The Sri Lanka security forces in a swift operation on September 2, 2007 took over control of the western coastal area south of Mannar along Arippu Silvatturai Kondachchi. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who had been expecting this move for some time now, made a tactical pull out, without offering much resistance, though they appear to have lost a dozen cadres. The region was under the nebulous control of the LTTE who used Silvatturai and other points to smuggle their needs and also to off load supplies from mother ships.
After the operation the security forces recovered a suicide boat, 25 boats with outboard motors, and a large stock of anti-personnel and some Claymore mines and assorted ammunition. Though this was not a major LTTE base, its loss will further constrict Sea Tiger's operational area on the west. The LTTE movement to Tamilnadu coast will now be a little more risky. Tactically, it makes the LTTE's sea based infiltration operations into Puttalam-Negombo-Colombo coast more difficult.
If taking control of the coast to prevent illegal LTTE boat operations was the objective, the security forces will have to expand their hold further south, along the Portugal Bay coast. That will require clearing the area further down to Marthondikulam-Manchchukkadi ending at Kudremalai point.
This would effectively cut off the LTTE infiltration into Wilpattu sanctuary, posing a threat to Sinhala villages on its periphery. Presumably this is what the security forces would do in the coming days, though the defence spokesman had said this operation was not the beginning of the northern offensive.
In July, the security forces had expanded the forward defended lines from west of Omanthai short of Paraiyanalankulam near Madhu Iranai Iluppaikulam. If we correlate the capture of the coastal area with the July operations, the security forces gain clear operational advantages for their northern offensive.
In all probability we can expect the opening up of the alternate axis Puttalam-Mannar road when Kudremalai point is linked up from the north. This will enable greater flexibility to build up troops as well as their maintenance. It also pushes any surprise LTTE threat from the west to the A9 axis farther. It also makes LTTE's lateral movements between east and western halves of A9 highway more difficult.
After the loss of east, lack of adequate reinforcements is a reality the LTTE has to face. This could explain the LTTE's pull out from the Arippu-Silvatturai coast without a counter offensive to draw off troops. Two other possible reasons are (1) to conserve strength to defend a more compact area when northern offensive comes and (2) inability to shift troops to the area due to forward contact of troops along the Mannar axis.
The LTTE had been proactively defending its forward defended lines elsewhere in north. Its artillery had been targeting Palali once again. However, it must be worried about its inability to infiltrate cadres both across the Jaffna Lagoon as well as Point Pedro coast in sizeable numbers.
As the forward troops are tying down the LTTE along the forward lines, the LTTE has to combine its infiltration tactics to its main offensive on Jaffna. To this extent the security forces have succeeded in taking over the operational initiative from the LTTE to prevent such a build up.
The repeated failure of the Sea Tigers to operate freely in the coastal seas of Jaffna peninsula and increasingly along the Alampil Sea is the main reason for the LTTE's current impasse. The LTTE chief Prabhakaran is reported to have made a rare public appearance at the funeral of the third rung leader of the Sea Tigers, Chandrasekaran Pillai alias Thiyagan, at Pudukkudiruppu.
Thiyagan was killed in an encounter with the Sri Lanka navy off Trincomalee coast on August 13, 2007. According to some reports quoting Sri Lanka MI sources, Cheliyan has taken over as the commander of Sea Tigers, after Soosai, the veteran Sea Tiger commander, was seriously injured in an explosion triggered during a training exercise. If this is correct, the Sea Tigers are probably in the process of being revamped.
In this backdrop, perhaps the time is ripe for a LTTE offensive action that would give a big psychological boost to its cadres and improve its sagging image. For this the best option for the LTTE appears to be to develop offensive action along Welioya-Kokkuthoduvai area, which is the comparatively weak underbelly of the security forces.
This option has three advantages for the LTTE: it poses a direct threat to Sinhala villages along the periphery and with its public fall out on LTTE capabilities, it takes the attention of security forces away from the main A9 axis, and it has the close support of heavy weaponry and probably Sea Tiger support from Wanni.
What are the chances of the security forces launching the northern offensive?
The Army Commander Gen Fonseka has recently replaced the commanders of almost all field formations in Mannar sub sector and the entire northern sector. Though the changes could be to beef up the command element for launching an offensive, the new commanders are likely to take sometime to ease up the battle plans. Perhaps, the Silvatturai operation was in a test for the operational coordination of new commanders.
What is the impact of the continuing "victories" of security forces on the peace process that has been in coma, and the All Party Representative Committee's peace formulation exercise? Though military gains are valuable to the government to stabilise its parliamentary and political support, each one of them makes it more difficult to go back to a peace process that was designed for an entirely different mindset.
As far as the APRC is concerned, President Rajapaksa's emphatic statement in a recent interview that federalism was "a negative word in Sri Lanka because people think it (is) synonymous with dividing the country. Also, I prefer the phrase 'power sharing' to 'devolution'," has cleared any illusions about the APRC deliberations. And his candid admission, "I cannot change history or my own political circumstances overnight... You must remember my political legacy and constraints. During my election I received few Tamil votes because of the LTTE-enforced boycott.
I was elected primarily by a Sinhala constituency on an election manifesto which made it clear that an ultimate solution to the ethnic crisis could be evolved only on the basis of a unitary state. In any peace settlement I have to carry the Sinhala voters with me. I cannot unilaterally impose a settlement it has to be the outcome of a political process an outcome that must be long-lasting and acceptable to the people," should put a stop to speculations about any value addition from the APRC exercise.
(http://www.newdelhireview.com/node/147)
No comments:
Post a Comment