Many believe that the killing of military informants and political opponents by the LTTE will continue because it is said to be a part of its survival strategy. For those who know the LTTE and its character well these killings are nothing unusual. Looking at the LTTE's past record these are not things that have cropped up suddenly. Such killings have been carried out from the beginning.
The LTTE killing squads commonly known as pistol groups have signified their continued existence to the public largely through a vicious series of killings of informants, members of opponent political groups and those considered to be traitors. Over 200 such killings have been reported since the ceasefire agreement came into being, several of which have occurred during the month of September 2004. The main motive of those involved appears to be to demonstrate that they are capable of policing their own areas without interference by any of the opponent political groups and the military. This is the only way it thinks it can survive. They know that the military informants are a threat to their existence. Hence, their elimination. Experienced observers believe that the LTTE is attempting to obtain predominant control over the Northern and Eastern provinces by using such methods of intimidation.
After nearly two decades of war and scores of battles which took the LTTE to the negotiating table with the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE now faces its most serious challenge. A revolt within the movement itself by its former eastern commander Karuna and his loyalists. The prevailing uncertainty in the eastern region gives no cause for comfort to the LTTE on both the political and military fronts. Their political activities have come to a standstill with political offices in the East closed and intermittent attacks on them by Karuna loyalists. The issues that have surfaced raise serious questions about the LTTE's organizational structure and the concept of Tamil nationhood in Sri Lanka. Prolonged stalemate in the peace process is bound to continue until the LTTE tide over the sense of insecurity in the east.
The LTTE has not shown any signs of softening their own political stance despite international pressure on them. It is also unlikely that they will change this stance until they vanquish the Karuna loyalists and bring the eastern area under their firm control. Effectively putting the Karuna group out of action will take precedence over the resumption of negotiations for the LTTE. The governments failure so far to reach a consensus on the ISGA proposals with the JVP will also result in negotiations reaching a stalemate. As far as the LTTE is concerned, total capitulation by two of the parties in the government is the only result it looks for. The appointment of a National Advisory Council by the President for peace and reconciliation is indeed an encouragement to the LTTE to bide for time. Therefore we should not be surprised that the peace process will drag on for quite sometime.
LTTE's insistence that its proposal for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) should form the basis of talks in resuming the stalled peace negotiations and the stance of the JVP on this issue has further aggravated the situation. UPFA government has not been able to reach a consensus on this issue with its main partner, the JVP. There is widespread opposition to this demand by both the JVP and the Hela Urumaya. JVP's Propaganda Secretary Wimal Weerawansa is on record having stated at public rallies that all patriotic citizens should express their combined protest against the Government's initiative to grant an Interim Council which he had said would pave the way for Eelam. The "Deshahitheshi Jatika Viyaparaya" (Patriotic National Front) one of the numerous front organizations formed by the JVP over the years vehemently oppose an LTTE run interim administration in the north east region. Elle Gunawansa Thero speaking at a meeting organized by the PNF on September 27 threatened the UPFA government that they will not hesitate to topple this government if they heeded the demand of the LTTE. Wimal Weerawansa was one of the speakers at this meeting.
It is pertinent to recall herein the formation of a similar organization in the late seventies by Elle Gunawansa Thero called the " mathroobumi arakshaka sangamaya" (Organisation for the protection of the motherland) which particularly eyed the public servants including the military. Several public meetings were held by this organization prior to the July 83 communal riots. This organization was considered by some to be communal in outlook. Surprisingly after a promising start, the organization soon fizzled out. The grapevine has it that after it fizzled out Elle Gunawansa Thero moved into a spacious temple on prime land opposite the BMICH donated by the government under the patronage of the former President Ranasinghe Premadasa.
It seems that the rebels are still not prepared to abandon their practice of killing political opponents which now occurs in and around Colombo with frequency. These have in fact gone up to such a level that even the international community and the monitoring mission had to express concern at their obduracy to continue this practice. A feeling has begun to sink in the government that the LTTE is not interested to meet the ceasefire conditions. Consequently the majority of Sri Lankans' confidence in regard to the peace process has plummeted. To a large extent the LTTE themselves are to be blamed for generating negative feelings against them.
Anyway as we have already noted, it is necessary that the government should expedite the negotiation process as the majority of the people in the country would say that "jaw jaw" is better than "war war". The point of most talks, even with the bitterest of enemies is compromise, unless the negotiations are about the implementation and administration of the unconditional surrender by one of the parties to the dispute. The compromise may be loaded heavily in favor of one side or the other but there has to be an element of give and take, however small. It is hoped that the JVP too will choose the path of consultations rather than confrontation. However, the LTTE itself will have to demonstrate its seriousness in choosing to talk rather than shoot. Regrettably however such token of the LTTE's seriousness is still to be demonstrated.
The LTTE sees the potential of the peace process being frittered away by the government not honouring its commitments while the government feels that the premature movement by the LTTE insisting on an interim administration even before the core issues have been dealt with have all created difficulties which are coming to a head.
Killings of political opponents have made it worse and more serious. From this clash of positions and perceptions has emerged a threat to the peace process that risks undoing the advances of the last three years.
