Despite warnings of dire consequences being expressed by the JVP, all indications are that the Government of Sri Lanka is gearing itself to resume negotiations on the basis of the LTTE’s proposals for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). Whatever else the LTTE may be prepared to compromise on during negotiations, one can be certain that they would insist on majority representation for themselves in the ISGA. It is the implications of this one aspect that Mr. Anandasangaree, the President of the TULF, warned in his letter to the LTTE (The Island, October 16, 2004). He said, "How can we expect any Government to agree to give majority representation for the LTTE in the Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). Whatever we demand the concerned parties must be in a position to concede. This demand for majority representation in the ISGA for the LTTE will only be the first step towards the de-merger of the North and East. Don’t forget that the Tamils, Muslims, and the Sinhalese who live in equal numbers in the Eastern Province will tend to oppose it and a demand of this nature will only increase the demand for de-merger of the North-East"(Ibid).
Mr. Anandasangaree’s appeal is not to precipitate a de-merger because the merger of these two provinces that has been "...achieved with the greatest difficulty by TULF leaders should be retained at any cost". The insistence on a unified region consisting of the Northern and Eastern Provinces is the single factor that would determine whether Sri Lanka’s national question would be resolved or not. As long as the TULF leadership or that of the LTTE insists on retaining the two provinces as a single unit "at any cost" there would never be any real peace for the Tamil community or for Sri Lanka.
While Mr. Anandasangaree and the TULF hope to retain a merged unit under a federal arrangement, the LTTE hopes to retain it with the gun. While Mr. Anandasangaree and the TULF hope to retain a merged unit by winning over the Muslims on the pretext of linguistic bonding as Tamil-speaking people, or through "indoctrination" as Mr. Chelvanayakam once put it, of the Eastern Province Tamils, despite the recent open defiance by Karuna and past electoral expressions of Eastern Tamil separateness from the Northern Tamils, the LTTE would retain a merged unit through coercion, intimidation or even by liquidating all those who are not with them or against them. In the final analysis, the intention of both Mr. Anandasangaree and the LTTE is to retain a merged unit "at any cost". Their difference lies ONLY in the means to achieve their goal. As far as the end result is concerned, there is no difference between the two, or for that matter any other Tamil political leader from the North: they all want a merged North-East unit.
THE KARUNA FACTOR
Having accepted the fact that a separate state was not possible militarily, the LTTE had to come up with a proposal that would give them both, legitimacy as well as absolute power in a no-war situation. Since this was not possible constitutionally, the strategy was to propose an arrangement wherein an interim arrangement would be allowed to consolidate into one in which the LTTE would be accepted as the only authority for the defined region. Absolute authority was needed not only to assure their physical survival but also for their recognition as the political entity to represent the Tamil people since it was not possible to gain acceptance democratically. The LTTE’s need to retain majority status in an interim arrangement as in the ISGA was therefore inevitable.
Karuna’s open defiance was a fall-out of the ISGA. Karuna’s decision to defect from the LTTE followed the appointment of Northern cadres to positions of importance in the East ignoring those from the East despite the invaluable contribution made by them. This led to claims of discrimination by Karuna. The choice open to him was either to play a minor role in a future LTTE administration or to opt for a leadership role in the East. By opting for the latter Karuna was only giving expression to what thousands of others in the Eastern Province, including the Eastern Province Tamils, had expressed democratically at every opportunity offered to them through the ballot (in 1977 and 20003), that the wish of the East was to be politically separate from the North.
The significance of Karuna’s action is that for the first time the people of the Eastern Province are prepared to go beyond mere democratic expression of their desire to be politically separate from the politics of the Northern Province and to openly declare a separate political future for themselves. It is ironic that the resolve of the Tamil community to set up a separate state militarily is the very process that has provoked the East to defy the hegemony of the North. The dominance of Northern politics prevented the East from seeking a separate political future despite their social and cultural separateness from the North: a dominance amounting to oppression that even today calls for the East to be "retained at any cost".
Sri Lanka’s national question would be resolved the day the Tamils of the North decide to let go the Eastern Province. A recent newspaper article urged the Sinhalese to "Make up your mind forthwith to let the Tamils go"(Daily Mirror, October 7, 2004). Paradoxically however, the plea of the Eastern Province Tamils, expressed democratically whenever the opportunity was given and now defiantly by Karuna, is that the Tamils of the North must let the Eastern Province go. As for the Sinhalese, letting the Tamils go would not be a problem if the Northern Tamils did not try to take with them the Eastern Province the Sihalese had nurtured and forged over millennia.
Outlining the economic prospects of the Eastern Province, Mr. Chelvanayakam had stated: "The land which is now in jungle was studded with ancient irrigation works of great magnitude, which when restored, would supply sufficient water for the cultivation of the whole area"(A.J. Wilson, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, 1994, p. 31). It was the Eastern Province that contained the ancient irrigation works referred to, and they constituted an integral part of the Hydraulic Civilization developed by none other than the Sinhalese. Therefore, retaining the Eastern Province at "any cost" under any political arrangement is morally unacceptable. Furthermore, the claim that these lands were colonized has no relevance because one cannot colonize one’s own land. What took place was a return to one’s own ancestral lands with its "ancient irrigation works" that were temporarily abandoned during foreign colonial rule.
INDIAN INTERVENTION
The merger of the Eastern Province with the Northern Province described by Mr. Anandasangaree as having been "achieved with the greatest difficulty by the TULF leaders", was accomplished with the assistance of India. It was the Indo-Lanka Accord that enabled the merger. As far as the TULF leadership is concerned its insistence is only for those aspects of the Accord that favour the merger to be implemented. This attitude goes for leaders of other Tamil political parties as well. On the other hand, the disingenuous of the Tamil leadership is reflected when they oppose the implementation of the remaining provisions of the same Accord, such as a referendum in the Eastern Province. Sri Lanka’s national question can only be resolved by India and Sri Lanka jointly living up to the commitments each undertook to implement when they signed the Indo-Lanka Accord.
Anything less would only make a mockery of India as a regional power and Sri Lanka as a weak nation-state without a leadership that is capable of living up to commitments it made to its Peoples. To allow developments in the Eastern Province to evolve without decisive action on the part of both India and Sri Lanka is to permit violence to determine the political future of Sri Lanka. This is unacceptable. Sri Lanka’s national question has to be resolved not through violence but ONLY through a DEMOCRATIC process that recognizes and respects the will of the Peoples.
CONCLUSION
If the Government hopes to resume negotiations on the basis of the ISGA and it accepts majority representation for the LTTE in such an arrangement, Mr. Anandasangaree has warned that it would lead to a de-merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. He has appealed to the leadership of the LTTE is to give up seeking majority status for the sake of retaining a single merged unit. To ask the LTTE to make such a sacrifice is to ask it to give up its role as the sole representative of Tamil interests. This would be a paradigm shift for the LTTE given its penchant for eliminating all opposition. Therefore, it is unlikely that the LTTE would abide by or even consider Mr. Anandasangaree’s request.
Instead, what the LTTE would hope to do is to "retain" the Eastern Province "at any cost" while also retaining its majority role in the ISGA. This is bound to lead to increased resistance from the Eastern Province, not only from Karuna, but from other groups as well. Consequently, the theater of violence would shift from the North to the East. If the Sri Lankan Government and India are genuinely interested in a speedy resolution of the national question both Governments should live up to their commitments as stated in the Indo-Lanka Accord and jointly hold a referendum in the Eastern Province.
As long as the Tamil leadership, whether TULF or LTTE, hopes to "retain" the Eastern Province "at any cost" Sri Lanka’s national question would not be resolved and the Tamil people would not know peace. As far as the Eastern Province is concerned there is little difference between the moderate Tamil leadership and the LTTE. Both claim entitlement to the Eastern Province without any justifiable basis, least of all on the basis of Democracy and the will of the people. Therefore, however difficult an adjustment it may be, it is ONLY by letting the Eastern Province go that the Tamil people can expect to find peace.
