Monday October 4th was the inaugural meeting of the National Advisory Council for Peace and Reconstruction (NAPCR), a much heralded, much awaited consultative process. We now must consider whether this creates a viable framework for taking the peace process forward. There have been many attempts to create consultative frameworks throughout the protracted civil war in Sri Lanka. Unfortunately, all have failed so far, because they were neither consultative nor succeeded in obtaining the support of significant representatives of the political parties in Sri Lanka.
The NACPR has been formulated to function as a national forum for consultation on the Peace Process between the Government and the citizenry, mainly through elected representatives, religious leaders, and leaders of civil society.
The government position on the ISGA is well framed and bold in its scope. It accepts the concept of setting up an Interim Administration while a permanent solution is being negotiated, with the requisite commitment from the LTTE that the Interim Administration and permanent solution would be based on the Oslo Declaration – that a federal solution should be sought within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. Discussions between the LTTE and NACPR would workout the extent of devolution and other details.
A consultative mechanism is essential for the peace process. It is too early to say whether this current initiative will be successful or not. The President failed to obtain the support of the Leader of the Opposition and the Tamil National Alliance, and it is not clear whether the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress actually participated. It is as if the bridegroom and the best man had not turned up for the party! This failure to obtain the consensus of the main opposition party and others reflects the tragic nature of our political culture and the vituperative and zero-sum politics conducted by our political leaders. Gaining consensus on significant national issues requires qualities of leadership, which are unfortunately in deficit in Sri Lanka.
The All Party Conference of 1977 and Beyond
Previous attempts include President Jayawardena, who stated in his election manifesto that the needs and aspirations of the Tamil peoples would be addressed and resolved through an All Party Conference. But in 1977 when he came to power instead of convening one he said, in the first parliamentary session when the TULF surprisingly became the leader of the opposition: "If you want war, we will give you war. If you want peace, we will give you peace;" a speech much relayed through the national radio and resulting in attacks on Tamils all over the country. It was only in 1984 after the ethnic pogrom of ‘83, itself inspired by Jayawardena, that he decided to convene the All Party Conference. That process lasted until December of 1984; but ended with the Tamils rejecting all that had taken place and with the President making the startling announcement: "The Tamils want regional councils and nothing else and the Sinhalese agree to District councils and nothing else."
Other attempts include the 1985 Political Parties Conference, which failed after its first sitting, and President Premadasa’s attempt to convene another All Party Conference in 1990, to which the LTTE sent observers from their newly created political wing, Peoples Front of Liberation Tigers.
The UNF Consultative Committees
During the talks in 2002, three sub-committees were established to form a consultative mechanism: the Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalisation, which broke down after several meetings; the Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North-East, which met several times but failed in implementation; and the Sub-Committee on Political Matters, which did not meet at all. There were no efforts by the UNF government to involve the opposition or the President in the negotiations process. No member of the opposition was invited to participate in the work of the subcommittees.
An Examination of the South African National Peace Accord
A key lesson that has been learnt from international experience in conflict resolution is that a successful peace process must be participatory and inclusive. The example of South Africa’s National Peace Accord shows this; it was well designed and involved all stakeholders. Most believed that the dismantling of the apartheid regime and the transition would result in bloodshed and mayhem. Distinctively characteristic of the South African experience was the extraordinary leadership shown by Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress and also the leadership shown by De Klerk, leader of the National Party, which steered the country into a smooth transition through a moderate course of action.
The mechanism set up in South Africa in the early 1990s as the parties finally came together to negotiate a transformation for the South African conflict, was the National Peace Accord. The National Peace Accord was deliberately established as a national structure involving diverse elements of civil society and the full range of political opinion in the country. The strategic thinking behind this mechanism was the recognition that agreements and negotiations between just the two adversarial parties were proving fragile. It was felt that a broad-based multilateral approach to the peace initiative would have the advantages of forcing the negotiating parties into the initiative, forcing the antagonistic police into a role that required them to maintain law and order, and protect communities, and of compelling the parties to adhere to their obligations, if only to appease civil society expectations and avoid broader public condemnation. In other words, a body comprised of diverse elements of civil society plus a wide range of political parties was more likely to guarantee peace than a bilateral engagement. The agreement specified implementation mechanisms creating a structure based on national, regional and local committees to facilitate violence prevention and specialized committees to address key themes.
National-level Structures included the 60-person National Peace Committee (NPC), composed of representatives from all the signatory parties and members of the preparatory committee, with the role to oversee the implementation of the agreement as a whole, to resolve any political obstacles to its smooth functioning, and to monitor compliance with the codes of conduct for political groups. The NPC was supported by an independent National Peace Secretariat (NPS), which implemented its orders and was responsible for establishing and coordinating the regional committees. Also established were the independent, five-person Commission of Inquiry (the Goldstone Commission) to investigate the nature and causes of political violence and intimidation, identify those responsible and suggest remedies; and a Police Board to make recommendations for more effective policing, improved police-community relations and policy changes.
Eleven Regional Peace Committees (RPCs) were established around the country. Each comprised representatives of political and religious organizations, unions, business and industry groups, local authorities, security forces and other relevant organizations. They were charged with preventing violence in their region by using a number of approaches, including mediation, monitoring, and facilitating preventive action. They reported to the national structures on the causes of violence, coordinated activities in the region and established networks of local committees. They made decisions by consensus. In particular, they established Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development (SERD) committees to broker development projects aimed at preventing or reducing violence.
In each region, a number of Local Peace Committees (LPCs) were established, eventually totalling more than 260 across the country. Membership was intended to reflect the composition of each community and involve representatives of key stakeholder groups. Their function was to promote trust and reconciliation at the grassroots, mediate conflicts, facilitate agreements on the operation of local public political events, promote compliance with the agreements reached and liaise with the local police and judiciary, and implement national and regional initiatives.
The NPA demonstrated the importance of providing space for civil society to operate freely and autonomously, and thereby to play a constructive and non-partisan role in the peace process. The essential element of the success of the NPA was the building of grassroots support and extensive participation by individual citizens in the peace process. Lessons learnt include:
`95 Political will and commitment within both civil society and government are essential to success
`95 Such initiatives must be led by an authority viewed as legitimate by as many stakeholders as possible
`95 When government, political parties and civil society commit to any such accord, their rhetoric must be matched by their actions
`95 The negotiation and implementation of the NPA showed it is possible to break down historical barriers and move from largely oppositional relationships to co-operative ones
`95 The provision of space for civil society to operate freely and autonomously is an essential part of negotiations
These structures constituted comprehensive and deliberate measures to maintain consultation and inclusion as a high priority in South Africa’s transition. Sri Lanka has a long way to go and many lessons to learn before we can approximate the grandeur and logic of the South African model. For the Sri Lankan process to succeed principled negotiations with all parties, respect and dignity for all stakeholders is a categorical imperative. It is not too late. Even now our leaders can save the country from the disaster to which it is heading.
