Presidential Commission of Inquiry to inquire into the disclosure of the existence of and the raid on the Safe House operated by the Sri Lanka Army at Athurugiriya.
Findings and conclusion only
Hon. D. Jayawickrama (Commissioner) Retired Judge of the Court of Appeal
S. M. J. Senaratne, Secretary to the Commission
Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall, Colombo 7. November, 2003. (Continued from yesterday)
The Commission wishes to adopt the above findings as part of this Report. The Committee consisted of Mr. Austin Fernando, Secretary/Defence as Chairman of the Committee, and Lt. Gen L. P. Balagalle, Commander of the Sri Lanka Army and Mr. Meril Gunarathne, Defence advisor as the other members. Their report has been submitted in May, 2003 which was tendered in evidence before this Commission marked as P60.
The killing of some of the senior commanders of the LTTE by the Army LRRP groups has led to a declaration of a unilateral ceasefire and signing of the MoU with the United National Front which has helped the United National Front in winning the election.
Within a few weeks after the United National Front coming into power the raid on this Safe House at Athurugiriya was conducted by ASP Kulasiri Udugampola, which helped the LTTE acquiring knowledge of the personnel who were involved in LRRP operations.
The evidence led before this Commission clearly establishes the fact that the Army Unit in the Athurugiriya Safe House, apart from other units under the Commandos and Special Forces, were in the process of eliminating some of the LTTE leadership. Unfortunately ASP Kulasiri Udugampola backed up with political patronage stopped these covert operations and betrayed this gallant unit and allowed the LTTE to go on a killing spree of the Army operatives and informants who were involved in covert operations.
It was a total betrayal and absolute treachery to the nation. It also has hindered the peace process by hardening the attitude of the people of the South towards the LTTE. Whatever the intentions were of the Government in aiding ASP Udugampola in this raid and the action he has taken thereafter it has backfired against the Government.
Thus it has neutralized the military strategy of the Armed Forces. The LTTE were able to track down and kill informants and civilians who have been helping in covert operations run by the DMI from the Safe House at Athurugiriya.
Evidence led before this Commission clearly establishes this fact. According to the LTTE transmissions monitored by the Army, the LRRP operations were so successful that the LTTE's confidence in having total control and untrammeled manoeuvrability in their own areas of control were shattered. ASP Kulasiri Udugampola who was not amenable to his own IGP and DIGs by raiding this Safe House has assisted and helped greatly the LTTE to decimate the informants, civilians, soldiers and operatives who were helping the LRRP operations of the DMI. D. B. S. Jeyaraj in his column "Cross Currents" in "The Sunday Leader" dated 11th August, 2002 (P120C), has this to say about this raid:
"It was the Athurugiriya incident that exposed the LRRP secret to the world at large. Media reports reveal that persons connected with the LRRP are being systematically hunted down by the Tigers."
Thus the country's national security interests were compromised by this raid and has assisted in neutralizing the military strategy of the Army in combating terrorism in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
h) Have the Defence authorities and the Police Department taken appropriate disciplinary action under the Police ordinance or other existing laws of the country against any officer/officers responsible for any illegal acts or violation of any Police Departmental Orders/Regulations and if so, is it considered sufficient in the circumstances;
No disciplinary action has been taken against any officer/officers responsible for any illegal acts or violations of any Orders or Regulations up to the time of the conclusion of the proceedings of this Commission.
Two Courts of Inquiry have been convened by the Army Commander and their findings have been tendered to the Commander and the Commander himself has made his own recommendations for disciplinary action against some officers. But so far no disciplinary action has been taken on the basis of these recommendations. The Army Commander stated before this Commission that he is awaiting the recommendations of this Commission to take disciplinary action against the officers mentioned in the two reports submitted to him by the two Courts of Inquiry.
As regards ASP Kulasiri Udugampola, even the Solicitor General on behalf of the Attorney General has directed the Inspector General of Police to take disciplinary action against him. The Inspector General of Police has only called for ASP Udugampola's explanation and ASP Udugampola has tendered his explanation to him. So far no disciplinary action has been taken against ASP Udugampola or other Police Officers who participated in the raid.
i) Recommendations that can be made to prevent interference by any officials or authorities in the military strategies of the Armed Forces duly operated on the orders of Commanders of the Armed Forces;
The Commission wishes to recommend as the first step to depoliticize the Army and the Police and to place these Forces in the hands of capable men. The Military strategies of the Armed Forces be planned and conducted only on the orders of the Commanders of the Armed Forces and restricted to be based on a "need to know basis".
The military strategies should be known only to the Commander-in-Chief, the Commander of the Army and the other Commanders under whom the LRRP groups and other officers who are directly involved in such military strategies. Only the persons who are directly involved should know and no others.
The Commission is of the view that the present system of covert operations has worked well and that is the reason why all these remained a secret until the raid on the Safe House. More punitive measures are needed to punish people who abuse the system. There should be some checks and balances to safeguard officers who are directly involved in such strategies. No civilians including Ministers, Secretaries to Ministries should know about the personnel involved and places from which they operate.
No secrets regarding military strategies should be shared with the bureaucracy as most of them are political appointees. Every form of protection should be given to the Intelligence operatives so that there is no outside interference. Specific regulations should be framed for the purpose of obtaining finances and weapons, storing of weapons to be used whenever they are required which would prevent frequent transportation and movement of weapons.
These regulations should be framed in such a manner that traces of operations of the personnel involved in such military strategies would not be known to others who are not involved in such strategies.
The Commission wishes to record as part of this Report the safeguards to protect informants proposed by the Committee appointed to examine measures required to enhance the safety of informants of the Directorate of Military Intelligence:
"Living in Army Camps
* All will be confined to Army Camps; and as far away as possible from the native areas of Informers as possible. Even in Colombo they will be confined to Camps.
Visiting their Homes
* They will be permitted to visit "homes" only for urgent or unavoidable reasons such as a bereavement or childbirth etc.
In the case of such visits, armed escorts will protect them till they return to their camps.
Families to see the Informers
* Opportunities will be given for their families to visit them in camps.
* Such arrangements will be made without Military officers visiting their homes.
Training in side-arms
* They will be trained in firing and other useful tactics, self defence etc., in Commando Complexes in Ganemulla and Kudaoya and issued side-arms. The use of side-arms will be monitored to prevent any misuse that will imminently become a threat to the community.
Limited Intelligence Operations
* They will never be employed for Intelligence Operations alone, but with Military officers in vehicles and only for limited purposes such as "spotting". Tinted vehicles will carry them to withhold identity.
Classes for Informers to instill an awareness
* Instruction classes will be held by D/MI to ensure their Personal Safety - viz: Avoidance of careless and loose talk; routing movements, safe meeting places; also the nature of the current threat to them, and to be always on the alert when they move; action to be pursued when any thereat is observed or "felt" etc.
Instructions to Handlers of Informers
* Special instructions will be given to lesser ranks against visits to homes of Informants, to ensure that identities are not exposed or suspicions are aroused by such actions. Safe meeting places that could be given security cover have to be established.
Only one Agency to run an Informant
* Any Informer should be run by only one agency. For instance, Ragupathy and Vardan who were killed were also spies of the Police. An Informant run by the DMI or DII should be left alone by Police. The Defence Advisor (MoD) will ensure correct guidance in this respect.
Allocation of Lands for Informants
* Moves to identify and allocate lands for families of Informers to live in reasonably close proximity to Camps where the latter are billeted, are under consideration on an urgent basis. The Army Commander is presently pursuing action in this respect. Such informant communities or colonies will be given security cover by the Intelligence Authorities in co-operation with the Army/Police.
Foreign employment
Opportunities to afford Foreign Employment to Informers whose lives are acutely imperilled, are under consideration; e. g. as Welfare Officers in the Middle East, as required by the Minister of Labour and Employment. The Army Commander/Defence Advisor will take appropriate action in this regard.
For Civilian Informers
Selective Enlistment as Soldiers
Since all such Informers cannot be mobilized and called upon to live in Army Camps, a selected number will be considered for enlistment as soldiers based on eligibility, and confined to Camps. They will be permitted to visit homes only in unavoidable circumstances, and under Armed Escort; arrangements will also be made for their safety/security.
* Those not enlisted as Soldiers - will be necessary to relocate them immediately in Safe Houses OUTSIDE areas where they presently reside. Minimal contact with them will make it difficult for LTTE to spot them.
* Training in side-arms
They will be trained in Commando Complexes in Ganemulla and Kudaoya and issued side-arms, as for Soldiers.
* Limited Int. Ops.
They will never be employed for Intelligence Operations alone, but with Military Officers in vehicles and only for limited purposes such as "spotting", as proposed for Soldier Informers.
* Classes for Informers to instill an awareness
Instruction classes will be held by D/MI to ensure their personal Safety - viz: Avoidance of careless and loose talk; routine movements, safe meeting places; also the nature of the current threat to them; and to be always on the alert when they move.
* Instructions to Handlers of Informants
Special instructions will be given to lesser ranks against visits to homes of informants. This is mostly required for this category as they mingle with other civilians.
(To be continued)
(http://www.dailynews.lk/2003/12/16/fea50.html)
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