Wanni top brass in ‘musical chairs’

Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka on Friday made a beeline to Vavuniya where he was received by outgoing Wanni Security Forces Commander Major General Upali Edirisinghe.
General Fonseka met Divisional Commanders and Brigade Commanders to review the security situation in the Wanni and brief them on operations ahead, now that the East has been cleared.
The Army Commander’s visit to the Wanni came exactly a week after army headquarters announced changes in the Wanni command, which were reported in a Sunday newspaper last week.
Senpathi reported changes to the commands in the Wanni - 56 and the newly created 57 Divisions- on June 17. Brigadier Jagath Rambukpotha from the artillery was appointed General Officer Commanding (GOC) 56 Division while Brigadier Jagath Dias from the infantry was appointed GOC 57 Division.
Commander, Mannar Division, Major General Udeni Munasinghe, given a Brigadier’s appointment, retired prematurely and was replaced by Brigadier Channa Gunatilleke.
Area Commander Weli Oya, Major General Nimal Jayasuriya, once GOC 53 Division, was replaced by Brigadier M.K. Jayawardena. And to top it all, Security Forces (SF) Commander, Wanni, Major General Upali Edirisinghe was also removed and replaced by Major General Jagath Jayasuriya.
Ever since the GOC 53 Division Brigadier Srinath Rajapaksa was selected for a defence course in China, speculation was rife that Major General Jagath Jayasuriya, would replace him. This would have been a stepping stone to SF Commander Jaffna, from General G.A. Chandrasiri, who further climbed the ladder. General Jagath Jayasuriya has been brought straight away as SF Commander Wanni. With this appointment and that of Major General G.P.R.S. de Silva as GOC 21 Division, the entire Wanni Command has changed within a space of two months.
Changing the entire Command in a very vulnerable area, may send mixed signals to the LTTE. It may mean that the military would no longer be pursuing operations in the Wanni or, it could also mean that officers were handpicked to undertake specific operations in the region.
Generally, change of the entire command could be disadvantageous to the forces. SF Commanders and Division Commanders need time to familiarize themselves with Brigade Commanders and Field commanders, to get to know their strengths and weaknesses and to familiarize themselves with the terrain and be privy to intelligence inputs of the enemy, before taking the plunge. Of course, those leaving the command would pass on available intelligence.
With the Wanni waiting to flare up, and the buildup already reported previously, the question is which side would take the initiative? The LTTE has two options, either to dig in with a formidable defence or, pre-empt with a strike. A successful strike would unsettle the Government, making it more vulnerable.
Political events do have an impact on military operations. This week the ruling alliance was rocked with the news that a coalition partner, the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), withdrew its support for the government. A major section of the CWC, headed by its leader, Arumugam Thondaman, decided to sit in the Opposition benches from next week.
This follows SLFP (M) wing leader Mangala Samaraweera’s announcement that several members would cross over to the Opposition. Generally, such crossovers begin with minority parties like the CWC and Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), as witnessed in 2001. These are followed by disgruntled members of the key party in a ruling alliance that takes a decisive step after satisfying itself as to the direction the wind is blowing.
The initial euphoria of military victories has already died down, with the cost of living spiraling even as the expenditure shoots up. The government is cash strapped and not knowing where to turn.
On the other hand, the LTTE, which hit a low ebb, has the advantage of playing for time, a factor any terrorist organization relishes. On the other hand, governments- whether they are pursuing peace or war agenda- have limited timeframes to achieve their objectives. The government is three years, three months old and already showing signs of cracking up, unless the JVP supports it with its numbers. This will be to its own advantage, as the JVP would not want to go to the polls for fear of reducing its own numbers. To continue the war, the JVP would support the government, which, however, allowed the JVP to go its own way, after accepting crossovers from the Opposition, against the wishes of the Marxist party.
Political support apart, the question is how would the government raise money to carry on its programmes, even as the international community seems to distance itself from the administration.
Even if it has the political support in Parliament and the financial wherewithal to continue operations, what is the guarantee that the LTTE, well entrenched in the Wanni, would cave in. On the other hand, if the military faces a reversal, it would affect the ruling SLFP’s chances of returning to power.
All its achievements so far, culminating in the liberation of Thoppigala and the entire east, would come to naught.
The operations to drive away the LTTE from Muttur (first anniversary this week), Kattaparichchan, Lower Thopur, and Selvanagar, Sampur, Vakarai , Verugal , Kadiraveli and Thoppigala were reported in great detail by Senpathi who also recorded shortcomings of the military and the LTTE air raids, much to the chagrin of certain officers. The Navy’s direct contribution in the early operations and indirect support to the military, by preventing supplies and reinforcements by sea, must also be recorded.
During the past year, the military recovered an unprecedented amount of arms and ammunition, after each operation. The recent ones are no exception. Major Sarada Samarakoon who led soldiers from the 10 Gajaba Regiment recovered a massive haul of arms and ammunition including four mortar launchers, a grenade launcher, two machine guns, a Sniper gun, 24 T-56 rifles and 60 rounds of ammunition, 200 mortar shells, 325 anti-personnel mines, 6,500 rounds of live ammunition, two claymore mines, 400 cartridges and 199 detonators. These were buried and camouflaged with leaves. Meanwhile, the 51 Brigade in Jaffna, this week, recovered a cache of arms and ammunition including five suicide belts loaded with ammunition.
Defence Secretary Gotbhaya Rajapaksa joined Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagam to the Philippines. ASEAN Regional Forum members, especially India, China, Australia, Japan and the United States were requested to help Sri Lanka protect its maritime borders. The Government is doing all it can, on all fronts, to prevent the LTTE from smuggling weapons into the country.
However, back home, the government is in a crunch. The JVP would support the government only until a point of time, when it is advantageous. The JVP would not want to be identified with the ruling party, as it would further affect its ratings at an eventual election.
While the options of the military are limited, given the political and financial considerations, the LTTE, on the other hand, is neither bound by financial constraints nor political compulsions.
Hence, the LTTE would, in time to come, when the government is weakened, begin to strike. Weli Oya has been identified as a vulnerable area
A former Reserve Strike Division (53) Commander Major General Nimal Jayasuriya who was accorded a farewell as outgoing Area Commander Weli Oya, now takes up a logistics duty as Forward Maintenance Area in Jaffna, ensuring enough provisions- food, fuel and the like.
At the time Jayauriya took up the appointment at Weli Oya, there was no Forward Defence Line (FDL) between Padaviya and Kebethhigollewa, which was attacked twice last year. As Weli Oya had been identified as a probable target by the Tigers, all out to prove they are still in the running, General Jayasuriya got a 25-km bunker line constructed to prevent raids on villages in Weli Oya. This was also to prevent the Tigers from infiltrating and placing bombs in the area.
A stretch of five km of no-man’s land between Kokkutuduvai, almost on the eastern coast, and Janakapura, was a tactical disadvantage to the army. General Jayasuriya had a fortified bunker line built linking Janakapura. This was also appreciated by the villagers.
A raid on a Sinhala border village could have a political fallout at the centre, which in turn, could affect the military balance in the war.
The LTTE is currently in a similar situation to the immediate post Riviresa, sans both the Jaffna peninsula and the East. In the earlier phase, it took Mulativu, this time it has to defend Mulativu.
It is tempting to go for the big kill in Mulativu and it is uncertain whether the military would receive the nod from a government trapped on all sides.

(http://www.nation.lk/2007/08/05/militarym.htm)