Military dictates theatre of battle

Following a stormy week following the eviction of Tamil lodgers, and in view of the Commander in Chief, President Mahinda Rajapaksa, taking wing to Geneva, the National Security Council did not meet this week.
Instead, Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, who ran into a storm over the eviction of lodgers and a hard hitting interview with an international news agency, met some of the commanders on Wednesday.
On Friday, the Defence Secretary met IGP Victor Perera who had offered to resign but later, reversed his decision. It was President Rajapaksa who ordered the IGP to hand over a report on the matter.
The week also had its funny side with Government Whip Jeyaraj Fernadopulle trying to retract the apology tendered by Prime Minister Ratanasiri Wickramanayake for the eviction. Finally, Media Minister Anura Priyadharshana Yapa announced that the apology was the official position.
As if the drama was not enough, there may be another government twist to the whole affair.
The LTTE claims the LTTE had planned to stage a major five-pronged attack on Colombo and its port, as if to justify the removal last week of some structures adjoining the port wall. However, the biggest blunder in the whole revelation was that the Tigers planned to attack the harbour, cargo ships and containers. Is the government trying to commit economic hara-kiri, vis-à-vis the port, after the security forces successfully repulsed two previous attempts close to the port? Furthermore, would the suspected LTTE cadre be allowed to carry the entire operational plan on his person? And what negligence to leave it lying in a boutique.
Or is it that the Tigers wanted the government to do its dirty work?
During UNP times, too, there were attempts to plant such stories which were, in fact, damaging to the defence establishment and the economy. The Tigers’ aim is to paint a dismal picture. Should the authorities aid and abet them in their plans?
Against this background, those in the defence hierarchy are unrelenting in the pursuit of their goals. Accordingly, on Thursday Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa with Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Air Chief Marshall Donald Perera and Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka traveled to Maha Oya, to be briefed by the Special Task Force on resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons there. They also proceeded to Vavuniya to check out operations and security in the Omanthai region, flashpoint of a major battle last week.
Passing the torch?
Incidentally, the CDS was traveling just two days after completing a-year in office (June 12) , with the man who decided to retain him and the one who was rumoured to succeed him.
Speculation was rife that Perera would be given a diplomatic posting to make way for another CDS. That was not to be, and unlike the service chiefs, whose extensions are subject to yearly renewals after 55, the CDS, who is a retired officer, could continue without an extension.
Fonseka’s extension as Commander is till December 2007, and if he is to continue as Army Chief, his services need to be extended. Given his success in the military operations to date, and in view of the battles ahead, he would, too, most likely, be given an extension, unless something drastic happens in the interim.
The defence establishment, while retaining Fonseka’s services as Army Chief, could have made him the CDS. There have been precedents where previous holders of this office also remained as service chiefs. Former Army Commander General Lionel Balagalla and former Navy Chief Admiral Daya Sandagiri are two examples.
However, the authorities were not keen to rock the boat at this stage and appoint Fonseka CDS, bypassing Navy Commander Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, who is the senior most commander to whom the post goes by tradition. While Fonseka appears indispensable to the defence establishment, the role played by the Navy in ‘Eelam War IV’, which the LTTE claimed would be decided on the seas, has been creditable.
To iron out whatever differences between these two service chiefs, Defence Secretary Rajapaksa had a discussion with Admiral Karannagoda and General Fonseka.
The junior most service chief Air Marshall Roshan Goonetileke also completed his first of four years in office, on Tuesday. Air Marshall Goonetileke will not require an extension, as he would complete his customary four-year term prior to turning 55.
Ruling the skies
One defence official noted that the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF), with close upon a thousand sorties, turned a defensive into an offensive war in the past year, beginning with the battle for Mawil Aru in July.
After the LTTE initiated the war, the defence establishment decided where they fight it, with the SLAF taking on identified targets, including infrastructure. The LTTE’s will to fight declined, as the SLAF continued to inflict much damage on its assets, including its fuel and ammunition dumps, gun positions and camps.
In this phase of the war, the LTTE, to date, has scored heavily with its light aircraft raids, not so much in achieving its targets but, in causing panic and confusion among the security forces and the people, not to mention the economic damage due to the airport closure at night. The drop in tourist arrivals with terrorist attacks in Colombo also did more damage than the guerilla attacks that included soft targets. It has been decided to re-open the airport at night and is likely that SriLankan and Mihin Lanka would resume night flights and pave the way for other airlines.
Not only has the Government been able to secure 3D radar but, it has also been advised by both American and South Asian experts on the need for interceptors. Towards this end, MiG 29s and other aircraft are being looked at.
A team of experts have already visited Ukraine for this purpose. This week, while on a mission to obtain UAVs, an expert, Dr. Amith Munindradasa, a senior lecturer and former Head of the Department of Electronic and Telecommunication Engineering of the University of Moratuwa, passed away in Tel Aviv, following a bout of pneumonia. The Government is increasingly involving academics to evaluate military equipment, to ensure that the security forces get the best material.
Horses for courses
Last week’s temporary setback west of Omanthai, in the Wanni, came after a string of successes in the East. By recommending several officers for promotion, based on their successes in the East, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka has indicated that hard work would not go unrewarded.
However, by removing Brig. Sumith Manawadu from 57 Division- created for offensive operations in the Wanni- and posting him to a non operational theatre, the army chief had a message: Those who fail will not be tolerated.
The correct decision has now been made to have Brig. Jagath Dias, an Infantry officer from 56 Division, to head the offensive 57 Division, and Brig. Jagath Rambukpotha from the Artillery Corps, to replace Dias, to head the holding Division. Brig. Dias led 516 Brigade that captured Colombuthurai, Ariyale and Navakuli bridge in 2000 after the Elephant Pass debacle which made the army retreat almost up to Jaffna town.
The question is whether Brig. Manawadu was suited to head 57 Division, in the first place. He was not from the Infantry but, from the Artillery Corps. and was Director, Planning at Army Headquarters when he was handpicked to head a Division created for offensive operations.
Apart from insufficient combat experience, he was selected over and above many senior and experienced officers, including those from Infantry regimes.
Overlooked were two Majors General and at least six Brigadiers. Majors General Abdul Zaheer and Aruna Jayatillake and Brigadiers Chrishantha de Silva, Deepal de Alwis, R.M.J. Ratnayake, L.W.C.B. Rajaguru, Tuan Morseth and Susil Udumalagala were overlooked.
Barring de Silva (a capable officer from the Engineering Corps), Jayatilleke, Rajaguru, Morseth and Udumalagala are all Infantry officers with substantial experience and exposure from platoon and company commander days.
While the strategies and operational plans are so far salutary, the security forces should ensure that the best officers are placed in the right positions to prevent any heartburn.
Special Forces has Tiger on the run
The military, with successful deployment of the Special Forces in small groups, on covert jungle operations in the East, wrested control of the region with minimum civilian and military casualties.. The military’s expectations to maximize Tiger casualties, did not materialize, as, in most of the confrontations, the Tigers withdrew to live another day. The LTTE claims that it has lost roughly a thousand cadres.
Offering limited resistance, the LTTE cadres moved north and fortified these areas, to face the military’s predicted forward thrust.
While it is a basic principle in British conventional warfare to concentrate ones forces to separate and contain the enemy, in guerilla warfare, it is advantageous for the Tiger cadres to attack from scattered positions. The security forces, adopting a virtual non conventional approach in the East, would like to take on the Tigers in a conventional war in the Wanni, as they inch forward and close the gaps. Of course, the use of Special Forces to penetrate the jungles, as they did in the East, will continue in the Wanni.
The military strategists are on record that they do not want to hold real estate and take control but, are keen on seeking and destroying LTTE cadres and their assets, to weaken the Tigers.
This is with the hope that the third level of cadres would turn themselves in, while the second level will be confused. Of course, the hardcore Tigers will fight tooth and nail but, in a demoralized frame of mind. This appears to be part of the overall strategy to weaken the Tigers, even as the deep penetration teams take on key targets within Tiger territory.
Military operations in Toppigala continued this week, in an effort to flush out the Tigers from, what is described as a significant wilderness base. Toppigala was an operational base from where the Tigers supplied arms and ammunition to cadres in the rest of the region.
This is the first time in an operation, where the Tigers lost much equipment, as they have been systematically cleared from the region from Sampur to Pullumallai, nearly a 100 km parallel to the sea coast. Isolated attacks by the LTTE are staged to make their presence felt as a morale booster to the cadres.

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Govt. reveals LTTE plans to attack Harbour

Three spies, Sindu, Muhudalan and Sheelan were deployed to provide information on the area between Galle Face and Colombo Harbour. They had pointed out the targets. According to Areevamudan, an arrested LTTE cadre, the attack, to be launched mid 2007 or, on a date determined by Areevamudan, was intended to cripple the economy and to upset the security forces. According to information provided by Achchudan Master, it is easy to launch the attack from the Galle Face roundabout. Five police checkpoints are located in the area. Movement of heavy vehicles is prohibited on the approach to Galle Face. Therefore, vans were to be used for the attack. Two Dvora fast attack crafts are on round-the-clock sea patrol off Galle Face. Achchudan had advised to launch an attack with two fibre glass boats from Wellawatta or Dehiwela, with a few more boats from the Mt. Lavinia area. Nandan and Deeman of the Divers Unit, were to swim underwater and destroy the Dvora crafts. Meanwhile, Kidiravan and Sheelan were to be signaled to lead two groups of four cadres each, bearing code numbers 321, 4017, 821, 3067 and 654, 787, 7530, 223 in two ambulances. Kidiravan and Sheelan are to be commanded by Achchunath and Elilavanvan from Vavuniya. Ten minutes later, another group of 15, also bearing code numbers, were to launch a massive offensive and break the wall adjoining the habour, 200 meters from gate No. 2, and enter the harbour. Here they were to divide into three groups of five each. Group No.1 to attack several targets while Group No. 2 had its own targets and so did Group No. 3. Achchunath has provided the codes to Kadiravan and Sheelan. All attacks were to last between three to five minutes. The plan was based on information provided by spies from 2005 to 2006. Fuel storage tanks and oil tankers were to be the targets of the group using the sea route. They were to first capture an identified ship and disconnect its communication system, the government claimed.
Then, they were to act as the crew of the ship. A heavy vehicle was to enter gate No.4 and explode it in an area marked target 5. After setting fire to all the containers in the harbour within three hours, the attackers were expected to retreat. Two cadres on the top of the fish market, were to shoot aircrafts. Meanwhile, the main security bases in the North were to come under continual artillery fire to create further problems for the Army. Sasandan Kalaiarasan was to video film the events. Sea Tiger headquarters at Kaiveli had arranged for the training of cadres for the attack. The plan is now being studied by Vinayagam and Sangilian of the intelligence wing. Injured cadres were to be sent to a temporary medical centre at Alwis Place, Wattala via Mattakkuliya . After two days they were to be transported to Trincomalee by train, and from there to Mullaithivu. Another arrangement was to take them to a house at Navinna, provided by Parliamentarian Chandrasekaran, and after a week to Vavuniuya.
Group No 01: Two of the first group of five from the Vanni were to stay at a school hostel arranged by Achchunath at Vavuniya while one of the other three were to travel to Colombo by night mail and the other in the day to stay at Wellawatta.
The two men staying at the school hostel were to proceed to Anuradhapura by bus and from there to Colombo.
Group No.2 were to come from Vidathalathivu to Arippu in Mannar, and from there to Puttalam. Two of them were to travel to Colombo and stay at Alwis place, Wattala, and another two by a lorry to Colombo and stay at a Teleshop in Grandpass.
Group 3: Two members of this group were to travel from Trincomalee by night mail and the others by train the following day.
Group 4 was expected to proceed to Kadiramalai and from there to Negombo by sea and to Colombo by bus. Two of them were to stay at Maligawatta and the others at Mt. Lavinia.
Group 5 was proceed from the Wanni to Batticaloa and from there to Colombo by train.
Each unit had been ordered to continue the attack using weapons seized during the battle.
The fighting unit had been instructed to continue the attack, even if communication between the commanding unit and the fighting unit failed. They must take orders from the leader of the unit or, act as they deem fit to achieve their objective.
Though the military would be prepared for an air attack by the Tigers, the LTTE, however, would attack Kelanitissa Power station and Kolonnawa Petroleum complex by air, at 2030 hours. However, the air raid would be suspended if the weather was not favourable.
A proposal to invite family members of the cadres joining the attack, to the Wanni, to spend a day with them, was rejected by LTTE headquarters (HQ). LTTE HQ called for a report on the disappearance of a cadre sent to Colombo to gather information for the attack. Did he flee to India, after sneaking information to the army or, was he killed by the army? It was decided that, the date and time of the workshop for the attack, was to be notified on receipt of this report.
LTTE HQ ordered that Dialog telephones not be used during the attack. Instead, satellite communication equipment to be provided to the leaders of units and cell card telephones to the cadres. They were to be paid Rs. 5,000 for transport. After the attack, group 01 and 02 to break the wall near Gate 01 and proceed to Fort Railway Station, and Group 3 by vehicle parked near St. Anthony’s Church, Kochchikade. LTTE cadres with 6-years experience in land and sea battles, were selected for the attack. They are engaged in swimming practices under Kapilan. Kalaiwanan has informed that the weapons for the attack would be handed over to the cadres at Navinna, where they were to meet 3-hours before the attack. Cadres not willing to join the attack, should inform in writing before the end of the workshop, giving valid reasons. Kapilamman has informed that spies were deployed to provide further information on the harbour. 32 cadres will be deployed for the attack and the routes of the vehicles.
It is reported that 80% of the plan would be completed by the end of the workshop. Fifty-three cadres, including those in charge of supplies attended the workshop.

(http://www.nation.lk/2007/06/17/newsfe3.htm)