Eastern promise - Sri Lankan troops turn Tigers back into guerrillas By Tom Farrell

Non-Subscriber Extract

The government's capture of the eastern Sri Lankan town of Thoppigala on 11 July has theoretically brought the entire east of the country back under its control for the first time since 1994. The ethnic separatist group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) no longer runs the type of parallel administration it has established in the north and which it expanded into the east during the 2002-2006 ceasefire despite a major split in the movement and the damage wrought by the tsunami on 26 December 2004.

The fall of Thoppigala was the culmination of a series of ground offensives by the Sri Lankan Army and counter-insurgency units of the police Special Task Force in the east that began in July 2006. The security forces expelled the LTTE from the territories it held south of Trincomalee harbour in August-September 2006, then captured the key coastal town of Vakarai in January after prolonged shelling and the displacement of 30,000 residents. In March-April, the army and task force pushed west into the interior of Batticaloa district, an offensive that displaced more than 100,000 civilians, but brought key roads back under government control for the first time in more than a decade.

While the long-running insurgency's heaviest fighting has been concentrated in the north, control of the east (which comprises Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara districts) has been important to the LTTE and its loss will be a significant blow to the group. The area's coastline and harbours allowed the rebels to bring in supply ships from Southeast Asia, the source of most of their weapons, and launch maritime attacks against convoys supplying government forces stationed on the Jaffna peninsula to the north.

The loss of the east may not have a significant impact on the LTTE's operations in the north as it was already difficult to transfer supplies to the region from the east through government-controlled territory. However, it has limited both the LTTE's pool of potential recruits and the ability of its Sea Tiger naval wing to launch attacks on vessels sailing from Trincomalee.

The Sea Tigers can still operate from bases further north, but they will have fewer options with which to surprise the Sri Lankan Navy. They can use the northwest coast, where large numbers of fishing vessels provide their attack boats with cover. However, less government shipping travels along the western route and the Sea Tigers would also be exposed to greater maritime surveillance by India.

Despite these factors, the loss of the east does not spell the end of the LTTE or violence in the east. The government will be required to hold the territory gained with significant numbers of troops while simultaneously fighting the LTTE in the north. The rebels are unlikely to make life easy for the military in the east, promising a campaign of assassinations, economic sabotage and low-intensity warfare to hamper the promised government reconstruction and development efforts, part of Colombo's attempt to win over the support of the local population.

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