The Chief Negotiator of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Anton Balasingham last week delivered a strong message to Norwegian facilitators - Special Envoy Erik Solheim and Ambassador Hans Brattskar.
He said the LTTE was concerned over the killings in the East and elsewhere carried out by armed groups, obviously with the assistance of Military Intelligence units. During a meeting in London, he charged this was a violation of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and will definitely not be helpful to create a conducive environment for the parties to recommence the stalled peace process.
"Unless the Government takes effective measures to end this series of violence perpetrated on the LTTE, it is hard to imagine how one can seriously talk about re-commencing peace talks," their official Peace Secretariat web site quoted Mr. Balasingham as saying.
Both Mr. Solheim and Mr. Brattskar flew to London to de escalate rising tensions between the Government and the LTTE. That became their top priority to ensure the CFA remained intact. This is whilst they continued their long drawn efforts to persuade the two sides to return to the negotiating table - a move that no doubt is turning out to be arduous and time consuming. More so with the two sides trading allegations and distancing themselves from each other.
Whilst Mr. Balasingham was articulating LTTE's position in London, some developments that ran counter to the accusations he was making were surfacing in Colombo. Those revelations pointed the finger directly at the LTTE for some of the killings. The targets were helpers and informants of the Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI).
No doubt members of the Karuna faction were also gunning down cadres loyal to the Wanni leadership in a violent campaign that is now hotting up in the East. Senior officials and military leaders have denied any formal backing to the Karuna group in their campaign. The latest to join in was President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. She told foreign correspondents on Friday there was no security forces support. It was the Government's policy not to back one terrorist group against another, she said. The new disclosures came to light during ongoing Police investigations into the death of Suresh alias Tissaveerasingham Surendran. He was shot dead by Tiger guerrilla hit men on August 28 at Pepiliyana.
Suresh was a key player in the now defunct Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) once operated in the East by the DMI. He helped accomplish vital targets. A Police raid on a Safe House (or a forward intelligence cell) operated by the DMI, during the tenure of the former United National Front (UNF) Government betrayed all their covert operations. Subsequent efforts by UNF leaders to cover up this serious breach of national security failed. One UNF Cabinet Minister offered DMI officers attractive cash rewards, promotions and a life of luxury together with their families in a country of their choice. They, however, spurned the overtures which were in return for withdrawing a fundamental rights violation case they had filed in the Supreme Court.
When some of the others helping the DMI operatives were tracked and gunned down by LTTE hit men, Suresh was moved to a rented house in Pepiliyana. He was earlier operating from Batticaloa. From Pepilyana he had planned to go abroad to seek employment. He was under specific orders not to move away from the house lest he be identified by guerrilla spotters roaming the City of Colombo and suburbs. How then was Suresh tracked down and killed?
The answers, The Sunday Times learnt, came in confessions his wife Sivajothi Sivalingam made to the Police. She was given the LTTE nom de guerre Jothi. The saga she related would easily be good material for a book with chapters studded with love, intrigue and espionage.
Jothi and her two children lived with Suresh but left him and went to Batticaloa after an altercation. When she was in Pepiliyana she had regular visitors from the East. Upon her departure, Suresh lived with Jothi's sister, Rajendran Geethanjali (LTTE nom de guerre Kavitha). The two fell into Police hands when they arrived in Colombo to claim the body of Suresh.
Now Police say Jothi has confessed to having conspired with top rung Tiger guerrilla cadres to murder Suresh. It seemed she was piqued by Suresh's affair not only with her sister but also with another woman. Those made her go out of the way to teach him a lesson.
She made contact with Ramanan, the Tiger guerrilla intelligence wing leader for Batticaloa. He in turn was in touch with Keerthi, the LTTE intelligence boss for the East who reported directly to Pottu Amman, the spy chief, who directed operations from the Wanni.
Jothi had first planned to poison Suresh. However, the latter had become suspicious. This was after he began to feel uncomfortable about some of the men who visited his home to meet Jothi. Though they had parted ways, Jothi was still in touch with Suresh. She had talked to him about making plans for a grand birthday bash for their elder son on September 28. But Jothi also had other plans that were not conveyed to Suresh.
If Suresh's handler in the DMI, a senior officer who played a prominent role in DMI's LRRP operations in the East, accepted the invitation to the party, there was going to be additional visitors. That was in the form of either LTTE hit men armed with pistols or a suicide bomber. Their task was to kill this DMI officer, one of those who contributed to the success of their LRRP operations in the East. He had also, with the help of Suresh, identified or attacked other targets.
Police say a more sinister plan was afoot if by some chance the officer concerned was unable to attend the birthday party. Two "gift packs" supposed to contain sweetmeats and pieces of birthday cake were to be delivered to the homes of the officer in question and to Brigadier Kapila Hendavitharana, Director of Military Intelligence. The latter has just been named Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI). In that capacity he heads the tri service intelligence arms. In reality the "gift packs" were to contain an improvised explosive device.
Opening the pack would have been instant death to the DMI chief and his top operative. But, plans had been changed ahead of the impending birthday party. This is believed to be over suspicion that Suresh, who discouraged the birthday bash, was planning to leave the country. The task of gunning him down, Jothi had told Police, fell on Mylvaganam Sivakumar (LTTE nom de guerre Venthan), a notorious guerrilla hit man responsible for a spate of attacks.
Besides Suresh, it was Venthan and his hit men who were responsible for killing DMI informants associated with activities of the safe house at Athurugiriya. Here is his catalogue:
Ganeshamoorthy Tillekerajah alias Samy - Shot dead in Wellawatte on December 11, 2002.
Sivathamby Rajan alias Varathan - Shot dead in Batticaloa on February 4, 2003.
Kadirgamathamby Ragupathy alias Ragu - Shot dead in Mount Lavinia on March 13, 2003.
Kumaraperumal Periyamban alias Master - Shot dead in Batticaloa on May 21, 2003.
Lance Corporal L. Devaraja alias Ashok - Shot dead in Pepiliyana on April 26, 2003.
Kandiah Yogarasa alias PLOT Mohan - Shot dead at Bambalapitiya on July 31, 2004.
All these killings were officially denied by the LTTE. They argued that killings in controlled areas were a matter for the Government since security was in their hands. Killings in uncontrolled areas, the LTTE claimed, were the result of internecine battles within paramilitary groups. However, Jothi's confessions to the Police have thrown new light on the killings. The Police findings are to be sent to the Attorney General once the investigations are concluded.
Special Envoy Solheim arrives in Colombo on September 13. During talks with UPFA leaders and Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat, Dr. Jayantha Dhanapala, he is expected to place the LTTE positions enunciated by Mr. Balasingham. In turn, the Government is now armed with fresh evidence to counter some of the LTTE accusations, more pointedly the involvement of Tiger guerrilla intelligence in the killings of DMI operatives and informants.
Such killings had continued after the previous UNF Government failed to take preventive action. This was after the Police raid at the Safe House in Athurugiriya led by ASP Kulasiri Udugampola, who was then a Superintendent of Police. He has since been sent on compulsory leave by the Police Commission. Disciplinary action was also initiated against many Army officers named by the Commission. However, some still continue to have Army drivers, escorts and even transport facilities unofficially.
President Kumaratunga appointed a one man Commission of Inquiry to probe "disclosures of the existence of and the raid on the safe house." The Commissioner D. Jayawickrema named some Army and Police officers who "have conspired with Kulasiri Udugampola to raid this Safe House for their own personal benefits." He held that the country's national security interests were compromised by this raid.
Even if UNF leaders tried to play down the existence of the safe house at Athurugiriya soon after the Police raid, killings of informants were triggered off by this incident. Such killings related not only to those directly helping or were informants of the DMI but also extended to many others including those assisting other Army units or military installations in the former operational areas of the North and East.
When such killings proliferated, then Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, appointed a three member Committee to Examine Measures Required to Enhance the Safety of Informants of the Directorate of Military Intelligence. It was headed by then Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando and comprised then Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle and then Defence Advisor, retired DIG Merril Gunaratne. They spelt out measures necessary to protect those assisting DMI. That action, despite public denials on the existence of a DMI safe house, was significant enough.
The Committee's recommendations included placing informants and helpers in close proximity to security installations and the issue of weapons. That is not all. Later, former Defence Secretary Fernando was asked by the Commission whether he was aware of the existence of the Safe House. He replied:
"No. I do not think, and I do not think there is a necessity either, because this type of operation is so covert that even the Minister or Secretary need not know, because these are done in such secrecy. We only know the principles of doing it, but perhaps if a success takes place we will be told and not written, O.K, Mr. "X" is gone because of us, and we will not know how it was done, when it was done or what and what were taken and all that. I do not think there is any necessity, for the sake of State secrecy the Minister, the Secretary, the President or the Prime Minister need not know."
Now there is more shocking news. An investigation ordered by President Kumaratunga, as a sequel to the Commission's findings, has in their report made some startling disclosures. A main highlight, supported by corroborative evidence, is the fact that the Police raid on the safe house was not an accident or carried out due to lack of awareness. The probe has revealed that it was in fact a conspiracy where some high ranking Police officials, with the support of Army officers, were involved. Among the policemen named is a high ranking officer now head of an important investigation division.
The Sunday Times learns that the probe report has now been forwarded to the Attorney General's Department for action. Upon their advice, besides indictments against those involved, disciplinary action is to be initiated against those in the Police who have been identified.
The ten man team that conducted the investigation was headed by Asoka Wijetilleke, SSP. It included Neville Guruge, ASP and a team seconded from the CID. They were made up of three Inspectors, two Sub Inspectors, a Sergeant Major, a Sergeant and a Woman Police Constable. They recorded evidence at the Mounted Police Division Headquarters in Pettah.
These developments come in the backdrop of a Tiger guerrilla manhunt for rival cadres and DMI informants in the East, the City of Colombo and the suburbs. Whilst stepping up the manhunt, the LTTE has also intensified efforts to regain full military control of the Batticaloa district. This week a large group led by Akbar had taken full control of the Vakarai area. A house to house campaign to re enlist cadres who fled after the Karuna split has also been launched. Their families had been told that it was the only way they could be protected if a war was to break out. On Thursday a group of 20 youth had been enlisted in Sittandy.
If recruitment was very slow in the Batticaloa distirict, it was going on at a hectic pace in the Trincomalee district. Tiger guerrilla cadres were also conducting searches in the Toppigala jungles for members of the Karuna faction. This is particularly in the backdrop of the incident near an Army check-point at Kayankerni where two senior LTTE cadres were killed.
In south Trincomalee, intelligence sources say, the guerrilla build up also continues. Larger numbers are being concentrated in the coastal village of Sampur, which is located cheek by jowl with the entrance to Trincomalee harbour. According to these sources, the head of LTTE's artillery wing, Banu and his close associates have been visiting this area and strengthening encampments there. The move has led to stepped up vigilance by the Sri Lanka Navy from their Eastern Command in Trincomalee.
It was early this week that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) sent the Ministry of Defence and the Peace Secretariat an interim report on LTTE camps south of Trincomalee - a matter that has been dealt extensively in these columns. According to Defence Ministry sources, the SLMM had confirmed the existence of a number of camps including Manirasakulam (or Kurangu Paanchan Kulam). Their final report is now being awaited.
With Norwegian facilitation efforts resuming in Colombo from next week, the UPFA has to contend with several important issues. One is the concerns raised by the killing spree of Army informants and the counter to LTTE accusations that military intelligence was supporting paramilitary groups opposed to the LTTE.
Another will be to formulate immediate counter measures to prevent the proliferation of incidents in the City and suburbs. With direct peace talks long way off, making sure that the ceasefire, which President Kumaratunga has conceded is a good thing, remains intact seems a more difficult task.