in war ... and some for a long time afterwards ....
Regards, Rod Thomas...
In my experience with Australian soldiers, I have found that the need to be "macho" amongst themselves is paramount. However, in saying that, I have seen a couple of "big blokes" emotionally crumble on operation and be comforted by his mates in a way that I never thought would happen. I have found that once away from the situation, we as nurses, are able to almost give the boys "permission" to cry, and sometimes that is all that was needed. I know my husband who has been on operational service would never cry in front of his men (he is an officer), and yet in the privacy of our home, his tears flow freely on occasion. I personally think it is entirely dependent on the situation and the personality of the individual. But in short, yes men do cry in war.
Regards
Narelle Biedermann
My answer is yes, but in battle tears quickly turn to hate and revenge.
Peace and Love, ~ Sarge ~ T
This former Navy Combat Corpsman did ... far too often ... and, I still do.
Doc Upton
I (as a male, one-each) cry at certain movies!! I've cried at The Vietnam Wall. I've gotten teary eyed while handing a deceased veteran's US flag, freshly pulled and folded from his casket, to widows whom I didn't even know. And I cried most all the way through the movie Saving Private Ryan ... (but maybe not during the scenes that most would expect tears). I have no problem saying this to women or men. It isn't a big deal to me. Perhaps I learned how to cry at Parris Island. One day the drill instructor had broken a recruit down to tears and some of us laughed. The drill instructor turned to us in a frenzy and yelled something along the lines of, "what are you laughing at? You think its funny to see a grown man cry? You think men don't cry? Go to Vietnam, you'll see men cry!!!" He then proceeded to "punish" us with a long drawn out punishment PT session. So we figured that either he or some of his buddies had cried over there. The point he made to us that day was very important to him....and us. We, the 18 year old "wanna-be-real-men" boys of common America, the little green amphibious monsters of the green machine, future United States Marines, raised with the maxim of "hush, big boys don't cry"...had been given a basic truth from a Vietnam Vet..."yes, men cry in war. You will too...just you wait and see." On the other hand, I recall a Vietnam Vet friend of mine with whom I once talked of this. He said he had tried to cry a few times but he just couldn't. And the way he said it really sounded like he really wished he could have. "I've tried to, Bob ... I, I just can't". Recent movies have had crying male soldier scenes. Specifically: Hamburger Hill ... in the middle of the flick where a guy gets a dear-john letter. And right at the end when one of the survivors sits down in post-battle. Tom Hanks does a superb "acting" job of crying in Saving Private Ryan ... then, he clears his head...and gets back into the mission-accomplishment mode. Earlier war movies, especially from the late 40s to 60s seldom had these kinds of scenes. Two documentary still-photos come to mind about men crying in war. One of them is of a US soldier in a tiger-stripe uniform in Vietnam, sitting on a couple of crates of ammo...his head in his hands, crying. The other one is the US soldier in Desert Storm who was in a medivac helicopter with his dead buddy. Both these pictures are of real warriors, with real emotions. They are no worse than any other soldier. They are no weaker. Nor less brave. They are just ... soldiers who've been through a little piece of hell. Yes, men cry in war ... and many of those who can't ... wish they could.
Robert Gross
Maybe some don't, but most do. Some soldiers I knew actually loved war, but most didn't.
Bill Ehrhart
Men do cry in war, or afterwards. A lifer friend of mine with a Bronze Star for valor, two tours and an extension to each tour (enlisted, 101 Airborne) in Vietnam told me about weeping for his dead friends. And I suppose also for the things he did and saw. I have also seen another lifer (commissioned, now retired F-4 pilot) so sorrowful and remorseful over the things he did and saw others do that I was terrified he was going to shoot himself, but he never wept. Not one tear. I have never been so relieved or surprised to see anyone alive.
The flip side of, "men don't cry" is that women do, but not all of us do, or for more than a few sobs.
We all have different ways of coping with the insupportable.
Erin Solaro
After heavy fighting in Europe, as many as a quarter of the patients evacuated to U.S. Army medical facilities "were uninjured physically but were babbling, crying, shaking, or stunned, unable to hear or talk...." (Ambrose 1997, 329-30)
A U.S. girlfriend of a World War II soldier, upon receiving a letter saying that he cried many nights during heavy fighting, "was convinced I had loved a coward. I never wrote to him again." (Costello 1985, 198)
Joshua
The answer is yes ... some more than others, depending on how numbed out you were.
Dan S. Vietnam 67-68 TET 68 survivor
Sane soldiers cry in war
Sane soldiers try to not cry in combat
Sane soldiers try to stay alive
Sane soldiers sometimes do not have time to cry
Sanity makes you cry
Sanity makes you want to stay alive
Sanity makes you cry at the insanity of combat
Sanity keeps you from crying
Death makes you cry the first time you meet
Death does not allow you the luxury of crying again
Death will take you if you stop to cry
Insanity will team up with death and take you as you cry
Denver Mills
Collected by Joe Borneo
Laws Of Combat Survival
Don't look conspicuous, it draws fire.
When in doubt, empty your magazine.
Never share a foxhole with anyone braver than you.
Never forget your weapon was made by the lowest bidder.
If your attack is going well, it's an ambush.
No plan survives the first contact intact.
Five second grenade fuses burn down in three seconds.
Look unimportant, the bad guys may be low on ammo.
If you are forward of your position, artillery will fall short.
The enemy diversion you are ignoring is the main attack.
The important things are always simple.
The simple things are always hard.
The easy way is always mined.
If you are short of everything except the enemy, you are in combat.
When you secure an area, don't forget to tell the enemy.
Incoming fire has the right-of-way.
Friendly fire -- isn't.
If the enemy is in range, so are you.
No combat ready unit has ever passed inspection.
Beer math is: two beers times 37 men = 49 cases.
Body count math is: 2 guerrillas plus 2 pigs = 37 enemy KIA
Things that must work together are not shipped together.
Radios will fail as soon as you need them.
Anything you do will get you shot, including doing nothing.
The only thing more accurate than incoming fire is incoming friendly fire.
Make it tough for the enemy to get in and you can't get out.
When both sides are convinced that they are about to lose, they are both right.
Professional soldiers are predictable, but the world is full of amateurs.
Sincerly yours, Sgt."Smokey Robinson" Reser
I am glad and you should be glad to that there are some of us out there that know what you are troubled by. The first time I came across this syndrome was when my father told me about his time spent in a German concentration camp. He was captured in the Battle of the Bulge with General Patton. He told me they use to march the Jews out to the pits and make them all watch as they machine gunned them down and bulldozed them over . Really busting their balls. My father carried a picture of a friend who was shot in front of him for many years. The second time I was talking to my best friend when he was in Nam . We sent tapes back and forth instead of letters. One nite he was talking to me and they came under attack. He left the tape running and thank GOD 20 min. later came back and he was crying, so was I as I was listening. I am just guessing but I think it is safe to say that a lot of MEN cried and still do.
Peace, Jim Bopp
Well, I would say about 95% or more.
Jan Scruggs
I don't know how scholarly this is, but from my families experience.... My dad flew R&R flights out of Vietnam during the war. One trip fell over his birthday, so my mom had a cake snuck on the plane. Half way through the flight, one stewardess (in on the secret) brought the cake out and had the whole flight sing happy birthday to my dad and passed out cake to everyone. Not only were many of the soldiers crying by the end, the stewardess told my mom several of them asked her if it was ok if they ate their cake before their meal.
Deborah Campbell
My uncle Larry, 80, lives in Seaside, California and he was in the Normandy Invasion then walked across Europe in an INFANTRY UNIT till they met the Russians coming from the other direction ... HE NEVER TALKS ABOUT IT MUCH ....
Ron Cabral
Some do, some don't, just like real life.
Bill Elmore
Well from my experience, the answer is yes. In my year with the 101st. I saw a full range of emotions, from laughing to crying. All in the extreme moods, out of control. This would usually be in short bursts and then it was back to business. I broke down in a fire fight once. We were operating in Cambodia in January 68, just before the Tet. We had been in contact all day, we walked into an NVA base camp, which realy annoyed the people there. After things calmed down and the shooting stopped, my platoon moved out to link up with the rest of the company. My point element, I was a squad leader now and not on point any more. But I was still up front 4th man back. The point man missed a turn in the trail, and went the wrong direction. In doing this we cut off an NVA machine gun team trying to get out of the area, and they just lit us up.
They did not hit anyone, but now we were cut off from our platoon and could not move. The NVA could not move either and it was shoot till you hit someone. We had been in constant contact for over two weeks, every day, and everyone’s nerves were shot, including mine. We were cut off by about 30 to 40 yards from the rest of the platoon, which might as well be on the far side of the moon. The NVA was tearing up the area with their machine gun, rounds going every where, and it was only a matter of time before someone was hit. The 4 of us were also rearranging the landscape as best we could. I looked down the trail, saw the radio operator, and yelled, "Somebody do something," and I was crying, totally out of control. Nobody could do anything for us, it was our ball game. This outburst was short and left me shaken, but I regained control of my mind and went back to the business at had. I put my weapon on full auto, and was about to stand up and go for it. Seeing how I thought I was going to die, might as well take some of them with me, when a round cracked right by my right ear. This gave me a whole new outlook, I got the attention of the rest of the point element, and gestured with my hand to move back and out of the area. You see Joe, we were not trained to do that, and didn't do that. When fired on we attacked and overran the people shooting at us. That's why the NVA did not like running into the 101st. Retreat was not in our dictionary, so no one including myself thought, "Hey let's get the fuck out of here and maybe these assholes will stop shooting." As soon as we moved back and out of the line of fire, they stopped shooting and moved out of the area also. I bet they were just as scared as we were. Funny how that works, now isn't it. Once back with the platoon and safe, I felt completely drained emotionally. The radioman never said a word about my crying, that was between us. But I still can see that trail and the whole thing as if it was yesterday. And at the time I was embarrassed at my outburst. I was seasoned veteran, a squad leader, and had to be in control at all times or else people may die. That's a nice trip to lay on a 21 yr. old kid from E. Oakland ... me.
A few days before I had to deal with my machine gunner in my squad. As I said we were in so much shit for so long that people were coming apart at the seams. What the Army had done, without telling us, (it's a need to know thing) was drop us right in the middle of the NVA supply base camps in Cambodia, west of Song Be, 2 1/2 years before the US ever admitted going there. They knew the Tet was coming and wanted to disrupt the NVA supply lines. There was about 2,00 troops involved in this operation. So for a month and a half we were hip deep in NVA. On this day we were in contact and my machine gunner froze on the gun. He just stared down the barrel and mumbled, "Where do I shoot," over and over. I just yelled in his ear, "I don't give a fuck, just fire to the front." He snapped out of it and started working the gun again. This guy was a Pima Indian, and a seasoned vet also. But by this time everyone’s nerves were gone. We were taking heavy casualties, and people were just completely exhausted. In fact the worst scene happened the night before all this. We were in our fire base, it was dark, and this black guy from Baltimore just goes ballistic. He had gotten a letter from his woman, saying she was going to have his kid, and the guy went nuts. He started to run at the wire, firing his weapon, and screaming, "You ain't going to kill me, I'll get you first." He was also crying, just gone. Three of us come up behind him and knocked him down, took his weapon, and carried him back into the fire base. We sat him down and stayed with him all night. I sat there on the ground with his head in my lap and just held him. The whole squad stayed with him saying, "It's ok man, we're here." When the medics came to get him, they were going to sedate him, we would not let them take him. I told them he would be fine and we would stay with him all night. The next morning he was fine, which is a relative term, and nothing was said about the night before. Such is war, such is humanity, and the two don't mix well. But we have been doing this shit as long as we have been walking upright. Makes us look real stupid, now doesn’t it!
Airborne, Steve
I've seen guys cry out of anger, frustration, loss, and hate ... and I've done my share. But then that ain't the image that most folks know or like it seems. The worst leaders I ever saw in 30 years in uniform were those "every hair in place," fish eye cold, by the book martinets who had only the force of law behind them. It was doubly worse if they were stupid. I never saw or heard of them expressing any emotion much less a genuine drop of tear. Yeah, real soldiers cry in war ... and some for a long time afterwards ....
Regards, Rod Thomas...
In my experience with Australian soldiers, I have found that the need to be "macho" amongst themselves is paramount. However, in saying that, I have seen a couple of "big blokes" emotionally crumble on operation and be comforted by his mates in a way that I never thought would happen. I have found that once away from the situation, we as nurses, are able to almost give the boys "permission" to cry, and sometimes that is all that was needed. I know my husband who has been on operational service would never cry in front of his men (he is an officer), and yet in the privacy of our home, his tears flow freely on occasion. I personally think it is entirely dependent on the situation and the personality of the individual. But in short, yes men do cry in war.
Regards
Narelle Biedermann
My answer is yes, but in battle tears quickly turn to hate and revenge.
Peace and Love, ~ Sarge ~ T
This former Navy Combat Corpsman did ... far too often ... and, I still do.
Doc Upton
I (as a male, one-each) cry at certain movies!! I've cried at The Vietnam Wall. I've gotten teary eyed while handing a deceased veteran's US flag, freshly pulled and folded from his casket, to widows whom I didn't even know. And I cried most all the way through the movie Saving Private Ryan ... (but maybe not during the scenes that most would expect tears). I have no problem saying this to women or men. It isn't a big deal to me. Perhaps I learned how to cry at Parris Island. One day the drill instructor had broken a recruit down to tears and some of us laughed. The drill instructor turned to us in a frenzy and yelled something along the lines of, "what are you laughing at? You think its funny to see a grown man cry? You think men don't cry? Go to Vietnam, you'll see men cry!!!" He then proceeded to "punish" us with a long drawn out punishment PT session. So we figured that either he or some of his buddies had cried over there. The point he made to us that day was very important to him....and us. We, the 18 year old "wanna-be-real-men" boys of common America, the little green amphibious monsters of the green machine, future United States Marines, raised with the maxim of "hush, big boys don't cry"...had been given a basic truth from a Vietnam Vet..."yes, men cry in war. You will too...just you wait and see." On the other hand, I recall a Vietnam Vet friend of mine with whom I once talked of this. He said he had tried to cry a few times but he just couldn't. And the way he said it really sounded like he really wished he could have. "I've tried to, Bob ... I, I just can't". Recent movies have had crying male soldier scenes. Specifically: Hamburger Hill ... in the middle of the flick where a guy gets a dear-john letter. And right at the end when one of the survivors sits down in post-battle. Tom Hanks does a superb "acting" job of crying in Saving Private Ryan ... then, he clears his head...and gets back into the mission-accomplishment mode. Earlier war movies, especially from the late 40s to 60s seldom had these kinds of scenes. Two documentary still-photos come to mind about men crying in war. One of them is of a US soldier in a tiger-stripe uniform in Vietnam, sitting on a couple of crates of ammo...his head in his hands, crying. The other one is the US soldier in Desert Storm who was in a medivac helicopter with his dead buddy. Both these pictures are of real warriors, with real emotions. They are no worse than any other soldier. They are no weaker. Nor less brave. They are just ... soldiers who've been through a little piece of hell. Yes, men cry in war ... and many of those who can't ... wish they could.
Robert Gross
Maybe some don't, but most do. Some soldiers I knew actually loved war, but most didn't.
Bill Ehrhart
Men do cry in war, or afterwards. A lifer friend of mine with a Bronze Star for valor, two tours and an extension to each tour (enlisted, 101 Airborne) in Vietnam told me about weeping for his dead friends. And I suppose also for the things he did and saw. I have also seen another lifer (commissioned, now retired F-4 pilot) so sorrowful and remorseful over the things he did and saw others do that I was terrified he was going to shoot himself, but he never wept. Not one tear. I have never been so relieved or surprised to see anyone alive.
The flip side of, "men don't cry" is that women do, but not all of us do, or for more than a few sobs.
We all have different ways of coping with the insupportable.
Erin Solaro
After heavy fighting in Europe, as many as a quarter of the patients evacuated to U.S. Army medical facilities "were uninjured physically but were babbling, crying, shaking, or stunned, unable to hear or talk...." (Ambrose 1997, 329-30)
A U.S. girlfriend of a World War II soldier, upon receiving a letter saying that he cried many nights during heavy fighting, "was convinced I had loved a coward. I never wrote to him again." (Costello 1985, 198)
Joshua
The answer is yes ... some more than others, depending on how numbed out you were.
Dan S. Vietnam 67-68 TET 68 survivor
Sane soldiers cry in war
Sane soldiers try to not cry in combat
Sane soldiers try to stay alive
Sane soldiers sometimes do not have time to cry
Sanity makes you cry
Sanity makes you want to stay alive
Sanity makes you cry at the insanity of combat
Sanity keeps you from crying
Death makes you cry the first time you meet
Death does not allow you the luxury of crying again
Death will take you if you stop to cry
Insanity will team up with death and take you as you cry
Denver Mills
Collected by Joe Borneo
Hamburger Hill proved to be the telling battle of the Vietnam War, as Pork Chop Hill was for the Korean War. By Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., U.S. Ar
"Don't mean nothin'." That was the refrain of the powerful 1987 movie about the battle for Hamburger Hill, more correctly called Ap Bia Mountain or Hill 937. Many veterans of that May 1969 fight would no doubt agree, since the hill was abandoned to the enemy soon after it was taken. But the truth is that it was one of the most significant battles of the war, for it spelled the end of major American ground combat operations in Vietnam.
The Hamburger Hill battle had run afoul of a fundamental war-fighting equation. Master philosopher of war Karl von Clausewitz emphasized almost a century and a half earlier that because war is controlled by its political object, "the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it both in magnitude and also in duration." He went on to say, "Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced." And that's exactly what happened. The expenditure of effort at Hamburger Hill exceeded the value the American people attached to the war in Vietnam. The public had turned against the war a year and a half earlier, and it was their intense reaction to the cost of that battle in American lives, inflamed by sensationalist media reporting, that forced the Nixon administration to order the end of major tactical ground operations.
This was not the first time the American public had stopped supporting a war. Contrary to widespread belief, Vietnam is not the most unpopular war in American history. The Mexican War in 1848 was far more unpopular, as was the 195053 war in Korea. The majority of Americans supported the war in Vietnam from the landing of the Marines in Da Nang in March 1965 (64 percent supporting, 21 percent opposed after the first U.S. combat engagements) until October 1967, when for the first time a plurality (46 percent opposed, 44 percent supporting) turned against the war. Those 30 months equaled the period of time the American people supported the ground war in Europe in World War II, from the landing of U.S. forces in North Africa in November 1942 until the end of the war in May 1945. Public opinion had turned--not on ideological grounds, as the anti-war movement would claim, but for pragmatic reasons. "Either win the damn thing or get the hell out!" was the prevalent sentiment, and when the Johnson administration seemed unable to do either, the American people's patience ran out.
American public opinion turned against the war in Korea after only five months, percentages of those in favor falling precipitously after Chinese intervention in the war in November 1950. The war became stalemated after the U.S. Eighth Army's defeat of the 230,000-man Chinese Spring Offensive in April 1951 (as it did in Vietnam with the defeat of the enemy's 1968 Tet Offensive), degenerating into a series of bloody outpost skirmishes.
The last of those skirmishes was the battle for Pork Chop Hill between July 6 and 10, 1953. Officially Hill 255 (from its elevation in yards), it was dubbed Pork Chop Hill because of its geographic shape. One of a series of outposted hills along the "Iron Triangle" in the western sector of the line of contact, it had long been contested by the enemy. Earlier, in November 1952, the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division's Thailand Battalion had come under heavy Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) attack there, but the assault was beaten back.
On March 1, 1953, then defended by the 7th Infantry Division's 31st Infantry Regiment, Pork Chop Hill came under an 8,000-round CCF artillery barrage. Then on March 23, the CCF 67th Division, under cover of an intense mortar and artillery barrage, made a ground attack on Pork Chop Hill. After some initial gains they were beaten back, only to resume the attack on April 16. Once again they were beaten back by counterattacks from the 31st Infantry, reinforced by a battalion from the 7th Infantry Division's 17th Infantry Regiment. But it was artillery that made the difference, as the 7th Infantry Division massed the guns of nine artillery battalions and fired 77,349 rounds in support of the two-day battle.
On July 6, 1953, the CCF made yet another attempt to capture Pork Chop Hill. This time they gained a foothold on a portion of the crest. After repeated attempts to dislodge them were repulsed, General Maxwell D. Taylor, the Eighth U.S. Army commander, ordered the hill to be abandoned on July 11, 1953. Two weeks later, with the signing of the armistice agreement at Panmunjom on July 27, the hill became part of the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea.
Ever the politician (as he would prove to be again in the Vietnam War), General Taylor had made his decision based on his perception of American public and political reactions to the high numbers of U.S. casualties. During the month of July 1953 alone, the United States and its allies along the line of contact, including Pork Chop Hill, had suffered 29,629 casualties both from enemy ground attacks and a record 375,565-round CCF artillery barrage. Chinese and North Korean casualties were estimated at 72,112, most from allied airstrikes and a 2-million-round artillery barrage.
The battle for Hamburger Hill, like the Vietnam War itself, was less intense than the battle for Pork Chop Hill in Korea. A body count confirmed that 633 NVA soldiers had died in the battle, but as Samuel Zaffiri noted in his definitive history of the fight: "There is no telling how many other NVA soldiers were killed and wounded and carried into Laos. No telling how many were buried alive in bunkers and tunnels on the mountain or ended up in forgotten graves in the draws or along the many ridges."
Final U.S. casualties were 46 dead and 400 wounded. While these losses were high, Hamburger Hill was not the bloodiest fight of the war, even for the 101st Airborne Division. In the earlier November 1967 battle of Dak To in the Central Highlands, 289 U.S. soldiers were killed in action and an estimated 1,644 NVA soldiers also perished, victims of the 170,000 rounds of artillery, the 2,100 tactical airstrikes and the 228 Boeing B-52 sorties that supported the operation. Later, during the week of February 10-17, 1968, in the midst of the Tet Offensive, 543 Americans were killed in action and another 2,547 wounded without causing any outcry from the American public.
The Hamburger Hill losses were much smaller, but they set off a firestorm of protest back home. The American people were growing more weary of the war. A February 1969 poll revealed that only 39 percent still supported the war, while 52 percent believed sending troops to fight in Vietnam had been a mistake.
Politicians were quick to seek advantage in those numbers. Most prominent was Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, whose brother John F. Kennedy had been the architect of America's Vietnam involvement. As Zaffiri related: "In the early afternoon of May 29 [1969]...Senator Kennedy [who had served as a draftee military policeman in Paris during the Korean War] stood up on the Senate floor and angrily denounced the attack on Dong Ap Bia, calling it 'senseless and irresponsible...madness...sympathetic of a mentality and a policy that requires immediate attention. American boys are too valuable to be sacrificed to a false sense of military pride.'"
Kennedy would escalate his attack on May 24 in a speech to the New Democratic Coalition in Washington, referring to the battle as nothing but "cruelty and savagery," as well as saying that the Vietnam War was unjustified and immoral. He was soon joined by other senators, including South Dakota's George S. McGovern, a decorated World War II bomber pilot, and Ohio's Stephen M. Young, an infantryman in World War I and an Army staff officer in World War II, who carried the attack to a new level.
In a lengthy speech on May 29, noted Zaffiri: "Young described how during the Civil War the Confederate generals Stonewall Jackson and Robert E. Lee attacked the Union forces at Chancellorsville from the rear and flanks simultaneously and routed them. 'Our generals in Vietnam acted as if they had never studied Lee and Jackson's strategy,' Young concluded. 'Instead, they fling our paratroopers piecemeal in frontal assaults. Instead of seeking to surround the enemy and seeking to assault the hill from the sides and the front simultaneously, there was one frontal assault after another, killing our boys who went up Hamburger Hill.'"
What set off this wave of criticism was a May 19 dispatch by Associated Press war correspondent Jay Sharbutt. While reports of the Hamburger Hill battle had been appearing in newspapers since May 14, most were innocuous descriptions of the fight in routine terms. But Sharbutt's dispatch struck a nerve: "The paratroopers came down the mountain, their green shirts darkened with sweat, their weapons gone, their bandages stained brown and red--with mud and blood.
"Many cursed Lt. Col. Weldon Honeycutt, who sent three companies Sunday to take this 3,000-foot mountain just a mile east of Laos and overlooking the shell-pocked A Shau Valley.
"They failed and they suffered. 'That damn Blackjack [Lt. Col. Honeycutt's radio call sign] won't stop until he kills every one of us,' said one of the 40 to 50 101st Airborne troopers who was wounded."
The day after Sharbutt's story hit the newspapers, Hamburger Hill fell to the troopers of the 101st Airborne Division's 3rd Brigade. But that victory was short-lived, for on June 5 the decision was made to abandon the hill to the enemy, further exacerbating public outrage. Adding fuel to the fire, the June 27, 1969, issue of Life magazine featured photographs of the 241 servicemen killed in Vietnam the previous week, including the five who had been killed in the assault on Hamburger Hill. The feature was titled, "The Faces of the Dead in Vietnam: One Week's Toll," and it was prefaced by a quote from a letter written by one of those five soldiers during a break in the fighting. "You may not be able to read this," it said. "I am writing in a hurry. I see death coming up the hill." The erroneous impression was thus created that all 241 pictured had been killed during the Hamburger Hill assault, increasing public disgust over what appeared to be a senseless loss of life.
Underlying that disgust was the fact that the war in Vietnam did not fit the model of war that was fixed in most American minds. Except for the 19th-century Indian wars on the Western plains, most of America's wars had fixed geographic boundaries, and progress could be measured by movement on the map. But Vietnam was different. As MACV commander General Creighton Abrams tried to explain: "We are not fighting for terrain as such. We are going after the enemy." At a news conference following Hamburger Hill's capture, the 101st Airborne Division's commander, Maj. Gen. Melvin Zais, reinforced General Abrams' words.
"The hill was in my area of operations," Zaffiri quoted Zais as saying. "That was where the enemy was, and that was where I attacked him. If I find the enemy on any other hills in the A Shau, I assure you I'll attack him there also." Asked why he had not relied on Boeing B-52 bombers to do the job, he said, "I don't know how many wars we have to go through to convince people that aerial bombardment alone cannot do the job." When criticized for the high number of casualties involved, Zais testily replied: "It's a myth somebody perpetuated that if we don't do anything, nothing will happen to us. It's not true....It's just a myth that we can pull back and everything will settle down. If we pulled back, and were quiet, they'd kill us in the night. They'd come on and crawl under the wire, and they'd drop satchel charges on our bunkers, and they'd mangle and maim and kill our men. The only way I can in good conscience lead my men is to insure that they're not caught in that kind of situation."
Zais was reiterating a truth that military commanders throughout history have known--offense is the very best defense. But war is first and foremost a political act, and in the view of politicians in Washington the 101st Airborne Division's assault on Hamburger Hill had been a disaster. As Hedrick Smith reported in the May 23, 1969, New York Times, a number of civilian officials in the Nixon administration were afraid such Pyrrhic victories "would undermine public support for the war and thus shorten the administration's time for successful negotiations in Paris." As one official privately told Smith: "Now clearly the greatest limitation is the reaction of the American public. They react to the casualty lists. I don't understand why the military doesn't get the picture. The military is defeating the very thing it most wants--more time to gain a stronger hand."
What the military did not realize was that the American public had always been the greatest limitation on the use of military force. As General Fred C. Weyand, General Abrams' successor as MACV commander, wrote after the war: "Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar relationship between the American Army and the American people. The American Army really is a people's army in the sense that it belongs to the American people who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement." In words particularly applicable to Hamburger Hill, he wrote, "When the Army is committed the American people are committed, when the American people lose their commitment it is futile to try to keep the Army committed."
Given the public and political reaction to Hamburger Hill, a change in war-fighting policy was not long in coming. In order to hold down casualties, what had been a policy of keeping "maximum pressure" on the enemy was changed to one of "protective reaction"--fighting only when threatened by enemy attack. As Lewis Sorley wrote in Thunderbolt (Simon & Schuster), his 1992 biography of General Abrams, when Henry Kissinger, then special assistant to the president for national security affairs, was asked "whether Abrams ever received any instructions, written or otherwise, to hold down the level of U.S. casualties, Kissinger replied, 'Not from the White House.' General Alexander Haig [Kissinger's deputy at the NSC] provided a different answer to the same question: 'Of course.'"
Sorley continued: "On June 19, just a month after the battle at Ap Bia Mountain, President Nixon cleared up any uncertainty there may have been about the existing policy. He had given explicit orders to General Abrams, he later said: 'They are very simply this: he is to conduct the war with a minimum of American casualties.'"
Vietnamization of the war had begun. At the same time Nixon gave his orders to General Abrams, the president also ordered a 25,000-man U.S. troop withdrawal by July 8 and removal of 35,000 more by early December. The U.S. military was on the way out of Vietnam, and the fighting on the ground would gradually be turned over to the ARVN. At the strategic level of the war, time had run out. As State Department Foreign Service Officer Norman Hannah, author of The Key to Failure (Madison Books) and one of the more insightful critics of the war, observed, "This is the tragedy of Vietnam--we were fighting for time rather than space. And time ran out."
Because time had run out at the strategic level, battlefield successes that had been won at the cost of so much blood and sacrifice were also rendered meaningless. In Hanoi a week before the fall of Saigon, I told my North Vietnamese counterpart on the Four Party Joint Military Team (set up by the Paris Peace Accords to deal, unsuccessfully as it turned out, with the POW/MIA issue), "You never beat us on the battlefield." He thought about that for a moment, then replied: "That may be so. But it's also irrelevant." And that irrelevance is what made Hamburger Hill so frustrating.
Previously, battlefield successes had been relevant indeed. Operation Apache Snow, of which the battle for Hamburger Hill would be a part, was designed by the U.S. XXIV Corps to keep the NVA forces in the A Shau Valley off balance. The goal was to prevent them from using the valley as a staging area for an attack on the old imperial capital of Hue and the coastal provinces, as they had done the previous year during the Tet Offensive.
The 45-kilometer-long A Shau Valley, located in rugged country in southwestern Thua Thien province along the Laotian border, was the site of Base Area 611. This base area was a terminus of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a series of roads, trails and pipelines along the Chaine Annamitique mountains that begin in North Vietnam and continue southward along the Laotian and Cambodian border areas to some 60 kilometers from Saigon.
The valley had long been a staging area for NVA units preparing to attack the coastal provinces, and U.S. Army Special Forces established a camp there in 1963. On March 9, 1966, the NVA 95th Regiment launched a major attack on the camp, and the next day, after hard fighting, it fell to the enemy. There they would stage their capture of Hue during the 1968 Tet Offensive. After Hue was retaken, a counterattack into the A Shau was mounted on April 19, 1968, by the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the ARVN 1st Division and an ARVN airborne task force. Called Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216, it ended on May 17, 1968, after stiff resistance and meager results. On August 4, 1968, two battalions of the 101st Airborne Division, with two ARVN battalions, launched an airmobile operation into the valley. Named Operation Somerset, it had no better luck than Operation Delaware and withdrew on August 19.
On January 20, 1969, after a hardened road into the eastern part of the valley was constructed, Operation Dewey Canyon was launched into the A Shau. Led by the three battalions of the 9th Marine Regiment, the Marines not only advanced to the Laotian border but also launched a battalion-sized raid into Laos itself. They discovered that the NVA had built major roads in the area, and as many as 1,000 trucks were moving east from there. After capturing enormous enemy arms caches, including 73 AAA guns, 16 122mm artillery guns, nearly 1,000 AK-47 rifles and more than a million rounds of small-arms and machine-gun ammunition, the Marines withdrew on March 13, 1969.
The immediate prelude to Operation Apache Snow was an operation by the 101st Airborne Division's 2nd Brigade on March 1, 1969, into the southern end of the A Shau Valley. Labeled Operation Massachusetts Striker, it uncovered massive North Vietnamese supply depots that the enemy had abandoned in their flight northward, ironically right into the path of Operation Apache Snow, which began on May 10.
A 10-battalion operation, Apache Snow's initial assault force consisted of the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division under the command of Colonel Joseph B. Conmy, Jr., with his 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry (3/187); the 2nd Battalion, 501st Infantry (2/501); the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (1/506); and two infantry battalions from the 1st ARVN Division. Also part of the operation were the three battalions of the U.S. 9th Marine Regiment; the U.S. 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry; and two additional ARVN infantry battalions. The operation was supported by some 217 airstrikes as well as fire from four 105mm artillery batteries, two 155mm batteries, one 175mm battery and one 8-inch battery.
The main action of the operation was the 10-day assault on Hamburger Hill, which was defended by the entrenched NVA 29th Regiment. The assault was led by the 3/187 "Rakkasans" under the command of Colonel Honeycutt. A detailed firsthand account of that battle by Colonel Conmy, the 3rd Brigade commander and a combat infantry veteran of World War II and the Korean War, appeared in Vietnam Magazine ("Crouching Beast Cornered," in the August 1990 issue). Several of his observations bear repeating, however.
First is his defense of the 3/187 commander Honeycutt, who has been severely condemned as being a heartless butcher. He was my classmate at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., the previous year and was known even then for his abrasive personality.
Enlisting in the Army at age 16 as a sixth-grade dropout, Honeycutt advanced from private to captain in five years and in the Korean War ended up commanding a rifle company in the 187th Regimental Combat Team, then commanded by Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland. Earning the nickname "Tiger" for his aggressiveness, he drove his subordinates hard and some would say mercilessly.
Conmy saw him in a different light. "If I ever go to war again, I want him on my team," he said. "He's a real fighter. Here's an indication of his type of leadership: In the first few days, 3/187 had sustained 50 percent casualties and there was talk of replacing the battalion. However, the troops and Colonel Honeycutt wouldn't have any part of it. They had started the thing and they wanted to finish it." And they did just that, joining forces with the 2/501, attacking from the northeast, the 2nd Battalion, 3rd ARVN Regiment, attacking from the southeast and the 1/506, attacking from the south. Reinforced by the 2/506's Alpha Company, the 3/187 would attack from the west. After the other three battalions had fought their way up the mountain, Colonel Conmy ordered them into blocking positions and gave the 3/187 the honor of making the final assault. By nightfall on May 20, 1969, it was all over.
Conmy also commented on the negative publicity: "Well, people wanted the war to end. This was a battle; maybe if it had been fought a couple of years earlier, it would have been noted--but probably wouldn't have received the attention that it did. In 1969 there was an uproar in the United States. In their eyes we were committing mayhem and murder. Our mission was still to save South Vietnam from communism and give it back to them. If nothing else, this battle certainly helped at the time [and] it was very instrumental in aiding in the eventual withdrawal of our troops from South Vietnam. The enemy had lost his Sunday punch, so to speak."
The late General Abrams, the MACV commander at the time, should have the last word on the battle for Hamburger Hill. His biographer, Lewis Sorley, related: "Shortly after the battle and its immediate aftermath, Abrams had several people over for a game of poker. They had dinner beforehand, and Abrams told his guests: 'Today we had a congressional delegation in, including Teddy Kennedy. They were complaining about the loss of life at Hamburger Hill. I told them the last time the 29th NVA Regiment came out of North Vietnam it destroyed Hue, and I heard from every antiquarian in the world. This time, when they came out again, I issued orders that they were to be intercepted and defeated before they could get to Hue. We drove them back into North Vietnam, but I was criticized for the casualties that entailed. If they would let me know where they would like me to fight the next battle, I would be glad to do it there.' Then they dealt the cards."
A rifle company squad leader in the Korean War and an infantry battalion operations officer in the Vietnam War, Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., is the editor of Vietnam Magazine. For further reading, he suggests: Hamburger Hill, by Samuel Zaffiri (Presidio); and Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action, Korea, 1953, by S.L.A. Marshall (Morrow).
Iraq's Resistance After Saddam by MICHAEL WARE/BAGHDAD (Friday, Dec. 19, 2003)
TIME's Michael Ware talks to the Iraqi insurgents about the impact of Saddam's capture on those fighting the U.S.
The insurgents are currently in a process of consolidation, reconstituting themselves into tighter and more committed cells, cleaving away the hangers-on and the remotely suspect. Although Saddam's arrest has hardly persuaded them to put down their weapons, some are feeling more cornered than before, others angrier and even more willing to wreak havoc. That may mean they're a little more dangerous, now, their antennae more acutely tuned to pick up signs of trouble, making them more careful to avoid unnecessary risk and more vigilant in their activities.
The insurgents are currently in a process of consolidation, reconstituting themselves into tighter and more committed cells, cleaving away the hangers-on and the remotely suspect. Although Saddam's arrest has hardly persuaded them to put down their weapons, some are feeling more cornered than before, others angrier and even more willing to wreak havoc. That may mean they're a little more dangerous, now, their antennae more acutely tuned to pick up signs of trouble, making them more careful to avoid unnecessary risk and more vigilant in their activities.
Their reactions to Saddam's arrest are a complex mix, reflecting a diversity of motivations behind their insurgency. The announcement was initially greeted with genuine shock and disbelief (still lingering in some quarters). Then, as the daze and denial lifted for some, the pragmatism that comes with acceptance began to kick in. And some of the who have evolved into organized networks — rather than ad hoc groups and autonomous cells — believe they are entering a new phase of the war. The U.S. military has snared its big fish, and is now trawling for the smaller ones. This means they must adapt, again, re-focus and move on.
The bad news breaks
Abu Raheman, commander of an Iraqi insurgent cell and an ex-military officer, had the television on when the news of Saddam's capture broke on Sunday Dec 14. Arab satellite channels were full of rumors, then confirmations by unnamed U.S. sources, and finally the announcement by administrator Paul Bremer. As the U.S. diplomat declared "We got him," Abu Raheman sat quietly. He lent forward on the edge of his seat, his face set in concentration. From time to time he passed comment as the conversation around him swayed back and forth over whether the story was true. While others become agitated in their shock, he remained focused, studious. In his mind he weighed what he was hearing on the television with what he knew of Saddam and those who had been close to him, of the military's intelligence-gathering and its operations, calculating the chances of the man he still calls President having fallen into U.S. hands. Mid-way through the afternoon he still wasn't totally convinced, but he certainly knew not to dismiss it. Clearly, he thought, he needed more information. Confirmation from sources and opinions he could trust.
Even then, he was already contemplating the meaning of it all. He knew he would have to change the operations of his cell, and communicate with the commanders above him before taking any action. In the days that followed, his methods shifted in accordance with what he recognized as a new situation. One thing hadn't changed for his commanders and for the roughly two dozen guerrillas under his own command — their will to fight. "We will continue," he said. "We are not Fedayeen, we are mujahideen. We don't fight for Saddam, we fight for Iraq."
Operations suspended
Two Baghdad cells with which I am familiar have temporarily suspended operations, moving into what one of the cell leaders described as a "technical" phase during which the new U.S. tactics will be studied, in order to formulate new modes of operation. Other cells, even those within the same broad network, have continued their attacks. At least one, deeply fanatical cell from this same organization has actually stepped up its strike rate in a blush of rage since Saddam's capture. This crew appears willing to risk the increased danger of exposure to give violent release to those emotions.
The Monday that followed the arrest announcement saw a spate of car- and suicide bombings in and around Baghdad — attacks of a type that U.S. intelligence officers see as the work of, as one put it, "imported talent", with Iraqi logistical and intelligence support . This may indicate that the foreign terrorist element was first to pick up the ball and run with it. Car bombings require planning that would make it unlikely they were launched in response to the arrest, but these operations certainly weren't aborted despite increased U.S. security. But the former Ba'athists weighed in, too, with a sophisticated ambush on a U.S. patrol in Samarra, near Tikrit.
Slowing the insurgent momentum
There's no question that Saddam's arrest struck a heavy psychological blow, even though most of the fighters weren't pining for his return to power. His capture has destroyed a sense of infallibility that had begun to take root among the insurgents. Before this, they felt they were on a roll, citing the White House's revising its political plans for Iraq, and mounting discord in the U.S. over the progress of the mission. They see their campaign, after all, as more political than military in nature, knowing they can't defeat the U.S. military on the battlefield, but believing they can do so in middle American living rooms if people tire of the drip feed of casualties in a war without an apparent end. In this sense, Saddam's capture was a major victory for the U.S. and a major defeat for the insurgency on the very turf on which they agree the conflict will be won or lost. The dictator's arrest has certainly swung many doubters in the Middle American living room more decisively behind the mission. The guerrillas also know now, more than ever, that they are vulnerable. If Saddam can be captured, so can anyone. But this sense may pass — indeed, I can already see it ebbing away with the week not yet over.
Among the broad spectrum of insurgents — disaffected and nationalist Iraqis, Fedayeen loyalists, Islamists and foreign jihadis — only a small proportion is likely to be deterred by the capture. The grouping it will hurt most will be the Saddam loyalists, principally the Fedayeen. They were fighting to restore him to power, and their principal goal is now beyond reach. Any flagging of spirits among the resistance will start with these men. But the others — the majority — are driven by motives more diverse and larger than anything connected with Saddam. Some never cared for him (especially the Islamists), or saw him for all his flaws, and they cast their fight in patriotic or religious terms, or a contagion of both. They respected Saddam, or at least recognized him as a rallying point. But that's about all. As one Iraqi cell commander told me during the week, "This hurts, but it's not the kind of hurt that stops your body from moving. It's only a small hurt and we can go on."
From quantity to quality
And if they have the will to fight on, they certainly have the means to do so. Weapons and ammunition are in plentiful supply, and money does not appear to be a concern. The insurgents' resources did not, by and large, depend on Saddam: Although a lot of their money has come from the coffers of the former regime, it has not been Saddam who has controlled the purse strings. The insurgents appear to have access to deep reserves of cash, managed by low-profile regime figures. While Saddam periodically sent cash in symbolic acts of gratitude or inspiration, say resistance figures, the bread and butter of the insurgency has come from Baathist financiers and from the community — donations, tithes, sponsorship by powerful families and clans — and these, according to the insurgents, show no sign of drying up. There may even be an influx of cash fueled by anger in Sunni communities over the U.S. victory.
Overall, the new phase of the conflict is likely to see a decline in the number and frequency of attacks carried out by each cell, as the guerrillas take more care to disguise themselves and protect their operations. But future attacks may be better crafted and targeted to inflict greater damage. As one mujahid told me in a dark field one night this week, "The games are over, this is more serious than ever." The same may hold for the Coalition.
Abizaid: Insurgents few but dangerous by CNN
Gen. John Abizaid, the head of the U.S. Central Command, described the opposition in Iraq as a small but well-organized network of cells numbering no more than 5,000 fighters.
Speaking to reporters via closed-circuit television from his headquarters in Tampa, Florida, Abizaid said it would be wrong to give Saddam credit for organizing the insurgency in advance of the U.S.-led invasion last spring, calling him "one of the most incompetent leaders" in world history.
He said he believes, however, that Saddam is still "alive and moving around Iraq."
"Now, people will say, 'Well, that's a very small number,' but when you understand that they're organized in cellular structure, that they have a brutal and determined cadre, that they know how to operate covertly, they have access to a lot of money and a lot of ammunition, you'll understand how dangerous they are," Abizaid said.
A Pentagon spokesman said that although the size of the weapons seizure was "about average," it was part of a heightened campaign to pre-empt attacks.
Abizaid suggested the supply of contraband munitions is drying up. He said "there's actually some indication, based on intelligence information that we have, that ammo is starting to be difficult for them to obtain in certain areas."
Guerrillas also kept up the pressure Thursday, attacking a U.S. vehicle in Fallujah with a bomb, causing three casualties, a witness told CNN.
Speaking to reporters via closed-circuit television from his headquarters in Tampa, Florida, Abizaid said it would be wrong to give Saddam credit for organizing the insurgency in advance of the U.S.-led invasion last spring, calling him "one of the most incompetent leaders" in world history.
He said he believes, however, that Saddam is still "alive and moving around Iraq."
"Now, people will say, 'Well, that's a very small number,' but when you understand that they're organized in cellular structure, that they have a brutal and determined cadre, that they know how to operate covertly, they have access to a lot of money and a lot of ammunition, you'll understand how dangerous they are," Abizaid said.
A Pentagon spokesman said that although the size of the weapons seizure was "about average," it was part of a heightened campaign to pre-empt attacks.
Abizaid suggested the supply of contraband munitions is drying up. He said "there's actually some indication, based on intelligence information that we have, that ammo is starting to be difficult for them to obtain in certain areas."
Guerrillas also kept up the pressure Thursday, attacking a U.S. vehicle in Fallujah with a bomb, causing three casualties, a witness told CNN.
ISGA : Dead-end or historic opportunity?
The Interim Self-Governing Authority - ISGA - proposals of the LTTE present a challenge as well as a historic opportunity to advance towards a genuine democratic settlement to the national crisis.
They represent the first and only proposals the LTTE has officially presented as a basis for a negotiated political settlement.
The LTTE conceives the ISGA proposals as a transitional way of moving towards a process of mutual de-escalation and normalisation, with the aim of seeking a final solution towards exercising the right of national self-determination of the Tamil people in the North-East region.
From the point of view of the LTTE, the proposals seek accommodation with the Sri Lankan state in exercising the right of a national self-determination it has already established on the ground, in the territory it has liberated, through two decades of armed struggle.
This is the ground reality. We can hold the tribal rituals, plunder the robes, burn the proposals, and call for total war.
We can continue to prevaricate by insisting on a "final solution" to sidetrack the fact of not having any alternative transitional solution. We can continue to play the game of war and peace and hold the country and the people hostage as every government has done.
Deciding the issue will produce the most portentous crisis ever in our history. Core issues
The emerging political conjuncture will present core issues, which will force themselves on the stage of history, to be resolved either through violence or through conscious, determined, democratic leadership and struggle. ISGA has brought these issues to the fore with a sense of finality.
The LTTE has expressed its terms for a voluntary union of the Tamil state with the Sinhala state on equal terms within a united country.
Can we come to terms with that? The Sri Lankan state has been built on the twisted ideology that only the majority Sinhala-Buddhists has the exclusive right to claim a national identity, and therefore to form a state, and that all others are to be treated as alien, second class minorities.
This is the official state-sponsored ideological mindset instilled into the Sinhala-Buddhist masses by both the UNP and the SLFP, and by the JVP, the Sihala Urumaya, MEP, the JHU and other such agents of the state.
As a consequence of the politics of chauvinism, duplicity and violent suppression of the Tamil people by the state, we have arrived at the ISGA. Do the Tamil people living in the North-East region have an equal right to form their own state - if they decide they can no longer coexist with a Sinhala-Buddhist hegemonic-theocratic state? How do we deal with a Tamil state that has come into existence through the force of arms? Can we live in peace with a Tamil state in an undivided country? Can there be a democratic Tamil state coexisting with the prevailing centralised, militarised chauvinist-hegemonic, feudal-colonial Sri Lankan state and political order? Should we try to radically transform the hegemonic Sinhala-Buddhist state so it is a genuine democratic state of the people?
Will the pre-eminent dignity of the Sinhala nation be enhanced by the recognition of the dignity of the Tamil nation and of the other nationalities?
A product of a deadly stalemate and a defunct political order
The ISGA proposals stand as a profound indictment of a fractured and defunct state. It is a recognition of the near impossibility of sharing any political power at the centre under the prevailing system. It is a vote of no-confidence regarding a hegemonic chauvinist, feudal-colonial state backed up by world imperialism and its regional enforcers.
A state propped up by the very same entrenched political ruling class constituted by the UNP-SLFP-JVP-SU-MEP-JHU-LSSP-CP all of which have combined and contributed to bring us to this crisis of civilization. ISGA is a response to this Sinhala-hegemonic state which stands as a mortal threat to exercising any real form of Tamil national self-determination.
ISGA has been conceived within the reality of a liberated Tamil state somehow compelled by the prevailing order to be joined together with a hegemonic, fractured, hostile, and volatile Sinhala state. Anyone who is anything but an ideological Neanderthal, with any degree of historical conscience - and intelligence, would arrive at such a conclusion.
Critique of ISGA
ISGA envisages a hegemonic Tamil state under the political leadership of the LTTE exercising undisputed dominance over the North-East region and over its diverse nationalities and communities. The LTTE has sought assurances for its continued undisputed dominance in the context of a heightened perception of being encircled, cornered and mortally threatened.
The democratisation of the Tamil polity is a function of the democratisation of the Sinhala state and polity and a task to be carried out by the people. Only a negotiated political settlement can pave the way for such a historical process.
However, the truth is that the ISGA proposals have failed to recognise the human and democratic rights and to provide assurances as to the security, dignity, equality and autonomy of the Sinhala people and the Muslim nationality in the region.
It does not explicitly entertain any organic integration with a central state. The proposals have not identified reciprocal obligations, responsibilities and duties in the context of sharing state power. These are fundamental issues that have to be democratically resolved in any negotiated political settlement.
What is needed is not to attack the ISGA nor to defend it. The challenge is to situate the conditions that have given rise to ISGA and to transform them so we can move away from the politics of stalemated, non-negotiable, final and ultimate demands on both sides of the divide, to the politics of principal accommodation and compromise. To achieve this goal, we would have to be blessed by a quality of statesmanship, or 'states-womanship' far beyond what prevails.
Critique of the peace process
All previous governments had failed to achieve a negotiated political settlement due to the failure to develop national consensus on recognising the right of self-determination of the Tamil nation.
The UNF did not possess a strategy for building democratic consensus for a political settlement.
Even though the UNF negotiated the historic Oslo Agreement it did not address any of the core issues.
It simply relied on Uncle Bush to somehow deliver the peace in exchange for selling out the country lock, stock and barrel to the US. Has the UPFA done any better? The UPFA has effectively stalemated the peace process and brought the country to a perilous state. They have not done anything constructive towards seeking a lasting political settlement.
This is because the UPFA is founded on an irreconcilable political contradiction. While the SLFP/PA would be more interested in seeking some sort of a negotiated settlement if only for the political survival of the system and that of their own, the JVP has no option other than to oppose this agenda at all costs.
This is because their political survival and ride to absolute state power depends on appearing as the only true saviours of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation.
This is the only card in the pack to demarcate themselves from both the major 'traditional' comprador ruling parties.
The JVP's game plan is to attack the UNP head-on, while accelerating the crisis and intensifying the contradictions within the UPFA, so that the SLFP/PA would appear to be just as bad and just the same as the UNP.
They would advance their political agenda even though it may mean a resumption of war, the destruction of our collective civilised existence and piling endless misery upon the people.
The way out of the crisis
Is there a way to rescue the peace process and to avert a state of national and civil war? What is the role and task of the people in resolving this issue? Can we identify a minimum transitional program to deal with the National Question at this crucial hour? The path lies in addressing the ISGA and articulating the institutions and instruments of democratically sharing power at the center, supplemented by effective forms of regional autonomy within a genuine federal framework.
(http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2004/09/12/fea27.html)
They represent the first and only proposals the LTTE has officially presented as a basis for a negotiated political settlement.
The LTTE conceives the ISGA proposals as a transitional way of moving towards a process of mutual de-escalation and normalisation, with the aim of seeking a final solution towards exercising the right of national self-determination of the Tamil people in the North-East region.
From the point of view of the LTTE, the proposals seek accommodation with the Sri Lankan state in exercising the right of a national self-determination it has already established on the ground, in the territory it has liberated, through two decades of armed struggle.
This is the ground reality. We can hold the tribal rituals, plunder the robes, burn the proposals, and call for total war.
We can continue to prevaricate by insisting on a "final solution" to sidetrack the fact of not having any alternative transitional solution. We can continue to play the game of war and peace and hold the country and the people hostage as every government has done.
Deciding the issue will produce the most portentous crisis ever in our history. Core issues
The emerging political conjuncture will present core issues, which will force themselves on the stage of history, to be resolved either through violence or through conscious, determined, democratic leadership and struggle. ISGA has brought these issues to the fore with a sense of finality.
The LTTE has expressed its terms for a voluntary union of the Tamil state with the Sinhala state on equal terms within a united country.
Can we come to terms with that? The Sri Lankan state has been built on the twisted ideology that only the majority Sinhala-Buddhists has the exclusive right to claim a national identity, and therefore to form a state, and that all others are to be treated as alien, second class minorities.
This is the official state-sponsored ideological mindset instilled into the Sinhala-Buddhist masses by both the UNP and the SLFP, and by the JVP, the Sihala Urumaya, MEP, the JHU and other such agents of the state.
As a consequence of the politics of chauvinism, duplicity and violent suppression of the Tamil people by the state, we have arrived at the ISGA. Do the Tamil people living in the North-East region have an equal right to form their own state - if they decide they can no longer coexist with a Sinhala-Buddhist hegemonic-theocratic state? How do we deal with a Tamil state that has come into existence through the force of arms? Can we live in peace with a Tamil state in an undivided country? Can there be a democratic Tamil state coexisting with the prevailing centralised, militarised chauvinist-hegemonic, feudal-colonial Sri Lankan state and political order? Should we try to radically transform the hegemonic Sinhala-Buddhist state so it is a genuine democratic state of the people?
Will the pre-eminent dignity of the Sinhala nation be enhanced by the recognition of the dignity of the Tamil nation and of the other nationalities?
A product of a deadly stalemate and a defunct political order
The ISGA proposals stand as a profound indictment of a fractured and defunct state. It is a recognition of the near impossibility of sharing any political power at the centre under the prevailing system. It is a vote of no-confidence regarding a hegemonic chauvinist, feudal-colonial state backed up by world imperialism and its regional enforcers.
A state propped up by the very same entrenched political ruling class constituted by the UNP-SLFP-JVP-SU-MEP-JHU-LSSP-CP all of which have combined and contributed to bring us to this crisis of civilization. ISGA is a response to this Sinhala-hegemonic state which stands as a mortal threat to exercising any real form of Tamil national self-determination.
ISGA has been conceived within the reality of a liberated Tamil state somehow compelled by the prevailing order to be joined together with a hegemonic, fractured, hostile, and volatile Sinhala state. Anyone who is anything but an ideological Neanderthal, with any degree of historical conscience - and intelligence, would arrive at such a conclusion.
Critique of ISGA
ISGA envisages a hegemonic Tamil state under the political leadership of the LTTE exercising undisputed dominance over the North-East region and over its diverse nationalities and communities. The LTTE has sought assurances for its continued undisputed dominance in the context of a heightened perception of being encircled, cornered and mortally threatened.
The democratisation of the Tamil polity is a function of the democratisation of the Sinhala state and polity and a task to be carried out by the people. Only a negotiated political settlement can pave the way for such a historical process.
However, the truth is that the ISGA proposals have failed to recognise the human and democratic rights and to provide assurances as to the security, dignity, equality and autonomy of the Sinhala people and the Muslim nationality in the region.
It does not explicitly entertain any organic integration with a central state. The proposals have not identified reciprocal obligations, responsibilities and duties in the context of sharing state power. These are fundamental issues that have to be democratically resolved in any negotiated political settlement.
What is needed is not to attack the ISGA nor to defend it. The challenge is to situate the conditions that have given rise to ISGA and to transform them so we can move away from the politics of stalemated, non-negotiable, final and ultimate demands on both sides of the divide, to the politics of principal accommodation and compromise. To achieve this goal, we would have to be blessed by a quality of statesmanship, or 'states-womanship' far beyond what prevails.
Critique of the peace process
All previous governments had failed to achieve a negotiated political settlement due to the failure to develop national consensus on recognising the right of self-determination of the Tamil nation.
The UNF did not possess a strategy for building democratic consensus for a political settlement.
Even though the UNF negotiated the historic Oslo Agreement it did not address any of the core issues.
It simply relied on Uncle Bush to somehow deliver the peace in exchange for selling out the country lock, stock and barrel to the US. Has the UPFA done any better? The UPFA has effectively stalemated the peace process and brought the country to a perilous state. They have not done anything constructive towards seeking a lasting political settlement.
This is because the UPFA is founded on an irreconcilable political contradiction. While the SLFP/PA would be more interested in seeking some sort of a negotiated settlement if only for the political survival of the system and that of their own, the JVP has no option other than to oppose this agenda at all costs.
This is because their political survival and ride to absolute state power depends on appearing as the only true saviours of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation.
This is the only card in the pack to demarcate themselves from both the major 'traditional' comprador ruling parties.
The JVP's game plan is to attack the UNP head-on, while accelerating the crisis and intensifying the contradictions within the UPFA, so that the SLFP/PA would appear to be just as bad and just the same as the UNP.
They would advance their political agenda even though it may mean a resumption of war, the destruction of our collective civilised existence and piling endless misery upon the people.
The way out of the crisis
Is there a way to rescue the peace process and to avert a state of national and civil war? What is the role and task of the people in resolving this issue? Can we identify a minimum transitional program to deal with the National Question at this crucial hour? The path lies in addressing the ISGA and articulating the institutions and instruments of democratically sharing power at the center, supplemented by effective forms of regional autonomy within a genuine federal framework.
(http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2004/09/12/fea27.html)
Australia announces enhanced security measures after Jakarta blast
The Interim Self-Governing Authority - ISGA - proposals of the LTTE present a challenge as well as a historic opportunity to advance towards a genuine democratic settlement to the national crisis.
They represent the first and only proposals the LTTE has officially presented as a basis for a negotiated political settlement.
The LTTE conceives the ISGA proposals as a transitional way of moving towards a process of mutual de-escalation and normalisation, with the aim of seeking a final solution towards exercising the right of national self-determination of the Tamil people in the North-East region.
From the point of view of the LTTE, the proposals seek accommodation with the Sri Lankan state in exercising the right of a national self-determination it has already established on the ground, in the territory it has liberated, through two decades of armed struggle.
This is the ground reality. We can hold the tribal rituals, plunder the robes, burn the proposals, and call for total war.
We can continue to prevaricate by insisting on a "final solution" to sidetrack the fact of not having any alternative transitional solution. We can continue to play the game of war and peace and hold the country and the people hostage as every government has done.
Deciding the issue will produce the most portentous crisis ever in our history. Core issues
The emerging political conjuncture will present core issues, which will force themselves on the stage of history, to be resolved either through violence or through conscious, determined, democratic leadership and struggle. ISGA has brought these issues to the fore with a sense of finality.
The LTTE has expressed its terms for a voluntary union of the Tamil state with the Sinhala state on equal terms within a united country.
Can we come to terms with that? The Sri Lankan state has been built on the twisted ideology that only the majority Sinhala-Buddhists has the exclusive right to claim a national identity, and therefore to form a state, and that all others are to be treated as alien, second class minorities.
This is the official state-sponsored ideological mindset instilled into the Sinhala-Buddhist masses by both the UNP and the SLFP, and by the JVP, the Sihala Urumaya, MEP, the JHU and other such agents of the state.
As a consequence of the politics of chauvinism, duplicity and violent suppression of the Tamil people by the state, we have arrived at the ISGA. Do the Tamil people living in the North-East region have an equal right to form their own state - if they decide they can no longer coexist with a Sinhala-Buddhist hegemonic-theocratic state? How do we deal with a Tamil state that has come into existence through the force of arms? Can we live in peace with a Tamil state in an undivided country? Can there be a democratic Tamil state coexisting with the prevailing centralised, militarised chauvinist-hegemonic, feudal-colonial Sri Lankan state and political order? Should we try to radically transform the hegemonic Sinhala-Buddhist state so it is a genuine democratic state of the people?
Will the pre-eminent dignity of the Sinhala nation be enhanced by the recognition of the dignity of the Tamil nation and of the other nationalities?
A product of a deadly stalemate and a defunct political order
The ISGA proposals stand as a profound indictment of a fractured and defunct state. It is a recognition of the near impossibility of sharing any political power at the centre under the prevailing system. It is a vote of no-confidence regarding a hegemonic chauvinist, feudal-colonial state backed up by world imperialism and its regional enforcers.
A state propped up by the very same entrenched political ruling class constituted by the UNP-SLFP-JVP-SU-MEP-JHU-LSSP-CP all of which have combined and contributed to bring us to this crisis of civilization. ISGA is a response to this Sinhala-hegemonic state which stands as a mortal threat to exercising any real form of Tamil national self-determination.
ISGA has been conceived within the reality of a liberated Tamil state somehow compelled by the prevailing order to be joined together with a hegemonic, fractured, hostile, and volatile Sinhala state. Anyone who is anything but an ideological Neanderthal, with any degree of historical conscience - and intelligence, would arrive at such a conclusion.
Critique of ISGA
ISGA envisages a hegemonic Tamil state under the political leadership of the LTTE exercising undisputed dominance over the North-East region and over its diverse nationalities and communities. The LTTE has sought assurances for its continued undisputed dominance in the context of a heightened perception of being encircled, cornered and mortally threatened.
The democratisation of the Tamil polity is a function of the democratisation of the Sinhala state and polity and a task to be carried out by the people. Only a negotiated political settlement can pave the way for such a historical process.
However, the truth is that the ISGA proposals have failed to recognise the human and democratic rights and to provide assurances as to the security, dignity, equality and autonomy of the Sinhala people and the Muslim nationality in the region.
It does not explicitly entertain any organic integration with a central state. The proposals have not identified reciprocal obligations, responsibilities and duties in the context of sharing state power. These are fundamental issues that have to be democratically resolved in any negotiated political settlement.
What is needed is not to attack the ISGA nor to defend it. The challenge is to situate the conditions that have given rise to ISGA and to transform them so we can move away from the politics of stalemated, non-negotiable, final and ultimate demands on both sides of the divide, to the politics of principal accommodation and compromise. To achieve this goal, we would have to be blessed by a quality of statesmanship, or 'states-womanship' far beyond what prevails.
Critique of the peace process
All previous governments had failed to achieve a negotiated political settlement due to the failure to develop national consensus on recognising the right of self-determination of the Tamil nation.
The UNF did not possess a strategy for building democratic consensus for a political settlement.
Even though the UNF negotiated the historic Oslo Agreement it did not address any of the core issues.
It simply relied on Uncle Bush to somehow deliver the peace in exchange for selling out the country lock, stock and barrel to the US. Has the UPFA done any better? The UPFA has effectively stalemated the peace process and brought the country to a perilous state. They have not done anything constructive towards seeking a lasting political settlement.
This is because the UPFA is founded on an irreconcilable political contradiction. While the SLFP/PA would be more interested in seeking some sort of a negotiated settlement if only for the political survival of the system and that of their own, the JVP has no option other than to oppose this agenda at all costs.
This is because their political survival and ride to absolute state power depends on appearing as the only true saviours of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation.
This is the only card in the pack to demarcate themselves from both the major 'traditional' comprador ruling parties.
The JVP's game plan is to attack the UNP head-on, while accelerating the crisis and intensifying the contradictions within the UPFA, so that the SLFP/PA would appear to be just as bad and just the same as the UNP.
They would advance their political agenda even though it may mean a resumption of war, the destruction of our collective civilised existence and piling endless misery upon the people.
The way out of the crisis
Is there a way to rescue the peace process and to avert a state of national and civil war? What is the role and task of the people in resolving this issue? Can we identify a minimum transitional program to deal with the National Question at this crucial hour? The path lies in addressing the ISGA and articulating the institutions and instruments of democratically sharing power at the center, supplemented by effective forms of regional autonomy within a genuine federal framework.
(http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2004/09/12/fea27.html)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
