Blunders and cover-ups by top brass humiliate govt.

The series of blunders and cover-ups by the top brass of the armed forces continued this week, resulting in the loss of many lives, and international condemnation of Sri Lanka that the country can ill-afford as it battles with the LTTE menace.

The incident that captured the headlines throughout the world was the army’s shelling of a refugee camp in Kathiraveli, Batticaloa on Wednesday, which killed at least 28 people, and wounded over a hundred. While the incident drew universal condemnation of the government and the army, it did not alter the balance of power on the battlefield.

The facts as can be proved are that several army camps came under artillery attack in the Valaichchenai area. The army used a "radar-grab" system that attempts to determine the location of the gun when it is fired. The army then fired back, and correctly hit the spot it had identified.

However, the site was a refugee camp housing more than 2,000 Tamil people displaced from the Sampur area. The final casualty toll is not clear, but is confirmed by the ICRC to already include 23 dead and 125 wounded.

What is not clear is whether the LTTE actually fired from the refugee camp at all. The army says the radar readings say so. The LTTE denies it. The SLMM and ICRC did not find any guns or evidence that guns had been there. But then, the Tigers are not likely to let the SLMM and ICRC visit the scene until all evidence of guns was removed. So the findings of the SLMM and ICRC are inconclusive. The Tigers could have easily moved the gun quickly in a lorry or towed by a tractor, and wiped away all evidence in the area, before allowing the foreigners in.

The radar grab system is of dubious value. Up to now, intelligence has not been able to confirm that army shelling of an LTTE gun position identified by radar, has ever resulted in the destruction of any of the Tigers’ artillery guns. In such a highly populated area, where numbers have swelled due to the influx of refugees, relying on the radar grab system is asking for disaster.

What is known, is that the LTTE has habitually used human shields over the last 20 years of the war. So it is quite likely that there were in fact LTTE guns at the refugee camp.

Survivors from the camp have said that there were no such guns there. However, this evidence is also questionable. People who have suffered the death of their families and friends due to the army’s artillery fire, and are themselves severely wounded, would naturally harbour a hatred towards the army, and say that it was an unprovoked attack.

What is known for certain is that the Vakarai area has over 50,000 people, most of them refugees. They are in reality being held hostage by the Tiger terrorists, and are being forcibly prevented from leaving the area. A few hundred have managed to flee by boat, but sources in the area say that the Tigers have now stationed cadres along the shore and have even fired into the air to prevent people from boarding the boats.

human shield tactics

However, knowing the situation, and the predicament of the civilians, the action of the army is not acceptable. What the army should have done a long time ago, in fact immediately after the Sampur area was captured, was to launch an assault and recapture Vakarai, driving the Tigers almost completely out of the Batticaloa district. This would also liberate all of these Tamil civilians. Unfortunately, the army lost the services of some 700 soldiers during its misadventure in Muhamalai. As a result, there are too few troops for such an operation. Thus the army is reduced to merely firing back with artillery. Given the human shield tactics that have long been adopted by Tigers, this week’s tragedy was bound to happen, sooner or later.

In fact, the Muhamalai blunder has now been conveniently swept under the carpet. Why Army Chief Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka did not remove the officer responsible for the operation, has never been explained to the public. Or is it because the officer responsible is sitting in a top position at Army Headquarters? What is known is that the operation was launched without the knowledge of almost all those whose authorization it required, includin g President Mahinda Rajapakse, Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickramanayake, and Chief of Defence Staff Air Chief Marshal Donald Perera. Neither did the commanders of the other two services, Air Marshal Roshan Gunatilleke and Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, know about it. Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapakse had been asked permission, and had expressly forbidden the operation!

The Kathiraveli incident and the plight of the refugees in Vakarai, literally caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, is a direct result of the army’s Muhamalai misadventure.

If the leadership of the army and navy had been more competent, the government would be in a position of great strength today, with control over almost all of the Eastern Province, and a firm grip on the Jaffna Peninsula. And the Tigers would not have dared to walk out of peace talks.

Meanwhile, the LTTE on Thursday evening once again attempted to destroy a convoy moving from Trincomalee to the Jaffna Peninsula. The stout defence of the escorting Dvoras prevented any harm from coming to the 300 Tamil civilians on board the ship. But two Dvoras were sunk, with 20 sailors killed and another four captured by the LTTE.

The navy has claimed no less than 22 Sea Tiger boats destroyed, 8 by the Dvoras and 14 by air force helicopter gunships and Kfir jets. But there is no independent confirmation of this yet. What does seem strange is that the navy was unable to prevent the Sea Tiger boats from stopping to pick up the navy sailors in the water, if they were being so hotly pursued by the air force.

Pro-LTTE media showed pictures of the four captured sailors and named them as "Indika Prasantha Pitiyakumbura, 30, (registration number: EE17275) Mechanical Engineer from 37C, Kirindiweva, Pundalu Oya, Nuwara Eliya; Saminda Kumara Hewage, 28, (XS 25749), Leading Seaman, Peliyakanda, Galewela, and Kamal Hemantha Kumarasiri, 26, (XS 29966), Padavi Parakramapura, Anuradhapura, all three from the Dvora P461, and Priyanka Medadeniya, 21, (SS38801), Ordinary Seaman from Nalanda, Matale of Dvora P416 who was wounded."

The LTTE also paraded heavy guns and ammunition, including a 23 mm canon, that they claim were stripped from the Dvoras before they sank.

extreme exaggeration

In fact, the Tigers claim that none of their vessels were sunk, although admitting that five Sea Tiger cadres were killed in the fighting. The Tigers used the captured guns and the sailors to support their claim that the Sea Tigers "chased the SLN vessels into Kankesanthurai harbour". This of course is an extreme exaggeration.

This incident highlighted the continuing folly of the navy in trying to force convoys of ships through to Kankesanthurai from Trincomalee, despite repeated attacks. Ever since the Tigers captured the A9 road in 1990, for the last 16 years, they have attacked naval convoys on the sea route again and again.

We are not for a minute saying that the sea convoys should be stopped. In fact, last week, this column put forward a strategy that requires all land routes to the LTTE-controlled areas to be closed down. Thus, the sea supply line to the isolated Jaffna Peninsula becomes all-important.

What is clear is that the route that the convoys take at present is far too risky. What the navy planners should do is to move the route further out into international waters, so that it becomes more difficult for the Tigers to attack the convoys. In addition, the likelihood of Sea Tiger craft surviving to get home, would also become more remote, as they would be open to attack by the air force and by naval reinforcements for much of the way back.

The navy was fully aware that the Tigers would strike a convoy on this route this week, following the government’s clear stand at the Geneva negotiations that the A9 road would not be opened at Muhamalai, and that it would supply the Peninsula by sea, come hell or high water. The LTTE, whose only demand at the negotiations was that the road be opened, was therefore definitely going to attack the sea route.

Instead of using this knowledge to plan and carry out a different type of operation, the navy tried to go through the treacherous route again, knowing full well that the convoy would be open to attack for more than 150 miles of its route. And attack, the Sea Tigers certainly did, catching the convoy between Vettilaikerni and Point Pedro. The crews of the escorting Dvoras fought back gallantly, but the Tigers had the advantage of the initiative as well as superior numbers.

mind-boggling

In war it is the side which has the initiative that wins almost all of the time, except in very rare occasions when the defending side has superior intelligence and defensive capabilities.

Why the convoy was in such dangerous waters at 5:15 p.m, when the Sea Tigers could attack and melt away into the darkness after dusk, when SLAF aircraft cannot operate, is mind-boggling. Clearly, the timing and the route taken were hopeless.

One glaring error on the part of the navy top brass is in selecting cargo ships which are far too slow. Most of the vessels can barely do 15 miles per hour at full speed, and usually steam at about 10 miles per hour. This means that each trip will take one and a half times as long in terms of the time spent in dangerous waters, than if faster ships are used. In addition, it gives the LTTE much more time to plan their attack once the Tigers know that a convoy is at sea. Unfortunately, the navy too often bows to the dictates of unscrupulous businessmen and politicians who require the navy and other government agencies to charter their vessels instead of more suitable ones. Thus the Dvoras, which are capable of nearly 50 miles per hour, and are faster than Sea Tiger craft, are bogged down in escorting such slow vessels.

Unfortunately, such blunders have gone unpunished in the past. For example, in the case of both the Habarana and Galle navy base attacks, the navy is content to punish some of the officers commanding the areas. Instead, it should be scrutinizing the performance of those at the very top, and sending them home.

In the case of Galle, the navy failed to detect the Sea Tiger boats, and incredibly it was President Mahinda Rajapakse who gave Navy Chief Karannagoda the tip off that an attack on the South was imminent. Yet, the navy was unable to locate the boats, until they sailed into Galle harbour. The reason for this is that the navy has lost so many Dvoras destroyed in the last 12 months that the navy could not spare any to protect Galle or any part of the Southern Province. By the time two Dvoras arrived from Colombo, which is itself sparsely guarded, Galle had already been attacked. The scapegoat in this incident now appears to be the Southern Area Commander, who had only taken up the post six days earlier. Perhaps this officer should have done more, but his task would have been infinitely more achievable if the navy commander and headquarters had assigned more Dvoras to him on a permanent basis. With the loss of two more this week, the situation has only got worse.

With regard to Habarana, one wonders what the top brass at navy headquarters was thinking, to have more than 400 sailors gather completely unprotected at a site only a few yards from a main road, and have them do this on a regular basis! Such a site should have been treated as a shore base of the navy, with permanent sentries, concrete barriers, and other roadblocks. Instead, it was treated as though it was a mere picnic spot, and the suicide bombers were able to drive straight in, ram a navy bus, and then explode their truck bomb! The setting up of such a base should have been directed from headquarters, to ensure that the standard security precautions and installations taken by the navy at all its other bases, were applied at Habarana. Instead, the lives of 140 sailors were snuffed out, because of the lack of proper leadership.