The second anniversary of the grand opening of the peace talks at Sattahip, Thailand between the previous United National Front (UNF) government and the LTTE falls tomorrow.
At the end of the first round, in his concluding speech, LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham noted that, "as far as the engagement here in Thailand is concerned, the LTTE is very happy. I think we have reached a remarkable success in establishing a very cordial relationship and the discussions were very constructive and we have taken a few decisions and this process is going to continue".
Of all Tiger seniors, Balasingham, who was at the epicentre of peace talks at that time, understandably has been the most optimistic about the peace process.
One may recall how, on March 13 this year, immediately after a meeting with the Norwegian facilitators, the same Balasingham said that Norway would announce the date of the next round of talks in "two or three days time".
Four months have passed and we are yet to hear anything about the dates for the next round of talks.
Two years into the first round of talks, the 'process' that Balasingham referred to is being fortunately continued to date. And whatever mishaps, this indeed is an achievement.
However, the 'relationship' between the two main players (now the Freedom Alliance government and the LTTE) is strained, peace dynamics dislodged and talks proper have come to an abrupt halt. Eighteen months have passed since the sixth round of talks held in Hakone, and jump-starting the talks is still very much a challenge, despite the reluctance by both parties to go back to war.
The months that passed under the UPFA has brought the maximum negative impact on the peace process, shifting the vibes between the government and the LTTE from tepid to icy cold.
However, given that most new structures in this country have had long gestation periods, the unsteady steps towards an interim arrangement, or for that matter a final settlement in the form of a new Constitution, is not something totally unexpected.
And the facilitators and the peace promoters continue to harp that what is more important is the fact that both parties remain engaged in discussions at least on a lower level, though talks-proper are yet to resume.
To quote G.L. Peiris at Sattahip, "whatever difficulties may arise, we have to hold fast to our cause of political negotiations".
While the vibes have been not all that healthy, any second thoughts by the LTTE to stray away from the course and muster support for legitimacy for Tamil Eelam through military means, got one of its biggest set-backs following the hard-hitting comments by the US State Department Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism, J. Cofer Black, last week.
The fact that the declaration by Black had hit a raw nerve of the Tigers was evident by the LTTE move to get its proxy, the TNA, to issue a statement on Monday, commenting on Blacks' observations.
"The Tamil people would like to convey that the failure to adopt an even handed approach could cause immense harm to the peace process and we would appeal that a more balanced approach be adopted in the cause of peace, which Ambassador Black asserts he is committed to uphold." the TNA statement says.
The carefully-worded, long statement by the TNA, which states that Black's views have "caused much concern to a wide section of the Tamil people", speaks of the LTTE's dilemma.
It shows that the Tigers which had so far criticized the United States openly, have been forced to make a strategic move to issue such responses under the TNA's name, having realized that with the ever-hardening stance of the United States and the international community as regards terrorism, the LTTE will be forced to change gear.
By using its proxy, a political party, the LTTE could conveniently avoid responding to the charges levelled by Black - of its links with other terrorist organizations, equipping them and disseminating information on how to conduct acts of terrorism.
The Tigers are mindful that they need to handle the international community with tact, rather than rub them on the wrong side, if they were to win their demands even at the negotiating table, particularly with regard to the issue of fiscal control for the North and the East, in the event a separate interim administration is set up. While this being the case, however the failure of the South to reach a consensus continues to place the LTTE in an advantageous position.
The latest move by President Chandrika Kumaratunga to appoint an all-party consultative committee, with the Prime Minister and the Opposition Leader as co-chairs, has failed to receive the desired response, with the UNP viewing the invitation as one aimed at dragging them also to the quagmire in the event the UPFA-sponsored peace talks and the process falls apart.
The invitation which was made in the backdrop of mischievous and irresponsible statements made by the likes of Minister Mangala Samaraweera, that the UNP was the enemy of the government, and the measures taken to hunt down UNP seniors, have made it difficult for even the die-hard pro-national government supporters within the UNP to entertain any sanguine thoughts about the President's move.
What we witness even today is the continuation of the tragedy of the Sri Lankan polity, with the two Southern principal parties bent on trying confidence building measures with the LTTE when they are in power, and failing to adopt a similar approach towards the key opposition and treating the other with an enemy perception.
If the President is keen on reaching a southern consensus, what she could have done first was to take steps to heal the wounds by trying to win the lost confidence of the UNP members.
Any move towards a consensus without adopting such measures is sure to be doomed as there is a major dent in the credibility of the President, in the eyes of a majority of the members in the Opposition, right now.
Therefore, the outright rejection by the Opposition, as part of political manoeuvring, if not manipulation, came as no surprise as the President had not done her home work before extending the invitation.
If the President was genuine in her exercise, she and her government had six months to strike a rapport with the Opposition.
She indeed had several options and the revival of the Mano-Malik talks would certainly have been one. Then there was also the set of proposals for by-partisanship, proposed by the Opposition Leader and sent through Rukman Senanayake, lying on the President's table since May, 2004 awaiting a response.
But none of these were tried even during the time the UPFA remained a minority government. Instead, they opted for the traditional vote-buying moves rather than looking at the larger picture - the need for a two-thirds majority in parliament to take any constructive step towards resolving the conflict.
Striking a rapport and sustaining a relationship with the opposition parties is something that our politicians still find difficult to do when in power, though banking on Opposition support is something they cannot do without to reach a negotiated settlement to the North-East conflict.
Therefore, even the tirade against the anti-peace elements by the President, on Monday, in Mahiyangana and statements made on the importance of a national consensus in the recent past, will do nothing to convince the opposition parties of the genuineness of the President's latest attempt and instead will be taken as those guided by self interest.
Two years have lapsed since peace talks opened but some of the fundamental catalysts vital for pushing the peace process are still not in place, and the failure to garner a southern consensus is just one of them.
The mandatory preparation of the constituency for the changes to be made to the structures, by warding off their unfounded fears, is something that both the UNF and the UPFA failed to accomplish.
While the UNP, to a certain extent, managed to win the confidence of the minorities, there are no signs that the UPFA is taking steps to assuage their grievances and both the Tamils and the Muslims harbour suspicions about the agendas of the new government.
This is in addition to the steady decline in the confidence the Sinhala electorate has on the government's performance, as regards carrying forward the peace process.
Unfortunately, peace is a product one cannot sell without marketing it properly, with whatever risks there is. If this is not done properly, the UPFA would soon have to face a similar fate as that faced by the previous UNF government.
(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2004/09/15/news/1.asp)
