The Spy Master and his Kaoboys

After working for 28 years in Military Intelligence, I realised that MI was like a mistress to be coveted and courted in privacy and ignored in public by the commanders. But after reading B Raman's 'The Kaoboys of the R&AW' - an absorbing walk down the memory lane of his 27-year journey in the Research and Analysis Wing - I came to the conclusion that civil intelligence agencies are no better. But unlike the MI they are not mistresses but royal concubines.

Their influence is great, but they have to stand in for the queen to take the flak when the royalty fails.According to Raman, the name Kaoboys was originally used by Ambassador Apa Pant. It stuck to RN Kao, the visionary chief of R&AW and his team when George Bush Sr was the CIA chief in the 1970s. When Kao visited the CIA HQ in Washington DC, Bush presented him a small bronze statue of a cowboy. And Raman as one of the original Kaoboys, shares his memories of working under the great spymaster.

Three things make this book remarkable candour and honesty, fair judgement, and moral courage. The self-effacing personality Raman has not prevented him from calling a spade a spade whether it is about his mentor and Guru RN Kao, or his organisation. I found Raman's book refreshing after reviewing General Musharraf's autobiography glorifying himself in the first person singular.

Unlike the General, Raman does not drum up his achievements loudly in every chapter. These are tucked in here and there in low key, often credited to his guru or his organisation.

As a nation our historical sense rarely goes beyond Ramayana and Mahabharata. Thus we have been missing out on first hand accounts those who participated in events that shaped national decision making process.

There are a few memoirs of politicians and bureaucrats from the former Vice President Dr MC Chagla to Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to Dr PC Alexander which do fill the void. But unlike many of them written in dry as dust 'South Block English', Raman has adopted a modern, reader-friendly style. So the book is interesting and a few anecdotes thrown in between makes it absorbing.

Books on Indian intelligence, that too on R&AW, are too few. So Raman's honest book is a welcome addition to understand Indian history in the making from an intelligence perspective. Raman's writing highlights areas of strengths and weaknesses not only in intelligence but also in our national policy making process and governance. This enhances the value of this book.

There are two broad streams of analytical thought running through the book: national leadership's role in the performance of R&AW, and issues relating to R&AW's structuring and operational management. This article shall touch upon some of these aspects rather than the juicy stories, some of which have already been reproduced in the media.
National leadership and the performance of R&AW.

The performance of R&AW under prime ministers like Mrs Indira Gandhi and PV Narasimha Rao, who had clarity of thought, was far superior to others like Morarji Desai or VP Singh whose prejudices overrode their faith in professional competence of intelligence agencies.

Intelligence assets take time to build; unfortunately lack of continuity in policy decisions on intelligence can cost the nation dearly. When this is combined with populist decision making by the rulers, it can become a disaster. The author has cited a number of such instances.

For instance the soft handling of terrorism in Kashmir by VP Singh kindled the spread of terror threat. Stung by this in a fire fighting measure, his government went to the other extreme of asking the R&AW to give arms training to RSS cadres of Jammu to fight the terrorists!

Though nothing came of it as the Babri Masjid issue took precedence, it showed the extreme swings which government policy could take. The dismantling of covert action assets painstakingly created in Pakistan when IK Gujral came to power is yet another such instance that affected India's national interest.

Among the prime ministers with whom Raman had interacted, Mrs Indira Gandhi comes alive as a powerful personality. Raman's vivid picture of Indira Gandhi's paranoia in chapter 5 is succinctly summed up in the statement 'benevolence and malevolence go side by side.' She recognised the value of giving enough space to RN Kao to build the R&AW as an effective organisation.

Actually, RA&W under Kao proved itself within eight years of its arrival during the Bangladesh war in 1971. But somewhere down the line, R&AW lost its grip with Bangladesh thereafter and came a cropper with Mujibur Rahman's assassination. The Bangladesh War was a glorious chapter in Indian intelligence, when the army, the BSF, the IB and the R&AW worked to a cogent plan without trampling upon each others toes. Unfortunately, that spirit was perhaps never recovered in any other national crisis or war ever after, whether it was Khalistani revolt, Mumbai blast or Kargil War.

Chapter 7 dealing with the period of Emergency is interesting. The questionable use of R&AW during the Emergency, like the induction of two officers in I&B Ministry, reflected the leadership failure of both the prime minister and the organisation. Though the misuse was probably exaggerated in public perception, it coincided with the period of R&AW's rapid expansion. More than that, the Emergency set a bad precedence in the successive governments misusing intelligence agencies for political purposes. Raman's frank analysis of Kao's role during this period as advisor to Mrs Gandhi has no frills attached.

The Rajiv Gandhi period was a troublesome one for the nation, with Punjab in the melting pot of insurgency aided and abetted by the ISI, in the midst of the young leader's attempt to establish himself on his own terms. Perhaps this is the best chapter in the whole book. The faltering steps taken by Rajiv Gandhi with the help of R&AW to handle Pakistan is explained in some detail by Raman. But Rajiv had the sense to maintain continuity with earlier policies and kept an open mind unlike his successors. Thus timely technology inputs to the R&AW were acquired in this period.

Most of the intelligence community will concur with Rajiv's belief and Raman's observation about the Pakistani mindset as an enduring phenomenon that bugs Pak perceptions and policies towards India. Of course there were some quirks in Rajiv's performance: training of the first batch of the SPG in Italy, Rajiv Gandhi directly getting involved in a campaign to 'get back' at VP Singh and the intelligence agencies joining his bandwagon, his inexperienced handling of the Sri Lanka intervention etc. Raman has objectively discussed these issues.
External threats to intelligence

Raman has cited a number of instances of penetration of the IB, PMO including the NSCS, and the R&AW by the CIA, French and German intelligence etc. For instance the CIA had a mole in R&AW in Chennai during 1987 and the French had infiltrated the PMO in Delhi in this period and sensitive information was leaking like a sieve in this period. His suggestion for setting up a watchdog body to monitor the performance of IB and R&AW is an important one. In the US, such a body reports directly to the Congressional Oversight Committees. However in our country, where some of the ministers continue to be in the cabinet even as serious criminal cases are pending against them, the usefulness of such a parliamentary oversight committee appears doubtful.

The CIA has probably four decades of relationship with Indian intelligence. Yet it has persisted successfully in penetrating Indian intelligence agencies more than once. Raman has documented a few such cases of CIA moles in R&AW (an unnamed IPS officer and Major Rabinder Singh). Despite this, his contempt is focused on the State Department as the biggest road block to Indian interests. The State Department had all along known the ISI's involvement in terrorism in India and had consistently refused to recognize it. During the Narasimha Rao days it had the temerity to put India on notice if the R&AW did not desist from covert action in Pakistan! For those who want better relations with the US, Raman gives a timely reminder in this piece.

R&AW and Iinternational relations

Many may not know the nature of relationship that exists between intelligence agencies of many countries. Raman recounts the relationship built between the R&AW and the CIA, French SDECE, Khad of Afghanistan, the SAVAK of Shah's Iran, MOSSAD, the MI5 and MI6, and even the Ministry of State Security of China at various points. Of course, these relations had two sides: they helped each other wherever it was possible but that did not prevent them from spying on each other. While CIA helped R&AW as far as China was concerned, it constantly tried to penetrate the top echelons of Indian administration and the R&AW.

Raman cites his own experience of working under cover appointments in Indian missions in Paris (operating with the full knowledge of the French to gather intelligence on third countries without using French nationals) and Geneva. These two accounts on the sidelines are full of interesting anecdotes of visits of VIPs from India and the internal politics of Indian missions.

Many may not know the R&AW had an important role in building bridges with African nations and Israel. Similarly it had a hand in opening up India's relations with China during Rajiv Gandhi's regime.

Conclusion

The book is a tribute to RN Kao, described by Raman as one who "gave credit to his colleagues and subordinates when things went well and took the blame when things went wrong. He was liked by the high and the mighty not only in India, but also in many countries, but throughout his life never once did he drop or use their names."

But it is much more than that. It is a mirror of how we excelled and faltered as a nation and the role played by the R&AW in it. And it is worth reading for this single reason.
As an old MI hand I share Raman's concern at the pedestrian response in the government machinery to take action upon receiving vital information. He cites the Rajiv Gandhi assassination is one instance he cites. I know this to be true first hand because MI handed over to the IB in Chennai an intercepted LTTE transmission where the cadre spoke of finishing off Rajiv when he came to Tamilnadu. The IB boss laughed it off. "Why should the LTTE kill him?" was his reaction. Perhaps the LTTE did not hear him; after a few months they killed Rajiv Gandhi.

Now we see this kind of inaction time and again, the latest being the Hyderabad blasts where there was advance notice of the explosions. Who is accountable for such lapses? Unless, we become a nation with accountability for our actions or inaction more innocent lives will be blasted to bits.

(http://www.newdelhireview.com/node/150)