The brazen killing of Major Tuwan Nizam Muthaliff, the Commanding Officer of the 1st Military Intelligence Corps, gunned down by the LTTE gunmen on a busy highway at Polhengoda is a pointer to the precarious situation the military intelligence officers have been exposed to since the Ceasefire Agreement.The military intelligence was well aware of the danger posed at the life of the Major Muthaliff, posthumously promoted to Lt. Colonel, that it beefed up his security and provided a contingent of escorts.
However, his entire contingent was on leave when he was killed by the two LTTE gunmen. This is however not an appreciation on Muthaliff, but an assessment on the sorry situation.
Highest ranking military officer
Major Muthaliff is the highest ranking military officer to be killed since the Ceasefire, but, before his murder, 36 military intelligence operatives had fell prey to the LTTE gunmen. (With the murder of Muthaliff, 37 military intelligence operatives, including 10 army intelligence operatives had been killed by the LTTE).
Apart from that 32 civilian military informants had been killed, plus 38 activists of non-LTTE Tamil parties which includes the EPDP, EPRLF (Varathan Group), PLOTE and TELO.
According to the Army statistics, 398 civilians have been killed since the signing of the Ceasefire till last Wednesday (June 1).
The statistics alone show the LTTE's rampant violations of the ceasefire.
The Ceasefire Agreement is itself flawed, which is understandable given political underpinnings and expectations of time it was signed.
The Norwegians who formulated the CFA wanted a win-win settlement and the Wickremesinghe Administration which had already taken up by the achievements of the two months of the unilateral ceasefire declared was not interested in possible repercussions on the national security if the Tigers' sincerity to the peace process proved bogus.
Of course, since its implementation, the Ceasefire Agreement produced tangible results, but the loopholes in the CFA, which left uncovered due to the rush to sign the agreement are to bring serious repercussions on the nation.
What the public witnessed on the sunny Tuesday morning at the Polhengoda colour lights was another phase of this ever unfolding drama.
Lance Cpl Clary, gunned down in Chenkalady, Batticaloa on 9, Feb. 2002 was the first military intelligence operative, who fell victims to the LTTE gunmen during the ceasefire. (That was before the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement on Feb. 22, 2002. But by the time, a unilateral ceasefire announced by the both sides since the election win of the Wickremesinghe Administration was on hold)
Since then, many more fell prey to the LTTE pistol gang, while a Government, over optimistic of the prospects of peace was ignoring the unfolding catastrophe.
The millennium city scandal where the then government deliberately tried to cover up its mishandling of an operation which exposed the vital information of a hitherto unknown Long Range Reconnaissance Mission and the identity of its operatives further aggravated the situation.
Inadequate counter measures
This and the lethargy of the successive governments to authorise the Security Forces to take effective counter measures against LTTE pistol gang members infiltrating the town saw the star military intelligence operatives leaving the country seeking refugee abroad.
Captain Nilam and his team, arrested by SP Kulasiri Udugampola, Inspector Nilabdeen, who head a number of successful operations which aborted a number of suicide operations and most para military operatives who worked with the Security Forces- were forced to leave the country, having seen the failure of the successive governments to provide them with protection.
To add insult to injury, some Ministers of the Wickremesinghe administration, notably Rajitha Senaratne went on to dispute the achievements of the deep penetration unit.
Mr. Senaratne may not have been aware, but even the LTTE admitted the leader of the LTTE's newly formed air wing, Shankar was killed by the operatives of deep penetration unit in a claymore mine explosion in Pallai.
Worst affected
The activists of non-LTTE Tamil political parties were the worst affected by the loopholes of the Ceasefire Agreement, which disarmed them under article 1.8 of the agreement, a move which had fatal consequences, paid by over hundred lives of political activists of the EPDP, EPRLF (Varathan group) and PLOTE.
The idea of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission's presence in the country was that their presence would be an impetus for the two parties' adherence to the Ceasefire Agreement.
But, LTTE's rampant violations of the CFA and the subsequent clashes after the split of renegade Eastern Commander has now made the truce monitors mere onlookers, unable to control the increasing number of violations.
The argument of the truce monitors, which had always been raised by its successive heads of the mission, including present SLMM chief Hagruph Haukland is that the SLMM was not a "police force" and that the success of the Ceasefire Agreement is depended on the sincerity of the two parties.
"Not the rifle, dialogue is our weapon," one time SLMM chief Trygve Telefssen told this writer. But, the recent history since the signing of the Ceasefire has ample evidence that the Tigers have repeatedly violated their promises given in such deliberations, pointing to lame excuses.
The SLMM has so far failed to hold the LTTE responsible for any of the killings of the military intelligence operatives, while the nature of the assassinations have the hallmarks of the Tigers.
Understandably, Norway's dual responsibility - which conflicts with each other - as the peace facilitator and the dominant party in the SLMM is one reason for the failure of the SLMM to talk tough against the LTTE violations of the truce agreement.
Norway being the facilitator needs to build a rapport with the Tiger leadership.
At the same time, the Head of the Monitoring Mission, the holder of the post should be a Norwegian, according to the CFA, is supposed to make important rulings on the ceasefire violations, which conflicts with the Norway's interests as a peace facilitator.
The plight of the SLMM is understandable. But the SLMM's failure itself ridicules its presence in the country. Major Muthaliff, apart from being a good soldier, was an emblem of the multi-racial country Sri Lanka. Born to Muslim parents, he was educated at D. S. Senanayake College, joined the Army in 1986 as an officer cadet, commissioned as a Second Lieutenant, married a Sinhala, Major Kumuduni Amarasinghe and later led a group of undercover operatives comprising all ethnic communities.
Sri Lanka has the tradition of locking the stable door after the horse has bolted.
Unless the authorities fail to sanction effective measures to counter the freely roaming LTTE gunmen in the town, many more security forces personnel will have to face the tragic end of Muthaliff.
(http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2005/06/12/securitylead.html)
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