HORROR AT DAWN

* What made the Anuradhapura airbase a sitting duck?
* Political fallout outweighs military losses

An old villager named Daniel Appuhamy (51), a resident of Kannitiya Ashokapura made it a daily routine to toil in his chena which bordered a jungle patch, about 5 km from the SLAF Base Anuradhapura.
On Saturday, Appuhamy went to his chena, but he didn’t return home for lunch. On the next day, the villagers combed the jungle looking for the old farmer. To their utter horror , they found his headless body near an abandoned chena. Next to the body was a pair of rubber slippers. Police joined in the search, but, could not find any further clue.
In the wee hours of the next day, a twenty one member Tiger squad attacked the Anuradhapura airbase, taking unprepared airmen off guard and destroying a fleet of aircraft.

Clue

Police launched a sweep in the jungles looking for a clue. Fresh concerns were raised about a link between Appuhamy’s murder and the Tiger attackers. Later in the week, police found the severed head of Appuhamy, wrapped in a trouser and concealed in a crevice of a “kon” tree. Two bullet shots were found on the head. It is no w believed that Appuhamy was murdered by Tiger attackers, who may have spotted him in the jungle. The nature of the assassination substantiates the claim.
His throat had been severed below the Adam’s apple, a tactic, generally used by trained killers. The head was wrapped in a trouser to conceal bleeding as blood marks could lead to the place where it was concealed. Appuhamy is the first kill of the Tiger attackers, who later in the day attacked the Air Force base in a daring raid.
It appears that the political fallout of the attack out weighs its military losses. But, suffice to say that the attack forced a nation out of its complacency; it was a rude shock to a public who were made to believe by an overdose of government propaganda that the Tigers were in retreat.

Pointer

The Tiger raid is a pointer to the glaring lapses in the security establishment. More than that, piecing together details, investigators are concerned as to how the Tigers knew the security procedures of the camp, which they infiltrated virtually unchallenged.
The Tiger hit squad cut through the steal perimeter wire fences of the camp and sneaked through an electrically charged protection wire fence. Shocking enough, the investigators have found that the wire was not connected to the power supply at the time of the raid. Unchallenged, the intruders cut through the third steel fence and moved towards the runway.
Questions have been raised as to how the Tigers removed sound trapped mines, planted between the runway and the perimeter bunkers. The mines were planted to explode creating a massive bang in case of an intrusion through the area. Did anyone within the camp tip off the intruders of its security plan is now the mind boggling question. Investigators have recovered several well detailed maps of the Air Force Base from the slain attackers.
A team of Tiger intruders moved towards the runway, unchallenged, while several men stayed guard taking aim at the airmen in the peripheral bunkers. The Black Tigers are believed to have split into two groups - one moved towards the hangars, while the other moved towards the runway where helicopters- both MI 24 Hind and MI 17 were parked. Though the SLAF Base Hingurakgoda is the home of the MI 24 Hind (NO 09 Attack Helicopter Squadron) MI 24s are placed in couples in the bases in the North East to ensure greater mobility and flexibility. The Vavuniya Air Force camp was earlier the strategic base given its proximity to the battle front; however, the SLAF limited the night parking of most of its aircraft, after the fighting spiraled. One main concern that precipitated the decision was that the SLAF Base in Vavuniya is located within the range of 130 mm howitzers of the LTTE, if the Tigers located 130 mm howitzers in Puliyankulam- the firing range of 130 mm artillery is 28 km.
The intruders attacked two MI 24 Hinds with Rocket Propelled Grenades. One Hind ( Registered No: CH 631) was engulfed in a fire ball while the other suffered structural damage, which SLAF assessors said could be repaired and that it is airworthy. It is also said that the Tiger attacker was snipped by an airman before he targeted the second MI 24 helicopter.

Under siege

As the first shots of the Tiger raid were heard, the camp was alerted that it was under siege. By that time, the infiltrators had neutralized the airmen in the peripheral bunkers and a fierce firefight raged between the airmen guarding a 23 mm anti air craft gun position and the attackers. In a matter of minutes, the Tigers captured gun positions, thereby virtually cutting off any emergency take off of the aircrafts. Tiger cadres, who moved towards the hangar, destroyed three PT-6 basic and advanced trainers (Registered No: CT 180, CT 183, and CT 190).
As the intruders were proceeding with their mission, the Radar system located in Vavuniya detected two low flying Tiger aircraft, which were heading southwards. The SLAF Base Anuradhapura was then on alert. When the Tiger aircraft approached the Air Base, the gunner at the Air Defence system took the aim. However, the USFM Radar combined gun system did not work.
SLAF sources said ammunition stuck in the gun. The Tiger aircraft flew away unscathed after dropping three bombs. One bomb fell near the married quarters of the Air Force personnel, while another fell on the playground, but this was away from the hangars. These pot shots of the Tiger aircraft are suggestive that the Tigers are still a long way to achieve precision in munitions delivering capability.
Though the Air Tiger raid looked more an image booster for the nascent guerrilla Air Wing, certain SLAF sources expressed belief that the target of the Tiger air raid could have been the aircraft parked on the ground, an area which was made inaccessible to the Tiger attackers due to heavy resistance by the alerted troops.
It has now been established that the Black Tigers were in contact with Kilinochchi via satellite phones. Our SLAF sources suggested that the Black Tigers could have directed the Air Tigers to bomb the aircraft parked on the ground. The bombs, however, fell far away from the target.
The greatest loss to the SLAF - of course, other than the 14 security forces personnel who perished in the fight- was the multi million dollars worth Beech Craft B 200T (Registered No CR 842) . It was on Sunday afternoon, that the Beech Craft, the home base of which is the SLAF Base in Ratmalana arrived at the Anuradhapura airbase.
The SLAF inventory has two Beech Craft: Beech Super King B 200T (SIGNIT) and Beech Super King B 200T (HISAR).
The ill- fated Beech Craft (SIGNIT) (CR 842) was procured by the SLAF in 1983 for the personal travel of then President JR Jayawardene. However, later the aircraft was converted to the role of a reconnaissance craft and by the late 90s it was equipped with high tech electronic listening devices which could intercept hand- held enemy communications on the ground and provides their directions.

Beech Craft

In 2002, the SLAF took the delivery of its second Beech Craft equipped with ultra tech HISAR system from Raytheon. Raytheon at that time announced that it received an US$ 10 million plus order from an unspecified South Asian customer. The package included the Beech Craft, HISAR system, Operational centre, spare parts and training. According to Raython, the HISAR system provides precise imagery and intelligence almost any where. During the typical mode of operation, the radar provides wide area, narrow sector searches, strip and spot search and sea surveillance.
By the time of the Black Tiger raid, Beech Craft (HISAR) has been grounded for the overhaul of its electronic system. Thus the Beech Craft (SIGNIT) and Beech Craft (HISAR) were the eyes and ears of the sky. The Tiger raid has yanked out the ears of the SLAF, a hole that needs to be filled urgently because with out its reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, the effectiveness and the precision of the SLAF’s Kfirs and MIG 27 strikes could be seriously compromised. The need to replenish the reconnaissance and surveillance capability has further been stressed by the fact that - though the government does not made it public - three Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAV), some of them not even removed from their packing had been seriously damaged in the attack. This will further erode the SLAFs reconnaissance capability. Among other air craft which were damaged were five Cessna 150 aircraft (Registered No CT 150, CT 151, CT 152, CT 153 and CT 154) all of which were retired from the service after the procurement of ten PT-6 basic and advanced trainers in 2001. The PT-6 replaced the 70s vintage Cessna as the primary pilot trainer. Cessna’s were stored at the SLAF Base Anuradhapura and at least one Cessna 150 was used as a liason air craft. The damage or the destruction of Cessna would have no impact on the SLAF. However, there are certain other details, which the government has covered up: Other than the destruction of three PT 6 trainers, three others were damaged (Registered Numbers: CT 188, CT 182 and CT 189) according to well placed sources. Apart from that one Bell 206 which was procured in 1972 and used as a helicopter trainer was also destroyed.

Pilot training

This will leave the SLAF with only three PT 6s for pilot training. The SLAF also has five K-8 jet trainers in its inventory. One could only hope that the government would fast track the procurement process, yet, still buy the best product for the security forces.
The final list of attrition is as follows: one Beach Craft (SIGNIT), one MI 24 Hind, one MI 17 Medium Lift Helicopter, one K-T basic and advanced jet trainer, three PT-6 pilot trainers, One Bell 206 helicopter trainer and another Bell 212 helicopter crashed in Mihintale, killing two pilots and two gunners, while it was tracking the low flying Tiger aircraft.
Damaged air craft are: one MI 24 Hind, Three PT-6, Five Cessna’s and three UAVs.
Perhaps, in the wake of the Tiger raid, equally disturbing was the obsession with the military losses and inflated figures presented by the Opposition - both by the UNP and SLFP (Mahajana Wing). Last week has been a sad week for us: not only the security lapses of our forces were paid for dearly, but also the bitter political opportunism of Sri Lankan politics was highlighted.
Opposition parliamentarians stole the show one by one to highlight the Tiger raid, often with inflated figures - one put the figure at over six billion rupees while the SLFP Mahayana Wing clamoured that the losses amounted to 17 billion rupees. Both have surpassed the damage calculated by pro Tiger Tamilnet, which put the figure at US $ 40 million.
Rather than ignorance,one could feel a wicked sense of joy in these generous figures. Perhaps these figures are substantiated by the sticker prices of the brand new units, but, it is almost public knowledge that Sri Lanka rarely buys brand new - also, it is rarely that any state pays the sticker prices even they opt to buy brand new. (Refer to India’s latest procurement drive for multi role aircraft) Sri Lanka generally buys from second hand markets; as for aircraft, Ukraine, with its large stock of cold war helicopters and fighter jets is the main supplier. The average cost for an overhauled MI 24 could vary from US 1.5 million to a maximum of US 2.5 million. Of course, still a brand new unit could cost US $ 6 million on its sticker value.
Thus, it must be admitted the actually losses were much lower than these inflated numbers. What is equally noticeable is more than the damage of the destroyed aircraft, their high tech equipment are costlier. Some well placed SLAF sources put the losses at a maximum of US $ 20 million. Commander of Air Force Air Marshal Roshan Gunatilake said the damage amounted to US $ 15 million; he seems to be closer to reality than most Opposition parliamentarians who clamour from their rooftops. However, the Tiger raid has uncovered glaring security lapses in the Anuradhapura airbase which is a main base of forward operations and logistics , but not a single special forces unit has been assigned to guard the camp.
This is indicative that the top brass had ruled out a ground raid. Indeed, a possible Tiger air raid was identified as the main threat to the Air Force Base. The investigators have also found that the camp did not have a contingency plan, nor had security drills been conducted for a quite some time time. These revelations speak well of why the camp was a sitting duck to the guerrilla intruders! SLAF’s elite Regimental Special Force was formed in 2003 to handle the security of the vital Air Bases, following a previous Tiger attack on the Katunayake Air Force base and adjacent International Air port- This unit is similar to the USAF’s first Special Operation Wing. These personnel are trained in airbase rescue operations, field craft, bomb disposal, fire fighting, water survival and rescue operations. However, none of the Special Forces personnel, either from the SLAF or any other service arm of the Sri Lankan Forces had been assigned to the security of the ill- fated air base. The SLAF Base is also home to the No 1 Flying Training Wing, which carries out Basic Flying Training for SLAF pilots. This wing is an independent formation ‘lodged’ within the Base upon which it depends on for administrative, logistic and infrastructure backup.
Several past discoveries in close proximity to the camp, if followed up, could have nipped the Tiger attack in the bud.

Anti aircraft ammunition.

A few weeks ago, a fisherman had in his fishing net found several hundred anti aircraft ammunition. In another incident, certain media reports revealed the discovery of small used tins in close proximity to the camp.
It is open to question as to whether these recoveries were tracked. However, the nature of the attack is indicative that the Tigers have conducted extensive reconnaissance of the base and these used tins could have been left behind by these Tigers The attack is reminiscent of the devastating Black Tiger raid on the BIA and the adjacent Air Force base. The attack resulted in a slump in tourist arrivals and the erosion of investor confidence which precipitated a negative economic growth for the first time in the post independent history of Sri Lanka.However, last week’s raid is unlikely to make a drastic impact on the economy which has shown a greater reliance in recent years. However, the fear is that the raid would force an embarrassed government to a knee- jerk reaction.
In an over reaction, the Government could change the course and opt to a major conventional confrontation with the Tigers.
Such hastily planned actions have been proved to be costly in the past.
The war cannot be expected to be a scripted one- sided play. The Tigers had their day on Monday. Yet, the recent gains of the security forces far out weighs the gains secured by the Tigers.
The government should stay the course and let the troops to consolidate on its recent military gains.