LTTE's Wanni bastion no longer impregnable

Forces have learnt from past debacles:

Next target: Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa on September 10, spelt out the Government's position with regard to the Wanni, without ambiguity at the ceremony held at the Naval Jetty in Trincomalee, when the nation paid tribute to the Navy men who returned to the Trincomalee port following their biggest victory in the sea.

He was very clear in his message that there will be no room for terrorism in the country and that if Wanni is the last bastion of terrorism that is obviously the next target of the Security Forces.

The Wanni operation is not the only message conveyed by him. He also indicated that the military option will be a backed up vehicle to implement the political solution that may be agreed upon at the All Party Representative Committee to solve the decades long conflict in the North and the East.

This means the Government is very clearly in it's resolve in adopting a politico-military approach to the North East conflict. In other words the Government needs to win the battle against terrorism one hundred per cent to facilitate the implementation of a political solution.

But many are looking forward to the defeat of the LTTE militarily in the Wanni which is considered to be the Tiger stronghold where all its military, administrative and political apparatus are concentrated.

Whether the Government conveys this message or not the LTTE is aware that the Security Forces, if not for the external pressure on the Government to hold back its military operations, will definitely conquer the Wanni to liberate the people from the iron grip of the Tigers.

But there are those who also think it will be suicidal for the Security Forces to step into Wanni.They are of the thinking that the Wanni is impregnable . There are many reasons to support this idea since many attempts to penetrate the LTTE heartland had ended in failure.

Jayasikurui (Victory Assured) the longest and costliest battle fought by the Security Forces to capture a 76 Km stretch of road between Vavuniya and Kilinochchi along the Jaffna Kandy A-9 highway was a classic example giving credence to this school of thought.

The LTTE reacted to this operation, launching a counter offensive "Operation Sei Allathu Sethu Madi" (Do or die) compelling the Security Forces to suspend the battle short of its objective of reaching only the Northern town of Mankulam, 32 Km South of Kilinochchi 18 months after the launch of the battle in May 1997.
Defeating LTTE

The subsequent attempts by the Security Forces, such as Ranagosa operation launched in 1999 to wrest control of the areas around Wanni though successful at the initial stage, later turned out to be debacles, leading to many reversals with Security Forces losing control of Kilinochchi, Paranthan and later the biggest debacle in Elephant Pass losing thousands of soldiers.

But the LTTE too suffered heavy losses during these battles though they were able to effectively resist Security Forces' moves to capture the Wanni. With this background, many are of the view that the Security Forces should think twice before attempting to defeat the LTTE in the Wanni.

Another school of thought is that the Government should exert pressure on the LTTE to enter the path of negotiations without launching military operation to liberate Wanni. This idea is grounded on the premise that such an operation would lead to a negative fall out on the international front.

However, the Government is very clear on this score. It wants to militarily defeat the LTTE prior to implementing any political solution. It is not ready to advocate any political solution without crushing the Tiger outfit.

Another idea gaining currency is that the Security Forces should not step into the Wanni at this juncture and that they should seal off the Wanni and bottle in the LTTE thus starving it of supplies, taking into consideration that the outfit is already running low on ammunition specially artillery rounds. This school of thought is based on the human cost involved in any such operation.

There is a justified reason for this thinking given the long duration such an operation would entail leading to suffering of the civilian population.

The other risk involved, in the quest for capturing the Wanni,is the ability of the LTTE to dig in and use the time lag to lobby international support though the outfit is in a weak position.

On the other hand the international community will not condone, the suffering of the civilian population and such tactic would take a comparatively longer period to deplete the LTTE's war chest.

What the Government should be clear about is that it is impractical to wait for longer period to defeat the LTTE in the Wanni since the latter has mastered the tactics of changing scenarios in an unimaginable time. The best example is the four-year Ceasefire offered to them.

The LTTE used this period to strengthen themselves militarily. Different situation

But the situation today is entirely different from that of the period in which Security Forces made unsuccessful efforts to capture the Wanni from the LTTE grip. The situation is more advantageous towards the Security Forces as they are now in a strong position against the LTTE having liberated the entire Eastern province from the LTTE grip.

There may be counter arguments, for instance in the mid of 1990's too the Security Forces launched operations to capture Wanni when the East was fully under the control of the Security Forces. But the bitter truth is that the Security Forces closed many camps in the East to reinforce the battle fronts in the Wanni.

That was done without any plan to hold the area by using any other means. Troops were drawn for the Jayasikurui operation mainly from Trincomalee and Batticaloa without any deployment of Police or any other force to dominate the area. That enabled the LTTE to move into these territories without any resistance and have their establishment in those parts of the East very easily.

But under the present scenario the Defence authorities have not left any room for the LTTE to raise their head again in the East though they deploy the same battalions who fought the battles in the East to dominate the areas in the Wanni too.

The difference, this time is that when troops are drawn out from the newly liberated areas in the East, the Police and the Police Special Task Force have been given the task to dominate the area without leaving any room for the LTTE to make a come back to the East.

Therefore, the East has been completely sealed off to the LTTE in the wake of any offensive launched to capture Wanni. More than 50 Police stations that are going to be opened in the East will do the role played by the Security Forces earlier.

The defeat of the LTTE militarily in the East would help the Police to run the normal civil administration in the East without any hindrance. Therefore the Tiger outfit cannot expect any help from the East to face any military operation in the Wanni.

Another disadvantageous situation for the Tiger outfit is that they have lost all of their recruitment bases in the North and East with the East fully coming under the Security Forces control, meaning, the LTTE cannot have any reinforcement from the East unlike in the past.

Not only in the East they have lost the other major recruitment base in Jaffna as they have completely loss control over the Jaffna population that is estimated to around 400,000. So the LTTE have to solely depend on the Wanni population that is estimated to be around 250,000 to 350,000, for all their requirements.
Different Tactics

One major factor behind the defeats of the Security Forces in the Wanni was due to the military tactics adopted by them to capture Tiger territory in the Wanni. The Tiger outfit was aware from which direction the troops were heading towards the Wanni when troops were engaged in the 18 month long Jayasikurui operation.

That the military tactics adopted by then Commanders resulted in heavy sacrifices of young lives in the costly operation which failed to realise its objective is only too well known.

One big advantage presently accruing to the Security Forces is that it has good military strategists to surprise the LTTE in many aspects without giving clear signals about troops movement.

Therefore, the Security Forces have now been able to scatter the entire fighting strength of the LTTE into different locations without allowing them to muster their strength at one point and launch massive offensive operation against the troops.

That was why the LTTE publicly accepted that they are now engaged in defensive operations in the Wanni to defend their territories. They are now not in a position to risks to muster their strength at one point as they fear troops infiltrations if they leave any weak link point in their defence lines.

Earlier, the LTTE was able to reverse the military victories in the Wanni mainly due to manoeuvrability of its fighting strength estimated to be around 6,000 to different locations to scatter the troops to different battle fronts.

That was the key factor behind the success of the military tactics of the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

The Security Forces now with a good knowledge of these tactics are now adopting counter strategies used by the LTTE itself to scatter the Forces.

On the other hand the Defence authorities have also taken steps to lessen the additional duties on the Security Forces such as to guard threatened villages, by improving the Home Guard service to a quality service under the Civil Security Department while establishing the State owned Rakna Arakshana Lanka to deploy security personnel to guard economic nerve centres in the South.
Colombo Security

Another key factor that has to be considered is the security in the South as the Tiger outfit which is intent on destabilising the south through their terror activities targeting economic nerve centres and the civilian population.

In this aspect also the Security Forces are now in a better position as the recent operations in the East and also in the South of Mannar have restricted the avenues available with the LTTE to pose a threat to Colombo or any other part of the country.

The loss of the East was a major blow to the LTTE as they made use of the region to bring in explosives and suicide cadres to Colombo. Later they made use of Silavatura Sea Tiger base to implement their terror operations in the South but that option too is now defunct with the capture of Silavathura by the troops.

The only path available to the LTTE to bring in explosives to Colombo is through Omanthai. But, it has become an extremely difficult task with the thorough rigorous checking by the Security Forces at the two road blocks at Omanthai and Medawachchiya.

The fast restructuring of the intelligence networks in the South has also proved profitable for the Security Forces as they could break the LTTE cells in the South during the past one and half years.

That was why the Tiger outfit could not wreak havoc in Colombo by exploding bombs though the LTTE boasted of bringing the fourth Eelam War to Colombo.

The LTTE is facing its worst set back yet in the Wanni in the backdrop of their Eastern debacle. With the deployment of the Security Forces on two fronts in Jaffna and Wanni FDLs the LTTE has to scatter their total strength to defend their territory.

According to intelligence reports, the LTTE has around 6,000 fighting cadres in the Wanni to defend their territory in Jaffna and also in the Wanni.
Wanni situation

They have to depend on some 4,000 cadres to defend the Wanni FDL from Mannar to Kokkuthuduvai. With the major thrust on the West of Omanthai the LTTE have strengthened their presence in its defences West of Vavuniya as they must concentrate on the North Western coast since it is the only life line left for their logistic and other support.

With this severe shortage of man power the LTTE has now deployed civilians and stray dogs to guard the roads in fear of troops infiltrations to their territory and to facilitate 'VIP' movements.

Apart from this the LTTE has to deploy at least 1000 fully trained cadres for the Radha Brigade to provide security for LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

Under these circumstances the Tiger outfit has to depend on the civilian population in the Wanni for all their requirements. Therefore, the civilian population in the Wanni are now living under extreme pressure of the LTTE.

The LTTE political leaders have now been deployed to be in charge of military activities. Even LTTE political leader S.P. Thamilselvan has not been spared in this as he has been given the task of defending the Pooneryn sector. Therefore, Thamilselvan has to remove his normal outfit and take cover inside a bunker to accomplish the task entrusted to him.

Balraj, the most senior military leader now with the LTTE is also not in good health like his 52 year old leader Velupillai Prabhakaran who is now ailing due to stress.

Therefore, according to Wanni sources Theepan is the only senior leader with the Tiger outfit and he is not a military tactician like his erstwhile colleagues. The leaders who escaped from the Eastern theatre have no recognition in Wanni and they are reportedly in shock due to the experience they had to face in the Wanni.

The low morale of the LTTE leaders has resulted in a large number of the rank of file ditching the outfit but have to confine themselves within the Wanni since they have to cross LTTE checkpoints even to surrender to the Security Forces.

Even with these reversals suffered by the LTTE capturing the Wanni will not be a cake walk to the Security Forces as the Tiger leader is ready to fight to the last man to defend his territory in desperation.

But the commitment of the Security Forces towards achieving the task even under difficult circumstances coupled with the leadership given by the three Forces commanders will ensure overcoming these obstacles if they launch any operation to liberate the civilian population in the Wanni.

It has thus become the duty of the Security Forces to liberate the innocent civilian entrapped in Wanni at this decisive juncture.

(www.sundayobserver.com)