"Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and National Security" Reviewed by Nanda Godage

A book by Rohan Gunaratna

My first reaction after a cursory reading was that Rohan Gunaratne had offered information to the LTTE that was detrimental to our interests. I was in fact quite disturbed. A more careful reading has provoked me into making a 'Comment' - hence this article.

I must in the first instance congratulate Rohan, for he has been the only Sri Lankan academic who has devoted his entire time and energy to the study of the LTTE itself and at times was gives the impression that the LTTE is an obsession with him. This must be appreciated, for the national mood is one of apathy and this mood is sadly reflected in the world of academia in this country. It would be conceded that but for the scholarly writings of Prof. Kingsley de Silva, and a few others, there has been comparatively very little written on this, 'The National Question'. Prof De Silva's recent book 'Reap the Whirlwind' is a 'must' read for every Sri Lankan, and anyone else interested in the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka.

Rohan Gunaratne's book has an interesting format. But before we discuss its contents, a word about the 13 page Foreword by General Richard Clutterbuck may not be out of place. It is indeed quite fascinating. He had participated in anti- terrorism campaigns in a bygone era, but what he writes is well worth reading.

Gunaratne's book is like the curate's egg, somewhat uneven but extremely good and informative on the whole. Quite often newspapermen, in their desire to pull off a scoop, fall victim to the urge to report on the basis of hearsay. Even scholars sometimes give into the temptation. Rohan Gunaratna appears, though, to have extremely occasionally, unknowingly, indulged in good faith, in the belief that what he has been told is indeed fact and succumbed.

This is a tendency that must be curbed. Whatever is put down must be verified not once but ten times over, for even one error would very well erode the credibility of the entire book. And that would be a great pity in the case of a valuable book such as this.

Another tendency that writers on such emotive subjects as ethnic conflicts need to guard against is letting emotion take over. Giving vent to emotion in a scholarly work detracts from the value of the book.

This book is certainly an improvement on Guneratne's previous writings, His proof readers, printer and binder have done him an injustice. But it is a 'must' read. There is such little knowledge about the LTTE among our opinion-makers and decision-makers that I would commend the book to them, (most unfortunately for this country our decision making politicians don't read, other than perhaps the newspapers. That said the first observation I wish to make is that the book is extremely informative. At times one gets the impression that he flaunts his knowledge of the LTTE. He also most unnecessarily mentions names of serving and retired public servants. I do hope that he has in the process not endangered the persons named. While reading the book I often wondered about its purpose, and also about Gunaratna's objective in writing this book.

Security-thinking

Perhaps the most important aspect of the book is the contribution Rohan Gunaratna makes towards the advancement of security-thinking in Sri Lanka. The author has, even previously advocated or rather pleaded, for the revamping of the Security- Intelligence bureaucracy in this country. The ethnic crisis would never have assumed its present proportions had there been an appreciation of the importance of 'National Security' in all its manifestations, and an appreciation of the crucial importance of Intelligence for the security of the State. There then does appear to be a growing awareness of this and a revamping and a restructuring is said to be taking place. It may be better late than never, but it must be mentioned that successive governments of this country never understood the importance of either Intelligence or Security.

Governments often used, or rather abused, the internal security network for their own political survival. This government virtually destroyed the NIB by removing the finest Intelligence officers we had in this country. I am particularly pleased that Rohan Gunaratne has specifically made reference to this self-destructive action of the government and "the politicization of the NIB". He refers to certain appointments of Intel officers to our Missions and states: "Many of them cut a sorry figure before their foreign counterparts who fear to exchange high quality intelligence with them". From my own experience I am aware that every word of this is true.

Not understood

In another context Gunaratna states "..career Intelligence officers respect and recognise only another career intelligence officer. Investigation and Intelligence are two different traits and trades". Again true, a fact not understood by politicians and civilian administrators who merely because they had the power interferred and almost destroyed the Intel organisation of the country. Today I doubt very much whether there is a single officer who could be described as an expert on the LTTE. The whole question of 'Intelligence' is a matter that should engage the attention of civil society groups and of the people at large, for our sentinels in parliament seem to be asleep or are too engrossed in the power game to bother about the damage being done to national institutions by their own kind of transient politicians!

The author makes a very pertinent point when he says that the war with the LTTE cannot be fought successfully without good Intelligence. Gunaratna quite rightly refers to the fact that unlike our Indian counterparts, Sri Lankan diplomats are not trained in Intelligence work. Most of them do everything other than the most important function of them all, which is, monitoring LTTE activities abroad. They have not only had no training but most of them avoid such crucial work as they would the plague. As stated earlier no government of Sri Lanka has given the subject of 'Intelligence', the priority it deserves. Gunaratna States: "Rigid adherence by Diplomats to Sri Lanka's classical foreign policy role of liaison with Governments was the biggest obstacle to the mooting of an aggressive counter propaganda campaign. The mindset of the Sri Lankan Diplomats could be attuned to aim for an innovative foreign policy to meet extant challenges and future threats".

Life and death

In regard to the matter of training and advice on intelligence, we have in fact, not accepted offers made to us by some of the foremost international institutions in the world, to help us develop our intelligence agencies to the level we need to fight this war. Someday, perhaps, the people will learn of these decisions that have made the difference between life and death for thousands of our soldiers.

Gunaratna also draws attention to the self-inflicted disadvantage and impediment we brought upon ourselves by separating the portfolio of Foreign Affairs from Defence. President Jayewardene was cynical about Foreign Affairs and made it just another ministry. Defence and foreign affairs are two sides of the same coin. In today's circumstances, the fact that it is not one ministry and directly under the Head of Government has been to the advantage of the LTTE.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book are the last two chapters. Alhough he has drawn upon material from his earlier writings much of the material is new. His analysis and comments are delving of much value. His book is also a mine of new information on the LTTE, delving into the very bowels of the LTTE. There is no doubt that he would have put himself in danger to acquire such information. He appears, from the book, to have thought it his duty to 'educate' his readership on the LTTE. He has used what is known as 'Open Source Intelligence' in writing this book to enable the people to understand the enemy.

In Chapters 4 and 5, Rohan Gunaratna covers the LTTE's international network most comprehensively. He gives extensive information on the LTTE's fundraising, its shipping network and its weapons procurement. These chapters must be made compulsory reading for our decision makers and our members of parliament. I do hope that at least these two chapters of Gunaratne's book would be translated and published in Sinhala newspapers. This is extremely important as there are many millions in the south, particularly among the Buddhist clergy whose ignorance of the problem and of the LTTE could be described as astounding. They seem to be depending on their imagination for their facts.

Information specialists

In discussing LTTE propaganda and the government's counter campaign, Gunaratna states that the "first positive move to fight LTTE propaganda in this direction was the appointment of information specialists to a dozen missions in late 1997".

This is not entirely correct. This government has certainly given a new dimension to the matter of countering LTTE propaganda abroad but it is certainly not "the first positive step to fight LTTE propaganda". Those who have not followed closely events during the period between 1983 and '87, mistakenly believe that we had left the field open to the anti Sri Lanka Tamil groups and the LTTE in particular. Nothing can be further from the truth.

In the period immediately after 1983, the then government poured in resources which later dried up without any understanding as to how best to deal with the external situation.

It must be remembered that our image was tainted after the atrocities of 1983. The International community believed that the Human Rights situation in Sri Lanka was bad and the world was prepared to believe any report about atrocities real or fictitious, which our detractors claimed the armed forces had committed. Isolated incidents were lashed together into one damning indictment. International Human Rights groups such as Amnesty International, church groups and governments (including governments such as Argentina, acting as proxies), and the United Nations Human Rights Commission and its sub-commission were on our back.

The much-maligned officers of the ministry of foreign Affairs can take justifiable pride in the fact it was they who were able to head off sanctions and intervention on humanitarian grounds. There can be no better proof that the massive propaganda effort to denigrate the country did not succeed, than the fact that development aid and foreign investment continued to come into the country. With the limited resources that were made available the ministry, through its embassies and high commissions reached out to the following constituencies that really mattered - the legislators, the officials of the ministries of foreign affairs in the countries they were accredited to, the media - the print media in particular - the think tanks, the human rights groups and church groups where such groups took an interest in the situation in Sri Lanka. It was neither possible nor necessary to reach out to the multitude or 'the man on the street'(who was not interested in our problem) as some in this country who criticised the ministry, advocated. It is therefore not correct to state that the LTTE campaign went unchallenged.

In perspective

Rohan Gunaratna has in this book set the ethnic crisis and our national security problem against the backdrop of the insurgencies around the world. He has in the process put our problem in perspective. Gunaratna's thesis on 'preventive diplomacy' to head off ethnic disputes from becoming threats to the existence of states, is worthy of the consideration of governments. Gunaratna discusses the genesis of the crisis and recalls the mishandling of the situation in the north by the J. R. Jayewardene Government. He states: "Without politically and economically diffusing the emerging situation his regime responded to the hit and run tactics of the Tamil insurgents by replacing the Police in Jaffna with the Army in 1979. Unlike the Police the Army had neither the training in civil relations nor Experience in Public Relations. The indiscriminate violence that followed contributed to public resentment. This was in addition to the various ethnic, educational, social, religious, and political grievances that the Tamils already suffered . The last straw, as Gunaratna states, was the open economic system which exposed the Jaffna farmer to severe competition from imports that were in fact dumped in our market to subvert the country.

Rohan Gunaratna next discusses the impact of the insurgency in Sri Lanka on the South Asian region and makes some useful suggestions for international cooperation under UN auspices.

As stated earlier, Gunaratna in the last two chapters discusses the organisational structure of the LTTE, its strategies and the threat posed by the LTTE. He refers to the importance of disrupting the LTTE's support network and faults the establishment rather harshly for their approach and lack of foresight.

Despite some shortcomings it is a book that must be read and digested by all those concerned with the future of our country.