LTTE's Eastern Regional Commander Karuna broke away from the organization roughly a year after the LTTE pulled out of talks, quickly exposed Prabhakaran's duplicity and preparatory plans to get back to war and last week his recently formed party Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) teamed up with another party to throw its biggest challenge.
As I said in my column last Saturday, the coming together of Karuna's TMVP and the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) to form the Tamileela Ikkiya Viduthalai Munnani (TIVM) could be the handiwork of the Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).
"Could it be that the latest news of the ENDLF joining hands with Karun's party to form the TIVM was the work of RAW?" this column questioned last Saturday. The column was laced with Prabhakaran's own previous observations about the ENDLF and the Tristar group in the late eighties.
A couple of days back an India Abroad News Service (IANS) moved a story on the lines that "an unexpected development has sparked speculation that India might be getting involved again in Sri Lanka's Tamil politics, for the first time since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi."
The IANS report was referring to Karuna teaming up with the ENDLF, a militant group-turned-political party that for long has been based primarily in India.
Quoting ENDLF sources, IANS reported that the group made its first face-to-face contact with Karuna in May, the same month when a new government took office in New Delhi.
"By then Prabhakaran had crushed Karuna's revolt and the latter had disappeared from public view. The ENDLF remained in touch with him but these contacts were kept under wraps. Apparently ENDLF representatives also went to Europe and Canada to activate those in the Tamil diaspora opposed to the LTTE,"
"Could all these have taken place without the knowledge of New Delhi?" the report queried.
"You may not believe it, but the fact is we acted on our own," the report said quoting an ENDLF source.
"If the statement is true, it must be a bizarre truth. If not, then it only means that New Delhi is sick and tired of the unending killings that plague Sri Lanka despite the Norway-brokered ceasefire of February 2002 and has decided to play a pro-active role in the island's Tamil politics, even if indirectly," the report said.
ENDLF general secretary R. Rajarattinam alias Mano Master, who was a minister in the India-backed North East Provincial Council and now lives in the Tamil Nadu capital Chennai, made the surprise declaration of the two parties coming together.
"The decision by Karuna, whose whereabouts are unknown, to throw his lot with ENDLF has led to speculation that New Delhi might be shedding its reluctance of well over a decade and indirectly taking on the LTTE," said the IANS story.
When the troops withdrew in March 1990, scores of ENDLF guerrillas and their family members retreated to India. They set up a camp, with some help from Indian authorities, at Malkangiri, a tribal-dominated area in Orissa. Even now ENDLF maintains the Orissa camp and another one in Salem in Tamil Nadu. It also runs a school for Sri Lankan Tamil children in Karnataka.
The ENDLF-Karuna statement is very harsh on the LTTE and equally critical of the Norwegian facilitators and the Scandinavian-manned Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission.
The sudden urgency by New Delhi to finalise the Indo-Lanka Defence Co-operation Agreement should be seen in this backdrop where the new party TIVM has sought in its maiden statement to strip the LTTE of its assumed status of sole representatives of the Tamil people.
This is despite the LTTE demanding from the new Freedom Alliance government that it be recognized as the sole representatives of the Tamils. Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar granted this status by implication during an overseas trip.
The second important aspect brought out in the TIVM statement is that the Tigers could not be allowed to rule the north and east. This again is curious as the government and the LTTE are expected to begin negotiations on setting up a modified ISGA with Tiger dominance.
In the same vein the statement sought the help of the international community to curb Tiger activities while all Tamils were urged to join hands to "Unite and fight against the terrorism, which exists in the name of liberating the Tamils."
The statement also says, "Tamils will tolerate no more the prolonging treacherous and barbarian act of Pirabakaran."
If New Delhi is backing this line then it could follow that it would also be keen in having Prabhakaran dead or alive.
The killing of the Tamilnadu forest brigand Veerappan, responsible for some 120 killings and who eluded the authorities for 15 long years, must have sent a chill down the spine of Prabhakaran. The LTTE has been responsible for the killing of some 1200 Indian soldiers during the IPKF times while its leader is wanted for the killing of former Indian Premier Gandhi. A request for Prabhakaran's extradition may also be made.
India, which did not want to be seen scuttling the peace talks, at the height of the peace process is aware that talks have been stalled more than one and a half years and the peace process it self has come to a standstill.
In fact Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Peterson made a serious comment when he met LTTE's Political Wing Leader S.P. Thamilselvan.
"Conflict situation in many other locations demand priority and we are afraid that the Sri Lankan peace process may be pushed to the backyard, hence both the parties should act with circumspection and retain the already given support without being diverted elsewhere," said Peterson weeks after Oslo Special Envoy Erik Solheim said all parties were frustrated over the peace process. Earlier Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgessen said the patience of the international community was being tested and its interests could be diverted away from the Sri Lankan peace process.
The JHU brought a motion in Parliament yesterday to call off the Norwegian facilitation, but the LTTE-backed TNA demanded an English translation preventing a vote being taken. The matter would come up at the next session.
The SLFP stalwarts too must be thinking aloud how they and the JVP bitterly criticized Norwegian facilitation during the UNF regime not too long ago.
The JVP continued to accuse the FA government of appeasing LTTE by releasing LTTE prisoners of war in exchange for two Sinhala home guards.
Meanwhile, the team of Indian defence experts left Sri Lanka on Thursday after consultations with their counterparts and the draft with the changes proposed would be carried to the Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee whose clearance is required. The Cabinet Committee on security will also have to clear it at that end while President Chandrika Kumaratunga the Defence Minister will have to do the honours here. While the agreement was mooted during the UNF times, India got miffed that the former administration got cold feet as the Tigers made clear its opposition. President Kumaratunga who rushed a defence team to India to pursue it after taking over the defence portfolio lost interest after the FA came to office. This sudden interest could be attributed to the Indian zeal and in the face of the stalemate President Kumaratunga was unable to resist it but must ensure that it would be in the interests of the country.
Ms. Kumaratunga, who was down with a bout of flu this week, is expected to visit New Delhi in the first week of November. It is unclear whether she would use this visit to sign the agreement.
That the LTTE deceived India and baulked on the Congress Party initiated 1987 Indo-Lanka Peace Accord is another grouse the party has with the terrorist organization even though the Congress-led UPA government would find itself in an embarrassing position given its other allies, including DMK.
If there was one Sri Lankan cabinet minister who backed this accord to the hilt it was Gamini Lionel Dissanayake whose 10th death anniversary falls today.
Incidentally, the Fifth Memorial Lecture in honour of the slain co-architect of President Chandrika Kumaratunga's Peace Package, Dr. Neelan Thiruchelvam was delivered recently.
The two leaders were assassinated by the LTTE as so was the co-signatory of the Accord, Former Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi while President Kumaratunga escaped death at the hands of an LTTE suicide bomber.
The Tigers also snuffed the life out of President Ranasinghe Premadasa and former National Security Minister, Lalith Athulathmudali who opposed the Indo-Lanka Agreement to varying degrees.
The organization killed moderate Tamils opposed to the organization in the immediate aftermath of Indo-Lanka Accord, during talks with President Premadasa and finally during the 34 months of the ongoing Norwegian facilitated cease-fire.
These are strategic killings no doubt making history repeat itself in style.
The whole wide world is now beginning to wonder what type of freedom fighters the Tigers are to kill members of their own community after forcing themselves as the sole representatives.
The Indians realized it long ago and the statement by the official spokesman of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on September 20, 1987 roughly a month after the Accord is very clear.
"We are deeply shocked and distressed at the recent incidents of violence which resulted in the deaths of over 100 Tamils…The killings of innocent Tamils … have been unfortunately engineered by the LTTE which after the brutal killings has now undertaken what it claims to be a peaceful Gandhian movement. " He was referring to a fast unto death undertaken by some Tigers including Thileepan.
Like the killings of Tamils, history is also repeating itself with the provocations engineered by the Tigers. On September 24, 1987 the External Affairs spokesman during a press briefing accused the Tigers of using women and children as a front behind which its supporters hurled rocks at the Indian soldiers.
Isn't this similar to the attack on the Kanchirankudah STF camp at Akairapattu that prompted a violent response, or the "Belts" episode at Manipay where clashes erupted after a lightning orchestrated civilian protest. These are just two of the many such incidents during this bout of the truce.
In the immediate post 1987 accord the LTTE had maintained that it was not a signatory to the agreement but this time its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran himself signed the February 22, 2002 Cease-fire Agreement and could not wriggle out of responsibility for the many violations.
What about the third important issue: the interim administration demand which is the main reason for the Tiger withdrawal from talks. Let's look at the parallel then.
"Mr. Pirabhakaran agreed to the composition of the Interim Administrative Council.." stated the agreed minutes of a meeting held on September 28, 1987 between the Tiger delegation headed by the LTTE Supremo and the Indian delegation led by Mr. Dixit. The council was to have a Chief Administrator (one of three persons nominated by the organization, 5 LTTE members, 2 TULF members, 2 Muslims and 2 Sinhalese, totaling 12.
A few days (03) later, Prabhakaran began on October 1 to attack Sinhalese civilians in Trincomalee. There were nearly 200 bodies of men, women, and children either charred, dismembered or bullet-ridden strewn all over the North and East. And this was while the armed forces were in the barracks.
The LTTE uses violence to distract attention when it is tied down to a commitment and wriggles out of it.
The LTTE's pattern of befriending leaders, tricking them and later eliminating them continued from Gandhi through Premadasa but appears to have stopped mid-stream after a failed attempt on Kumaratunga's life.
The organization continued its pattern of befriending the former UNF government but withdrew from talks this time with a valid excuse demanding an interim administration to channel funds and oversee development/ resettlement in the former war-torn North and East.
If this was its sole aim why did the organization pitch its demand (Interim Self Governing Authority) so high to make any compromise seem impossible?
Also, what is the logic in stating that the sole basis for talks should be ISGA alone and no other document should be tabled before talks commence? After all the LTTE should be reminded that ISGA was only a set of counter proposals to two sets of UNF government proposals for an interim council which the organization rejected. The UNF had earlier said its third set of proposals the July 17 Discussion Paper should along with ISGA be discussed.
The LTTE which says "ISGA only" however has said the document was not a rigid one and the organization was flexible. But the LTTE was not willing to accommodate any other document as the basis for negotiations but was willing to consider government criticisms and proposals at talks.
As I said before, the time spent on splitting hairs for an interim administration should have been spent for setting some effective structure within the law to usher in development.
