A very ‘local’ politician once asked me what has a Diplomat to do with ‘Intelligence’. My response was "everything". Yes it is indeed sad that our rulers do not often understand what ‘Intelligence’ is all about nor its importance. We have failed to understand the importance of the collation of information, its distillation into intelligence, its analysis and finally its dissemination to those who are authorized to act. Many situations could have been pre-empted if only we had realized the importance of ‘Intelligence’. We have paid a huge price for our ineptitude in this regard. We could learn a thing or two from Pottu Aman! It would be recalled that they even planted a bogus ‘Intel’ report on our so called Intelligence and trapped us.
In 1994, the new government pulled out the core of the NIB apparently on the basis of some statement by a servile police officer who had been rejected by the NIB but was able to worm his way into the confidence of a powerful politician. In subsequent years no government realized the importance of ‘Intelligence’ for our security.
Intelligence is the key: Not only to winning any war but, vitally, to keeping the peace. Unlike expensive munitions and armaments, an Intelligence Institution of thoroughly trained professionals would save lives through prior warning thus pre-empting disasters ensuring the security of the country. In this regard it should be stated that there are ‘Intel systems’ too that do not require replacement: you have it, you use it, you constantly build on it. The older it gets, the more effective it becomes. We do need to modernize our Intelligence structure.
The role of both internal and foreign intelligence grew in the seventies and eighties. Political subversion, the JVP and the Tamil insurgencies and the accompanying terrorism became serious problems. The National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) was an apex intelligence organization which coordinated the activities of both internal and foreign intelligence.
In the year 1998 with a view to improve foreign intelligence gathering, to meet the mounting threats and primarily to monitor LTTE activities abroad, the government accepted a new intelligence structure proposed by the DGSE, the overseas espionage arm of France, under which internal and foreign intelligence functions were separated from each other. This was the beginning of yet another disaster. A Directorate of Foreign Intelligence (DFI) was established although the recommendations specifically stated that the former NIB be converted as the DFI and a separate DII set up.
A former professional ‘Intel’ man wrote at the time "The newly formed DFI had to start from scratch and seek guidance and assistance from the NIB. To the consternation of many in the intelligence community, and to make matters worse the foreign intelligence functions once handled by regular officers of the NIB were relegated to four retired officers when the need was for full time intelligence professionals dedicated and committed to penetrating the LTTE organization abroad. This set in motion the decline of the foreign intelligence service in Sri Lanka. Today the DFI has become the most ridiculed service".
After that reference to our non security conscious culture, let me examine the nature of the work our officers were called upon to perform. Their primary responsibility was, after 1983 in particular, to keep a watch over Tamil militant activities abroad. In later years with the build up of a huge Tamil Diaspora, with one in every four Sri Lankan Tamils living overseas. They came to form the backbone of the LTTE’s support base for the separatist struggle. The Intelligence service had their work cut out for them... The LTTE had become the principal threat to the State-we had not only to keep a watch over the LTTE abroad, but also to cut their logistic lines. We certainly did not succeed. Today the LTTE Diaspora have established themselves brilliantly in the western countries that are a part of the Donor Group-they have offices staffed by men and women educated in those western countries, who have built up strong lobbies in each of those countries for their cause
To revert to our situation, with the establishment of a Directorate of Foreign Intelligence separate from the Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DII), new operatives were recruited, not creating a separate ‘Service’, but for ad hoc assignments. Such appointments were only an opportunity for someone to take ‘a break’ from the regular duties. Those sent could not be expected to have had any commitment to the Institution, in this instance the DFI, for they would not really be a part of an Intelligence Service and were not even expected to return to serve in the DFI; they would return to their substantive services. The work involved building strong personal contacts, creating a ‘contact bank’——and unless the succeeding officer belonged to the same Service such contacts are never passed on. Most important question of all was, whether they were trained men-At the outset, itself the DFI blundered by sending military officers not as Defence attaches but as intelligence officers. The men in charge did not know the difference between military intelligence, the work of Defence Attaches and trained intelligence cadres. For instance RAW, ISI, MI 6 and CIA do not have military personnel. I recall that they sent a ‘traffic cop’ as our Intel man to an important Asian station! We certainly must have Defence attaches in certain capitals but to appoint military men for intelligence work was to say the least, stupid.
Yes the DFI has been a disaster. This separation of the internal and external Intelligence Agencies has not been the best arrangement to protect our national security. It was also not practical; the DFI officers, who were not permanent Intelligence officers of an established Intelligence Service, were unable to obtain the cooperation of the ‘professional operatives’ with whom they had to work abroad. It is a known fact amongst intelligence operatives that they have their own code of conduct and honour; outsiders not trained in the ‘Grand Game’, and amateurs are scorned. Anyone with any interest in Intelligence work would be aware that those involved in "Kim’s Grand Game’, do not even trust their mothers.
The external intelligence services of the bigger countries have been established to safeguard their global interests. The CIA, for example, protects US interests overseas. Where countries do not have global interests, the Security Services would have other priorities, for instance in the case of India—-RAW would be keeping an eye on the supporters of Kashmir, abroad, and also watching what the ISI may be upto and visa versa of course. RAW and ISI operatives are often Diplomats trained in Intelligence work. Do we seek to establish such a service? But in that case we have a long way to go because we do not have trained operatives. Our problem is with us now and we do not have the luxury of training a new cadre for special duties-the lead-time would be two years at least. If the decision is however to have a separate Foreign Intelligence Service, then it should come under the President directly. Its budget must not be revealed in documents, but be submerged in a general vote. The names of its personnel should not appear in any telephone directories or office lists. They must be non persons at all times. The President should direct both internal and external intelligence organizations to operate on this basis.
Another option would be to revive the NIB and make it responsible both for internal and external security, as was the situation before. The difference should be that unlike the NIB of old, the new organization would need to be a specialized closed service. It would be nothing like the present NIB. Initially the new NIB should draw on the best talent available in the Police Service today, and recruit only those with a natural bent or flair for such work. I repeat,, it should be a non-transferable service. The organization would need to be multi-disciplinary, and entirely professional, the head of National Security must have security of tenure and must be wholly independent, answerable only to the Head of State and the National Security Council (reporting to even a very high level Parliamentary oversight committee could be risky, considering our unfortunate circumstances.). The head of the organization should not be required to report to any Secretary of a Ministry.
To support the work of our Intelligence Service, all Foreign Service Officers need to be trained for at least three to six months in the NIB before they go on posting. Today, but for a few, these officers do not do even basic information gathering on LTTE activities in the countries they serve in. Even non Diplomatic home based staff, should be given a two week immersion in security work at the NIB before they assume duties abroad, so that they would be security conscious. This is unfortunately significant by its absence today. I do hope the new batch of ‘Heads of Mission’ appointees would be required to undergo a measure of training.
If our Missions abroad are expected to support the peace process they do indeed have a role. They must obtain intelligence on the actions and intentions of the ‘enemy’, this is vital in taking considered negotiating positions. Otherwise negotiators can be operating ‘in the dark’. Good intelligence will bring greater effectiveness in negotiation and, most importantly, confidence in any settlement brought about. If peace comes, the investment is far from wasted. Good ‘Intelligence’ will continue to guarantee the integrity of the state.
