Revisiting LTTE’s Military Options

“The marginalisation of the 2002 CFA, which would have been a step towards just peace, has destroyed the confidence of the Tamil people and their expectations regarding future peace efforts. The Sri Lankan government’s ongoing war of aggression, aimed at the subjugation of the Tamil people under the guise of ‘war on Terrorism’, will add to the bloodstained pages of the island’s history. It has also compelled the Tamil people to resume their freedom struggle to realize their right to self - determination and to achieve statehood.”
– LTTE statement on February 22, 2007

“Secretary to the Defence Ministry Gotabhaya Rajapaksa said that the Government would not give into any pressures to change its defence policy that countered LTTE terrorism successfully. ‘We will not let any force dictate terms to us, whether they are national or international, to stop our on going counter-terrorism measures. We will continue till we eradicate this menace from our country,’ Rajapaksa said Friday. He said that the President, in his electoral manifesto, had promised to eliminate terrorism from the country and the people have given him a mandate to accomplish that task. ‘We have six years and we will not change tracks without achieving our target’. The Government’s defence policy had been commended by all forces against terrorism and the masses too have approved the on going operations. ‘Everybody requests us to keep going to save the people under the iron boot of a terrorist group. We have been successful and our troops are recording victory after victory,’ he said.The East has been cleared within a year and the now the LTTE is confined to the North.” - News item in the Island, February 24, 2007

From the two statements given above, it is evident that the mindsets of the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have a great similarity after completing five years of ceasefire in February 2007. Just as they swore by peace in 2002, now they are swearing to pursue war. The process of consigning ceasefire to statute books only is now complete. That is the gist of the their messages.

Already the Sri Lanka media is talking of an imminent LTTE attack citing the exodus of civilians from LTTE controlled areas in the north. On the other hand, LTTE says the air strikes in Vavuniya sector have caused panic among civilians who fear a Sri Lanka offensive in this sector. In the parliament the Minister of Fisheries had indicated possible LTTE attacks on Colombo port. There is a lot uncertainty on the future course of armed pursuit of ‘peace’ in Sri Lanka; it raises a few elusive questions:

What is LTTE going to do, having lost the military initiative to Security Forces at the end of 2006?

What actions can it take to defuse the Security Forces offensive in the north, when it comes about, as stated by the Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa?

The year 2006 was a bad one for the LTTE. It culminated in the progressive loss of control and erosion of their influence in the east and on the high seas. As indicated after the Vakarai action, LTTE appear to have pulled out major part of its forces out of the East. The remnants in the east would probably carry out low-level guerrilla operations reminiscent of the earlier years. In the north, the LTTE forces might not be fully be geared for a conventional war to take on big targets, say like Jaffna.

North

Thus now LTTE appears to be in the process of cutting their losses and getting their act together for the next phase of their struggle. This process requires: (1) preventing further Security Forces forays in Jaffna peninsula and island territories, (2) reduce Sri Lanka naval domination of West coast from Mannar to Colombo and (3) sustain defence of current positions in Vavuniya area.

In the 90s LTTE was able to go through a similar process with comparative ease. However, there had been a number of changes in the environment both at home and abroad. LTTE has to come to terms with the new realities while waging its tested and tried mix of conventional and unconventional (UC) warfare including terrorism. Having lost its military initiative, the LTTE is confronted with a number of unsavoury developments before it can launch a powerful conventional operation.

These include reduced firepower and strength, loss areas of control (and as a corollary reduction in local resources), tightened internal finance controls in Sri Lanka, disrupted financial and logistic supply chain from the Americas and the EU countries, not so favourable ambience in Tamil Nadu, and the increasing risk of interception in maritime traffic thanks to the tightening global integration of anti-terrorism measures at sea.

Its global propaganda network has been put on the back foot with increased sensitivity of international bodies to its questionable methods of operation, and international media’s readiness to probe and publicise LTTE’s global ‘grey’ activities.

In order to reconcile its needs for the next phase of its struggle with the existing environment discussed above, LTTE appears to have taken a number of measures. These include:

· Step up recruitment: Broaden the base of its compulsory recruitment through enrolment of all those in the age group of 18 to 40 to create the Makkal Padai (Peoples Force). This militia presumably would relieve trained LTTE cadres from second and third line duties connected with administrative security, supply chain, battlefield replenishment, and provide reinforcements to replace battle casualties. The people living in LTTE areas of control have no choice but to follow its orders. However, they are unhappy with these demands. Some of them who have streamed out of the areas, have been candid about the forced recruitment.

· Maintain an offensive posture along FDLs in Jaffna sector: LTTE deserters and surrendered cadres in the east had indicated low levels of morale after LTTE’s losses in 2006. Undoubtedly, LTTE needs to refurbish its image as a fighting force particularly among the Tamil people living in areas under its control, as well as Tamil Diaspora. Thus LTTE has to assume an offensive posture in its ground activities in the north. The LTTE artillery bombardment (with 130 mm guns) of Headquarters, 53 Division on February 14, 2007 in Kodikamam when senior commanders had gathered is an assertion of such a posture. It also sends a clear signal that the LTTE medium artillery is alive and kicking despite repeated air strikes to eliminate them. (According to the informed columnist Iqbal Athas at least four guns were involved in the bombardment.) At a pinch, this gives the LTTE the capability to interdict the use of Jaffna airport as was demonstrated in its August 2006 operation after its Mavil Aru debacle. Despite media reports of possible LTTE attack in Jaffna sector, in my view this may come later than sooner when LTTE’s overseas supply chain, particularly from Tamil Nadu, is stabilized.

This would require LTTE to draw away Sri Lanka Navy from Mannar coast on the east and off Chundikulam to Point Pedro in the north. Sea Tigers efforts to interdict ships supplying Jaffna came to naught. But their actions have woken up Indian Coast Guard and Navy to the potential threat posed by LTTE.

As a result they have tightened their patrolling, presumably in coordination with Sri Lanka Navy. The results have been quick and more may be forthcoming. LTTE is likely to try and tackle the adverse situation in Tamil Nadu politically rather than through confrontation.

In the coming weeks we can expect some of the pro-LTTE political leaders with clout in the state and central governments to try and lobby for scaling down the counter-LTTE operations along Tamil Nadu coast. Whether the state and central governments would respond to such backdoor methods is a moot point.

· Claymore mine attacks, selective killings, and sniping along forward lines and patrolling routes are attractive options for LTTE to keep up the UC war going particularly along the axes of operation in the north. This would impose caution on the Security Forces and delay their aggressive patrolling activities so essential before they launch offensive operations.

There are sufficient indications that LTTE also intends to carry the UC war to Colombo port through Sea Tigers attacks. This threat even if it fails to materialise would tie down naval ships and provide manoeuvring space for Sea Tigers to protect supply routes in the north.

Interrogation of apprehended LTTE cadres in Tamil Nadu has indicated that the suicide boat seized by the Coast Guard was intended for an attack on Kankesanturai (KKS) and that 15 more such boats are being readied for similar operations. These reports only reinforce the likelihood of the UC war heating up in preference to conventional operations.

East

The Security Forces are poised to follow up their successes in the east with operations against LTTE hides in Toppigala forests. The LTTE cadres still operating in reduced numbers can be expected to carry out UC attacks against soft targets (supply convoys, second line transport, civilian transport etc.) along the coastal roads. These can spill over in areas northwest of Wellikanda when the heat of Security Forces operation cools down. Presumably these areas will have to be dominated by Karuna’s force in he interim.

In the search operations following the Vakarai success, the Security Forces have recovered a large haul of weapons and equipment stashed away in LTTE hides. According to the Security Forces the weapons and equipment recovered up to February 16, 2007 included: 152 mm artillery guns-2, 120 mm Mortars-5, 81 mm Mortars – 8, Assault rifles T-56 – 624, Anti aircraft guns – 2, RPG launchers & rockets (quantity not specified), Machine guns – 13, Claymore mines – 71, High tech radio sets – 34, Intercom sets for internal use – 62, and Suicide boats (armed with 22 &24 Claymore mines) – 2. This is perhaps one of the biggest ‘catches’ of the Sri Lanka Army. The recovery of sizeable quantities of weapons from caches give insight into a few interesting aspects of LTTE operations:

· LTTE pull out (exfiltration in Indian military jargon) from Sampur-Vakarai-Verugal area was a planned operation than just running away from the battlefield as painted by the media. Apparently LTTE had used the concentration of civilians fleeing from the battle zone astride the axis of advance of Security Forces to buy time and delay the launch of the Vakarai offensive. This shows LTTE’s callous disregard for civilian lives and the bitter truth that when it comes to war self-preservation rather than humanitarian considerations always takes the upper hand.

· The recovery of 152 mm guns, and 120 mm mortars reduces the artillery threat in this sector to Sri Lanka naval shipping and coastal traffic. This gives a major advantage to the Security Forces to move reinforcements to Jaffna and to launch Naval operations from Trincomalee coast to support ground operations in the north and restrict Sea Tiger operations off Mullaitivu- Alapmpil coast.

· The loss of large quantities of close support weapons like machine guns and 81 mm mortars probably indicate the neutralisation of LTTE’s conventional capability in the east. However, we can expect UC operations as some of the leadership and cadres are still dispersed in the jungles on the west and south.

· Despite the constant and regular air strikes the LTTE was able to stash away even large weapons like 152 mm guns and 120 mm mortars. This would indicate the limitations of depending upon air support to neutralise ground threat, particularly in counter insurgency. This is a historical truth repeated from the time the American airborne weapons in Vietnam failed to win them the war. (Americans appear to be still in the same belief in Iraq). As our own experience has indicated helicopter gunships are a better option than fighter-bombers for such operations.

· The Security Forces are to be commended for unearthing such big caches within a reasonable time. Karuna’s knowledge of the ground in this region probably came in handy for search operations.

The Tamil Nadu factor

In the earlier part of this article LTTE’s use of Claymore mines figures as a weapon of choice in its UC operations. LTTE’s uncanny ability to use it to ambush Security Forces and VIP convoys is well documented. In UC warfare, this potent directional mine, which destroys the targets in a 60-degree arc in radius of about 50 m, is ideally suited for causing maximum casualty because on triggering it throws 700 steel balls at a height of about 6 ft. Functionally, it offers a number of activation options. LTTE had been manufacturing these mines. Despite the continuous air strikes in 2006, it evidently still retains the in-house capacity to produce them. Its manufacture requires casings made in cast iron, steel balls and explosives. LTTE probably assembles the weapon with these requirements procured from other suppliers. Security Forces in Sri Lanka are probably monitoring sale and traffic of such items useful LTTE

Evidently Tamil Nadu is now an important source for meeting this requirement as number seizures in recent months indicate. (In particular, the Indian Coast Guard’s seizure of a boat in the international waters carrying nearly 6.5 tons of ball bearings for LTTE is a case in point). LTTE with a network of sleeper agents in India is not likely to restrict its procurement to Tamil Nadu only. Kerala with convenient and undermanned coastline offers an attractive option. Andhra Pradesh with its borders in close proximity of Chennai and Karnataka offer less risky options. LTTE is likely to exploit the chinks in India’s coastal and internal security, particularly in southern states, to establish a safe conduit for its supplies. Thus in the context of LTTE’s ability to wage war in Sri Lanka Indian supply chain becomes a force multiplier. Any operation against LTTE in Sri Lanka has to consider neutralising the Tamil Nadu factor through political, diplomatic and military means. A study of LTTE’s current options would be incomplete without considering this aspect, though it has not been included in this article. It is a major topic on its own merit.

(http://www.newdelhireview.com)