A message reached the Northern Naval Area Headquarters (NNAHQ) on Tuesday around 4.30 pm that a fleet of Sea Tiger attack boats had taken to the sea from their base at Kadaikadu, south of Nagarkovil and were heading northwards.
By then only two Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) Dvora Fast Attack Craft (FAC) were in the area, monitoring sea movements. Soon after receiving the message, the NNAHQ alerted the entire area command about this development and they in turn informed Naval Headquarters in Colombo.
Navy Chief, Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda was in office when he received the news. He rushed to the operations room, where Director General Operations Rear Admiral S.M.D Weerasekera, Deputy Director Naval Operations Commander D.K.P. Dassanayake, Director Naval Operations Captain S.F. Ranasinghe and other staff had already commenced communications with NNAHQ about this latest development in the northern seas.
Though this was a surprise move by the Sea Tigers, the Navy aware of the diverse strategies of the Tigers had been on high alert.
The command office in Colombo informed the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters (ENAHQ) of this development and the Eastern (Trincomalee) Naval Commander Rear Admiral Tisara Samarasinghe was instructed to send a fleet of FACs immediately to the Northern Command.
While these activities were taking place, additional FACs from the northern Command had been dispatched towards Point Pedro, where already there was a number of FACs on alert.
When the Sea Tiger fleet was approaching Point Pedro, the FACs, monitoring their movement gave a full detailed report to the Colombo command office. The report stated that there were 16 LTTE attack boats, which were approximately some 16.5 metres long along with four boat engines of 250 hp. Four more suicide boats and four other small boats were also in the Sea Tiger fleet. All these were moving northwards and were some 4 to 5 nautical miles away from the shore.
Instructions had been given to the FACs in the area to allow the Tiger fleet to proceed towards Point Pedro until additional FACs reached the scene.
In the meantime, air force assistance was also sought and a MI-24 gunship took off from Palaly Air Force base. However, the helicopter had to return to the base due to a technical defect. But, the air force was also kept on high alert to provide any other assistance if necessary.
At the same time, the naval detachment at Point Pedro saw blips on their radar monitors. The flotilla was in the seas, some five to seven nautical miles off the shore of Point Pedro.
The time was just past 6.30 pm The FAC fleet from the east had by now almost reached the area .It was led by a squadron commander. As darkness began to envelope the area, the northern squadron commander gave his FAC fleet the green light to engage with the Tiger flotilla. At the same time, the army camps near Point Pedro also commenced targeting the Tiger fleet, using Multi-Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRL) and Artillery guns. This forced the Tiger flotilla to move further into the high seas where the Navy FACs could easily intercept and cause heavy damages to it.
The sea battle was 10 to 12 nautical miles away from the shore. Some of the smaller LTTE boats were unable to move as they did not have an operating radar system. The battle resembled a massive fireworks display at sea.
From the beginning of the battle the sea Tiger flotilla could not effectively hold out against the heavy attack by the Navy and the ground attack from the army .It was compelled to withdraw .This provided an opportunity for the Eastern FACs, who entered from the south to attack the fleeing Tiger boats.
During the first hour of the battle, the Tigers lost two attack boats and another two were damaged. Within the next two hours, it lost two more boats and was unable to move three other boats.
The Navy also continuously intercepted Tiger radio communication, which appealed for reinforcements to counter the heavy attack from the navy, but they did not receive the reinforcements they requested from their command.
Intercepted Tiger communication later claimed that the main problem that affected the sea Tigers was their inability to transfer casualties since most of the attacking boats had been damaged at the initial stage of the battle.
Around 11.30 in the night, the battle was almost over with what remained of the Tiger flotilla withdrawing from the scene. Unable to withstand the Navy fire, the flotilla beached at Thalaidy although the Sea Tigers do not normally use the Thalaiady beach as the Army can easily use artillery to target it.
Later the Sri Lanka navy said that it had destroyed five and damaged nine LTTE craft inflicting heavy damages to the enemy. One damaged Sea Tiger boat, which was left behind by the Tigers, was recovered by the naval personnel and it was towed to the Kankesanthurai Harbour.
The LTTE craft, which was 16.5 metres long, was fitted with four outboard motors (OBM) with a capacity of 250 horse power in each. A 14.5mm twin barrel anti-aircraft gun was fixed at the front with four GPM guns mounted on the sides to bolster its fire pwer. The craft also had radar and a GPS inside. Two communication sets were also found abandoned by the terrorists. There were four bodies of LTTE cadres trapped inside the craft. The bodies were retrieved by the naval personnel to be handed over to the LTTE through the ICRC.
The Navy also announced that around forty LTTE cadres were suspected to have been killed and a large number were believed to have sustained serious injuries in the confrontation. No naval craft was damaged or personnel injured in the incident.
The Navy believed that the Tigers wanted to carry out a surprise attack on the navy, like what they had done in November last year on the same seas. During that battle, the Navy had lost two FACs and more than 20 naval personnel, while four sailors are still in the custody of the LTTE .The main armament of the Dvora, the 23 mm Canon, Heckler & Koch AGL (Automatic Grenade Launchers), Fifty Calibre (Point Five Zero) Guns and Light Machine Guns including a large stock of 23mm canon shells had also been seized. However, this time, the Tigers were effectively defeated.
Navy to sell its Rs. 250 million worth Hovercraft
The Sri Lanka Navy has called tenders to sell its 250 million rupees worth Hovercraft - Landing Craft Air Cushion - that has not been used logistically for its intended purpose for many years.
According to a newspaper advertisement, the closing of the tender was June 17.
The Sri-Lanka Navy acquired this British designed Hovercraft that could achieve a speed of 50 knots with a full load of 10 tons and a range of 600 km for logistical use.
The medium-lift M10, designed by ABS Hovercraft (based in Romsey) is built by Vosper Thornycroft. The craft is capable of carrying 56 troops or two land rovers and 20 troops or other such permutations. It is armed with a 20mm cannon and can be fitted with missiles.
However, two years after it was purchased in 1998, it was used for advertising purposes and earned some money for the Navy, but it was not put to any military use.
After it was purchased, many in the military and outside stated that it was a ‘White Elephant.’
(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2007/06/22/opinion/02.asp)
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