Getting back to the negotiating table is very clearly in the objective interests of both the Government and the LTTE. The question is to figure why they are continuing to delay when they could benefit greatly by resuming their peace talks.
The Government's interest in getting back to the negotiating table would stem primarily from the condition laid down by the international donors at the Tokyo donor conference of June 2003. At that conference, the international donors pledged a very generous sum of US$ 4.5 billion in aid over a four-year period. But they made the disbursement of that large sum of money conditional upon the satisfactory progress of the peace process. The Government's primary interest in recommencing the peace talks would stem from its urgent need to obtain an inflow of substantial external funding to bridge the budget deficit. The Government's political future most critically depends on the revival of the health of the economy, which is being subjected to sharp inflationary pressures at the present time.
On the LTTE's side too there is a real need to get the peace process under way. But for the LTTE, their interest would be less in terms of obtaining economic aid than in directly consolidating their political and military control on the ground. Certainly, obtaining economic aid to bring the peace dividend to the long-suffering people of the north-east would be an important consideration for the LTTE. In fact they have constantly justified their demand for an interim self governing authority for the north-east on the basis of satisfying the developmental and economic needs of the people. But the LTTE leadership has also made it clear, time and again, that obtaining political control is of greater importance to them than obtaining economic resources.
The LTTE's need to utilise any forthcoming peace talks, as a vehicle to strengthen their control on the ground, would have got more urgent in view of the crisis situation that exists in the east. After the revolt by its eastern commander Karuna, who broke away from the LTTE, there is a vacuum of control in the east. Most of the LTTE's political offices in Batticaloa remain closed, as they are vulnerable to attack by the Karuna group. But if the LTTE can obtain political control over the north-east, by means of an interim self governing authority, such as they have proposed, it may become easier for them to completely eradicate the influence now wielded by Karuna, his remaining fighters and his political party in the east.
The priority given by the LTTE to political and military control, as against economic matters, can be seen quite clearly in their proposals for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). Only three of the 23 clauses pertaining to the ISGA are concerned with economic or developmental issues. These three clauses deal with the subjects of rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement. The balance 19 clauses are concerned with issues of political and military control and governance, such as the high security zones, the coastal waters, and law and order issues, elections, human rights and other governance issues.
What the above analysis suggests is that there is a major mismatch between the goals and expectations of the Government and the LTTE. The Government seeks to obtain economic resources as its primary goal while the LTTE seeks control on the ground as its primary goal. It is this mismatch that is creating suspicion and doubt in the minds of the two parties, regarding each other. The LTTE's concern would be that the Government is only seeking to restart the peace talks in order to open the purse strings of the international donors. The LTTE would be suspicious that the Government has no real intention of providing the LTTE with an interim administration of the kind they seek, as an outcome of the peace talks.
On the other hand, the Government's concern would be that the LTTE's intention in restarting the peace talks is simply to obtain the implementation of its far reaching ISGA proposals. These proposals seek the legalisation of LTTE-created institutions, such as its police, judiciary and the proposed auditor general, although they will have no relationship to existing national institutions. The LTTE's evident unwillingness to consider linkage with national institutions, and the implication that they seek total control, makes the situation more difficult from the Government's point of view. The LTTE has recently been seeking to backtrack on the commitment they made at the Oslo round of peace talks in December 2002, where they agreed to explore a federal solution within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. The mismatch between the goals and expectations of the Government and LTTE, with regard to the peace talks, would stand as the biggest obstacle to their resumption. It is unlikely that the visit of the high powered Norwegian delegation to Sri Lanka this week can change this mismatch in the short term. In fact, the Norwegians appear to be cognisant of the challenge they face. Their Foreign Minister has already stated that their visit should not generate too many expectations. He has pointed out that the messages he is receiving from the parties are not very positive ones. The highly publicised excerpts from the forthcoming book by LTTE ideologue Dr Anton Balasingham, distancing the LTTE from the federal consensus at Oslo, would be one example. However, by utilising their unique access to the very highest in the leadership of the two sides and, by clarifying the nature of the mismatch, the Norwegian facilitators can contribute much, to preparing the ground for future peace talks. There are two key areas in particular where the Norwegian facilitators could make a valuable contribution. The first would be to convince the LTTE leadership that the legitimacy of the ISGA proposal hinges upon a willingness to work within the parameters of the Oslo agreement on federalism. Unless the ISGA is amended to include the shared rule component of federalism, it will be impossible for any Sri Lankan government to hand over parts of the country to be ruled by an unelected, separate and unaccountable organisation.
The Norwegian facilitators are in a particularly strong position to impress upon the LTTE the need for a federal solution. At the very outset of their publicly announced entry into the Sri Lankan peace process, they announced the broad political parameters within which they would function. They publicly stated that their facilitation was conditional upon the two parties accepting a common framework of a united Sri Lanka in which Tamil aspirations would be substantially met. By agreeing to Norwegian facilitation and by entering into the Norwegian-facilitated peace process, the LTTE implicitly agreed to the parameters that the Norwegians set for their facilitation.
The second key area for the Norwegians to contribute to would be in respect of the approach adopted towards the peace process. Both parties would need to reorient themselves to approach the peace process in a manner that would ensure that both parties gain, rather than only one party gaining while the other party loses. The episode of the breakaway LTTE eastern commander Karuna, and the complicity of sections of the Government in it, would be an example of one party seeking to gain at the expense of the other. Certainly the LTTE was weakened by to this incident. But the covert support given to Karuna added to the mistrust between the two sides that continues to hold up the peace process to the detriment of virtually everyone.
Most scholars of peace processes, worldwide, advocate conflict resolution strategies in which there are mutual gains for both sides. A model to follow in this regard might be the Camp David Accords of 1976 that have ensured peace between Israel and Egypt for nearly three decades. At these peace talks, the US government was the mediator and recognised that Israel's interest was security while Egypt's interest was in its national sovereignty. The US mediators made this fact, that the interests of the two parties differed, actually work for a solution. They mediated a settlement whereby Israel gave back the Sinai desert that it had captured from Egypt while Egypt demilitarised the Sinai. Both parties gained from the negotiations.
The CFA that has become Sri Lanka's most precious possession today, had the positive feature that it enabled both parties to gain. The peace process was strongest during its initial stages when the Government and the LTTE considered each other to be partners in the peace process. It was only when they began to see that their interests were opposed, at least in some areas, that the relationship began to suffer and with it the peace process also suffered. The facilitators must show the parties that there are negotiating options by which, economic resources, development and responsible autonomy can be found to meet their legitimate needs and expectations.
