HSZs, special ‘sea lane’ and Indian factor - War on terror revisited:

Defence Minister Tilak Marapone, MP, PrimMinister Ranil Wickremesinghe, Deputy Leader of the UNP Karu Jayasuriya and Minister S.B. Dissanayake about to release pigeons in Colombo to mark the first anniversary of the CFA on Feb 22, 2003, while the LTTE backed by the TNA called for a general shut down in the North and East.

In the wake of the GoSL obtaining the services of two retired senior Indian military personnel, Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar and Vice Admiral, P. J. Jacob, one-time Chief of Naval Staff to advise the SL military on two crucial issues, namely the Jaffna High Security Zones (HSZ) and a special sea route for the Sea Tigers, the government of India distanced itself from the project.

The then UNP-led UNF government contacted former Indian Army Chief-of-Staff shortly after then Jaffna Security Forces Commander, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka emphasised on Dec. 28, 2002 that gradual phasing out of HSZs to facilitate resettlement of civilians shouldn’t be at the expense of military deployment in the Jaffna peninsula. Maj. Gen. Fonseka pointed out the catastrophic consequences of the removal of existing security mechanism in a report, which sent shock waves through the GoSL(Army on HSZs in Jaffna with; Govt. forces appreciate need to resettle civilians––The Island of Dec 29, 2002).

SF stands his ground

In spite of heavy criticism of the Maj. Gen’s stand on the HSZs, the Sinha Regiment veteran stood his ground unwaveringly. The Jaffna commander pushed for disarming of the LTTE as well as the de-commissioning of its long range weapons, particularly directed at the Jaffna peninsula. He insisted that the Norwegian-led five-nation Scandinavia truce monitoring mission should be in charge of de-commissioned of the LTTE arsenal.

At the behest of the LTTE, the TULF-led Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which in the run-up to Dec 5, 2001 general election recognised the LTTE as the sole representatives of the Tamil speaking people, called for the immediate transfer of the Jaffna Commander .

All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) President, Appathuray Vinayagamoorthy on Dec 30, 2002 wrote to then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe in this regard. Vinayagamoorthy suggested that the government replace Maj. Gen. Fonseka with an officer who would toe the government line with regard to resettlement of civilians (TNA wants Jaffna commander out – The Island of Dec. 31, 2002). The ACTC leader made his move close on the heels of Hindu Affairs Minister, T. Maheswaran demanding the removal of the Jaffna Commander and Northern Area Naval Commander, Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera, to facilitate the peace process. Shortly after Maheswarn’s call, Rear Admiral Weerasekera was named Director General of Naval Operations, a headquarters appointment, though the navy insisted it was a routine transfer. Rear Admiral Nandana Thuduwewatte succeeded him. President Chandrika Kumaratunga received a briefing from army commander, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle and Maj. Gen. Fonseka as regards the security situation, with the focus on Jaffna, at President’s House (TNA wants Jaffna Commander out – The Island of Dec 31, 2002).

Lt. Gen. Fonseka publicly endorsed the Jaffna commander’s prerequisites for vacation of HSZs. The government obviously erred in assuming that the army top brass wouldn’t have a contrary view on the decision to review HSZs in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, particularly in the Jaffna peninsula. The assessment was based on the fact that the military never in public opposed political decisions as regards crucial security matters, regardless of their implications. The government felt that even giving up of some of the territorial gains would be necessary at some point of time to facilitate the peace process (Tough stand by forces on HSZs unprecedented––The Island of January 5, 2003).

Harim’s bombsehll

In spite of a section of the press asserting that President Kumaratunga wouldn’t accept the vacation of Jaffna HSZs without proper security guarantee, her spokesman, Harim Peiris dropped a bombshell in the immediate aftermath of the army setting pre-conditions for civilian resettlement; he declared that the President wouldn’t take a stand on the HSZ issue. Peiris, who had negotiated with the LTTE on the President’s behalf, strongly denied media reports that she was against dismantling of the HSZs (CBK dumb on HSZs––The Island of January 9, 2003).

In spite of the PA having talks with the JVP and other nationalist groups to decide on a common strategy against the UNP-Norway-LTTE project, the PA cooperated with various NGOs, amidst a simmering dispute over the Jaffna HSZ issue. Four PA MPs, Sarath Amunugama, Ferial Ashraff, John Seneviratne and Ven. Baddegama Samitha left for a ten-day tour of four European countries to study existing federal models. Two senior LTTE representatives, too, joined the joint parliamentary delegation, which received funding by German NGO, Peace Talk (PA in Govt-Tiger delegation––The Island of January 12, 2003).

The HSZ issue was definitely the first major obstacle faced by the UNP and the Norwegians, as they stepped up pressure on the military to give in to LTTE demands.

Exit of Tigers

Close on the heels of the army’s pre-conditions for civilian resettlement in Jaffna, the LTTE quit the 18-member Sub Committee on De-escalation and Normalisation. The LTTE also refused to meet the army on January 14, 2003 to discuss the HSZ issue under the auspices of the Norwegians. In a bid to influence the army, the government brought in Maj. Gen. Nambiar. Those spearheading the peace process felt that the Indian could compel the army to change its tough position on the HSZs. But Maj. Gen. Fonseka steadfastly refused to compromise his position, which thwarted a catastrophe.

A naïve UNP leadership went to the extent of formulating a plan which envisaged a joint government-LTTE committee reviewing HSZs in Jaffna. The plan had to be dropped following protests. This was followed by the setting up of a Sub Committee headed by Defence Secretary Austin Fernnado and Ampara Batticaloa Commander, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan aka Karuna. That, too, died a natural death, following the army refusing to give up HSZs without adequate security guarantees. The decision to use Nambiar to get over the contentious issue was made during tripartite talks in Thailand, where they agreed on an Action Plan for an Accelerated Resettlement Programme for the Jaffna District.

Eye brows raised over Nambiar’s appointment

Many an eyebrow was raised over the appointment of Nambiar, with a section of the Opposition asserting that the country’s security couldn’t itself be decided by an outsider whatever his background. India quickly distanced from the project with the Indian High Commission in Colombo declaring that Nambiar’s appointment had nothing to do with India (India has nothing to do with Nambiar appointment with strap line HSZ review fuels fresh controversy––The Island of January 19, 2003).

Under the sponsorship of the Norwegians, the government and the LTTE agreed for a series of meetings beginning Jan. 2003 to discuss ways and means of strengthening the CFA (Defence Secretary to meet Tigers on truce violations––The Island of January 20, 2003). The first meeting took place at the Divisional Secretariat in Vaunativu, Batticaloa on Jan. 30, 2003 (Many contentious issues on agenda; Austin Fernando-Karuna pow wow tomorrow––The Island Jan. 29, 2003).

Amidst the crisis over HSZs, the UNP made a fresh attempt to win over the LTTE. On the instructions of UNP leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe, UNP Chairman, Malik Samarawickrema met LTTE Political Wing leader, S. P. Thamilselvam in Kilinochchi during the first week of February 2003. The meeting was the first of its kind since the signing of the CFA in February 2002 (Govt. expands political links with the LTTE––The Island of Feb 9, 2003). The UNP strategist used the opportunity to emphasise the pivotal importance of adhering to the CFA as it would be beneficial to one and all. Unfortunately, the LTTE believed its objectives could be achieved through military means. For the LTTE, the CFA meant a temporary respite, which enabled it to build-up fighting cadres for the next confrontation. The outfit wanted to bring in as many ship loads of arms, ammunition and equipment as possible though the navy remained on a heightened state of alert.

First anniversary of CFA

The first anniversary of the CFA was celebrated with the LTTE flexing its muscles. While the UNP-led UNF leaders gathered at Independence Square on Feb 22, 2003 to celebrate the event, the LTTE brought life in Batticaloa to a standstill. Alleging that the government had failed to implement the CFA, the LTTE ordered people to remain indoors in all Northern and Eastern districts, though their action wasn’t successful in Trincomalee and Vavuniya. The TNA backed the LTTE to the hilt. (Ceremonies in South, hartal in N&E to mark first anniversary of truce––The Island Feb. 23, 2003). . No one wanted to appreciate measures taken by PM Wickremesinghe even at the expense of his political career to promote the CFA. Had there been civil society support for the government, the LTTE would have been compelled to review its strategy.

Govt. releases 1,000

Tiger suspects

In the wake of the LTTE and the TNA accusing the UNP of failing to implement the CFA, the government revealed that over 1,000 terrorist suspects had been released since the CFA came into operation in February 2002, and not a single arrest was made under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), though the LTTE carried out a spate of killings (Over 1,000 terrorist suspects released since MoU no arrests under PTA––The Island of March 7, 2003).

The suspects released from prisons re-joined the LTTE. Among them were many intelligence wing cadres, who resumed operations after a short break. But, the Jaffna HSZ issue remained with the government trying to settle it with the help of Nambiar. Meanwhile, the navy confronted ‘MV Koimer’ belonging to the LTTE, which we discussed in our July 11 issue. The confrontation off Mullaitivu on March 10, 2003 resulted in the destruction of the ship. The government, in consultation with the Norwegians, sought the expertise of Vice Admiral Jacob to explore ways and means of avoiding similar incidents in the future. The government had no option but to seek an external opinion after Navy Chief Vice Admiral Sandagiri strongly objected to the LTTE-SLMM initiative to create a special sea lane for the Sea Tigers. The navy’s position undermined the very existence of the CFA, with some government members accusing the navy of playing politics at the behest of President Kumaratunga and Lakshman Kadirgamar.

Defence Secretary, Fernando said that the LTTE had sought a sea lane on the high seas 200 nautical miles off the north-east land subsequent to incidents involving the Navy, though he rejected it as it infringed on the country’s sovereignty, the CFA and international law. According to Fernando, the proposal had been only known to him, Peace Secretariat chief Ambassador B. A. B. Goonetilleke and SLMM chief Maj. Gen. Triggve Tellefsen (Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons).

The government and the Norwegians, struggling to overcome the Jaffna HSZ issue, suddenly realised that a second attack on an LTTE ship by the navy could prompt the LTTE to quit the CFA. Strangely, they didn’t pressure the LTTE not to traverse Sri Lankan waters as it could jeopardise the CFA. Instead, they brought in a retired Indian Vice Admiral to negotiate a deal. The Navy didn’t take the government initiative seriously. Jacob held a series of talks with PM Wickrmesinghe.

Army, Navy oppose  appeasement

The Navy top brass and the SLMM chief tried to assess the situation while the Indian High Commission said that India wasn’t responsible in any way for the GoSL decision to obtain the services of Nambiar and Jacob (Indian security chiefs not representatives of India: HC––The Island of May 11, 203). The Indian statement couldn’t have come at a worse time for the GoSL and the Norwegians, whereas it strengthened the hands of those who felt that the LTTE couldn’t be allowed to take advantage of the situation. Lt. Gen. Balagalle and Vice Admiral Sandagiri asserted that it would be suicidal to make further concessions without the LTTE giving up violence. Although the SLAF didn’t adopt an overtly hostile approach, the army and the navy strongly opposed the GoSL-Norwegian initiatives to appease the LTTE. President Kumaratunga, too, received the retired Indians at President’s House as the government pressed for agreements on Jaffna HSZs as well as a special sea lane for the LTTE. (President, Nambiar pow wow on HSZs––The Island of May 16, 2003). The UNP went out of its way to appease the LTTE, though the latter was violating the CFA. The GoSL made arrangements for senior LTTE cadres to receive medical treatment in Colombo or go abroad. In the middle of simmering disputes over Jaffna HSZs and the sinking of ‘MV Koimer’, the government arranged for 38-year-old Kandaiya Balasekaran suffering from a serious heart ailment and two others, Gnasunderam and Shivakanthan to leave for Singapore (More Tigers leave for medical treatment abroad––The Island of May 18, 2003). Bakasekaran was one of the top LTTE frontline commanders known as ‘Balraj’ responsible for some of most devastating attacks on the military. He was credited with spearheading an amphibious force, which played a crucial role, during the battle for the strategic Elephant Pass base in early 2000.

Neither the LTTE nor its supporters had any sense of responsibility. In the wake of the deepening crisis over Jaffna HSZ and an agreement on a special sea lane, the LTTE made another demand with the backing of the TNA.  It called for the immediate creation of an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. This was  several months before the de-merger of the Eastern Province from the North on a Supreme Court directive). At the behest of the LTTE, the TNA made representations to the US Embassy in Colombo. The TNA assured the US that the LTTE would participate at the two-day Tokyo Donor Conference on June 9 and 10, 2003 if the GoSL agreed to the proposal. The TNA declared that the proposed interim administration should be outside the country’s Constitution. US Ambassador Ashley Wills refrained from commenting on the LTTE/TNA proposals (TNA wants US to pressure SL on Interim Administration––The Island of May 24, 2003 issue). The PA strongly opposed the move, with PA spokesman, Dr. Sarath Amunugama alleging that the Norwegians had allowed the LTTE to keep on making new demands as part of its strategy. (PA opposes latest Tiger stand–– The Island of May 21, 2003).

The PA gradually stepped up pressure on the UNP, with President Kumaratunga refusing to issue a statement in support of the Tokyo Donor Conference, which was scheduled to begin on June 9, 2003. She also cancelled a scheduled meeting with Japanese peace envoy Yasushi Akashi in protest against what she called a deepening Japanese role in the peace process. She also turned down PM Wickremesinghe’s call for a meeting between them before the June 3 meeting. The LTTE, too, boycotted the Tokyo meeting making the whole process meaningless. (CBK snubs Japan: refuses statement backing confab––The Island of June 8, 2003).

While the GoSL and the international community were busy discussing ways and means of post-CFA economic recovery, the LTTE made another attempt to replenish its arsenal.

(Next installment on July 13 will deal with the sinking of ‘MV Shoshin’ also off Mullaitivu).

Three spied on STF movements for Tiger detainees

Vavuniya police last Friday arrested three persons, who were said to be LTTE spies. They are alleged to have been passing information on STF movements to the LTTE suspects detained in the Vavuniya prison.

A woman and two men had been arrested, Headquarters Inspector Vavuniya Police, Chief Inspector Erick Perera said.

He said that as some lawyers were recording the operation to rescue three guards held hostage by the detainees there, their phones had also been taken into custody and the footage deleted.

Special Task Force (STF) Commandant, DIG R. W. Chandrasiri Ranawana yesterday revealed that about 28 LTTE prisoners, detained in the Vavuniya prison, had satellite phones to pass information to the Tamil Diaspora abroad. Those phones were detected during the operation to rescue the three prison guards. The STF seized a total of 57 mobile phones during the raid on the prison.

He said that ASP Silvester Wijesinghe had been rushed to Vavuniya with special weapons and Tactic Unit commandoes on June 28 with 40 elite commandoes. Approximately 80 commandoes participated in the rescue of the three prison guards. The operation commenced at 12.00 noon on June 29 and was over at 12.45 p.m. All the prisoners were transferred to the Anuradhapura prison immediately afterwards.

Ranawana added that of 200 prisoners at the Vavuniya prison, 28 were LTTE detainees. The Vavuniya prison was located near the Court complex.

He said that the reason for taking three prison guards hostage was because they were transferring three detainees to the Anuradhapura prison on a Court order. The inmates were demanding that they be retained in the Vuvuniya prison. As the authorities refused to do so they staged a hunger strike. But food items adequate for six months were found inside the prison.

The Visit of Shiv Shankar Menon

The visit of Shiv Shankar Menon to Sri Lanka is an opportunity to emphasize our commitment to close and cordial relations with India in the context of good neighbourly relations with South Asia as a whole. This is particularly so on economic and social issues. But Shiv Shankar Menon is here with a different agenda to discuss a political settlement relating to the Tamils. The political and other compulsions of India have made it focus excessively on Sri Lankan issues. These have to be recognized and understood. There are the unreasonable and irrational pressures from Tamilnadu which finds Sri Lankan issues an easy diversion or psychological transference from the grinding realities of Southern Indian travails and frustrations. At the same time Sri Lanka should put forward, with greater clarity, the constraints that the Government faces in finding acceptable solutions to the National Question and why external advice, no doubt well intentioned, does not help but hinders finding consensual solutions to issues faced by the Tamil population in Sri Lanka.

The Centre falling apart

Sri Lanka should draw attention that all countries in South Asia face similar problems of centrifugal forces undermining the nation State, including resort to terrorist activities. India should understand well the wariness of Sri Lankans to grant extensive power to regional councils based on ethnic or religious lines. These forces encourage separatist movements. In India itself, the Union is under considerable strain and in certain Indian States significant areas are under Maoist Naxalite control. Manmohan Singh himself once stated that Naxalites are the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by the country. More generally, regional identities within India have gathered strength. Central Government control over State Governments has weakened. Time and again the Centre has had to bend to the pressures of State Governments. 

The words of Yeats in the poem ‘Second coming’ must be haunting its leaders:

Turning and turning in the widening gyre*

The falcon cannot hear the falconer;

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;

Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world……….

*gyre is a giant circular oceanic surface current.



We are all in the same boat

Like India and Sri Lanka, all other countries in the region, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal and the Maldives, and most recently Burma, are experiencing internal political tensions. "We are all in the same boat". The mantle that was acquired from the Euro centric colonial culture that was thrust on these countries has deprived them of an indigenous identity. This syndrome has led to bad governance and all the aberrations that stem from it. None of the South Asian countries have come up with a format for a stable society. The question has to be asked " Why?" and the entire focus should be on finding an answer.

Preserving the peace come what may

What has to be impressed on the Menon mission is that Sri Lanka has achieved its peace at very great cost. It has to preserve that peace come what may. To do that it has to work out its future on its own and that it will involve an evolution which needs time. This will then lead to strengthening its close cooperation with its neighbours. Denying that process will mean that the country will once again descend to becoming a plaything of external forces, a trauma it has unfortunately experienced over the centuries.

LTTE was engaged in the drug trade to finance themselves - Kohona

Drug Trafficking was one of the main sources of finance for the LTTE terrorists as reflected in the World Drug Report 2012, says Dr. Palitha Kohona, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations.

He was addressing at the UN General Assembly Thematic Debate on ‘Drug and Crime as a Threat to Development’ in New York on June 26.

Terrorist groups in many countries have engaged in the drug trade to finance themselves. Sri Lanka’s experience in dealing with drug trafficking was also linked to its fight against terrorism, he said. As had been mentioned by the distinguished panelists, terrorist groups almost invariably tend to engage in other forms of organized crimes to raise finances, including money laundering, across borders. The same group has continued to engage in human trafficking, Dr. Kohona further said.

Following is the statement by Dr. Kohona:

"Thank you for organizing this thematic debate today. We commend Mr Yury Fedotov, Executive Director, The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on the Launch of the World Drug Report. This report is an eye-opener for all who are engaged in combating the illicit drug problem. The drug problem, as highlighted by our colleague, Mr. Maged Abdelaziz, is a threat to sustainable development and to civilized society.

"The impact of illicit drugs is multi-faceted. The social and economic pillars of sustainable development are affected by illicit drugs as the proliferation of narcotic drugs corrodes social cohesion, disrupts established social values and is a massive drain on resources. However, drugs are produced in response to demand. Poor farmers, encouraged by drug lords will continue to rely on this source of income as long as there is a demand and there is no alternative source of income. The drug menace in many countries overshadows national development programmes.

"The consumption of drugs and other attendant crimes also adversely impact on national and personal expenditure, health services, access to education and consumption of food and nutrition. A workforce, impacted by drugs, cannot function at its fullest potential and, therefore, is a severe threat to the optimum use of labor capacity in an economy.

"Drugs have lead to organized criminal groups to take part in the production, distribution, and sale of controlled and banned substances. These activities have also become a threat to political stability and to the economy and society. In some cases, these groups have become powerful enough to challenge the State itself, in particular to critical State institutions.

"Terrorist groups in many countries have engaged in the drug trade to finance themselves. Sri Lanka’s experience in dealing with drug trafficking was also linked to its fight against terrorism. As has been mentioned by the distinguished panelists, terrorist groups almost invariably tend to engage in other forms of organized crimes to raise finances, including money laundering, across borders. The same group has continued to engage in human trafficking.

"Drug Trafficking was one of the main sources of finance for the LTTE terrorists as reflected in the World Drug Report 2012. The US Department of Justice has linked the LTTE with drug trafficking in its Drug Enforcement Administration Statement before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, entitled "Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism - a Dangerous Mix" in 2003.

"When compared with other Asian countries, illicit drugs have not become a severe threat to Sri Lanka’s society itself or the economy. Largely as a result of its cultural and religious background, people have been reluctant to engage venture into large-scale drug related activities. The per capita consumption of drugs in the country is very low. Tourism, which is booming at present, may change this.

"A strong law enforcement mechanism, including a strong legal culture, is also in place. This includes both preventive and punitive measures. It includes the monitoring of attempts at local production, imports, exports and distribution.

We have to be continuously conscious of the possibility of regional drug distribution using Sri Lanka as a transit point.

Sri Lanka’s national programme is guided by the National Policy for Prevention and Control of Drug Use. The National Dangerous Drugs Control Board (NDDCB) is mandated to achieve balance between supply reduction measures, treatment and rehabilitation, and demand reduction measures. The Police Narcotics Bureau (PNB) spearheads the law enforcement dimension.

Sri Lanka is a party to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000). Sri Lanka is also a party to the UN Convention Against Corruption (2003).

"The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has also played a crucial role in building Sri Lanka’s capacities in the fields of legal drafting and training of law enforcement officers. We are also actively engaged in collaboration with regional organizations such as the Colombo Plan and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Sri Lankan agencies maintain constant contact with their counterparts in the South Asian region, especially in India and Pakistan. The Police Narcotics Bureau serves as a platform for SAARC countries to input, share, and review regional narcotics statistics.

Vignettes of the War Ghathakaya (The Butcher) By Keerthi Warnakulasuriya

Reviewed by C. A .Chandraprema

Senior Divaina journalist and defence correspondent Keerthi Warnakulasuriya’s Sinhala book Ghathakaya (The Butcher) is not just about Prabhakaran despite the title and the photograph of Prabhakaran on the front cover. It would perhaps have been better to call it ‘Vignettes of the War’ or something like that because that is what it is – a collection of self contained writings on various aspects of the war. One article that immediately caught my attention was one essay on D.P.Sivaram a former colleague of ours in The Island. Warnakulasuriya has pulled no punches in his description of Sivaram as an LTTE agent. Sivaram, who later became the editor of Tamilnet had many Sinhala friends including the present writer and we all knew he was LTTE, but such was his personality that we liked him nevertheless. After he was abducted and killed by a rival Tamil political group in April 2005, it was Dayan Jayatilleke who said in anguish that Sivaram may have been an LTTEer but every LTTEer is not a D.P.Sivaram.

Warnakulasuriya’s main accusation against Sivaram is that he was trying to build up the theory that the Tigers could never be defeated, through his writings first in The Island and later in other newspapers. This certainly was true. He has on many occasions told even the present writer  things to that effect. He was in fact one of those who kept saying that Jaffna could never be captured because the casualty rates among the civilians, military and the tigers themselves would be too high to make such an operation feasible. Yet the Chandrika Kumaratunga government took Jaffna disproving everything that Sivaram and others had been saying.  The exercise that Sivaram engaged in was not in his best interests. He was producing theory in favour of an outfit over which he had no control. When he said that the armed forces would never be able to capture Jaffna, he expected the LTTE to stay and fight or at least blend into the population and carry out guerrilla attacks on the armed forces.

Sivaram never bargained for what the LTTE actually did. They fled the area taking the population with them, thus making the advance of the army that much easier. Later, the people came back to their homes and Prabhakaran ended up with nothing. After his theory about Jaffna failed, another thing that Sivaram used to say is that Prabhakaran was invincible. He never said this directly, but he would say that some Tamil nationalist in Fiji had published an advertisement in a Fijian newspaper (A.S.P.Liyanage fashion)  with just a photograph of Prabhakaran and the words "By the grace of god, invincible." Many people both local and foreign did in fact think Prabhakaran was invincible. Sivaram has told the present writer also about that Fijian advertisement but I never swallowed that story. For eight years from 1994 to the early part of 2002, I used to say in my lectures at the Ranjan Wijeratne Academy for Political Education that if someone shoots Prabhakaran he will definitely die, but  the problem was in finding someone who can shoot him.

The last time I met Sivaram just two days before he was abducted and killed, Siva tried a different pitch with me saying that Prabhakaran was like the Satan in John Milton’s Paradise Lost a brave and audacious rebel unbowed by the blows of adversity whose most noteworthy characteristic was his indomitable will. Well I listened to his pitch but was never convinced. I liked Sivaram for all his attempts to market the LTTE to me even though it is quite obvious that journalists like Warnakulasuriya did not. Sivaram was a genial friend, a wonderful conversationalist and all that but I am constrained to agree with Warnakulasuriya that Sivaram did have a dark side to his character. During the JVP insurrection in the late 1980s, it was Sivaram who had coordinated the provision to landmine technology from PLOTE to the JVP.  The JVP was using those landmines to kill Sivaram’s Sinhala friends in the left movement in Colombo. I remember Dr Rajitha Senaratne who was then in the Mahajana Party telling me how he always drives at breakneck speed when going to attend the funerals of left wing activists killed by the JVP. The JVP knew that left wing leaders would be coming along the road from Colombo for the funeral and there was a risk of landmine attacks. Dr Senaratne’s  theory was that if one went fast enough, even if the vehicle went over a landmine, hopefully because of the speed the vehicle was travelling at, the explosion would hit only the rear of the of the vehicle and he would survive.

That was all Sivaram’s handiwork. He was a man who had enormous personal charm. The fact that he gave landmine technology to the JVP should have been enough to make the present writer hate him. Yet I covered up for Sivaram and did not publish his name when I wrote my series on the JVP even though I did mention the fact that it was PLOTE that gave that know-how to the JVP. That perhaps was the extent of Sivaram’s personal charm. He was shielded even by persons whose lives he put at risk. Besides, to become a backer of an organisation like the LTTE needs a twist to your character.  Siva did have his dark side and there were obviously people who were not as good natured or forgiving as the present writer which is why things turned out the way they did in April 2005.

Warnakulasuriya’s book has some interesting episodes of the war such as the high drama surrounding the importation of multi-barrel rocket launchers to Sri Lanka with the transport planes bringing them from the Czech Republic being delayed at various airports by interested parties. It is little known episodes like this about the war that makes Warnakulasuriya’s book interesting. Another episode is the daredevil exploits of Inspector Nilabdeen who crossed over to LTTE held territory in the east in search of evidence of Prabhakaran’s involvement in the Central Bank bombing of 1996.  Prabhakaran had awarded the LTTE operative who had organised the hit on the Central Bank a special plaque to commemorate the success of the event and this was kept in the home of  the main suspect.  A team of officers had crossed over to the LTTE held area disguised as Tamil civilians and brought the trophy along with the father of the main suspect. When the trophy was dusted for fingerprints, some of those found were those of Prabhakaran.

The fingerprints of Prabhakaran were never available with any intelligence service in Sri Lanka, and they had to seek the help of the Tamil Nadu police to get Prabhakaran’s fingerprints which had been obtained when he was arrested following the Pondy bazzar  shootout in 1982. The fingerprints on the trophy and those provided by Tamil Nadu had matched and that was how Prabhakaran’s direct connection to the Central Bank bombing was established forensically. The vignettes of the war in Warnakulasuriya’s book would be of interest to the English readership as well and he should consider getting a good English translation done.

(The Island)