There are two schools of thought that seek to explain America's quest for global power. The dominant and popular school argues that American military power projection across the world is driven mainly by the desire to control vital resources and the domination of global sea lanes on which these resources have to be shipped to America and its allies.
The average reader has heard all about the war for oil and other vital resources and remains quite convinced about the arguments of this school of thought that dominates most public discourse on the US government's global interests. Those who subscribe to this school of thought are generally inclined to believe that America has no real strategic interests in Sri Lanka.
The second, lesser-known school, avers that there is more to US military expansionism than the securing of vital resources. If the US is driven only by the need to secure vital resources to sustain the economic foundations of its sole super power status then it is perfectly possible to do so by buying those resources in the world markets, according to this school of thought. Japan became the second biggest economic power in the world by buying oil and other vital resources at market prices. The same can be said of Korea and Taiwan. China, which is fast emerging as a super power, never went to war over oil.
Chalmers Johnson, a well-regarded American scholar, who is one of the main proponents of this view, provides an interesting illustration: After the first war for oil, the US spent 50 billion dollars out of its annual budget to defend the Persian Gulf. The annual cost of oil the US imported during that period was 11 billion dollars - the imports accounted only for ten percent of annual American consumption (for an insight into the workings of the US imperial military system at work around the world read his book 'Blowback')
Quite obviously the US military was not spending 50 billion dollars to protect and bring back 11 billion dollars worth of oil to America!
As one who subscribes to the second school of thought on US military expansionism, I will corroborate this point further with an example from the horse's mouth.
An American defence analyst argues in a centennial issue of the United States War College journal, 'Parameters', that the US should have a foothold on the Spratlys Islands in South China Sea.
"The Spratlys are not Kuwait - they are not even Falklands. They are not about oil, they are not about democracy, and they are not about human rights- for the most part they are not even inhabited. The correct answer, of course, is that in the Spratlys we would be fighting over the balance of power in Asia", ('An Evitable War: Engaged Containment and the US-China Balance' by Lt. Col. Roy C. Howle, acting executive officer and military assistant for operations to the Undersecretary of the US Army, in 'Parameters' Vol. XXXI, No. 3, Autumn 2001)
Simply put, the US wants to advantageously position its military power in all strategically important parts of the world so that the balance of power ineach region would inevitably and overwhelmingly be on its side. This would preclude the rise of any global hegemon like the USSR in the future and would help the US 'overdetermine' the course of world affairs by being in a position to effectively project its power in every nook and cranny of this planet. The US government's strategic interests in Sri Lanka are intertwined with its military objectives in South Asia and Asia.
Therefore a brief overview of the strategic objectives of the US in Asia in general and South Asia in particular is necessary to identity and understand the development of US military interests in Sri Lanka.
Four years ago the US Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, the US Air Force and the Commander of the US's Pacific Air Forces commissioned a study on projecting US military power in Asia. The research for the project was carried out by RAND Corporation.
According to the declassified version of this study - 'The US and Asia: Toward a New Force Posture'- America's "access strategy" in Asia is centred on "increasing opportunities for deployments and exercises and on the development of contingency agreements with potential security partners in the area" - in South Asia this means Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives and Nepal. It should be noted here that the "access strategy" also includes plans to significantly increase electronic and other intelligence assets in the territories of potential security partners in the region.
In this context it is interesting to note what the study says of potential security partners in the region such as Sri Lanka: "In the near term, access strategy for Asia should centre on increasing opportunities for deployments and exercises and on the development of contingency agreements with a number of potential security partners in the area. Depending on the closeness of the resulting relationship, this could include measures to tailor local infrastructure to USAF operations by extending runways, improving air traffic control facilities, repairing parking aprons and the like." It should be noted in this context that the US is only seeking and looking for basing opportunities in South Asia but not avenues for constructing new military installations for USAF operations.
According to the RAND study, "The identification of bases that are currently capable (or nearly so) of supporting USAF operations has both political and financial advantages. There appears to be little appetite, either in the United States or in the region, for the construction of additional American military installations.The bases identified in this analysis should not require significant upgrades that could be costly in terms of either USAF budget dollars or American political capital."
The study focused on five key attributes: the length of the runway(s) at the facility, runway width, the amount of ramp space, the number of fighter sized parking spaces available, and whether or not weapons storage is available. It also looked at pavement loading characteristics (which are critical to operating large heavy aircraft such as air-lifters), the availability of fuel and 'other factors'.
Discussing basing opportunities for the US in South Asia, the RAND study notes that they are "somewhat limited in this part of the world". The study observe further, "Diego Garcia is the permanent US outpost nearest the subcontinent, but we use the term 'near' advisedly - for that base lies approximately 2500 nautical miles from Islamabad. (The base is approximately the same distance from Kashmir.) and 2200 nautical miles from New Delhi."
The study identifies three general regions for basing opportunities located east, west, and north of India.
The study first discusses the area east of India: "This region has limited facilities and relations between Burma and the United States are stressed. Finally given the proximity of this region to China, opportunities for close military relations may be limited in the event of heightened tensions", the authors say.
"The second region consists of the Central Asian republics. Improved access to South Asia could grow from enhanced relations with these former Soviet republics". The study notes that Central Asian states such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan could serve as valuable entrepots to the Subcontinent.
"The third region is the Middle East, and it is here that we see the most prominence for conducting operations in South Asia. As was show during the Gulf War, the air base facilities in this region are second to none, and the governments in the region are relatively stable, often with national interests that align with those of the United States. With regard to geography, Oman is closest to the Indian-Pakistani border - about 500 nautical miles. Relations between the government of Oman and United States are good, and Oman has shown itself to be a steadfast ally. In addition the basing infrastructure is well developed. Two bases - Seeb International and Masirah Island - are particularly well suited for the conduct of USAF operations".
The other bases available to the USAF for operations in South Asia are in Thailand and Singapore. The US has a long-standing defence treaty relationship with Thailand and use of a Royal Thai naval air station in U Tapaho. It has a similar defence treaty arrangement with Singapore. But the RAND Corp. study notes that New Delhi is 1600 nautical miles from Bangkok as are bases in central Saudi Arabia and it is 2200 nautical miles from Singapore.
Therefore the US began to actively look for basing opportunities in countries closer to India. In Sri Lanka the war with the LTTE offered America ample scope for this purpose. The cease-fire agreement created the ideal environment for further studying and consolidating basing and other opportunities in Sri Lanka. This is when we saw a sharp increase in US Pacific Command visits to this island.
America has several legal instruments such as the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) and Access and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) by which it can cement deals with countries where it wants to position itself to gain strategic advantage or dominance in a region. Explaining the advantages of such agreements, the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) chief Admiral Thomas Fargo says "ACSA and MLSA enhance inter operability and readiness and provide a cost effective mechanism for mutual logistics support for US".
According to him USPACOM has signed the ACSA with Philippines, Australia, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, New Zealand, Fiji and Tonga. He says that eight other countries including Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are eligible for signing the ACSA. (Admiral Thomas B. Fargo: 'Statement of the US Navy Commander- US Pacific Command before the House International Relations Committee, Sub Committee on Asia and the Pacific, on US Pacific Command Posture' - June 26, 2003)
In 1999, the US signed a defence treaty (probably the VFA and/or MLSA) with Nepal. This was done despite a treaty between India and Nepal that explicitly prohibits Kathmandu from courting external military alliances and assistance without New Delhi's approval (Exchange of Letters in the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1951).
India, patently alarmed by this development, has, since then, sought to dissuade countries in the region from entering into such defence agreements with the US. New Delhi is also apparently keen to subtly reduce the influence of the US military that has been silently expanding in some neighbouring countries in recent years. (It is no accident that the Maoist Guerrillas are attacking US interests in Nepal)
The Kuda Oya International Airport project is a case in point. On February 19, 2004 the Ministry of Transport, Highways and Civil Aviation placed an ad in the papers inviting "Expressions of Interests from Reputed Organisations/Consortia/Joint Ventures for the development of an International Aerodrome at Kuda Oya Wellawaya". In the past US Special Forces had allegedly trained in Kuda Oya with the Sri Lanka military. Later the place was called an adventure theme park. If one draws a radius from the sea-lanes that curve off our southern coast, one end would be in Kuda Oya. It would show the importance of its location. If anyone were to inquire into the project's current status it might throw some light on the tensions behind the specific strategic interests that intersect in Sri Lanka. Also consider India's stand on developing the Palaly airfield in Jaffna.
America recently 'upgraded' Pakistan to a Major Non NATO Ally status. If, on top of this, Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka were to sign the ACSA, the American military's strategic posture in South Asia would be complete and unchallengeable. (A US offer to sign the ACSA with India was rejected by New Delhi as a ruse to take the edge off its objections to America signing the agreement with other South Asian countries).
It is a fact that the US wanted to sign the ACSA or a similar treaty with Sri Lanka in 2002 when the UNP was in power. USPACOM chief confirms that Sri Lanka is still on the list of countries with which America wants to sign the treaty. If his statement on what ACSA entails were perused together with the RAND Corp. study on increasing US basing opportunities in South Asia, we would get a very clear picture of America's strategic interests in Sri Lanka.
The Letters of Exchange of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987 (ISLA) prohibit Sri Lanka from having foreign troops on its soil without India's sanction. But like Nepal, Sri Lanka too can ignore the ISLA and cement a military deal with the US.
Politicians and influential opinion makers (including former arch anti imperialist Dayan Jayatilleka) are clamouring for US assistance to defeat the LTTE. The US compulsion to find basing opportunities here and the desire of Sinhala nationalists to preserve the unitary state with foreign military assistance appear to be equal in their self-persuasive force.
This is why I argue that a point might be soon reached where there would be a confluence of American and Sinhala nationalist interests whether India likes it or not.
But then like Nepal there would be a price to pay.
