Full-scale war imminent on the northern front

If anyone thought that military operations were intended to pressurise the LTTE into coming to the negotiating table, such illusions were effectively dispelled by the Defence Secretary’s frank disclosure. It is no longer a case of bringing the LTTE to the negotiating table through military means for a political settlement. It is now a case of destroying or diminishing the LTTE as a pre-requisite for a political solution

It’s ‘unofficially’ official now! Three things are certain.
There’s going to be a big war in the Northern Province against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
There will be no let up until the objective of vanquishing the Tigers is achieved. Even if it is not feasible, an ongoing relentless attempt will be made.

There won’t be any political solution until and unless the military goal of eradicating ‘terrorism’ (read LTTE) is fulfilled.
Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa emphasised the above three points unambiguously at Trincomalee last week. The occasion was the felicitation ceremony for the navy for reportedly destroying three ships, allegedly carrying arms for the LTTE.

The Defence Secretary’s elder sibling, President Mahinda Rajapaksa was also present as Gotabhaya stated these views but maintained silence, indicating tacit consent. The fact that the Defence Secretary stated so in the presence of the Head of State, Head of Government and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces shows that the sentiments expressed were an ‘officially sanctioned unofficial policy declaration.’ So it’s unofficially official.

Calling the shots
It is also crystal clear now who calls the shots literally and metaphorically as far as war and peace is concerned. Mahinda Samarasinghe may say one thing and Rohitha Bogollagama another, but effective decisions are made and articulated elsewhere. The Minister who repeats these more lucidly than any other of his colleagues is Jeyaraj Fernandopulle.

It was only a few weeks ago that Gotabhaya Rajapaksa spoke forthrightly at a passing out parade about a proposed military advance into the LTTE held areas of the north. This was emphatically denied by some Cabinet ministers but within days the Musali region of Mannar District was taken over in a surprise manoeuvre.

If anyone thought that military operations were intended to pressurise the LTTE into coming to the negotiating table, such illusions were effectively dispelled by the Defence Secretary’s frank disclosure.

It is no longer a case of bringing the LTTE to the negotiating table through military means for a political settlement. It is now a case of destroying or diminishing the LTTE as a pre-requisite for a political solution.

There is a saying about an army marching on its stomach. The cost conscious sections of society might be appalled by the economic consequences of prosecuting a prolonged war. But Gotabhaya Rajapaksa thinks otherwise. “We cannot establish permanent peace in the country by winning only half or two-thirds of the war against terrorism,” he said in Trincomalee.

The Defence Secretary also said “President Rajapaksa cannot implement the desired political solution to the north and east conflict unless LTTE terrorism is defeated 100 percent.”

Defence Secretary’s stance
He said that President Rajapaksa, amidst the economic constraints the country is facing, has given all that is required for the security forces and the police to achieve their task of defeating LTTE terrorism.
On another occasion the Defence Secretary’s erstwhile Commanding Officer and present Army Commander Lt. Gen Sarath Fonseka was posed a question by a media person about the impact of the escalating war on the economy. “It is better to have a bankrupt country than half a country,” was the answer.

This then sums up the military mood. The military option against the LTTE will be pursued relentlessly and diligently regardless of economic or any other consequences. The defence establishment has scented blood. It wants to go in for what it perceives to be an easy kill.

The Bard of Avon wrote of a ‘tide in the affairs of men.’ The defence establishment feels that the security forces are riding the crest of a victorious anti-Tiger wave. The wave has to be ridden until the LTTE is engulfed, it is felt.
There is a frenzy of populist euphoria in the air. It is a combination of the natural and artificial, spontaneous and contrived, real and imaginary. But it is there.

It was Talleyrand I think who warned that “war is too serious a matter to be left in the hands of generals.” But currently in Sri Lanka, that is exactly what is happening. The military and defence hierarchy runs the war and makes policy. The political establishment falls in line.

Some might say this is not healthy for a country but there are few takers for this in the upper echelons of the government. A feeble opposition with an unimaginative leadership is hopelessly unable or unwilling to check this militarisation of the government. Arguably, a national security state is in formation.

Puzzling conduct
The behaviour and conduct of the LTTE in recent times has been, at best, puzzling. The seeming helplessness of the LTTE in the face of Colombo’s military juggernaut has contributed to this new found confidence and determination on the part of the security establishment.

The LTTE is primarily a militant movement fighting for the goal of national liberation. The government depicts it as terrorist while the LTTE self-perception is that of being freedom fighters. One man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist.

Fighting for the lofty objective of national liberation does not automatically remove the terrorist tag if terror tactics are adopted. Likewise, the adoption of terrorist tactics does not automatically disqualify a national liberation movement. One can be both a terrorist and freedom fighter. It is not a case of one or the other.

However, realistically, these distinctions do not manner any more in an increasingly uni-polar world where there are no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ terrorists. No matter what the ideal is, the use of terrorist methods makes a group or an individual, terrorist. The end does not justify the means after September 11, 2001. All terrorists are ‘evil.’

There is a lot of hypocrisy and double standards here. A state is allowed to adopt all sorts of underhand methods amounting to state terrorism but it is not labelled terrorist. An air force plane can kill innocent civilians by dropping a bomb from the air and get away with it by calling it ‘collateral damage.’

But woe unto a non-state actor planting a bomb that kills civilians intentionally or unintentionally – it will be automatically labelled terrorism and very often does deserve that label. But dropping bombs from an altitude allows greater latitude in getting away from the terrorist label. All states gang up in refusing to admit state terrorism.

Defining terrorism
How does one define the LTTE? Each violent action has to be scrutinised on its own merits to arrive at a definition. The Tigers have three salient aspects when it comes to engaging in violence.

It has the attributes of a conventional militia when it adopts positional warfare. The LTTE fights like an army when it captures or defends territory. The Tigers function as a guerilla force when launching attacks against security force installations or convoys. It is a terrorist outfit whenever it kills innocent civilians through bombs or massacres and assassinates political leaders and other civilians.

Thus, the LTTE can be loosely termed as a self-styled national liberation movement that engages in terrorism at times. Each LTTE action has to be specifically classified into categories of warfare, guerilla tactics or sheer terrorism.
After the LTTE withdrew from the Eastern Province, analysts predicted that all three dimensions of the Tigers would come into play in due course.

The LTTE would engage in positional warfare and fight like a conventional army to retain northern territory. The Tigers would adopt guerilla tactics against security forces in the east. It would assassinate political leaders and destroy economic targets through terrorist methods in Colombo and elsewhere in the south, it was expected.

However, so far, no target has been attacked in Colombo or elsewhere except for the diversionary thrills of a nascent air wing dropping bombs. The limited air strikes too have stopped for some months now.
In the east some limited landmine ambushes have occurred in the Ampara and Trincomalee District jungle adjacent areas, but few attacks were reported in Batticaloa District.

Defending territory
In the north, the LTTE has been stoutly defending areas on the Vavuniya-Mannar District borders and in the Weli Oya/Manal Aaru region. It is also defending territory in the Jaffna Peninsula along the Forward Defence Lines (FDLs) of the Kilaly-Eluthumattuvaal- Nagar Kovil axis. But in the Musali region of Mannar South, the LTTE did not fire a single shot and allowed a walkover.

Even though a major offensive has not been launched by either side, there have been sporadic exchanges of artillery fire between both sides in the Vavuniya-Mannar District borders and also in the peninsula. There has also been regular aerial bombardment and strafing by the air force at positions in the Wanni. The navy too has shelled the coastal areas and also battled the Sea Tigers off the Mullaitivu coast.

It can be seen, therefore, that war related incidents have been happening since April last year. Many civilians in the Wanni have been killed, injured and displaced over the past 17 months.

Both sides are wary of the other launching an ‘invasion’ into their territory. Therefore, bombing and shelling is done by the armed forces on the one hand and shelling by the LTTE on the other to prevent major offensives. There are widely prevalent minor skirmishes. These activities are done to keep the ‘other’ side on its toes and to keep it guessing from where and when the big attack will come.

The preliminary limited strikes and offensives are no substitutes for the real McCoy. They cannot pre-empt or prevent the major offensive, counter-offensive or raid, if and when they are launched.

The armed forces can commence their ground based drives southwards from the peninsula, south-eastwards from Thallady in Mannar, northwards and north-westwards from any point along the Mannar-Vavuniya Road or from Omanthai or the Iranai Iluppaikulam Road or from Maamaduwa or the Weli-Oya/Manal Aaru region.

Sea-borne invasions across the Jaffna lagoon towards the Mannar-Poonagary coast or via the northern seas on the Mullaitivu-Chundikulam coast are also possible.

Defensive strategy
The LTTE too can commence major attacks on several possible targets. A sea-borne operation across the lagoon into the peninsula, a ground based offensive from Muhamaalai or Nagar Kovil points; attacks on army camps in Mannar, Vavuniya and Weli-Oya sector are also possible. A long shot could be incursions via jungles into Medawachchiya, Kebethigollewe, Padaviya, etc.

By all accounts the Tigers seem to be adopting a defensive strategy for now. LTTE Political Chief S.P. Tamilselvan said recently that the Tigers were maintaining “patience intentionally.” This strategy may have certain politico-military reasons.
In the first place, the LTTE is heavily disadvantaged vis-à-vis the armed forces in terms of manpower, firepower, airpower, naval power and armoured vehicle power. This places the Tigers in a very weak position.

Therefore, it would naturally be reluctant to hold on to extensive territory. The Tigers will yield some territory in order to prevent over stretching and dilution of personnel. To cite a phrase used by defence analysts, they will “trade space for time.”

What will this time be used for? Obviously, strengthening defences and recruiting cadres is one. This is happening now. But the Tigers will prolong the war in the hope that the time gained will work against Colombo. Rising defence costs will drain the Treasury and increase the cost of living and inflation. Economic problems can cause social and political unrest.

The armed forces may over extend themselves in the bid to gain more real estate. If they bite more than they can chew, the LTTE would like to make them choke.

The mounting tally of alleged human rights violations and civilian casualties caused by the armed forces can discredit the regime internationally. There may come a point where international intervention becomes inevitable.
The Tigers also expect stirrings in Tamil Nadu and related impact in New Delhi. There is also the expectation that the Tamil people in Sri Lanka and abroad will rally around the LTTE as the war escalates and civilian suffering increases.

Vital rear base
Even if the LTTE Political Commissar’s claim of exercising patience is true, the security establishment is in no mood to believe it. It will be seen as the LTTE making a virtue out of necessity as the view in defence circles is that the Tigers are weak and vulnerable. Therefore, the resolve to go on the offensive will gain strength.

However, there is a point beyond which the LTTE cannot retreat, lie low or exercise patience. This is because the Wanni heartland is, in guerilla parlance, the rear base of the LTTE. It is very vital to the Tigers that they retain control of a swathe of territory with access to the sea. The LTTE has to offer fierce resistance to preserve some territory at least.

The Tigers have strengthened defences and are ready to adopt positional warfare to defend this territory. Apparently, the Tigers have set up three ‘defence rings’ – A primary outer ring around most territory under their control, a secondary inner ring around key areas in Kilinochchi, Vavuniya and Mullaitivu, and a tertiary line of defence around strategic areas of the north-eastern sector.
The fact that this primary defensive outer line has been able to prevent government incursions on the Vavuniya-Mannar borders and inside the peninsula shows the determination and grit of the LTTE to resist military advances.

Unlike what happened in the east or the peninsula when defeated, the Tigers have no place to go if the Wanni is overrun. So the Tigers, fighting a desperate battle to safeguard their rear base, will fight hard when the time comes.
The Tigers may even adopt their customary tactic of letting the enemy advance and then hit back swiftly and hard. This was well demonstrated during the conflict of the nineties.

Armed forces strategy
But the armed forces strategy devised by the Sarath-Gotabhaya duo is not likely to be a mechanical repetition of the disastrous approach under ‘Gen.’ Anuruddha Ratwatte during ‘Operation Jayasikuru’ in the nineties.
It is more likely that the government will adopt the ruthless double-track strategy adopted successfully in the east: A widespread campaign of bombing and shelling on a broad scale on points throughout the region on the one hand and on the other, a sustained campaign of intensive concentrated attacks on a limited target area.

The civilians are uprooted and their dwellings and infrastructural facilities demolished. After civilians leave a particular area and move to another place, the vacated place is shelled and bombed to saturation point. Then the army advances on ground, consolidates and establishes control of a limited area.

Thereafter, this process is repeated again and again. In a slow, systematic manner, the armed forces advance and hold target areas while the civilian population flees from place to place or to government areas. This is what happened in stages in the east and after 15 months, the armed forces dominate the province now.

Moreover, unofficial embargoes on food, medicine, fuel and essential items will be imposed as was done in the east. Transport and movement of people will be restricted. Payment of salaries of government employees, including teachers, will be suspended. Agriculture, fisheries and cottage industries will be reduced to a standstill.

If the armed forces have their way as they did in the east, this scenario is likely to happen in the north too.
This strategy will certainly cause immense hardship to the civilians. But judging from the apathy and silence of the international community towards the tragic civilian plight in the east, there seems very little chance of any foreign pressure to make Colombo call off the war or abandon its hard-line strategy.

Beginning of the end
Though Sinhala hawks would like the armed forces to go in quickly and finish off the Tigers, the defence establishment is not likely to rush in. Plans and preparations will be made carefully and cautiously.

However, it seems highly improbable that the Tigers will passively wait for the government to enfeeble, encircle and then engulf them. Contrary to optimistic assertions in Colombo, the LTTE is not both down and out. It is only down, but not fully out. Past experience has shown that the Tigers crouch to pounce.

If the armed forces succeed in dislodging the Tigers from their entrenched positions in the Wanni, it can only mean the beginning of the end. So the Tigers will fiercely resist such moves. It is a back-to-the-wall situation
This resistance is not likely to be reactive alone. There could be counter-offensives and counter-strikes that could change the situation drastically. Also, this counter-strategy need not be confined specifically to the battlefields.

Another moot point having a bearing on the war situation is the approaching ‘Maa Veerar Naal’ (Great Heroes’ Day) on November 27. What will Prabhakaran say on that day? Conversely, what will the armed forces allow him to say on that day?
Whatever the situation, full-scale war seems inevitable and imminent. Even the raging monsoon rains may not be able to deter its pace or intensity.

The fluctuating fortunes of war may be fickle and fluid. But one thing is certain. The civilians are going to suffer. The misery of the east will be repeated in the north. The tragic plight of recently displaced Tamils and Muslims from Mannar South is a sad pointer of things to come in this respect.

(http://www.nation.lk/2007/09/23/newsfe2.htm)