Members of the Sri Lanka Army's Special Forces Brigade launched an attack on an LTTE bunker-line manned by members of the LTTE's elite Charles Anthony Regiment in the general area Periyathampanai killing seven fighters from that unit last morning. The Special Forces recovered all seven bodies and seven T-56 assault rifles. They also captured a GPMG (General Purpose Machine Gun). The LTTE, in recent months have brought in its elite units to defend the areas being targeted by the Army in Mannar and Vavuniya. The four fighters killed by the Special Forces in a recent ambush in Vilattikulam on the 15th were also identified as members of the elite Charles Anthony Regiment.
Meanwhile latest reports indicated that the civilians killed and injured in the crossfire between the Sea Tigers and the Sri Lanka Navy off Pesalai yesterday morning were part of a recent exodus of civilians from the LTTE areas destined for India but also government controlled areas. The Human Smuggling Operations and the Sea Tigers' Veduthalthivu camp, which is mixed in with a fishing village to avoid air-raids, has created enormous complications for Tamil fishermen in recent months.
Confidential reports received by DefenceWire also indicated that the LTTE 'Research and Development Wing' headquarters in Vishwamadu targeted by the Sri Lanka Air Force has been reduced to rubble. Eight structures that stood at the location have been completely destroyed except for parts of the stone foundations. A self-styled LTTE 'Lt. Col' who was identified as the LTTE's Chief 'Scientists' was also killed in the attack.
(http://defencewire.blogspot.com/2007/10/special-forces-hunt-charles-anthony.html)
Thursday, October 18, 2007
Thursday, October 11, 2007
Military ups the ante in the Wanni
While consolidating its gains, the military is steadily ‘pegging away’ at the Tigers’ ‘resources’ to weaken its resolve
The army, which controls the A-14 Road from Medawachchiya to Mannar, has tried to penetrate the Wanni from various points west of the A-9 Road along the Omanthai–Vavuniya stretch. It happened at Thirukeswaram, Andankulam, and west of Giant’s Tank, Periyamadu, Palampiddi, Vilattikulam, Pokkaravanni, Iranai Illuppaikkulam, Periyathampanai and Thampanai. The LTTE has struck back hard, forcing the military to flee in most instances.
Two months back, on August 5, Senpathi made a pertinent observation: “With the Wanni waiting to flare up and the buildup already reported previously, the question is which side would take the initiative? The LTTE has two options, either to dig in with a formidable defence or, pre-empt with a strike.”
With the Wanni flaring up with battle after battle, during the past fortnight, we now have the benefit of hindsight to say which side actually took the initiative.
The Media Centre for National Security (MCNS) quoting unnamed sources yesterday said: “Troops have effectively neutralised successive LTTE attempts to advance into military defence lines separating non liberated Wanni area.”
Midweek, intense fighting erupted west of Omantai at Vilattikulam, when a limited operation was organized by the 57 offensive Division headed by Brig. Jagath Dias, who took over exactly two months back. (His predecessor, Sumith Manawadu, was transferred days after the 57 Brigade at Kalmadu army camp, came under LTTE artillery fire and the military base of the 16th Battalion of the Artillery Regiment at Pompaimadu, west of Vavuniya, came under attack on June 2).
There was a major reshuffle within the command structure in the Wanni and Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya who took over as Security Forces Commander (SFC) Wanni five weeks back, coordinated the latest operations.
The Vilattikulam operation that lasted till the following morning- Thursday, was undertaken by the 6th Battalion of the Vijayaba Regiment (VR) under Maj. Sisira Pilapitiya assisted by the 8th Battalion of the Gajaba Regiment (GR) and the 4th Battalion of the VR.
Troops advanced toward the LTTE stronghold, captured a mortar base, a communication centre and several bunkers. Meanwhile, the 4th Battalion of the Sinha Regiment under Col. G.S. Welikalage, assisted by the 9th Battalion of the GR fought for the LTTE stronghold in Pokkravanni, where LTTE Maj. Jeyam was killed in the attack.
In the recent fighting, 19 soldiers including 14 from the 9 GR were wounded in action (wia), two soldiers including Capt. Soysa were killed in action (kia) and another three, were classified missing in action (mia).
According to intercepted LTTE messages, the Tigers’ head of administration in the area, Solan, who was in charge of supplies to the Forward Defence Lines (FDL), was killed when a cab carrying Tiger cadres exploded. A tractor carrying supplies to Tigers was also destroyed by the army.
So, it appears, the LTTE has taken the first option. It has dug in with a formidable defence and responded in the face of the military offensives.
Attack and Retreat.
During the past couple of months, the military had launched lightning operations from a dozen places in the Wanni. But, it has not been all that successful in penetrating this jungle terrain. At most points, the Tigers that had to flee the east, over several months, until Thoppigala, the last bastion fell, have joined in the defence.
What is more, the LTTE has struck back hard, forcing the military to flee in most instances. It hit back with a barrage of mortar fire and rained artillery shells on the targets. The Tigers also used direct fire to push back the military’s FDLs that had advanced in some places.
The military, which controls the A-14 Road from Medawachchiya to Mannar, has tried to penetrate the Wanni from various points west of the A-9 Road along the Omanthai–Vavuniya stretch. It happened at Thirukeswaram, Andankulam, and west of Giant’s Tank, Periyamadu, Palampiddi, Vilattikulam, Pokkaravanni, Iranai Illuppaikkulam, Periyathampanai and Thampanai among other places.
The military claims it ended up killing dozens of Tigers and destroying enemy bunkers in the ensuing confrontations. In clashes on Friday at Navathkulam and Periyathampane areas, it claimed two Tiger were killed and six others wounded, while four soldiers were also injured.
Nine LTTE cadres were reportedly killed this week in an attack west of Thampane, but MCNS says 16 Tigers were killed and the bodies of four were recovered. A fortnight back, on September 22, a Capt. and two soldiers died and 22 wounded in a battle in Thampane that lasted several hours and went late into the night.
Operations west of the Giant’s Tank in Mannar, have been more frequent. They were undertaken by the Commando Brigade and the STF. Several LTTE bunkers were destroyed, while troops advanced about a kilometer into LTTE territory. However, troops under Capt. Pandita, had to face Tiger mortar fire that injured the officer and two soldiers. Maj. Sarada Samarakoon of the10th Battalion GR, along with the second commando Brigade, advanced up to the LTTE FDLs and destroyed seven Tiger bunkers last week, according to claims. The military also claims that 35 Tigers were killed and 40 more wounded in the confrontations on Wednesday and Thursday, mainly in the area northwest of the Giant Tank. There was no independent confirmation of the casualties.
The main aim of the military is to penetrate the first FDL along the Vidattaltivu-Periyamadu-Mundurmurippu-Puliyayankulam-Marutodai axis from West to East in the Mannar and Vavuniya districts.
Consolidating gains
The military admits that the LTTE has increased its numbers in Vidattaltivu area, where a civilian influx has been observed.
To enter the Mullaitivu district, there is another FDL along the Kannadi-Iramiyankulam-Naddankandal-Kummakulam-Kanakarayankulam axis. Still further up north, there is the Mankulam, Olumadu Oddusudan axis secured by the Tigers in 1999. These bases are located by the main highway that leads to the strategic Elephant Pass complex, the gateway to the northern peninsula. In 2000, the LTTE went for the big kill and overran the Elephant Pass base. Smaller camps such as Nedunkerni, Kanagarayanakulam and Ampagamam, to name a few were also overrun in 1999. While attacking Oddusudan and Mankulan, they took on Weli Oya and overran Puliyankulam and Gajabapura eight-years-ago.
This week, during a confrontation in the Weli Oya area, three Tigers, including an area leader identified as Kalivanan, were killed in counter attacks at Kiriibban Wewa, raising fears whether a third front was likely to open. As the Mannar operations appear to be time consuming, it is unclear whether a front is to be opened up in Weli Oya, where the Tigers, several months ago, said there was a military buildup.
The military claims that the Tigers staged the attack at the Kiriibban Wewa.
Weli Oya has been identified as a vulnerable area with the LTTE possibly eyeing this place, to begin its strike. But, it has to make sure it succeeds.
The Weli Oya Command also changed hands from Maj. Gen. Nimal Jayasuriya to Brig. M.K. Jayawardena. At the time Jayasuriya took over Weli Oya, there was no FDL between Padaviya and Kebethhigollewa, which was attacked twice last year.
As the military had identified Weli Oya as a probable target of the Tigers, Gen. Jayasuriya had a 25-km bunker line constructed to prevent raids on villages in Weli Oya. A stretch of five-km of no man’s land between Kokkutuduvai, almost on the east coast, and Janakapura, was a tactical disadvantage to the army. The former Weli Oya commander had a fortified bunker line built linking Janakapura.
On Tuesday (02) security forces launched an attack and destroyed an LTTE boat after detecting a cluster of Tiger boats, in the seas off Kokkuthudai in Pulmudai. The battle between security forces and sea tigers which lasted nearly three hours ended around 3:30 a.m. Wednesday (03). The forces used heavy artillery, mortar and small arms to launch the attack on the cluster of boats.
On the A-9 Road, the army has been restricted to Omantai, far below Puliyankulam. The entry-exit point on this road to the south, is at Omantai and the north at Muhamalai, which along with the Kilali-Nagarkovil axis, still appears impregnable on either side.
The 8th Battalion VR attacked LTTE’s Nargakovil FDL this week and destroyed several bunkers, after an attempt last week did not bring in the desired results. Ten LTTE cadres were killed and about 20 injured in Nagarkovil, while two soldiers were killed during a confrontation again this week on the Kilali FDLs. In attacks the previous week at Kilali, the military claimed that 20 Tigers were killed, as against two soldiers, but the Tigers admitted the deaths of four Tigers and an unknown number of soldiers from the 4th Battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry. Last week too, there were attacks at Muhamalai and the trend appears to be frequent lighting attacks to weaken the Tigers, but the status quo on the ground remains and any area secured eventually, had to be conceded. Military, officials and the army top brass repeated ad nauseum, that taking control of real estate was not their intention.
Then, what is the military gain, we may ask?
Gnawing away at the Tigers
As we see it, it is a war of attrition or at least, such a phase, the military is currently engaged in. Destroying Tiger bunkers has been another strategy employed by the military in its recent limited offensives. In the process, it is only logical that the military sustains losses in the north and the Wanni. In the East, there were lesser casualties and the Tigers withdrew to fight another day, and that is in the Wanni.
It its cold calculation of decimating the Tigers, the military may be blind to the fact that if the Tigers hold out till a change of regime, to recruit, it would state how the LTTE survived arguably, one of the most ferocious phases of the war. The undeclared ‘Eelam War IV’ most certainly, has surpassed the previous one in terms of the concerted efforts of the three forces, skills and tactics employed, the use of artillery, mortar and multi barrel fire, intelligence gathering, support from the ‘Karuna’ group, that almost divided the LTTE into a Wanni and the eastern faction.
Surviving such an onslaught, is enough propaganda for the Tigers to recruit both here and in Tamil Nadu.
So, it is obvious why the LTTE has not taken the second option and initiated attacks, not only in the Wanni but, along the Kilali-Muhamali-Nagarkovil axis?
The LTTE cannot afford to initiate an attack, unless it is sure to succeed? The result of the major attack the Tigers initiated in Muttur and the provocation made in Mavil Aru, is too widely known here and among the diaspora. The August 11 Muhamalai attack staged by the baby brigade and followed by the specialized Charles Anthony Brigade was also a disaster. Not even the Kilali offensive, including the boat landing by Sea Tigers, could make material difference. It was a failed attempt with a capital F.
No wonder then, that LTTE Political Wing Leader, in mid September, said, “The LTTE is maintaining patience and still restricting itself to a defensive war.”
Tigers dig in
The military, however, can afford to take chances, as it has the success story in the “East” to brag about. Nevertheless, the military cannot afford to lose a major battle in terms of territory, casualties or loss of equipment. The October 11 debacle in Muhamalai, in terms of casualties reported and equipment lost, is a grim reminder of the many conventional battles previously lost.
Hence, the recent offensives are lightning attacks by small groups, to limit the loss in terms of casualties.
So, at this rate, it is estimated that the military would take another three to four years to succeed, given that the Tigers are well entrenched and have the added advantage of familiarity with the terrain.
As we said last week, the modus operandi of the security forces was likely to succeed in the Mannar region via the Wanni. We are not denying that the military would eventually succeed, but it would be at such a slow pace that political developments were likely to overtake the military gains.
Political developments are also shaped by economic considerations, and the military would find it difficult to sustain its campaign financially.
LTTE Leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is a master at the game of a protracted struggle and as we said before, has outlived the tenures of governments here, in India and will soon do so in America.
Even if there were to be a change of government, the military has changed the balance of power in the new government’s favour. Having wrested control of the East, the new dispensation, if it intends commencing peace talks, will be able to do so from a position of strength. Contrast this with the UNF’s previous unenviable position in December 2001, with the East also under the Tigers’ belt and the air force depleted, having lost some of its fighters.
The air force has wreaked havoc in this ‘Eelam War IV’, taking on Tiger assets week after week. Repeated attacks staged by fighter jets in Vashvamadu beyond Pudurippu, over a fortnight, have had a huge effect on the LTTE. Where the army is unable to penetrate in the Mullaitivu district, the air force has been pounding sensitive areas. It is reliably understood that bunker buster bombs are also used to target underground facilities.
Naturally, the Tigers who called the shots and negotiated from a vantage position at that time, were able to secure ‘a federal solution.’ The UNP’s recent dropping of the word “federalism”, is a tacit recognition of the military achievements on the ground, sea and air.
If the LTTE refuses to talk peace, which is the likely scenario, as it does not talk from a position of weakness, the alternative might be to continue the war. The military will not agree to a change in the ground situation. Hence, one reason cited by the UNP for this change was a change in the military situation on the ground.
The army, which controls the A-14 Road from Medawachchiya to Mannar, has tried to penetrate the Wanni from various points west of the A-9 Road along the Omanthai–Vavuniya stretch. It happened at Thirukeswaram, Andankulam, and west of Giant’s Tank, Periyamadu, Palampiddi, Vilattikulam, Pokkaravanni, Iranai Illuppaikkulam, Periyathampanai and Thampanai. The LTTE has struck back hard, forcing the military to flee in most instances.
Two months back, on August 5, Senpathi made a pertinent observation: “With the Wanni waiting to flare up and the buildup already reported previously, the question is which side would take the initiative? The LTTE has two options, either to dig in with a formidable defence or, pre-empt with a strike.”
With the Wanni flaring up with battle after battle, during the past fortnight, we now have the benefit of hindsight to say which side actually took the initiative.
The Media Centre for National Security (MCNS) quoting unnamed sources yesterday said: “Troops have effectively neutralised successive LTTE attempts to advance into military defence lines separating non liberated Wanni area.”
Midweek, intense fighting erupted west of Omantai at Vilattikulam, when a limited operation was organized by the 57 offensive Division headed by Brig. Jagath Dias, who took over exactly two months back. (His predecessor, Sumith Manawadu, was transferred days after the 57 Brigade at Kalmadu army camp, came under LTTE artillery fire and the military base of the 16th Battalion of the Artillery Regiment at Pompaimadu, west of Vavuniya, came under attack on June 2).
There was a major reshuffle within the command structure in the Wanni and Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya who took over as Security Forces Commander (SFC) Wanni five weeks back, coordinated the latest operations.
The Vilattikulam operation that lasted till the following morning- Thursday, was undertaken by the 6th Battalion of the Vijayaba Regiment (VR) under Maj. Sisira Pilapitiya assisted by the 8th Battalion of the Gajaba Regiment (GR) and the 4th Battalion of the VR.
Troops advanced toward the LTTE stronghold, captured a mortar base, a communication centre and several bunkers. Meanwhile, the 4th Battalion of the Sinha Regiment under Col. G.S. Welikalage, assisted by the 9th Battalion of the GR fought for the LTTE stronghold in Pokkravanni, where LTTE Maj. Jeyam was killed in the attack.
In the recent fighting, 19 soldiers including 14 from the 9 GR were wounded in action (wia), two soldiers including Capt. Soysa were killed in action (kia) and another three, were classified missing in action (mia).
According to intercepted LTTE messages, the Tigers’ head of administration in the area, Solan, who was in charge of supplies to the Forward Defence Lines (FDL), was killed when a cab carrying Tiger cadres exploded. A tractor carrying supplies to Tigers was also destroyed by the army.
So, it appears, the LTTE has taken the first option. It has dug in with a formidable defence and responded in the face of the military offensives.
Attack and Retreat.
During the past couple of months, the military had launched lightning operations from a dozen places in the Wanni. But, it has not been all that successful in penetrating this jungle terrain. At most points, the Tigers that had to flee the east, over several months, until Thoppigala, the last bastion fell, have joined in the defence.
What is more, the LTTE has struck back hard, forcing the military to flee in most instances. It hit back with a barrage of mortar fire and rained artillery shells on the targets. The Tigers also used direct fire to push back the military’s FDLs that had advanced in some places.
The military, which controls the A-14 Road from Medawachchiya to Mannar, has tried to penetrate the Wanni from various points west of the A-9 Road along the Omanthai–Vavuniya stretch. It happened at Thirukeswaram, Andankulam, and west of Giant’s Tank, Periyamadu, Palampiddi, Vilattikulam, Pokkaravanni, Iranai Illuppaikkulam, Periyathampanai and Thampanai among other places.
The military claims it ended up killing dozens of Tigers and destroying enemy bunkers in the ensuing confrontations. In clashes on Friday at Navathkulam and Periyathampane areas, it claimed two Tiger were killed and six others wounded, while four soldiers were also injured.
Nine LTTE cadres were reportedly killed this week in an attack west of Thampane, but MCNS says 16 Tigers were killed and the bodies of four were recovered. A fortnight back, on September 22, a Capt. and two soldiers died and 22 wounded in a battle in Thampane that lasted several hours and went late into the night.
Operations west of the Giant’s Tank in Mannar, have been more frequent. They were undertaken by the Commando Brigade and the STF. Several LTTE bunkers were destroyed, while troops advanced about a kilometer into LTTE territory. However, troops under Capt. Pandita, had to face Tiger mortar fire that injured the officer and two soldiers. Maj. Sarada Samarakoon of the10th Battalion GR, along with the second commando Brigade, advanced up to the LTTE FDLs and destroyed seven Tiger bunkers last week, according to claims. The military also claims that 35 Tigers were killed and 40 more wounded in the confrontations on Wednesday and Thursday, mainly in the area northwest of the Giant Tank. There was no independent confirmation of the casualties.
The main aim of the military is to penetrate the first FDL along the Vidattaltivu-Periyamadu-Mundurmurippu-Puliyayankulam-Marutodai axis from West to East in the Mannar and Vavuniya districts.
Consolidating gains
The military admits that the LTTE has increased its numbers in Vidattaltivu area, where a civilian influx has been observed.
To enter the Mullaitivu district, there is another FDL along the Kannadi-Iramiyankulam-Naddankandal-Kummakulam-Kanakarayankulam axis. Still further up north, there is the Mankulam, Olumadu Oddusudan axis secured by the Tigers in 1999. These bases are located by the main highway that leads to the strategic Elephant Pass complex, the gateway to the northern peninsula. In 2000, the LTTE went for the big kill and overran the Elephant Pass base. Smaller camps such as Nedunkerni, Kanagarayanakulam and Ampagamam, to name a few were also overrun in 1999. While attacking Oddusudan and Mankulan, they took on Weli Oya and overran Puliyankulam and Gajabapura eight-years-ago.
This week, during a confrontation in the Weli Oya area, three Tigers, including an area leader identified as Kalivanan, were killed in counter attacks at Kiriibban Wewa, raising fears whether a third front was likely to open. As the Mannar operations appear to be time consuming, it is unclear whether a front is to be opened up in Weli Oya, where the Tigers, several months ago, said there was a military buildup.
The military claims that the Tigers staged the attack at the Kiriibban Wewa.
Weli Oya has been identified as a vulnerable area with the LTTE possibly eyeing this place, to begin its strike. But, it has to make sure it succeeds.
The Weli Oya Command also changed hands from Maj. Gen. Nimal Jayasuriya to Brig. M.K. Jayawardena. At the time Jayasuriya took over Weli Oya, there was no FDL between Padaviya and Kebethhigollewa, which was attacked twice last year.
As the military had identified Weli Oya as a probable target of the Tigers, Gen. Jayasuriya had a 25-km bunker line constructed to prevent raids on villages in Weli Oya. A stretch of five-km of no man’s land between Kokkutuduvai, almost on the east coast, and Janakapura, was a tactical disadvantage to the army. The former Weli Oya commander had a fortified bunker line built linking Janakapura.
On Tuesday (02) security forces launched an attack and destroyed an LTTE boat after detecting a cluster of Tiger boats, in the seas off Kokkuthudai in Pulmudai. The battle between security forces and sea tigers which lasted nearly three hours ended around 3:30 a.m. Wednesday (03). The forces used heavy artillery, mortar and small arms to launch the attack on the cluster of boats.
On the A-9 Road, the army has been restricted to Omantai, far below Puliyankulam. The entry-exit point on this road to the south, is at Omantai and the north at Muhamalai, which along with the Kilali-Nagarkovil axis, still appears impregnable on either side.
The 8th Battalion VR attacked LTTE’s Nargakovil FDL this week and destroyed several bunkers, after an attempt last week did not bring in the desired results. Ten LTTE cadres were killed and about 20 injured in Nagarkovil, while two soldiers were killed during a confrontation again this week on the Kilali FDLs. In attacks the previous week at Kilali, the military claimed that 20 Tigers were killed, as against two soldiers, but the Tigers admitted the deaths of four Tigers and an unknown number of soldiers from the 4th Battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry. Last week too, there were attacks at Muhamalai and the trend appears to be frequent lighting attacks to weaken the Tigers, but the status quo on the ground remains and any area secured eventually, had to be conceded. Military, officials and the army top brass repeated ad nauseum, that taking control of real estate was not their intention.
Then, what is the military gain, we may ask?
Gnawing away at the Tigers
As we see it, it is a war of attrition or at least, such a phase, the military is currently engaged in. Destroying Tiger bunkers has been another strategy employed by the military in its recent limited offensives. In the process, it is only logical that the military sustains losses in the north and the Wanni. In the East, there were lesser casualties and the Tigers withdrew to fight another day, and that is in the Wanni.
It its cold calculation of decimating the Tigers, the military may be blind to the fact that if the Tigers hold out till a change of regime, to recruit, it would state how the LTTE survived arguably, one of the most ferocious phases of the war. The undeclared ‘Eelam War IV’ most certainly, has surpassed the previous one in terms of the concerted efforts of the three forces, skills and tactics employed, the use of artillery, mortar and multi barrel fire, intelligence gathering, support from the ‘Karuna’ group, that almost divided the LTTE into a Wanni and the eastern faction.
Surviving such an onslaught, is enough propaganda for the Tigers to recruit both here and in Tamil Nadu.
So, it is obvious why the LTTE has not taken the second option and initiated attacks, not only in the Wanni but, along the Kilali-Muhamali-Nagarkovil axis?
The LTTE cannot afford to initiate an attack, unless it is sure to succeed? The result of the major attack the Tigers initiated in Muttur and the provocation made in Mavil Aru, is too widely known here and among the diaspora. The August 11 Muhamalai attack staged by the baby brigade and followed by the specialized Charles Anthony Brigade was also a disaster. Not even the Kilali offensive, including the boat landing by Sea Tigers, could make material difference. It was a failed attempt with a capital F.
No wonder then, that LTTE Political Wing Leader, in mid September, said, “The LTTE is maintaining patience and still restricting itself to a defensive war.”
Tigers dig in
The military, however, can afford to take chances, as it has the success story in the “East” to brag about. Nevertheless, the military cannot afford to lose a major battle in terms of territory, casualties or loss of equipment. The October 11 debacle in Muhamalai, in terms of casualties reported and equipment lost, is a grim reminder of the many conventional battles previously lost.
Hence, the recent offensives are lightning attacks by small groups, to limit the loss in terms of casualties.
So, at this rate, it is estimated that the military would take another three to four years to succeed, given that the Tigers are well entrenched and have the added advantage of familiarity with the terrain.
As we said last week, the modus operandi of the security forces was likely to succeed in the Mannar region via the Wanni. We are not denying that the military would eventually succeed, but it would be at such a slow pace that political developments were likely to overtake the military gains.
Political developments are also shaped by economic considerations, and the military would find it difficult to sustain its campaign financially.
LTTE Leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is a master at the game of a protracted struggle and as we said before, has outlived the tenures of governments here, in India and will soon do so in America.
Even if there were to be a change of government, the military has changed the balance of power in the new government’s favour. Having wrested control of the East, the new dispensation, if it intends commencing peace talks, will be able to do so from a position of strength. Contrast this with the UNF’s previous unenviable position in December 2001, with the East also under the Tigers’ belt and the air force depleted, having lost some of its fighters.
The air force has wreaked havoc in this ‘Eelam War IV’, taking on Tiger assets week after week. Repeated attacks staged by fighter jets in Vashvamadu beyond Pudurippu, over a fortnight, have had a huge effect on the LTTE. Where the army is unable to penetrate in the Mullaitivu district, the air force has been pounding sensitive areas. It is reliably understood that bunker buster bombs are also used to target underground facilities.
Naturally, the Tigers who called the shots and negotiated from a vantage position at that time, were able to secure ‘a federal solution.’ The UNP’s recent dropping of the word “federalism”, is a tacit recognition of the military achievements on the ground, sea and air.
If the LTTE refuses to talk peace, which is the likely scenario, as it does not talk from a position of weakness, the alternative might be to continue the war. The military will not agree to a change in the ground situation. Hence, one reason cited by the UNP for this change was a change in the military situation on the ground.
Military ups the ante in the Wanni
While consolidating its gains, the military is steadily ‘pegging away’ at the Tigers’ ‘resources’ to weaken its resolve
The army, which controls the A-14 Road from Medawachchiya to Mannar, has tried to penetrate the Wanni from various points west of the A-9 Road along the Omanthai–Vavuniya stretch. It happened at Thirukeswaram, Andankulam, and west of Giant’s Tank, Periyamadu, Palampiddi, Vilattikulam, Pokkaravanni, Iranai Illuppaikkulam, Periyathampanai and Thampanai. The LTTE has struck back hard, forcing the military to flee in most instances.
Two months back, on August 5, Senpathi made a pertinent observation: “With the Wanni waiting to flare up and the buildup already reported previously, the question is which side would take the initiative? The LTTE has two options, either to dig in with a formidable defence or, pre-empt with a strike.”
With the Wanni flaring up with battle after battle, during the past fortnight, we now have the benefit of hindsight to say which side actually took the initiative.
The Media Centre for National Security (MCNS) quoting unnamed sources yesterday said: “Troops have effectively neutralised successive LTTE attempts to advance into military defence lines separating non liberated Wanni area.”
Midweek, intense fighting erupted west of Omantai at Vilattikulam, when a limited operation was organized by the 57 offensive Division headed by Brig. Jagath Dias, who took over exactly two months back. (His predecessor, Sumith Manawadu, was transferred days after the 57 Brigade at Kalmadu army camp, came under LTTE artillery fire and the military base of the 16th Battalion of the Artillery Regiment at Pompaimadu, west of Vavuniya, came under attack on June 2).
There was a major reshuffle within the command structure in the Wanni and Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya who took over as Security Forces Commander (SFC) Wanni five weeks back, coordinated the latest operations.
The Vilattikulam operation that lasted till the following morning- Thursday, was undertaken by the 6th Battalion of the Vijayaba Regiment (VR) under Maj. Sisira Pilapitiya assisted by the 8th Battalion of the Gajaba Regiment (GR) and the 4th Battalion of the VR.
Troops advanced toward the LTTE stronghold, captured a mortar base, a communication centre and several bunkers. Meanwhile, the 4th Battalion of the Sinha Regiment under Col. G.S. Welikalage, assisted by the 9th Battalion of the GR fought for the LTTE stronghold in Pokkravanni, where LTTE Maj. Jeyam was killed in the attack.
In the recent fighting, 19 soldiers including 14 from the 9 GR were wounded in action (wia), two soldiers including Capt. Soysa were killed in action (kia) and another three, were classified missing in action (mia).
According to intercepted LTTE messages, the Tigers’ head of administration in the area, Solan, who was in charge of supplies to the Forward Defence Lines (FDL), was killed when a cab carrying Tiger cadres exploded. A tractor carrying supplies to Tigers was also destroyed by the army.
So, it appears, the LTTE has taken the first option. It has dug in with a formidable defence and responded in the face of the military offensives.
Attack and Retreat.
During the past couple of months, the military had launched lightning operations from a dozen places in the Wanni. But, it has not been all that successful in penetrating this jungle terrain. At most points, the Tigers that had to flee the east, over several months, until Thoppigala, the last bastion fell, have joined in the defence.
What is more, the LTTE has struck back hard, forcing the military to flee in most instances. It hit back with a barrage of mortar fire and rained artillery shells on the targets. The Tigers also used direct fire to push back the military’s FDLs that had advanced in some places.
The military, which controls the A-14 Road from Medawachchiya to Mannar, has tried to penetrate the Wanni from various points west of the A-9 Road along the Omanthai–Vavuniya stretch. It happened at Thirukeswaram, Andankulam, and west of Giant’s Tank, Periyamadu, Palampiddi, Vilattikulam, Pokkaravanni, Iranai Illuppaikkulam, Periyathampanai and Thampanai among other places.
The military claims it ended up killing dozens of Tigers and destroying enemy bunkers in the ensuing confrontations. In clashes on Friday at Navathkulam and Periyathampane areas, it claimed two Tiger were killed and six others wounded, while four soldiers were also injured.
Nine LTTE cadres were reportedly killed this week in an attack west of Thampane, but MCNS says 16 Tigers were killed and the bodies of four were recovered. A fortnight back, on September 22, a Capt. and two soldiers died and 22 wounded in a battle in Thampane that lasted several hours and went late into the night.
Operations west of the Giant’s Tank in Mannar, have been more frequent. They were undertaken by the Commando Brigade and the STF. Several LTTE bunkers were destroyed, while troops advanced about a kilometer into LTTE territory. However, troops under Capt. Pandita, had to face Tiger mortar fire that injured the officer and two soldiers. Maj. Sarada Samarakoon of the10th Battalion GR, along with the second commando Brigade, advanced up to the LTTE FDLs and destroyed seven Tiger bunkers last week, according to claims. The military also claims that 35 Tigers were killed and 40 more wounded in the confrontations on Wednesday and Thursday, mainly in the area northwest of the Giant Tank. There was no independent confirmation of the casualties.
The main aim of the military is to penetrate the first FDL along the Vidattaltivu-Periyamadu-Mundurmurippu-Puliyayankulam-Marutodai axis from West to East in the Mannar and Vavuniya districts.
Consolidating gains
The military admits that the LTTE has increased its numbers in Vidattaltivu area, where a civilian influx has been observed.
To enter the Mullaitivu district, there is another FDL along the Kannadi-Iramiyankulam-Naddankandal-Kummakulam-Kanakarayankulam axis. Still further up north, there is the Mankulam, Olumadu Oddusudan axis secured by the Tigers in 1999. These bases are located by the main highway that leads to the strategic Elephant Pass complex, the gateway to the northern peninsula. In 2000, the LTTE went for the big kill and overran the Elephant Pass base. Smaller camps such as Nedunkerni, Kanagarayanakulam and Ampagamam, to name a few were also overrun in 1999. While attacking Oddusudan and Mankulan, they took on Weli Oya and overran Puliyankulam and Gajabapura eight-years-ago.
This week, during a confrontation in the Weli Oya area, three Tigers, including an area leader identified as Kalivanan, were killed in counter attacks at Kiriibban Wewa, raising fears whether a third front was likely to open. As the Mannar operations appear to be time consuming, it is unclear whether a front is to be opened up in Weli Oya, where the Tigers, several months ago, said there was a military buildup.
The military claims that the Tigers staged the attack at the Kiriibban Wewa.
Weli Oya has been identified as a vulnerable area with the LTTE possibly eyeing this place, to begin its strike. But, it has to make sure it succeeds.
The Weli Oya Command also changed hands from Maj. Gen. Nimal Jayasuriya to Brig. M.K. Jayawardena. At the time Jayasuriya took over Weli Oya, there was no FDL between Padaviya and Kebethhigollewa, which was attacked twice last year.
As the military had identified Weli Oya as a probable target of the Tigers, Gen. Jayasuriya had a 25-km bunker line constructed to prevent raids on villages in Weli Oya. A stretch of five-km of no man’s land between Kokkutuduvai, almost on the east coast, and Janakapura, was a tactical disadvantage to the army. The former Weli Oya commander had a fortified bunker line built linking Janakapura.
On Tuesday (02) security forces launched an attack and destroyed an LTTE boat after detecting a cluster of Tiger boats, in the seas off Kokkuthudai in Pulmudai. The battle between security forces and sea tigers which lasted nearly three hours ended around 3:30 a.m. Wednesday (03). The forces used heavy artillery, mortar and small arms to launch the attack on the cluster of boats.
On the A-9 Road, the army has been restricted to Omantai, far below Puliyankulam. The entry-exit point on this road to the south, is at Omantai and the north at Muhamalai, which along with the Kilali-Nagarkovil axis, still appears impregnable on either side.
The 8th Battalion VR attacked LTTE’s Nargakovil FDL this week and destroyed several bunkers, after an attempt last week did not bring in the desired results. Ten LTTE cadres were killed and about 20 injured in Nagarkovil, while two soldiers were killed during a confrontation again this week on the Kilali FDLs. In attacks the previous week at Kilali, the military claimed that 20 Tigers were killed, as against two soldiers, but the Tigers admitted the deaths of four Tigers and an unknown number of soldiers from the 4th Battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry. Last week too, there were attacks at Muhamalai and the trend appears to be frequent lighting attacks to weaken the Tigers, but the status quo on the ground remains and any area secured eventually, had to be conceded. Military, officials and the army top brass repeated ad nauseum, that taking control of real estate was not their intention.
Then, what is the military gain, we may ask?
Gnawing away at the Tigers
As we see it, it is a war of attrition or at least, such a phase, the military is currently engaged in. Destroying Tiger bunkers has been another strategy employed by the military in its recent limited offensives. In the process, it is only logical that the military sustains losses in the north and the Wanni. In the East, there were lesser casualties and the Tigers withdrew to fight another day, and that is in the Wanni.
It its cold calculation of decimating the Tigers, the military may be blind to the fact that if the Tigers hold out till a change of regime, to recruit, it would state how the LTTE survived arguably, one of the most ferocious phases of the war. The undeclared ‘Eelam War IV’ most certainly, has surpassed the previous one in terms of the concerted efforts of the three forces, skills and tactics employed, the use of artillery, mortar and multi barrel fire, intelligence gathering, support from the ‘Karuna’ group, that almost divided the LTTE into a Wanni and the eastern faction.
Surviving such an onslaught, is enough propaganda for the Tigers to recruit both here and in Tamil Nadu.
So, it is obvious why the LTTE has not taken the second option and initiated attacks, not only in the Wanni but, along the Kilali-Muhamali-Nagarkovil axis?
The LTTE cannot afford to initiate an attack, unless it is sure to succeed? The result of the major attack the Tigers initiated in Muttur and the provocation made in Mavil Aru, is too widely known here and among the diaspora. The August 11 Muhamalai attack staged by the baby brigade and followed by the specialized Charles Anthony Brigade was also a disaster. Not even the Kilali offensive, including the boat landing by Sea Tigers, could make material difference. It was a failed attempt with a capital F.
No wonder then, that LTTE Political Wing Leader, in mid September, said, “The LTTE is maintaining patience and still restricting itself to a defensive war.”
Tigers dig in
The military, however, can afford to take chances, as it has the success story in the “East” to brag about. Nevertheless, the military cannot afford to lose a major battle in terms of territory, casualties or loss of equipment. The October 11 debacle in Muhamalai, in terms of casualties reported and equipment lost, is a grim reminder of the many conventional battles previously lost.
Hence, the recent offensives are lightning attacks by small groups, to limit the loss in terms of casualties.
So, at this rate, it is estimated that the military would take another three to four years to succeed, given that the Tigers are well entrenched and have the added advantage of familiarity with the terrain.
As we said last week, the modus operandi of the security forces was likely to succeed in the Mannar region via the Wanni. We are not denying that the military would eventually succeed, but it would be at such a slow pace that political developments were likely to overtake the military gains.
Political developments are also shaped by economic considerations, and the military would find it difficult to sustain its campaign financially.
LTTE Leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is a master at the game of a protracted struggle and as we said before, has outlived the tenures of governments here, in India and will soon do so in America.
Even if there were to be a change of government, the military has changed the balance of power in the new government’s favour. Having wrested control of the East, the new dispensation, if it intends commencing peace talks, will be able to do so from a position of strength. Contrast this with the UNF’s previous unenviable position in December 2001, with the East also under the Tigers’ belt and the air force depleted, having lost some of its fighters.
The air force has wreaked havoc in this ‘Eelam War IV’, taking on Tiger assets week after week. Repeated attacks staged by fighter jets in Vashvamadu beyond Pudurippu, over a fortnight, have had a huge effect on the LTTE. Where the army is unable to penetrate in the Mullaitivu district, the air force has been pounding sensitive areas. It is reliably understood that bunker buster bombs are also used to target underground facilities.
Naturally, the Tigers who called the shots and negotiated from a vantage position at that time, were able to secure ‘a federal solution.’ The UNP’s recent dropping of the word “federalism”, is a tacit recognition of the military achievements on the ground, sea and air.
If the LTTE refuses to talk peace, which is the likely scenario, as it does not talk from a position of weakness, the alternative might be to continue the war. The military will not agree to a change in the ground situation. Hence, one reason cited by the UNP for this change was a change in the military situation on the ground.
The army, which controls the A-14 Road from Medawachchiya to Mannar, has tried to penetrate the Wanni from various points west of the A-9 Road along the Omanthai–Vavuniya stretch. It happened at Thirukeswaram, Andankulam, and west of Giant’s Tank, Periyamadu, Palampiddi, Vilattikulam, Pokkaravanni, Iranai Illuppaikkulam, Periyathampanai and Thampanai. The LTTE has struck back hard, forcing the military to flee in most instances.
Two months back, on August 5, Senpathi made a pertinent observation: “With the Wanni waiting to flare up and the buildup already reported previously, the question is which side would take the initiative? The LTTE has two options, either to dig in with a formidable defence or, pre-empt with a strike.”
With the Wanni flaring up with battle after battle, during the past fortnight, we now have the benefit of hindsight to say which side actually took the initiative.
The Media Centre for National Security (MCNS) quoting unnamed sources yesterday said: “Troops have effectively neutralised successive LTTE attempts to advance into military defence lines separating non liberated Wanni area.”
Midweek, intense fighting erupted west of Omantai at Vilattikulam, when a limited operation was organized by the 57 offensive Division headed by Brig. Jagath Dias, who took over exactly two months back. (His predecessor, Sumith Manawadu, was transferred days after the 57 Brigade at Kalmadu army camp, came under LTTE artillery fire and the military base of the 16th Battalion of the Artillery Regiment at Pompaimadu, west of Vavuniya, came under attack on June 2).
There was a major reshuffle within the command structure in the Wanni and Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya who took over as Security Forces Commander (SFC) Wanni five weeks back, coordinated the latest operations.
The Vilattikulam operation that lasted till the following morning- Thursday, was undertaken by the 6th Battalion of the Vijayaba Regiment (VR) under Maj. Sisira Pilapitiya assisted by the 8th Battalion of the Gajaba Regiment (GR) and the 4th Battalion of the VR.
Troops advanced toward the LTTE stronghold, captured a mortar base, a communication centre and several bunkers. Meanwhile, the 4th Battalion of the Sinha Regiment under Col. G.S. Welikalage, assisted by the 9th Battalion of the GR fought for the LTTE stronghold in Pokkravanni, where LTTE Maj. Jeyam was killed in the attack.
In the recent fighting, 19 soldiers including 14 from the 9 GR were wounded in action (wia), two soldiers including Capt. Soysa were killed in action (kia) and another three, were classified missing in action (mia).
According to intercepted LTTE messages, the Tigers’ head of administration in the area, Solan, who was in charge of supplies to the Forward Defence Lines (FDL), was killed when a cab carrying Tiger cadres exploded. A tractor carrying supplies to Tigers was also destroyed by the army.
So, it appears, the LTTE has taken the first option. It has dug in with a formidable defence and responded in the face of the military offensives.
Attack and Retreat.
During the past couple of months, the military had launched lightning operations from a dozen places in the Wanni. But, it has not been all that successful in penetrating this jungle terrain. At most points, the Tigers that had to flee the east, over several months, until Thoppigala, the last bastion fell, have joined in the defence.
What is more, the LTTE has struck back hard, forcing the military to flee in most instances. It hit back with a barrage of mortar fire and rained artillery shells on the targets. The Tigers also used direct fire to push back the military’s FDLs that had advanced in some places.
The military, which controls the A-14 Road from Medawachchiya to Mannar, has tried to penetrate the Wanni from various points west of the A-9 Road along the Omanthai–Vavuniya stretch. It happened at Thirukeswaram, Andankulam, and west of Giant’s Tank, Periyamadu, Palampiddi, Vilattikulam, Pokkaravanni, Iranai Illuppaikkulam, Periyathampanai and Thampanai among other places.
The military claims it ended up killing dozens of Tigers and destroying enemy bunkers in the ensuing confrontations. In clashes on Friday at Navathkulam and Periyathampane areas, it claimed two Tiger were killed and six others wounded, while four soldiers were also injured.
Nine LTTE cadres were reportedly killed this week in an attack west of Thampane, but MCNS says 16 Tigers were killed and the bodies of four were recovered. A fortnight back, on September 22, a Capt. and two soldiers died and 22 wounded in a battle in Thampane that lasted several hours and went late into the night.
Operations west of the Giant’s Tank in Mannar, have been more frequent. They were undertaken by the Commando Brigade and the STF. Several LTTE bunkers were destroyed, while troops advanced about a kilometer into LTTE territory. However, troops under Capt. Pandita, had to face Tiger mortar fire that injured the officer and two soldiers. Maj. Sarada Samarakoon of the10th Battalion GR, along with the second commando Brigade, advanced up to the LTTE FDLs and destroyed seven Tiger bunkers last week, according to claims. The military also claims that 35 Tigers were killed and 40 more wounded in the confrontations on Wednesday and Thursday, mainly in the area northwest of the Giant Tank. There was no independent confirmation of the casualties.
The main aim of the military is to penetrate the first FDL along the Vidattaltivu-Periyamadu-Mundurmurippu-Puliyayankulam-Marutodai axis from West to East in the Mannar and Vavuniya districts.
Consolidating gains
The military admits that the LTTE has increased its numbers in Vidattaltivu area, where a civilian influx has been observed.
To enter the Mullaitivu district, there is another FDL along the Kannadi-Iramiyankulam-Naddankandal-Kummakulam-Kanakarayankulam axis. Still further up north, there is the Mankulam, Olumadu Oddusudan axis secured by the Tigers in 1999. These bases are located by the main highway that leads to the strategic Elephant Pass complex, the gateway to the northern peninsula. In 2000, the LTTE went for the big kill and overran the Elephant Pass base. Smaller camps such as Nedunkerni, Kanagarayanakulam and Ampagamam, to name a few were also overrun in 1999. While attacking Oddusudan and Mankulan, they took on Weli Oya and overran Puliyankulam and Gajabapura eight-years-ago.
This week, during a confrontation in the Weli Oya area, three Tigers, including an area leader identified as Kalivanan, were killed in counter attacks at Kiriibban Wewa, raising fears whether a third front was likely to open. As the Mannar operations appear to be time consuming, it is unclear whether a front is to be opened up in Weli Oya, where the Tigers, several months ago, said there was a military buildup.
The military claims that the Tigers staged the attack at the Kiriibban Wewa.
Weli Oya has been identified as a vulnerable area with the LTTE possibly eyeing this place, to begin its strike. But, it has to make sure it succeeds.
The Weli Oya Command also changed hands from Maj. Gen. Nimal Jayasuriya to Brig. M.K. Jayawardena. At the time Jayasuriya took over Weli Oya, there was no FDL between Padaviya and Kebethhigollewa, which was attacked twice last year.
As the military had identified Weli Oya as a probable target of the Tigers, Gen. Jayasuriya had a 25-km bunker line constructed to prevent raids on villages in Weli Oya. A stretch of five-km of no man’s land between Kokkutuduvai, almost on the east coast, and Janakapura, was a tactical disadvantage to the army. The former Weli Oya commander had a fortified bunker line built linking Janakapura.
On Tuesday (02) security forces launched an attack and destroyed an LTTE boat after detecting a cluster of Tiger boats, in the seas off Kokkuthudai in Pulmudai. The battle between security forces and sea tigers which lasted nearly three hours ended around 3:30 a.m. Wednesday (03). The forces used heavy artillery, mortar and small arms to launch the attack on the cluster of boats.
On the A-9 Road, the army has been restricted to Omantai, far below Puliyankulam. The entry-exit point on this road to the south, is at Omantai and the north at Muhamalai, which along with the Kilali-Nagarkovil axis, still appears impregnable on either side.
The 8th Battalion VR attacked LTTE’s Nargakovil FDL this week and destroyed several bunkers, after an attempt last week did not bring in the desired results. Ten LTTE cadres were killed and about 20 injured in Nagarkovil, while two soldiers were killed during a confrontation again this week on the Kilali FDLs. In attacks the previous week at Kilali, the military claimed that 20 Tigers were killed, as against two soldiers, but the Tigers admitted the deaths of four Tigers and an unknown number of soldiers from the 4th Battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry. Last week too, there were attacks at Muhamalai and the trend appears to be frequent lighting attacks to weaken the Tigers, but the status quo on the ground remains and any area secured eventually, had to be conceded. Military, officials and the army top brass repeated ad nauseum, that taking control of real estate was not their intention.
Then, what is the military gain, we may ask?
Gnawing away at the Tigers
As we see it, it is a war of attrition or at least, such a phase, the military is currently engaged in. Destroying Tiger bunkers has been another strategy employed by the military in its recent limited offensives. In the process, it is only logical that the military sustains losses in the north and the Wanni. In the East, there were lesser casualties and the Tigers withdrew to fight another day, and that is in the Wanni.
It its cold calculation of decimating the Tigers, the military may be blind to the fact that if the Tigers hold out till a change of regime, to recruit, it would state how the LTTE survived arguably, one of the most ferocious phases of the war. The undeclared ‘Eelam War IV’ most certainly, has surpassed the previous one in terms of the concerted efforts of the three forces, skills and tactics employed, the use of artillery, mortar and multi barrel fire, intelligence gathering, support from the ‘Karuna’ group, that almost divided the LTTE into a Wanni and the eastern faction.
Surviving such an onslaught, is enough propaganda for the Tigers to recruit both here and in Tamil Nadu.
So, it is obvious why the LTTE has not taken the second option and initiated attacks, not only in the Wanni but, along the Kilali-Muhamali-Nagarkovil axis?
The LTTE cannot afford to initiate an attack, unless it is sure to succeed? The result of the major attack the Tigers initiated in Muttur and the provocation made in Mavil Aru, is too widely known here and among the diaspora. The August 11 Muhamalai attack staged by the baby brigade and followed by the specialized Charles Anthony Brigade was also a disaster. Not even the Kilali offensive, including the boat landing by Sea Tigers, could make material difference. It was a failed attempt with a capital F.
No wonder then, that LTTE Political Wing Leader, in mid September, said, “The LTTE is maintaining patience and still restricting itself to a defensive war.”
Tigers dig in
The military, however, can afford to take chances, as it has the success story in the “East” to brag about. Nevertheless, the military cannot afford to lose a major battle in terms of territory, casualties or loss of equipment. The October 11 debacle in Muhamalai, in terms of casualties reported and equipment lost, is a grim reminder of the many conventional battles previously lost.
Hence, the recent offensives are lightning attacks by small groups, to limit the loss in terms of casualties.
So, at this rate, it is estimated that the military would take another three to four years to succeed, given that the Tigers are well entrenched and have the added advantage of familiarity with the terrain.
As we said last week, the modus operandi of the security forces was likely to succeed in the Mannar region via the Wanni. We are not denying that the military would eventually succeed, but it would be at such a slow pace that political developments were likely to overtake the military gains.
Political developments are also shaped by economic considerations, and the military would find it difficult to sustain its campaign financially.
LTTE Leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is a master at the game of a protracted struggle and as we said before, has outlived the tenures of governments here, in India and will soon do so in America.
Even if there were to be a change of government, the military has changed the balance of power in the new government’s favour. Having wrested control of the East, the new dispensation, if it intends commencing peace talks, will be able to do so from a position of strength. Contrast this with the UNF’s previous unenviable position in December 2001, with the East also under the Tigers’ belt and the air force depleted, having lost some of its fighters.
The air force has wreaked havoc in this ‘Eelam War IV’, taking on Tiger assets week after week. Repeated attacks staged by fighter jets in Vashvamadu beyond Pudurippu, over a fortnight, have had a huge effect on the LTTE. Where the army is unable to penetrate in the Mullaitivu district, the air force has been pounding sensitive areas. It is reliably understood that bunker buster bombs are also used to target underground facilities.
Naturally, the Tigers who called the shots and negotiated from a vantage position at that time, were able to secure ‘a federal solution.’ The UNP’s recent dropping of the word “federalism”, is a tacit recognition of the military achievements on the ground, sea and air.
If the LTTE refuses to talk peace, which is the likely scenario, as it does not talk from a position of weakness, the alternative might be to continue the war. The military will not agree to a change in the ground situation. Hence, one reason cited by the UNP for this change was a change in the military situation on the ground.
'Tigers taking heavy beating' - Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya
Vavuniya Security Forces (SF) Commander, Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya shares exclusive comments with The Bottom Line.
Within a period of two weeks, the Army has killed 172 LTTE cadres, and wounded more than 80, Vavuniya Security Forces (SF) Commander, Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya, told The Bottom Line, in an exclusive interview. "This count was ascertained by intercepting LTTE communication, as well as observations by our troops. At the same time, the Army lost eight, including 2 officers, with 22 soldiers wounded."
The bodies of Captain Zoysa of the 6 Vijayaba Regiment and Captain Alagiyawathha of the 10 Ceylon Light Infantry who were missing in action, were later handed over to the Army, via the ICRC, while the Army handed over 4 LTTE bodies to the ICRC.
"Compared with the LTTE death toll and wounded, the Army figure is much less," he said.
Maj. Gen. Jayasuriya was adjutant to the late Lt. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwe, Commanding Officer of the 1st Armoured Corp in the Vavuniya, Mannar and Welioya regions. This region came under the purview of Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya
"My Division Commanders and I (57 Division Commander Brig. Jagath Dias of the Gajaba Regiment, 56 Division Brig. Jagath Rambukpotha of the Artillery Regiment, First Task Force Commander Brig. Charlie Gallage, who is also Brigade Commander of the Commandos and Special Forces Brigade Commander Colonel Nirmal Dharmarathne) have done and continue to implement counter LTTE tactics and strategies.
"I can't disclose military plans because military plans are top secret.
"When we implement our tactics and strategies, the LTTE was surprised and they will be surprised in the future too. I wont' allow them to relax." "At the moment we are conducting our operations in west of Madhu and west of Omanthi, but we keep changing our military plans. We destroyed several LTTE bunkers and we cut off supply routes of the LTTE"
Asking him about the LTTE stronghold in north Mannar, Vidattalthivu, Kaddaddi and A-32 road, he said "the army received accurate intelligence in those LTTE areas and Artillery and MBRL targets were accurately taken. We will be attacking them in the future.
They attacked and continue to attack troops with 122mm Artillery and 80 and 81 mm mortars. Mainly due to this artillery fire, our troops suffered causalities.
Finally, I asked the Ma. Gen. that his target is not a cake walk, because his troops battle terrorists in the jungle. He replied "I will make it a cake walk and my officers and soldiers are trained for jungle warfare and they are skillful officers and soldiers. I am confident of my officers and soldiers and we do have good leadership as well."
A soldier who was wounded in a mortar attack, returned to the battlefront, after his wounds healed. He didn't want to declare his name. I asked him why he returned to the battlefront and he said, "We are heading into the last den of the terrorists. I want to be a part and parcel of this historical victory."
His fellow soldier told me that he welcomed his colleague who showed great determination and courage with a hug and teased him and asked what he brought them from home to eat.
On 8th morning, around 8:30 a.m., in Mannar, the LTTE tried to infiltrate the FDLs in Mannar in north Uliankulam. Vigilant soldiers attacked the LTTE cadres and killed 2 cadres on the spot.
Under heavy fire from the army, the rest of the LTTE cadres fled. In a separate incident, on the same day, troops on a search operation, discovered an underground bunker in Vilattikulam, used for weapons storage, and recovered 46 nos. 82 mm mortars, 23 nos. 60mm mortars, 6,300 rounds of T-56 ammunition and 26 anti personnel mines.
In Vavuniya, Pokkaravant, the army unearthed 600 anti personnel mines. In Jaffna, on the afternoon of 7th and 8th, the LTTE attacked the Muhamalaie FDL with 81mm mortars. The army retaliated.
Brigade commander of 552 Brigade were ordered to dismantle the LTTE mortar position. The Brigade Commander selected soldiers and sent them to attack the LTTE FDL during the night using RPG (rocket propel grenades), grenade launchers and small arms which surprised the LTTE. The troops destroyed six LTTE bunkers. According to LTTE radio transmissions, 6 LTTE cadres died and more than 12 wounded.
On September 25, there was a rehersal of an LTTE passing out parade in Pooneryn. On information of this event Air Force and Army launched an attack and caused heavy casualties.
Recruitment Drive
During this year the army recruited 25,000 soldiers and 75 officer cadets. The army commander gave instructions that all recruits have to train and go through the full training period.
The Army hopes to increase the elite special force to 5000. The STF continued its operation in the thick jungles of Ampara. STF Commandant DIG Nimal Lewke said that the LTTE had exploded a mine targeting STF personnel. As a result one STF member died while two were injured.
DIG Nimal Lewke said "troops marching deep inside the jungle, the main obstacle is antipersonnel mines. The STF defused 524 antipersonnel mines and he further said there are less than 60 LTTE cadres and they divide in to small groups. We are hunting them"
The Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) sank the 10th LTTE ship 800 nautical miles south of Dondra Head, early morning today, SLN spokesman Commander D.K.P. Dadanayake said. The Commander further said that the Sri Lanka Navy received credible intelligence information and their attack ships SLNS Sagara, SLNS Saura and SLNS Saranimala sailed south on October 1, detected the ship on radar and sailed close to the suspected ship.
Early morning on October 7, around 5:30 am, the Navy ships sighted the suspected ship and noticed that it hadn't hoisted any flag. The ship with the name MV Matshusima was 70 metres in length. The Navy communicated with the ship on the international communication channel 16, but there wasn't any response. Instead of radio contact, the LTTE cadres on board, fired with medium-calibre guns at the SLN ship. The Navy retaliated. The battle lasted nearly 3 hours, and at 9:30 am the LTTE ship was sunk. The LTTE ship had onboard water scooters (used for suicide missions), 153 Artillery, GPS, radars, electronic equipment used to monitor Armed Forces communication. The Navy received information that two senior LTTE cadres were onboard.
The SLN has, beyond any doubt, proved its talent and capabilities. One of the officers engaged in the battle, said 'Sri Lanka Navy is no more a brown water Navy, we are a blue water Navy. Though we badly lack resources, we accomplished our mission and we will do so in the future. We are committed and dedicated to our task.
On October 9 Sri Lanka Air Force MiG jets bombed LTTE military installation early in the morning.
Within a period of two weeks, the Army has killed 172 LTTE cadres, and wounded more than 80, Vavuniya Security Forces (SF) Commander, Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya, told The Bottom Line, in an exclusive interview. "This count was ascertained by intercepting LTTE communication, as well as observations by our troops. At the same time, the Army lost eight, including 2 officers, with 22 soldiers wounded."
The bodies of Captain Zoysa of the 6 Vijayaba Regiment and Captain Alagiyawathha of the 10 Ceylon Light Infantry who were missing in action, were later handed over to the Army, via the ICRC, while the Army handed over 4 LTTE bodies to the ICRC.
"Compared with the LTTE death toll and wounded, the Army figure is much less," he said.
Maj. Gen. Jayasuriya was adjutant to the late Lt. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwe, Commanding Officer of the 1st Armoured Corp in the Vavuniya, Mannar and Welioya regions. This region came under the purview of Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya
"My Division Commanders and I (57 Division Commander Brig. Jagath Dias of the Gajaba Regiment, 56 Division Brig. Jagath Rambukpotha of the Artillery Regiment, First Task Force Commander Brig. Charlie Gallage, who is also Brigade Commander of the Commandos and Special Forces Brigade Commander Colonel Nirmal Dharmarathne) have done and continue to implement counter LTTE tactics and strategies.
"I can't disclose military plans because military plans are top secret.
"When we implement our tactics and strategies, the LTTE was surprised and they will be surprised in the future too. I wont' allow them to relax." "At the moment we are conducting our operations in west of Madhu and west of Omanthi, but we keep changing our military plans. We destroyed several LTTE bunkers and we cut off supply routes of the LTTE"
Asking him about the LTTE stronghold in north Mannar, Vidattalthivu, Kaddaddi and A-32 road, he said "the army received accurate intelligence in those LTTE areas and Artillery and MBRL targets were accurately taken. We will be attacking them in the future.
They attacked and continue to attack troops with 122mm Artillery and 80 and 81 mm mortars. Mainly due to this artillery fire, our troops suffered causalities.
Finally, I asked the Ma. Gen. that his target is not a cake walk, because his troops battle terrorists in the jungle. He replied "I will make it a cake walk and my officers and soldiers are trained for jungle warfare and they are skillful officers and soldiers. I am confident of my officers and soldiers and we do have good leadership as well."
A soldier who was wounded in a mortar attack, returned to the battlefront, after his wounds healed. He didn't want to declare his name. I asked him why he returned to the battlefront and he said, "We are heading into the last den of the terrorists. I want to be a part and parcel of this historical victory."
His fellow soldier told me that he welcomed his colleague who showed great determination and courage with a hug and teased him and asked what he brought them from home to eat.
On 8th morning, around 8:30 a.m., in Mannar, the LTTE tried to infiltrate the FDLs in Mannar in north Uliankulam. Vigilant soldiers attacked the LTTE cadres and killed 2 cadres on the spot.
Under heavy fire from the army, the rest of the LTTE cadres fled. In a separate incident, on the same day, troops on a search operation, discovered an underground bunker in Vilattikulam, used for weapons storage, and recovered 46 nos. 82 mm mortars, 23 nos. 60mm mortars, 6,300 rounds of T-56 ammunition and 26 anti personnel mines.
In Vavuniya, Pokkaravant, the army unearthed 600 anti personnel mines. In Jaffna, on the afternoon of 7th and 8th, the LTTE attacked the Muhamalaie FDL with 81mm mortars. The army retaliated.
Brigade commander of 552 Brigade were ordered to dismantle the LTTE mortar position. The Brigade Commander selected soldiers and sent them to attack the LTTE FDL during the night using RPG (rocket propel grenades), grenade launchers and small arms which surprised the LTTE. The troops destroyed six LTTE bunkers. According to LTTE radio transmissions, 6 LTTE cadres died and more than 12 wounded.
On September 25, there was a rehersal of an LTTE passing out parade in Pooneryn. On information of this event Air Force and Army launched an attack and caused heavy casualties.
Recruitment Drive
During this year the army recruited 25,000 soldiers and 75 officer cadets. The army commander gave instructions that all recruits have to train and go through the full training period.
The Army hopes to increase the elite special force to 5000. The STF continued its operation in the thick jungles of Ampara. STF Commandant DIG Nimal Lewke said that the LTTE had exploded a mine targeting STF personnel. As a result one STF member died while two were injured.
DIG Nimal Lewke said "troops marching deep inside the jungle, the main obstacle is antipersonnel mines. The STF defused 524 antipersonnel mines and he further said there are less than 60 LTTE cadres and they divide in to small groups. We are hunting them"
The Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) sank the 10th LTTE ship 800 nautical miles south of Dondra Head, early morning today, SLN spokesman Commander D.K.P. Dadanayake said. The Commander further said that the Sri Lanka Navy received credible intelligence information and their attack ships SLNS Sagara, SLNS Saura and SLNS Saranimala sailed south on October 1, detected the ship on radar and sailed close to the suspected ship.
Early morning on October 7, around 5:30 am, the Navy ships sighted the suspected ship and noticed that it hadn't hoisted any flag. The ship with the name MV Matshusima was 70 metres in length. The Navy communicated with the ship on the international communication channel 16, but there wasn't any response. Instead of radio contact, the LTTE cadres on board, fired with medium-calibre guns at the SLN ship. The Navy retaliated. The battle lasted nearly 3 hours, and at 9:30 am the LTTE ship was sunk. The LTTE ship had onboard water scooters (used for suicide missions), 153 Artillery, GPS, radars, electronic equipment used to monitor Armed Forces communication. The Navy received information that two senior LTTE cadres were onboard.
The SLN has, beyond any doubt, proved its talent and capabilities. One of the officers engaged in the battle, said 'Sri Lanka Navy is no more a brown water Navy, we are a blue water Navy. Though we badly lack resources, we accomplished our mission and we will do so in the future. We are committed and dedicated to our task.
On October 9 Sri Lanka Air Force MiG jets bombed LTTE military installation early in the morning.
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
Case of the vanishing Tiger
Sri Lankans in Colombo are puzzled over the whereabouts of Shanmugan Kumaran Tharmalingam (aka Kumaran Pathmanathan), chief procurer of arms of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
The Sri Lankan defence ministry website stated that “reliable sources from Thailand reveal that LTTE’s chief for cross-border terrorist activities, Kumaran Padmanathan, alias KP, has been arrested in Bangkok on 10 September.”
However, Thai authorities dismissed the report, saying they were not aware of the arrest, if any was made. And Thai police told the media that a thorough check showed that the last time it arrested any LTTE member was in 2003, and he was extradited to Sri Lanka on 15 August, 2007.
The local newspapers in the teardrop-shaped island in the Indian Ocean are awash with speculation of KP’s supposed disappearance while in Thai custody.
The latest, by the main opposition United National Party, alleged that the Sri Lanka government had facilitated his release as it had a pre-presidential poll deal between the President and the LTTE.
KP is some sort of an enigma in the conflict-ravaged country where the government is engaged in a two-decade-long military operation to tame the Tigers fighting for a separate homeland and who control areas of the north.
“He is a master of disguise,” said Rauff Hakeem, Sri Lanka’s posts and telecommunications minister who shared iftar delicacies with me at his Colombo residence. However, Rauff, who is the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress leader, said he was not aware of KP’s present whereabouts.
According to F Rovik, who is a lawyer with R-Senter, a Norwegian human rights organisation, KP travels widely “with more than 20 passports to his name, and possessing the ability to pass himself off as a middle-class Tamil.”
It is believed the 52-year-old Sri Lankan, who is the second most wanted man in Sri Lanka (number one is LTTE supremo Velupillai Pirabhakaran), has obtained Thai citizenship and is married to a Thai woman.
In India, he is wanted for his alleged role in prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1991.
There is no surprise in Sri Lanka that KP’s supposed detention is in Thailand as the LTTE has a colourful existence in the kingdom, which is about 2,200 km from northern Sri Lanka.
For example, when the Phuket Marine Police arrested LTTE agent Christy Reginold Lawrence on 9 April, 2000, he led them to his shipyard where they found a half-built mini submarine, which could accommodate two to three people.
The Sri Lanka government revealed that it was similar to a submarine it seized from the LTTE in Jaffna in the early 1990s.
The Tigers, Rovik noted, have been active in Thailand for two decades, using the country to acquire weapons and train cadres and as a transit point for weapons smuggling.
“LTTE has established several front companies and has a broad net of contacts in shipping, military and the police as well as among arms dealers. The front companies include shipping companies, trading firms, restaurants and hotels,” he wrote in a published report Peace in Sri Lanka: Obstacles and Opportunities.
Rovik wrote that Thailand’s long coastline, porous borders, modern infrastructure, corrupt officials and a history of gun-running since regional conflicts of the 1950s, make it an ideal location for weapons traders and buyers.
“Experts say that some of the arms sold in Thailand are rusty leftovers from the Cambodian conflict, but brand new weapons are also freely available, either smuggled from China or obtained illegally from legal manufactures,” he noted.
“There are more than 10,000 trawlers and other vessels roaming the Thai seas, making it difficult to monitor weapons smuggling.”
He added that the Tigers’ front companies and sympathisers in Bangkok had an extensive logistics network.
“Munitions have moved not only through Phuket but also Ranong and Krabi on the Andaman coast, as well as Sattaship on the Gulf of Thailand,” he pointed out.
However, Rovik said LTTE had very limited support, if any, among Thai politicians or the public in general.
“The fact that they have operated in Thailand for so long is purely due to corruption and liberal Thai policies,” he explained.
Whether Thai policies are liberal or not, the fact is KP remains as elusive as ever.
The Sri Lankan defence ministry website stated that “reliable sources from Thailand reveal that LTTE’s chief for cross-border terrorist activities, Kumaran Padmanathan, alias KP, has been arrested in Bangkok on 10 September.”
However, Thai authorities dismissed the report, saying they were not aware of the arrest, if any was made. And Thai police told the media that a thorough check showed that the last time it arrested any LTTE member was in 2003, and he was extradited to Sri Lanka on 15 August, 2007.
The local newspapers in the teardrop-shaped island in the Indian Ocean are awash with speculation of KP’s supposed disappearance while in Thai custody.
The latest, by the main opposition United National Party, alleged that the Sri Lanka government had facilitated his release as it had a pre-presidential poll deal between the President and the LTTE.
KP is some sort of an enigma in the conflict-ravaged country where the government is engaged in a two-decade-long military operation to tame the Tigers fighting for a separate homeland and who control areas of the north.
“He is a master of disguise,” said Rauff Hakeem, Sri Lanka’s posts and telecommunications minister who shared iftar delicacies with me at his Colombo residence. However, Rauff, who is the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress leader, said he was not aware of KP’s present whereabouts.
According to F Rovik, who is a lawyer with R-Senter, a Norwegian human rights organisation, KP travels widely “with more than 20 passports to his name, and possessing the ability to pass himself off as a middle-class Tamil.”
It is believed the 52-year-old Sri Lankan, who is the second most wanted man in Sri Lanka (number one is LTTE supremo Velupillai Pirabhakaran), has obtained Thai citizenship and is married to a Thai woman.
In India, he is wanted for his alleged role in prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1991.
There is no surprise in Sri Lanka that KP’s supposed detention is in Thailand as the LTTE has a colourful existence in the kingdom, which is about 2,200 km from northern Sri Lanka.
For example, when the Phuket Marine Police arrested LTTE agent Christy Reginold Lawrence on 9 April, 2000, he led them to his shipyard where they found a half-built mini submarine, which could accommodate two to three people.
The Sri Lanka government revealed that it was similar to a submarine it seized from the LTTE in Jaffna in the early 1990s.
The Tigers, Rovik noted, have been active in Thailand for two decades, using the country to acquire weapons and train cadres and as a transit point for weapons smuggling.
“LTTE has established several front companies and has a broad net of contacts in shipping, military and the police as well as among arms dealers. The front companies include shipping companies, trading firms, restaurants and hotels,” he wrote in a published report Peace in Sri Lanka: Obstacles and Opportunities.
Rovik wrote that Thailand’s long coastline, porous borders, modern infrastructure, corrupt officials and a history of gun-running since regional conflicts of the 1950s, make it an ideal location for weapons traders and buyers.
“Experts say that some of the arms sold in Thailand are rusty leftovers from the Cambodian conflict, but brand new weapons are also freely available, either smuggled from China or obtained illegally from legal manufactures,” he noted.
“There are more than 10,000 trawlers and other vessels roaming the Thai seas, making it difficult to monitor weapons smuggling.”
He added that the Tigers’ front companies and sympathisers in Bangkok had an extensive logistics network.
“Munitions have moved not only through Phuket but also Ranong and Krabi on the Andaman coast, as well as Sattaship on the Gulf of Thailand,” he pointed out.
However, Rovik said LTTE had very limited support, if any, among Thai politicians or the public in general.
“The fact that they have operated in Thailand for so long is purely due to corruption and liberal Thai policies,” he explained.
Whether Thai policies are liberal or not, the fact is KP remains as elusive as ever.
LTTE has strong links with Thai military
There was extensive news coverage of Shanmugan Kumaran Tharmalingam (a.k.a Kumaran Pathmanathan and KP), chief procurer of arms of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is based in Thailand and that he has been arrested by the Thai authorities.
The credible news of his presence in Thailand has not been reported so far. The LTTE uses Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia as its main operating hub and extensive network of clandestine operations are carried out using Singapore as its financial centre.
All the activities are commanded by KP who is on the move all the time between the hub countries. Some of the Malaysian based LTTE activists who are said to be professionals give valuable support to legitimise the nefarious deeds of the clandestine activities of the Tamil Tigers in the area. A Sri Lankan lawyer Pasupathy based in Malaysia is confirmed to be the head of professionals working under KP.
KP’s activities further stretches to the renounced pariah state of President Mugabe i.e., Zimbabwe, where he is able move-about without any difficulties. He is said to be travelling between Cambodia, Thailand and Zimbabwe under false names and identity. Cambodia is said to be the main place of residence of KP.
It is known the LTTE has heavily bribed the Thai military officials. In 2002 when LTTE delegation met the Sri Lankan officials in Bangkok for peace talks some members of the delegation was taken by a senior Thai military commander accompanied by soldiers to meet KP in the interiors of north-eastern jungle. The delegation members (names withheld) had lengthy meeting in a tea boutique and they had discussed operational issues of the LTTE.
The Thai military had provided security throughout the four hour meeting with KP. Once the meeting was over, the delegation members were taken back to Bangkok in military vehicles.
This visit of the delegation members had taken place when LTTE mentor Anton Balasingam was tussling (refer to Anton Balasingam’s hero’s day speech in 2004) with few other members whom were visiting the red light areas of Bangkok.
(http://lankaguardian.blogspot.com/2007/10/ltte-has-strong-links-with-thai.html)
The credible news of his presence in Thailand has not been reported so far. The LTTE uses Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia as its main operating hub and extensive network of clandestine operations are carried out using Singapore as its financial centre.
All the activities are commanded by KP who is on the move all the time between the hub countries. Some of the Malaysian based LTTE activists who are said to be professionals give valuable support to legitimise the nefarious deeds of the clandestine activities of the Tamil Tigers in the area. A Sri Lankan lawyer Pasupathy based in Malaysia is confirmed to be the head of professionals working under KP.
KP’s activities further stretches to the renounced pariah state of President Mugabe i.e., Zimbabwe, where he is able move-about without any difficulties. He is said to be travelling between Cambodia, Thailand and Zimbabwe under false names and identity. Cambodia is said to be the main place of residence of KP.
It is known the LTTE has heavily bribed the Thai military officials. In 2002 when LTTE delegation met the Sri Lankan officials in Bangkok for peace talks some members of the delegation was taken by a senior Thai military commander accompanied by soldiers to meet KP in the interiors of north-eastern jungle. The delegation members (names withheld) had lengthy meeting in a tea boutique and they had discussed operational issues of the LTTE.
The Thai military had provided security throughout the four hour meeting with KP. Once the meeting was over, the delegation members were taken back to Bangkok in military vehicles.
This visit of the delegation members had taken place when LTTE mentor Anton Balasingam was tussling (refer to Anton Balasingam’s hero’s day speech in 2004) with few other members whom were visiting the red light areas of Bangkok.
(http://lankaguardian.blogspot.com/2007/10/ltte-has-strong-links-with-thai.html)
Monday, October 08, 2007
The Special Forces Brigade
On 25th August 2007, a group of solemn faces entered the 1st Regiment Headquarters of the Sri Lanka Army’s Special Forces at Naula, situated in beautiful Matale District in the Central Province. They included the Army Commander Lt. Gen Sarath Fonseka and the Colonel Commandant of the Special Forces and the Security Forced Commander Jaffna Maj. Gen. G.A. Chandrasiri. The occasion was the annual commemoration of the fallen heroes of the Special Forces. The Special Forces, which began as a Combat Tracker Team of just two officers and 38 men, has grown into three regiments since its first Training School was established fifteen years ago. Since then the Special Forces have contributed to the Security Forces more than any other unit imaginable.
Amongst the most notable of fallen heroes of this fighting formation was Col A.F. Lafir PWV RWP RSP (posthumous), who was the commanding officer of a unit of Special Forces that infiltrated Alampil in the Mulaithivu District in July 1996. Colonel Lafir and his Special Forces unit that landed at Alampil had all volunteered for the mission. Little did they know that the LTTE had overrun almost the entire Mulaithivu base and were ready in unusually large numbers. Colonel Lafir and his men fought their way in but were surrounded, ambushed, shelled and bogged-down by LTTE automatic fire. Colonel Lafir, in true Special Forces style was determined, dared (SF Motto: Determined, Dared and Done) and took every effort to complete his mission to the very end. Unfortunately, this was not the best day for the Army’s Special Forces and the unit lost many men and their CO, Colonel Lafir. But by the time of Colonel Lafir’s untimely death, the Special Forces had progressed from a Combat Tracker Team to an elite unit with three separate regiments specializing in Rapid Deployment operations (RDF-1SF) counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism warfare, reconnaissance and battle space preparation in the medium and deep battle-space and Jungle warfare.
The 2nd Regiment of the Special Forces was raised in 1994 with a focus on amphibious assault, Under-water Demolition (UDT) and sea-borne infiltration (water to land/air or land to water/air) reconnaissance missions. In 1996, the 3rd Regiment of the Special Forces was raised. This unit performs some of the Army’s most secretive of missions in medium and deep battle-space environments. The Alpha Squad of the 3SF is dreaded by the LTTE. Coupled with Military Intelligence, these units infiltrate LTTE areas and carry-out ambushes, offensive raids and sabotage missions.
The kill-ratio for the Alpha Unit is 1-400 (400 LTTE Killed for one SF soldier killed). Only on a very rare occasion have these troops been sighted and ambushed. Even when ambushed many troopers often return to base safely after spending as many as ten days inside the deep jungle, either on their own or as small teams. These extraordinary missions are conducted despite the deployment of the LTTE’s elite troops along the border. The LTTE has also deployed large numbers of its civilian forces, sometimes numbering in their hundreds to hunt a single team. Thanks to hide-and-conceal tactics and superior survival skills imparted to them in their specialized training, these soldiers operating in the deep battle-space have remained an effective and reusable force for the Army. DefenceWire has discussed other details of this unit in this same site. More details will be provided without jeopardizing the safety of these men and national security in months to come.
The Special Forces are also renowned for their ability to generate military break-throughs. In the fight to capture Vakarai a 40-man amphibious assault-team was used to break the LTTE’s determined forces that had dug-in for a conventional war with the Army. Prior to this exercise the Special Forces carried-out several ambushes and offensive raids inside Vakarai. One such operation resulted in the death of ‘Lt. Col’ Arivu, the Military-in-charge for the LTTE in Vakarai. The LTTE became demoralized and were outmaneuvered and outwitted when the Army switched to unconventional warfare using the Special Forces. Similar ‘softening-up’ operations are now continuing in the Vanni region.
The greatest possible threat to this unit has come from Sri Lankan politicians who have attempted in the past to engage in conventional warfare against the LTTE based on a political agenda. The results have been devastating for the Special Forces, with the two-thousand-man Brigade depleting to a few hundred during conventional operations against the LTTE’s Ceaseless-Waves in the Vanni. A similar blunder may have been averted when Colonel Prasanna Silva, the former Commander of the Special Forces refused to send his men into the Northern theatre of operation to meet a political deadline soon after the Vakarai and Thoppigala battles. He argued for precious time for planning an operation and for his men to recuperate from the battle-fatigue they had faced due to continued deployment in the Northern and Eastern theatres of war. Colonel Silva almost resigned from the Army after the dispute became an open conflict in the Army and the media gave wide publicity to the issue. Subsequently the Defence Secretary and also President Mahinda Rajapakse intervene directly to resolve the issue.
Another invisible threat is looming in the horizon for the Special Forces. This comes in the wake of government plans to expand the Home Guard force. On 27th August 2007, the first batch of Home Guards with specialized infantry training passed-out from the Galkiriyagama Combat Training School. The youth enlisting in the Home-Guards are from the North, North Central, North Western or North Eastern Provinces. This has traditionally been the base for Special Forces recruitment. The difficult terrain in these areas has conditioned many a man, and these men, in turn, have enriched the ranks of the Special Forces. It is doubtful whether this trend would continue as men get diverted from joining the Special Forces and instead get enlisted in the Home Guard Force. Although the services of the Home Guards needs to be upgraded, it should not be at the expense of the Army.
(http://defencewire.blogspot.com/2007/08/special-forces-bridage.html)
Amongst the most notable of fallen heroes of this fighting formation was Col A.F. Lafir PWV RWP RSP (posthumous), who was the commanding officer of a unit of Special Forces that infiltrated Alampil in the Mulaithivu District in July 1996. Colonel Lafir and his Special Forces unit that landed at Alampil had all volunteered for the mission. Little did they know that the LTTE had overrun almost the entire Mulaithivu base and were ready in unusually large numbers. Colonel Lafir and his men fought their way in but were surrounded, ambushed, shelled and bogged-down by LTTE automatic fire. Colonel Lafir, in true Special Forces style was determined, dared (SF Motto: Determined, Dared and Done) and took every effort to complete his mission to the very end. Unfortunately, this was not the best day for the Army’s Special Forces and the unit lost many men and their CO, Colonel Lafir. But by the time of Colonel Lafir’s untimely death, the Special Forces had progressed from a Combat Tracker Team to an elite unit with three separate regiments specializing in Rapid Deployment operations (RDF-1SF) counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism warfare, reconnaissance and battle space preparation in the medium and deep battle-space and Jungle warfare.
The 2nd Regiment of the Special Forces was raised in 1994 with a focus on amphibious assault, Under-water Demolition (UDT) and sea-borne infiltration (water to land/air or land to water/air) reconnaissance missions. In 1996, the 3rd Regiment of the Special Forces was raised. This unit performs some of the Army’s most secretive of missions in medium and deep battle-space environments. The Alpha Squad of the 3SF is dreaded by the LTTE. Coupled with Military Intelligence, these units infiltrate LTTE areas and carry-out ambushes, offensive raids and sabotage missions.
The kill-ratio for the Alpha Unit is 1-400 (400 LTTE Killed for one SF soldier killed). Only on a very rare occasion have these troops been sighted and ambushed. Even when ambushed many troopers often return to base safely after spending as many as ten days inside the deep jungle, either on their own or as small teams. These extraordinary missions are conducted despite the deployment of the LTTE’s elite troops along the border. The LTTE has also deployed large numbers of its civilian forces, sometimes numbering in their hundreds to hunt a single team. Thanks to hide-and-conceal tactics and superior survival skills imparted to them in their specialized training, these soldiers operating in the deep battle-space have remained an effective and reusable force for the Army. DefenceWire has discussed other details of this unit in this same site. More details will be provided without jeopardizing the safety of these men and national security in months to come.
The Special Forces are also renowned for their ability to generate military break-throughs. In the fight to capture Vakarai a 40-man amphibious assault-team was used to break the LTTE’s determined forces that had dug-in for a conventional war with the Army. Prior to this exercise the Special Forces carried-out several ambushes and offensive raids inside Vakarai. One such operation resulted in the death of ‘Lt. Col’ Arivu, the Military-in-charge for the LTTE in Vakarai. The LTTE became demoralized and were outmaneuvered and outwitted when the Army switched to unconventional warfare using the Special Forces. Similar ‘softening-up’ operations are now continuing in the Vanni region.
The greatest possible threat to this unit has come from Sri Lankan politicians who have attempted in the past to engage in conventional warfare against the LTTE based on a political agenda. The results have been devastating for the Special Forces, with the two-thousand-man Brigade depleting to a few hundred during conventional operations against the LTTE’s Ceaseless-Waves in the Vanni. A similar blunder may have been averted when Colonel Prasanna Silva, the former Commander of the Special Forces refused to send his men into the Northern theatre of operation to meet a political deadline soon after the Vakarai and Thoppigala battles. He argued for precious time for planning an operation and for his men to recuperate from the battle-fatigue they had faced due to continued deployment in the Northern and Eastern theatres of war. Colonel Silva almost resigned from the Army after the dispute became an open conflict in the Army and the media gave wide publicity to the issue. Subsequently the Defence Secretary and also President Mahinda Rajapakse intervene directly to resolve the issue.
Another invisible threat is looming in the horizon for the Special Forces. This comes in the wake of government plans to expand the Home Guard force. On 27th August 2007, the first batch of Home Guards with specialized infantry training passed-out from the Galkiriyagama Combat Training School. The youth enlisting in the Home-Guards are from the North, North Central, North Western or North Eastern Provinces. This has traditionally been the base for Special Forces recruitment. The difficult terrain in these areas has conditioned many a man, and these men, in turn, have enriched the ranks of the Special Forces. It is doubtful whether this trend would continue as men get diverted from joining the Special Forces and instead get enlisted in the Home Guard Force. Although the services of the Home Guards needs to be upgraded, it should not be at the expense of the Army.
(http://defencewire.blogspot.com/2007/08/special-forces-bridage.html)
A Win in Vilattikulam
The Sri Lanka Army made several attacks inside LTTE controlled areas in Vavuniya and Mannar on the 3rd, 4th and 6th of October (this month). Independent sources claim that around 40 LTTE may have been killed in the attacks. The first strike was launched by around 400 troops, backed by Special Forces in the general area Vilattikulam.
In a move unexpected by the LTTE, the Army moved around 400 troops in a covert operation into Vilattikulam in Vavunia. The usual artillery and mortar barrages that signal the coming of such troops was avoided. Strict radio silence was also maintained. Troops engaged in the offensive on the 3rd bypassed LTTE bunker-lines and came upon 2 double cabs and 1 tractor. The three vehicles were transporting over thirty LTTE cadres which were attacked successfully killing the majority of them. On the 4th, another tractor full of LTTE cadres was ambushed. By this time, around six LTTE bunkers were also surrounded by troops. The army managed to completely neutralize the enemy manning the bunkers.
Special Forces units hiding along roads in Vilattikulam successfully attacked reinforcements. By 3rd afternoon, monitored radio communications indicated that 19 LTTE were killed. By 4th evening, the figure had risen to around twice that amount. 5 valiant soldiers sacrificed their lives in the offensive. On 6th morning, troops again infiltrated the general area Uylankulam successfully neutralizing advancing LTTE units. Exact number of LTTE casualties is still unavailable.
(http://defencewire.blogspot.com/2007/10/win-in-vilattikulam.html)
In a move unexpected by the LTTE, the Army moved around 400 troops in a covert operation into Vilattikulam in Vavunia. The usual artillery and mortar barrages that signal the coming of such troops was avoided. Strict radio silence was also maintained. Troops engaged in the offensive on the 3rd bypassed LTTE bunker-lines and came upon 2 double cabs and 1 tractor. The three vehicles were transporting over thirty LTTE cadres which were attacked successfully killing the majority of them. On the 4th, another tractor full of LTTE cadres was ambushed. By this time, around six LTTE bunkers were also surrounded by troops. The army managed to completely neutralize the enemy manning the bunkers.
Special Forces units hiding along roads in Vilattikulam successfully attacked reinforcements. By 3rd afternoon, monitored radio communications indicated that 19 LTTE were killed. By 4th evening, the figure had risen to around twice that amount. 5 valiant soldiers sacrificed their lives in the offensive. On 6th morning, troops again infiltrated the general area Uylankulam successfully neutralizing advancing LTTE units. Exact number of LTTE casualties is still unavailable.
(http://defencewire.blogspot.com/2007/10/win-in-vilattikulam.html)
Army eyes Vedithalthivu
It was a military-religious affair. Yesterday, ranks and files of the Sri Lanka Army converged at the sacred Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi to receive blessings. The Commander of the Army, Security Forces commanders and other Senior officers, each representing their respective units placed the flags of the Army Headquarters, Volunteer Force Headquarters, Security Forces Headquarters Divisions, Brigades, Regiments, Battalions and Army training schools before the sacred Bodhi tree, paying obeisance to the religion.
The Maha Sangha chanted Seth pirith and spread jasmine flowers over the flags. The Sri Lanka Army was observing an age-old ritual of the armed forces of Sri Lanka, seeking customary and symbolic blessings of the historic Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi.
The SLA was paying obeisance at a critical time, when the fighting has taken a turn for the worse.
Hundred km northwards from the sacred town of Anuradapura, troops are fighting bitter battles with the Tigers in the jungles west of Omanthai and East of Madhu.
They have muffled the Tigers roar and forced the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to fight a defensive war on all fronts of the Wanni.
Mettle
The Sri Lankan forces have proved their mettle. Their valour is distinguished and their sacrifice unparalleled, yet the Northward push is not going to be a cake walk. Tiger cadres are known to resist any military attempt to push into the Wanni through out their secessionist campaign. The LTTE fought tooth and nail, when the troops launched Operation Jayasikuru to open a land link between the Jaffna peninsula and the South.
Yet, the troops have proved successful in their recent operations. Most important, is that specialized small team operations have cut down casualty figures. However, bitter battles lie ahead. Right now, the security forces and the Tigers are spiking ahead of the monsoon.
Their immediate objective is to inflict maximum casualties on the Tigers, thereby draining the enemy’s manpower. Troops have forced the Tigers to defend themselves on all fronts. In the Wanni, soldiers are moving towards Vedithalthivu, an area dubbed as the “green bowl”. Vedithalthivu resembles a “green bowl in the map, due to the surrounding greenery and water ponds, which is in sharp contrast to the Wanni. Tigers have camped in the area and resisting the security forces advance. But, suffice it is to say that the Special Forces and Commando teams have cracked the Tiger defences in certain areas of Vedithalthivu.
Infantry troops operate in small troops, breaking away from their defence localities on the Omanthai- Mannar borders and conduct swift and overwhelming attacks on the Tiger positions.
Defence line on fire
Draw a straight line from Omanthai to Mannar. Fighting is concentrated in and around the line. One military official quipped that the Tiger defence line was literally on fire. He was referring to the use of overwhelming force against the LTTE.
In certain areas, troops operate deep in the Tiger territory, pushing the Tigers further into the Wanni. One military source said “troops operated well ahead of Pokkaravanni” Bitter battles are being waged in Thampanai and Periathampanai, Mullikulam and Vilathikulam.
The worst fighting since the LTTE counter- offensive in the first week of June took place on Wednesday and Thursday, last week in Vilathikulam.
Troops of the Six Vijayaba Infantry Regiment (VIR) advancing to capture a strategically important junction in Vilatikulam came under stiff resistance.
An officer, a captain who commanded a company and his buddy went missing amidst a heavy barrage of mortar fire.
Three soldiers were killed in the fighting and 25 were wounded. Of them 22 have been classified as P3 or minor injuries dubbed walking wounds. One soldier suffered P 1 injuries and two others suffering injuries have been classified as P 2 injuries. Troops, who advanced from several directions, surrounded the Tigers, killing sixteen cadres on Thursday.
Nine Tiger cadres were killed in the West of Omanthai in two separate incidents. Referring to intercepted Tiger communication, the Army said, the Tigers have named twelve of the cadres who had been killed on Wednesday.
Troops ambushed a tractor transporting LTTE cadres, killing five in Vilathikulam. Two other cadres were killed in a subsequent gun battle.
However, these figures cannot be independently verified.
The Tigers are forced to defend themselves on all fronts, which is a nightmarish scenario for the LTTE in the context of its depleting man power. Last week, we quoted intelligence reports which revealed a massive shift of the guerrillas from the Northern front to the Wanni in order to wade off the security force’s Wanni push.
According to intelligence sources, the Northern front is now manned by only 1800 cadres.
As the guns turned on the Wanni front, troops continued with limited operations ahead of their northern defence lines.
On Sunday night, under the cover of darkness, a small group of troops belonging to 1 Gemunu Watch (GW) sneaked into Tiger territory, ahead of security forces defence line in Nagar Kovil. Armed to the teeth, they tiptoed through a gap between two Tiger bunkers. Their target: a bunker line identified as a strong point of the enemy. Well versed with special infantry operations, they crept through the darkness and took the Tigers by total surprise, attacking them from the rear. Overwhelming fire power, over powered the Tiger cadres in their well fortified bunkers. It was a swift and lightening blow.
Destroyed
In a matter of minutes, troops had destroyed several bunkers; a military official said eight bunkers were destroyed. The Army said at least 10 LTTE cadres were killed and twenty injured. These figures of LTTE casualties could not be verified independently. Having taken the Tigers by surprise, troops rushed back to their positions. By then the Tigers were aware of the presence of the soldiers. As they were crossing ‘No Man’s land’, a barrage of mortar fire rained on them.
In the absence of a cover, troops were easily visible. Two soldiers were killed in the mortar attack and seven others were injured.
In another incident, a small team of infantry troops broke away from their forward defence positions in Kilali and sneaked to the guerrilla territory in the early hours of Wednesday.
They exploded a Bangalore torpedo, killing two Tiger cadres. The explosion, however, alerted the guerrillas of their presence in the enemy territory. Troops retreated returning fire as the alert Tiger cadres reacted, supported by a heavy barrage of mortars.
Two soldiers succumbed later to injures on admission to the Palali military hospital. LTTE infiltration into the Jaffna peninsula continues despite heavy security measures to deter LTTE activities in the peninsula.
Major haul of explosives
On Thursday afternoon, troops recovered a suicide jacket, T 56 assault rifle and a communication set buried in an abandoned land in Thirunaweli, Jaffna.
Earlier on Wednesday, troops unearthed a major haul of explosives and ammunition in West of Walikamam, Jaffna.
Troops recovered four suicide jackets, two claymore mines four remote control devices, two T 56 assault rifles, eight magazines, five hundred rounds of ammunition, ten hand grenades, one area map, three radio sets, twenty four detonators, thirty claymore mine batteries and two army uniforms.
According to intelligence reports, about twenty under cover Tiger cadres are operating in the Jaffna peninsula.
Meanwhile, on the Eastern front, the Navy has confirmed the death of sea Tiger leader Nishanthan, who led the sea Tigers to the sea battle off Pulmudai on September 27It was believed that Nishanthan perished in the sea clash in which the Navy said it killed at least 18 Tiger cadres. His death was confirmed after SBS commandoes recovered the body of the slain guerrilla floating in the sea. Immediately after, the top Tiger leader went missing; the Navy has noticed a larger number of fishing boats from Sali Sambalthivu area dominating the sea. A naval officer said the sea Tigers could have assigned the local fishermen to comb the sea to find clues about the fate of Nishanthan.
On September 30, the sailors were alerted by local fishermen of the presence of the body of a Tiger cadre. The body was later handed over to Police.
(http://www.lakbimanews.lk/defence.htm)
The Maha Sangha chanted Seth pirith and spread jasmine flowers over the flags. The Sri Lanka Army was observing an age-old ritual of the armed forces of Sri Lanka, seeking customary and symbolic blessings of the historic Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi.
The SLA was paying obeisance at a critical time, when the fighting has taken a turn for the worse.
Hundred km northwards from the sacred town of Anuradapura, troops are fighting bitter battles with the Tigers in the jungles west of Omanthai and East of Madhu.
They have muffled the Tigers roar and forced the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to fight a defensive war on all fronts of the Wanni.
Mettle
The Sri Lankan forces have proved their mettle. Their valour is distinguished and their sacrifice unparalleled, yet the Northward push is not going to be a cake walk. Tiger cadres are known to resist any military attempt to push into the Wanni through out their secessionist campaign. The LTTE fought tooth and nail, when the troops launched Operation Jayasikuru to open a land link between the Jaffna peninsula and the South.
Yet, the troops have proved successful in their recent operations. Most important, is that specialized small team operations have cut down casualty figures. However, bitter battles lie ahead. Right now, the security forces and the Tigers are spiking ahead of the monsoon.
Their immediate objective is to inflict maximum casualties on the Tigers, thereby draining the enemy’s manpower. Troops have forced the Tigers to defend themselves on all fronts. In the Wanni, soldiers are moving towards Vedithalthivu, an area dubbed as the “green bowl”. Vedithalthivu resembles a “green bowl in the map, due to the surrounding greenery and water ponds, which is in sharp contrast to the Wanni. Tigers have camped in the area and resisting the security forces advance. But, suffice it is to say that the Special Forces and Commando teams have cracked the Tiger defences in certain areas of Vedithalthivu.
Infantry troops operate in small troops, breaking away from their defence localities on the Omanthai- Mannar borders and conduct swift and overwhelming attacks on the Tiger positions.
Defence line on fire
Draw a straight line from Omanthai to Mannar. Fighting is concentrated in and around the line. One military official quipped that the Tiger defence line was literally on fire. He was referring to the use of overwhelming force against the LTTE.
In certain areas, troops operate deep in the Tiger territory, pushing the Tigers further into the Wanni. One military source said “troops operated well ahead of Pokkaravanni” Bitter battles are being waged in Thampanai and Periathampanai, Mullikulam and Vilathikulam.
The worst fighting since the LTTE counter- offensive in the first week of June took place on Wednesday and Thursday, last week in Vilathikulam.
Troops of the Six Vijayaba Infantry Regiment (VIR) advancing to capture a strategically important junction in Vilatikulam came under stiff resistance.
An officer, a captain who commanded a company and his buddy went missing amidst a heavy barrage of mortar fire.
Three soldiers were killed in the fighting and 25 were wounded. Of them 22 have been classified as P3 or minor injuries dubbed walking wounds. One soldier suffered P 1 injuries and two others suffering injuries have been classified as P 2 injuries. Troops, who advanced from several directions, surrounded the Tigers, killing sixteen cadres on Thursday.
Nine Tiger cadres were killed in the West of Omanthai in two separate incidents. Referring to intercepted Tiger communication, the Army said, the Tigers have named twelve of the cadres who had been killed on Wednesday.
Troops ambushed a tractor transporting LTTE cadres, killing five in Vilathikulam. Two other cadres were killed in a subsequent gun battle.
However, these figures cannot be independently verified.
The Tigers are forced to defend themselves on all fronts, which is a nightmarish scenario for the LTTE in the context of its depleting man power. Last week, we quoted intelligence reports which revealed a massive shift of the guerrillas from the Northern front to the Wanni in order to wade off the security force’s Wanni push.
According to intelligence sources, the Northern front is now manned by only 1800 cadres.
As the guns turned on the Wanni front, troops continued with limited operations ahead of their northern defence lines.
On Sunday night, under the cover of darkness, a small group of troops belonging to 1 Gemunu Watch (GW) sneaked into Tiger territory, ahead of security forces defence line in Nagar Kovil. Armed to the teeth, they tiptoed through a gap between two Tiger bunkers. Their target: a bunker line identified as a strong point of the enemy. Well versed with special infantry operations, they crept through the darkness and took the Tigers by total surprise, attacking them from the rear. Overwhelming fire power, over powered the Tiger cadres in their well fortified bunkers. It was a swift and lightening blow.
Destroyed
In a matter of minutes, troops had destroyed several bunkers; a military official said eight bunkers were destroyed. The Army said at least 10 LTTE cadres were killed and twenty injured. These figures of LTTE casualties could not be verified independently. Having taken the Tigers by surprise, troops rushed back to their positions. By then the Tigers were aware of the presence of the soldiers. As they were crossing ‘No Man’s land’, a barrage of mortar fire rained on them.
In the absence of a cover, troops were easily visible. Two soldiers were killed in the mortar attack and seven others were injured.
In another incident, a small team of infantry troops broke away from their forward defence positions in Kilali and sneaked to the guerrilla territory in the early hours of Wednesday.
They exploded a Bangalore torpedo, killing two Tiger cadres. The explosion, however, alerted the guerrillas of their presence in the enemy territory. Troops retreated returning fire as the alert Tiger cadres reacted, supported by a heavy barrage of mortars.
Two soldiers succumbed later to injures on admission to the Palali military hospital. LTTE infiltration into the Jaffna peninsula continues despite heavy security measures to deter LTTE activities in the peninsula.
Major haul of explosives
On Thursday afternoon, troops recovered a suicide jacket, T 56 assault rifle and a communication set buried in an abandoned land in Thirunaweli, Jaffna.
Earlier on Wednesday, troops unearthed a major haul of explosives and ammunition in West of Walikamam, Jaffna.
Troops recovered four suicide jackets, two claymore mines four remote control devices, two T 56 assault rifles, eight magazines, five hundred rounds of ammunition, ten hand grenades, one area map, three radio sets, twenty four detonators, thirty claymore mine batteries and two army uniforms.
According to intelligence reports, about twenty under cover Tiger cadres are operating in the Jaffna peninsula.
Meanwhile, on the Eastern front, the Navy has confirmed the death of sea Tiger leader Nishanthan, who led the sea Tigers to the sea battle off Pulmudai on September 27It was believed that Nishanthan perished in the sea clash in which the Navy said it killed at least 18 Tiger cadres. His death was confirmed after SBS commandoes recovered the body of the slain guerrilla floating in the sea. Immediately after, the top Tiger leader went missing; the Navy has noticed a larger number of fishing boats from Sali Sambalthivu area dominating the sea. A naval officer said the sea Tigers could have assigned the local fishermen to comb the sea to find clues about the fate of Nishanthan.
On September 30, the sailors were alerted by local fishermen of the presence of the body of a Tiger cadre. The body was later handed over to Police.
(http://www.lakbimanews.lk/defence.htm)
Friday, October 05, 2007
Slow Victory in Sri Lanka
The Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon, just south of India) civil war is staggering to a finish. After 25 years, and over 70,000 dead, the rebels are fading. The cause of the war was ethnic rivalry. Hindu Tamils are a minority (18 percent of the 18 million people on the island) and were originally brought in by the British as agricultural workers. There were always some Tamils on Sri Lanka, for the Indian province of Tamil Nadu is just across the 29 kilometer wide straits. But the large number of agricultural workers settled in the north and along the coasts, where the plantations were. The Tamils formed all Tamil communities and maintained their ethnic identity.
The majority of Tamils have long felt they were discriminated against by the majority Sri Lankans (Sinhalese, who are Buddhist). Not surprisingly, the native Sri Lankans took a dim view of all these foreigners the British had imported. There were tensions. In 1972 that anger began to get organized when Velupillai Prabhakaran formed the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) movement. In 1976 the, TNT renamed itself the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This was more than a name change, for the TNT had become, as the LTTE, a very disciplined and fanatical terrorist organization. The LTTE began using suicide bombers about the same time Islamic terrorists did, and more effectively. But the war in Sri Lanka never made the news much in the West.
The war had its ups and downs, and even an Indian intervention, with peacekeepers, in the late 1980s. Nothing worked. The LTTE wanted to partition the island, and by the late 1990s, had effectively done that. The LTTE controlled the northern tip of the island, and most of the eastern coast. In response, Sri Lanka recruited more troops, bought more weapons, and kept fighting. In 2002, there was a ceasefire, and a serious effort to negotiate a peace deal. Talks dragged on for three years. Two years ago, the violence resumed, triggered by growing refusal, by the Sinhalese majority, to even consider partition, and a split inside the LTTE. One faction of the rebels wanted to settle for more autonomy, but the hard core insisted on partition, or a fight to the death. But too many Tamils were tired of fighting. The renewed fighting has the government helping the rebels within the LTTE, causing the LTTE to lose control of the east coast. In the last three years, the LTTE has lost 60 percent of its territory, and about half of its best fighters. The government now has the initiative, and is picking apart the remaining LTTE force.
The violence could go on for a few more years, since the government does not want to get a lot of its soldiers killed in order to stamp out the LTTE. Moreover, the rebels still have an edge when it comes to fanaticism. Everyone remembers battles in the 1990s, where outnumbered, but more determined, LTTE fighters routed the army time and again. Until the LTTE organization on the island is taken apart, the Sinhalese majority cannot rest. But the current situation is the best the government has been in since the early 1980s.
(http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htwin/articles/20071005.aspx)
The majority of Tamils have long felt they were discriminated against by the majority Sri Lankans (Sinhalese, who are Buddhist). Not surprisingly, the native Sri Lankans took a dim view of all these foreigners the British had imported. There were tensions. In 1972 that anger began to get organized when Velupillai Prabhakaran formed the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) movement. In 1976 the, TNT renamed itself the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This was more than a name change, for the TNT had become, as the LTTE, a very disciplined and fanatical terrorist organization. The LTTE began using suicide bombers about the same time Islamic terrorists did, and more effectively. But the war in Sri Lanka never made the news much in the West.
The war had its ups and downs, and even an Indian intervention, with peacekeepers, in the late 1980s. Nothing worked. The LTTE wanted to partition the island, and by the late 1990s, had effectively done that. The LTTE controlled the northern tip of the island, and most of the eastern coast. In response, Sri Lanka recruited more troops, bought more weapons, and kept fighting. In 2002, there was a ceasefire, and a serious effort to negotiate a peace deal. Talks dragged on for three years. Two years ago, the violence resumed, triggered by growing refusal, by the Sinhalese majority, to even consider partition, and a split inside the LTTE. One faction of the rebels wanted to settle for more autonomy, but the hard core insisted on partition, or a fight to the death. But too many Tamils were tired of fighting. The renewed fighting has the government helping the rebels within the LTTE, causing the LTTE to lose control of the east coast. In the last three years, the LTTE has lost 60 percent of its territory, and about half of its best fighters. The government now has the initiative, and is picking apart the remaining LTTE force.
The violence could go on for a few more years, since the government does not want to get a lot of its soldiers killed in order to stamp out the LTTE. Moreover, the rebels still have an edge when it comes to fanaticism. Everyone remembers battles in the 1990s, where outnumbered, but more determined, LTTE fighters routed the army time and again. Until the LTTE organization on the island is taken apart, the Sinhalese majority cannot rest. But the current situation is the best the government has been in since the early 1980s.
(http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htwin/articles/20071005.aspx)
Special Task Force
STF Motor Cycle Squad
This squad, active in Colombo and suburbs at one time, is doing yeoman services in operation areas by providing access to areas unreachable by other heavier vehicles. They are capable of rapid deployment and launching quick, surprise attacks.
Search and bomb disposal unit
Established after the bomb attack on Parliament on 08 August 1987, this unit, known at its inception as the STF Search Unit is the first to be established by an act of Parliament.
Based on the training given to the officers of this unit by foreign bomb disposal experts and their extensive training on explosives, this unit was officially declared the Bomb Disposal Unit.
With special training on suicide bombs and Intelligent Explosive Devices (IED), the scope of this unit has become wider today. This is the only unit in the Police permitted to handle and assume responsibility for all explosive devices in the arsenals of the Department
.
Parachute Unit
The Parachute Unit, who had completed the parachute training course of the Sri Lanka Air Force, is capable of landing in enemy-held areas with the assistance of airborne troops.
STF Women’s Unit
This unit assists in working in the offices and operation areas, and search operations and body searches of women at road blocks.
The nature of duties of the Special Task Force
Other than their duties in the operational areas, the foremost duty of the STF is assisting the Police in upholding the law and order of the country. Rehabilitating the civil population in operational areas and conducting road searches are major parts in the duties of the STF.
* Launching operations to thwart terrorist attacks
* Operations in Batticaloa, Vavuniya and Amparai Districts
* Protecting the VIPs
* Protecting foreign VIPs
* Carrying out search operations and intelligence missions
* Searching for, and disposal of bombs and explosive devices
* Assisting the police in difficult situations
* Holding special training programmes for the Police, the Special Forces and other institutions
* Prevention of terrorism in Colombo and suburbs
* Prevention of organised crime
* Conducting search operations to upgrade the security of sensitive points
* Providing security for National Festivals and other special occasions
* Providing assistance in disaster situations
are some of the duties of the Special Task Force.
Special thanks to:
The Commandant of the S.T.F. D.I.G.Nimal Lewke,
S.S.P. S.T.F. Ajith Wickremasekera
I.P Sanjeewa Silva
Photography - Media Unit of the STF
Rathna Pitagampala
Priyantha Wijewardene
This squad, active in Colombo and suburbs at one time, is doing yeoman services in operation areas by providing access to areas unreachable by other heavier vehicles. They are capable of rapid deployment and launching quick, surprise attacks.Search and bomb disposal unit
Established after the bomb attack on Parliament on 08 August 1987, this unit, known at its inception as the STF Search Unit is the first to be established by an act of Parliament.
Based on the training given to the officers of this unit by foreign bomb disposal experts and their extensive training on explosives, this unit was officially declared the Bomb Disposal Unit.
With special training on suicide bombs and Intelligent Explosive Devices (IED), the scope of this unit has become wider today. This is the only unit in the Police permitted to handle and assume responsibility for all explosive devices in the arsenals of the Department
.
Parachute Unit
The Parachute Unit, who had completed the parachute training course of the Sri Lanka Air Force, is capable of landing in enemy-held areas with the assistance of airborne troops.STF Women’s Unit
This unit assists in working in the offices and operation areas, and search operations and body searches of women at road blocks.
The nature of duties of the Special Task Force
Other than their duties in the operational areas, the foremost duty of the STF is assisting the Police in upholding the law and order of the country. Rehabilitating the civil population in operational areas and conducting road searches are major parts in the duties of the STF.* Launching operations to thwart terrorist attacks
* Operations in Batticaloa, Vavuniya and Amparai Districts
* Protecting the VIPs
* Protecting foreign VIPs
* Carrying out search operations and intelligence missions
* Searching for, and disposal of bombs and explosive devices
* Assisting the police in difficult situations
* Holding special training programmes for the Police, the Special Forces and other institutions
* Prevention of terrorism in Colombo and suburbs
* Prevention of organised crime
* Conducting search operations to upgrade the security of sensitive points
* Providing security for National Festivals and other special occasions
* Providing assistance in disaster situations
are some of the duties of the Special Task Force.
Special thanks to:
The Commandant of the S.T.F. D.I.G.Nimal Lewke,
S.S.P. S.T.F. Ajith Wickremasekera
I.P Sanjeewa Silva
Photography - Media Unit of the STF
Rathna Pitagampala
Priyantha Wijewardene
Thursday, October 04, 2007
The army thinks it can win. It is wrong
FROM the line of dusty travellers leaving the Tamil Tigers' heartland in northern Sri Lanka, young men are strikingly absent. The people trudging out of rebel territory, across a strip of scrubby ground dotted with bundles of barbed wire and gun-slung soldiers, say securing exit passes from the rebels has become increasingly tough. For the young, it is all but impossible. As far as the Tigers are concerned, they are potential fighters.
The rebels want to keep the young and fit in their stronghold, a mini-state run with thuggish ruthlessness. Since 1983, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have fought for an independent “homeland” in the east and north for the island's Tamil minority. In July the Sri Lankan army declared it had cleared the eastern part for the first time in 14 years. Now its sights are on the north. In his heavily fortified headquarters in the capital Colombo, the army chief, General Sarath Fonseka, says he expects to chase the Tigers from the north in a year, “maybe less”.
This is more than a commander's bravado. After the army's triumph in the east, subsequent victories suggest the Tigers' strength is diminished. In early September the army cleared an area just south of their heartland, capturing a Tiger naval base purportedly used to receive smuggled weapons. Days later it sank three ships it said were ferrying light aircraft and a bullet-proof car for the Tigers' chieftain, Velupillai Prabhakaran. In eastern Sri Lanka some Tamils express surprise, and sometimes disenchantment, that the Tigers' roar has been more muffled of late.
If the army did win the north while holding the east it would constitute a huge and unprecedented victory. Its last big push into the area, in the late 1990s, ended with hundreds of dead soldiers and a humiliating retreat. In the east, which has a mixed population of Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims, the rebels' hold was patchy and the army was helped by the defection in 2004 of the Tigers' commander in the region, known as Colonel Karuna. The Tigers hold the Tamil north in a much tighter grip. And the army has fewer soldiers than it would like for its northern campaign, because it is busy securing the east.
Days after the government celebrated its latest victories in the eastern port town of Trincomalee last month, suspected Tigers bombed a bus in the area, killing the driver and wounding several passengers. Though such incidents in the east have decreased, they suggest that the Tigers remain a force to be reckoned with. In the north, on the margins of their fief, there are areas where it is unclear quite who is in control: the army or the rebels.
Even a northern victory, momentous as it would be, would not bring an end to Sri Lanka's conflict. That will not come without a political solution, giving some measure of autonomy to the island's Tamils who have suffered discrimination from the Sinhalese majority more or less since independence.
A cross-party group of politicians has made some progress on this front, agreeing that the island should be devolved at the provincial level—an improvement on an earlier government proposal for district-level devolution. But last month the defence minister, Gotabhaya Rajapakse (brother of the president, Mahinda Rajapakse), made it clear where the government's priorities lay. A political solution, he said, would be impossible without first crushing the Tigers. This dashed any faint hope that the ceasefire agreement the government and the Tigers signed in 2002, and which is still notionally in force, might yet be revived.
In the east, meanwhile, the government has an opportunity to show Tamils they are better-off under the government than they were under the rebels. But its commitment to this goal is questionable. In a Trincomalee town hall with views of the glittering Indian Ocean, more than 80 families sleep on a concrete floor amid battered cardboard boxes of possessions. They have lived here for more than a year, since they were shelled out of their homes in nearby Sampur, a former Tiger stronghold; thousands more of their fellow townspeople languish in camps outside the town. Though few of them seem to know it, they are unlikely to return home: Sampur has been turned into a no-go high-security zone for the army.
The government faces other challenges if it is to pull off victory in the north. People in Colombo, for whom the war is a rather distant affair, may not have heard any bombs lately. But they complain about rocketing inflation, and political support for President Rajapakse's government is ebbing. Dogged by allegations of incompetence and corruption, it is expected to be further weakened when it presents its budget in November. In last year's, military expenses surged by 44%. Another big rise will increase pressure to show that all this spending is achieving something.
(http://www.economist.com/world/asia/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=9905428)
The rebels want to keep the young and fit in their stronghold, a mini-state run with thuggish ruthlessness. Since 1983, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have fought for an independent “homeland” in the east and north for the island's Tamil minority. In July the Sri Lankan army declared it had cleared the eastern part for the first time in 14 years. Now its sights are on the north. In his heavily fortified headquarters in the capital Colombo, the army chief, General Sarath Fonseka, says he expects to chase the Tigers from the north in a year, “maybe less”.
This is more than a commander's bravado. After the army's triumph in the east, subsequent victories suggest the Tigers' strength is diminished. In early September the army cleared an area just south of their heartland, capturing a Tiger naval base purportedly used to receive smuggled weapons. Days later it sank three ships it said were ferrying light aircraft and a bullet-proof car for the Tigers' chieftain, Velupillai Prabhakaran. In eastern Sri Lanka some Tamils express surprise, and sometimes disenchantment, that the Tigers' roar has been more muffled of late.
If the army did win the north while holding the east it would constitute a huge and unprecedented victory. Its last big push into the area, in the late 1990s, ended with hundreds of dead soldiers and a humiliating retreat. In the east, which has a mixed population of Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims, the rebels' hold was patchy and the army was helped by the defection in 2004 of the Tigers' commander in the region, known as Colonel Karuna. The Tigers hold the Tamil north in a much tighter grip. And the army has fewer soldiers than it would like for its northern campaign, because it is busy securing the east.
Days after the government celebrated its latest victories in the eastern port town of Trincomalee last month, suspected Tigers bombed a bus in the area, killing the driver and wounding several passengers. Though such incidents in the east have decreased, they suggest that the Tigers remain a force to be reckoned with. In the north, on the margins of their fief, there are areas where it is unclear quite who is in control: the army or the rebels.
Even a northern victory, momentous as it would be, would not bring an end to Sri Lanka's conflict. That will not come without a political solution, giving some measure of autonomy to the island's Tamils who have suffered discrimination from the Sinhalese majority more or less since independence.
A cross-party group of politicians has made some progress on this front, agreeing that the island should be devolved at the provincial level—an improvement on an earlier government proposal for district-level devolution. But last month the defence minister, Gotabhaya Rajapakse (brother of the president, Mahinda Rajapakse), made it clear where the government's priorities lay. A political solution, he said, would be impossible without first crushing the Tigers. This dashed any faint hope that the ceasefire agreement the government and the Tigers signed in 2002, and which is still notionally in force, might yet be revived.
In the east, meanwhile, the government has an opportunity to show Tamils they are better-off under the government than they were under the rebels. But its commitment to this goal is questionable. In a Trincomalee town hall with views of the glittering Indian Ocean, more than 80 families sleep on a concrete floor amid battered cardboard boxes of possessions. They have lived here for more than a year, since they were shelled out of their homes in nearby Sampur, a former Tiger stronghold; thousands more of their fellow townspeople languish in camps outside the town. Though few of them seem to know it, they are unlikely to return home: Sampur has been turned into a no-go high-security zone for the army.
The government faces other challenges if it is to pull off victory in the north. People in Colombo, for whom the war is a rather distant affair, may not have heard any bombs lately. But they complain about rocketing inflation, and political support for President Rajapakse's government is ebbing. Dogged by allegations of incompetence and corruption, it is expected to be further weakened when it presents its budget in November. In last year's, military expenses surged by 44%. Another big rise will increase pressure to show that all this spending is achieving something.
(http://www.economist.com/world/asia/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=9905428)
Iceland offers unqualified apology to Sri Lanka for its diplomat’s unauthorized meeting with Tigers
The Government of Iceland has tendered an unqualified written apology to the Government of Sri Lanka for the unauthorized meeting of Bjarni Vestmann, Minister Counsellor of the Foreign Ministry of Iceland, with representatives of the LTTE, according to a press release issued by the Embassy of Sri Lanka in Washington.
The apology was tendered after Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama, who is currently on an official visit to Washington DC, took up the issue with his counterpart Mrs. Ingibjörg Sólrún GÃsladóttir, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade of Iceland on Wednesday morning. The Minister strongly protested the action of Vestmann, and requested his immediate recall.
Foreign Minister GÃsladóttir emphatically stated that the Government of Iceland had not authorized Vestmann to make any contact with the LTTE, which he has done much to their disappointment
The Iceland Foreign Minister noted the close relations between Sri Lanka and Iceland and hoped for the continuation of this relationship.
According to Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry sources, Vestmann had not gone through the proper channels. A spokesperson said that his visit was not approved by the Foreign Ministry.
The Sri Lankan Peace Secretariat too reacted sharply to the unauthorized visit of Vestmann to the Tigers Political and Administrative headquarters in Killinochchi. In reply to a question as to how Vestmann slipped passed the checkpoints, the Peace Secretariat has said that vehicles of established agencies like SLMM are not checked. But it has recommended to the Ministry of Defence that in future all vehicles and individuals traveling in them should be checked closely.
The Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) headed by the Norwegians is now washing their hands off saying that the presence of S.P. Tamilselvan, the political head of head of the LTTE, was coincidental and the report that formal discussions took place was incorrect. At the last minute SLMM backed off from taking Vestmann to the Peace Secretariat. SLMM told the Peace Secretariat that they had informed the Foreign Ministry about the incident and expressed their regrets.
(http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/7653)
The apology was tendered after Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama, who is currently on an official visit to Washington DC, took up the issue with his counterpart Mrs. Ingibjörg Sólrún GÃsladóttir, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade of Iceland on Wednesday morning. The Minister strongly protested the action of Vestmann, and requested his immediate recall.
Foreign Minister GÃsladóttir emphatically stated that the Government of Iceland had not authorized Vestmann to make any contact with the LTTE, which he has done much to their disappointment
The Iceland Foreign Minister noted the close relations between Sri Lanka and Iceland and hoped for the continuation of this relationship.
According to Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry sources, Vestmann had not gone through the proper channels. A spokesperson said that his visit was not approved by the Foreign Ministry.
The Sri Lankan Peace Secretariat too reacted sharply to the unauthorized visit of Vestmann to the Tigers Political and Administrative headquarters in Killinochchi. In reply to a question as to how Vestmann slipped passed the checkpoints, the Peace Secretariat has said that vehicles of established agencies like SLMM are not checked. But it has recommended to the Ministry of Defence that in future all vehicles and individuals traveling in them should be checked closely.
The Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) headed by the Norwegians is now washing their hands off saying that the presence of S.P. Tamilselvan, the political head of head of the LTTE, was coincidental and the report that formal discussions took place was incorrect. At the last minute SLMM backed off from taking Vestmann to the Peace Secretariat. SLMM told the Peace Secretariat that they had informed the Foreign Ministry about the incident and expressed their regrets.
(http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/7653)
Iceland apologises to Sri Lanka
Iceland has apologised to the Sri Lankan government for the unauthorised meeting of one of its diplomats with rebels in the north of the island.
Sri Lanka had called for the expulsion the diplomat, Bjarni Vestmann.
Foreigners and journalists are not allowed to enter territory held by the Tamil Tigers without permission.
The Sri Lankan foreign ministry said that the diplomat had managed to get a ride with truce monitors of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission.
It said it had lodged a protest with the mission for transporting the diplomat.
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7028553.stm)
Sri Lanka had called for the expulsion the diplomat, Bjarni Vestmann.
Foreigners and journalists are not allowed to enter territory held by the Tamil Tigers without permission.
The Sri Lankan foreign ministry said that the diplomat had managed to get a ride with truce monitors of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission.
It said it had lodged a protest with the mission for transporting the diplomat.
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7028553.stm)
Sri Lanka calls for expulsion of Icelandic diplomat
Sri Lanka on Tuesday called for the expulsion of an Icelandic diplomat who made a clandestine visit to the Tamil Tiger-held north of the island.
Sri Lanka's foreign ministry said it asked Reykjavik to recall Bjarni Vestmann, a minister-counsellor at Iceland's foreign ministry, after he entered the country on a tourist visa and went to the north to meet with rebels.
"The (Sri Lankan foreign) minister strongly protested the action of Mr. Vestmann and requested his immediate recall," a ministry statement said.
Foreigners and journalists are not allowed to enter territory held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) without government permission.
The diplomat, however, had managed to get a ride with Scandinavian truce monitors, the ministry said.
It said it had also lodged a protest with the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) for transporting the diplomat.
There was no immediate comment from the SLMM or Vestmann.
The Tamil Tigers had on Tuesday posted a picture of Vestmann calling on the LTTE's political wing leader S. P. Thamilselvan at the guerrillas' political headquarters in Kilinochchi.
The SLMM is on the island to monitor a Norwegian-brokered truce agreed to in February 2002. The ceasefire has since collapsed.
(http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071004/wl_sthasia_afp/srilankaicelandunrestdiplomacypeace_
071004114351&printer=1;_ylt=AgL7KiOmbJrcs2T4s0csWLPuOrgF)
Sri Lanka's foreign ministry said it asked Reykjavik to recall Bjarni Vestmann, a minister-counsellor at Iceland's foreign ministry, after he entered the country on a tourist visa and went to the north to meet with rebels.
"The (Sri Lankan foreign) minister strongly protested the action of Mr. Vestmann and requested his immediate recall," a ministry statement said.
Foreigners and journalists are not allowed to enter territory held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) without government permission.
The diplomat, however, had managed to get a ride with Scandinavian truce monitors, the ministry said.
It said it had also lodged a protest with the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) for transporting the diplomat.
There was no immediate comment from the SLMM or Vestmann.
The Tamil Tigers had on Tuesday posted a picture of Vestmann calling on the LTTE's political wing leader S. P. Thamilselvan at the guerrillas' political headquarters in Kilinochchi.
The SLMM is on the island to monitor a Norwegian-brokered truce agreed to in February 2002. The ceasefire has since collapsed.
(http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071004/wl_sthasia_afp/srilankaicelandunrestdiplomacypeace_
071004114351&printer=1;_ylt=AgL7KiOmbJrcs2T4s0csWLPuOrgF)
Senseless death of Sri Lankan Good Samaritan
'Our dearest Fr Packiaranjith has been killed in a claymore mine attack; the Diocese of Mannar is in deep sorrow.' The news from a friend in northern Sri Lanka was shocking, but not surprising. As a local coordinator for the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) in Mannar District, Fr Nicholaspillai Packiaranjith lived and worked in a contested territory in Sri Lanka's long-running civil war.
The 40-year-old priest was killed on 26 September, when his van was blown up by a mine in rebel-held territory as he was delivering aid to displaced people and orphans. Typically, the army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) blamed each other for the blast. We are unlikely to discover the truth, because both cynically use war casualties to bolster their propaganda.
More than 10,000 people attended the funeral of Fr Packiaranjith on 29 September. In a press statement, the Bishop of Mannar, Rayappu Joseph, said Fr Packiaranjith served with 'exemplary dedication' and was 'deeply committed to the poor and the marginalised', which made his murder all the more heinous.
Apart from being a priest who gave his life for his people, Fr Packiaranjith represents the victims of Sri Lanka's civil war, which has raged intermittently for over 25 years, claiming at least 70,000 lives. The LTTE wants autonomy in the north-east for the minority Tamils, whose grievances date back to post-Independence days, when they bore the brunt of mob violence and of discriminatory laws and policies imposed by governments dominated by the Sinhalese majority.
The war shows no signs of abating. The Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, also the President's brother, recently announced the government's intention to defeat the LTTE '100 per cent' before negotiating a political solution to the so-called 'ethnic problem'. Rajapaksa later went back on his word and claimed to want to reach agreement with the LTTE, but the writing on the wall is clear.
The ceasefire signed in 2002 is no longer worth the paper it is written on. Fierce fighting rages anew. The defection in 2004 of a senior LTTE leader from the east, Karuna, has fuelled the conflict. Both the LTTE and the Karuna faction are indulging in forced recruitment, extending this even to children. Thousands of people have been displaced, and at least 4,000 have been killed since late 2005 when the peace process started to come apart. Over 1,000 have 'disappeared'. There is scepticism about official inquiries set up to investigate well-known cases, like the disappearance of Fr Jim Brown, a priest from Jaffna, on 20 August 2006.
Sri Lanka has a history of failed peace talks. The high hopes of those wanting peace are frequently dashed. The island ranks second only to Iraq in the number of unsolved disappearances, a phenomenon fuelled by the notorious 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). Commissions of inquiry set up by the former president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, ascertained that 26,000 people disappeared — others put the figure at close to 60,000 — and concluded that the armed forces were largely responsible.
The cases also included disappearances perpetrated in the suppression of an uprising among the Sinhalese in the late 1980s. But impunity is the name of the game in Sri Lanka. There is what the Asian Human Rights Commission aptly described a 'total collapse of the rule of law'. The armed forces and Tamil paramilitary groups literally get away with murder.
The LTTE is not accountable to anyone. It eliminates perceived detractors, uses terror tactics, and expects all Tamils to contribute to the never-ending liberation struggle. Apologists depict LTTE-held territory as a de facto state on a war footing and use this rationale to justify violations of human rights.
Nonetheless, the LTTE has been internationally accepted as the legitimate representative of the Tamils and remains a force to be reckoned with, despite recent military setbacks. The government strategy of talking peace and waging war is bound to fail and only serves to bring suffering.
For all their rhetoric, neither warring party has the welfare of civilians at heart. They fail to learn from the mistakes of history and instead repeat them, with the result that innocents like Fr Packiaranjith pay the price. Sri Lanka's people can only beg for peace and draw international attention to their plight, as Bishop Joseph did when Fr Packiaranjith was killed: 'Enough blood has flowed. We call on all men and women of goodwill to condemn this killing and to voice their strong condemnation of the ongoing senseless war.'
(http://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article.aspx?aeid=3532)
The 40-year-old priest was killed on 26 September, when his van was blown up by a mine in rebel-held territory as he was delivering aid to displaced people and orphans. Typically, the army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) blamed each other for the blast. We are unlikely to discover the truth, because both cynically use war casualties to bolster their propaganda.
More than 10,000 people attended the funeral of Fr Packiaranjith on 29 September. In a press statement, the Bishop of Mannar, Rayappu Joseph, said Fr Packiaranjith served with 'exemplary dedication' and was 'deeply committed to the poor and the marginalised', which made his murder all the more heinous.
Apart from being a priest who gave his life for his people, Fr Packiaranjith represents the victims of Sri Lanka's civil war, which has raged intermittently for over 25 years, claiming at least 70,000 lives. The LTTE wants autonomy in the north-east for the minority Tamils, whose grievances date back to post-Independence days, when they bore the brunt of mob violence and of discriminatory laws and policies imposed by governments dominated by the Sinhalese majority.
The war shows no signs of abating. The Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, also the President's brother, recently announced the government's intention to defeat the LTTE '100 per cent' before negotiating a political solution to the so-called 'ethnic problem'. Rajapaksa later went back on his word and claimed to want to reach agreement with the LTTE, but the writing on the wall is clear.
The ceasefire signed in 2002 is no longer worth the paper it is written on. Fierce fighting rages anew. The defection in 2004 of a senior LTTE leader from the east, Karuna, has fuelled the conflict. Both the LTTE and the Karuna faction are indulging in forced recruitment, extending this even to children. Thousands of people have been displaced, and at least 4,000 have been killed since late 2005 when the peace process started to come apart. Over 1,000 have 'disappeared'. There is scepticism about official inquiries set up to investigate well-known cases, like the disappearance of Fr Jim Brown, a priest from Jaffna, on 20 August 2006.
Sri Lanka has a history of failed peace talks. The high hopes of those wanting peace are frequently dashed. The island ranks second only to Iraq in the number of unsolved disappearances, a phenomenon fuelled by the notorious 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). Commissions of inquiry set up by the former president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, ascertained that 26,000 people disappeared — others put the figure at close to 60,000 — and concluded that the armed forces were largely responsible.
The cases also included disappearances perpetrated in the suppression of an uprising among the Sinhalese in the late 1980s. But impunity is the name of the game in Sri Lanka. There is what the Asian Human Rights Commission aptly described a 'total collapse of the rule of law'. The armed forces and Tamil paramilitary groups literally get away with murder.
The LTTE is not accountable to anyone. It eliminates perceived detractors, uses terror tactics, and expects all Tamils to contribute to the never-ending liberation struggle. Apologists depict LTTE-held territory as a de facto state on a war footing and use this rationale to justify violations of human rights.
Nonetheless, the LTTE has been internationally accepted as the legitimate representative of the Tamils and remains a force to be reckoned with, despite recent military setbacks. The government strategy of talking peace and waging war is bound to fail and only serves to bring suffering.
For all their rhetoric, neither warring party has the welfare of civilians at heart. They fail to learn from the mistakes of history and instead repeat them, with the result that innocents like Fr Packiaranjith pay the price. Sri Lanka's people can only beg for peace and draw international attention to their plight, as Bishop Joseph did when Fr Packiaranjith was killed: 'Enough blood has flowed. We call on all men and women of goodwill to condemn this killing and to voice their strong condemnation of the ongoing senseless war.'
(http://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article.aspx?aeid=3532)
IPKF was victim of vile LTTE propaganda: Tamil rights activist
The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) which was deployed in Sri Lanka's troubled North and East between 1987 and 1990, was a victim of vile propaganda by the LTTE, an internationally acclaimed Sri Lankan Tamil human rights activist has said.
"We began our work in 1987 when the Indian Army took control of Jaffna. Apart from the callousness of an army, we saw that many instances of civilian tragedy were deliberately engineered by the LTTE for propaganda," said Dr Rajan Hoole, after receiving the Martin Ennals Award from the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva on Tuesday.
"Our early work discussed the thwarting of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement by both the LTTE and the (Sri Lankan) government and how the Indian Peace Keeping Force was pushed to strong military action by the LTTE's calculated provocations, resulting in many violations by the IPKF," Hoole said in his acceptance speech.
For two decades, Hoole and the fellow award winner K Sritharan, have been meticulously documenting human rights violations by all armed groups, including the government, in the Tamil-speaking Sri Lankan North East, at grave risk to their lives.
Provoked Lankan forces too
Referring to the post 1990 or post IPKF situation, Hoole said, "It fell to us to record the LTTE's cynicism in deliberately inviting reprisals against civilians, the terrible reprisal of the government forces, and the LTTE's ideologically directed violence against the Muslims including the ethnic cleansing of the entire Northern Muslim population and the mosque massacres in the East."
According to Hoole, the LTTE's "simple programme is to undermine any healthy development in the Sinhalese south for a political settlement, and by some foul act of violence, provoke the State's inherent harshness towards the Tamils."
Referring to the December 2005 Presidential elections in which the LTTE is said to have helped Sinhala hardliner Mahinda Rajapaksa to win, Hoole said, " It was in character for the LTTE to abet the election of a President with nationalist leanings and then deliberately provoke war. It saw this as the most promising way to a separate state."
Lankan government blamed
Hoole blamed the Sri Lankan government too for the continuance of the bloody conflict, the lack of democracy in the Tamil areas, and the continuing hold of the LTTE on the Tamil population. The state had not given the Tamils an alternative to the militancy and separatism of the LTTE but had only been concentrating on the military elimination of the LTTE, and trampling on the basic rights of the Tamils in the process, he pointed out.
"Democratic institutions are fracturing beyond a point of repair while the leaders are blinded by the arrogance of power. Their short term political interest helps the LTTE to thrust and hold the Tamil civilians in a regime of war, claiming with some logic that there is no alternative," Hoole said.
On the current political situation in Sri Lanka, he said that in the Sri Lankan government's war on terror, there was only a token acknowledgement of the need for a political settlement. That was merely a device to buy time and satisfy the world.
And in all this, he added, the LTTE had become a "pretext for crushing the Tamil people in the interest of a Sinhalese hegemonic state."
(http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print.aspx?Id=2fa65204-93c6-489d-8af5-4c6c3099b3b7)
"We began our work in 1987 when the Indian Army took control of Jaffna. Apart from the callousness of an army, we saw that many instances of civilian tragedy were deliberately engineered by the LTTE for propaganda," said Dr Rajan Hoole, after receiving the Martin Ennals Award from the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva on Tuesday.
"Our early work discussed the thwarting of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement by both the LTTE and the (Sri Lankan) government and how the Indian Peace Keeping Force was pushed to strong military action by the LTTE's calculated provocations, resulting in many violations by the IPKF," Hoole said in his acceptance speech.
For two decades, Hoole and the fellow award winner K Sritharan, have been meticulously documenting human rights violations by all armed groups, including the government, in the Tamil-speaking Sri Lankan North East, at grave risk to their lives.
Provoked Lankan forces too
Referring to the post 1990 or post IPKF situation, Hoole said, "It fell to us to record the LTTE's cynicism in deliberately inviting reprisals against civilians, the terrible reprisal of the government forces, and the LTTE's ideologically directed violence against the Muslims including the ethnic cleansing of the entire Northern Muslim population and the mosque massacres in the East."
According to Hoole, the LTTE's "simple programme is to undermine any healthy development in the Sinhalese south for a political settlement, and by some foul act of violence, provoke the State's inherent harshness towards the Tamils."
Referring to the December 2005 Presidential elections in which the LTTE is said to have helped Sinhala hardliner Mahinda Rajapaksa to win, Hoole said, " It was in character for the LTTE to abet the election of a President with nationalist leanings and then deliberately provoke war. It saw this as the most promising way to a separate state."
Lankan government blamed
Hoole blamed the Sri Lankan government too for the continuance of the bloody conflict, the lack of democracy in the Tamil areas, and the continuing hold of the LTTE on the Tamil population. The state had not given the Tamils an alternative to the militancy and separatism of the LTTE but had only been concentrating on the military elimination of the LTTE, and trampling on the basic rights of the Tamils in the process, he pointed out.
"Democratic institutions are fracturing beyond a point of repair while the leaders are blinded by the arrogance of power. Their short term political interest helps the LTTE to thrust and hold the Tamil civilians in a regime of war, claiming with some logic that there is no alternative," Hoole said.
On the current political situation in Sri Lanka, he said that in the Sri Lankan government's war on terror, there was only a token acknowledgement of the need for a political settlement. That was merely a device to buy time and satisfy the world.
And in all this, he added, the LTTE had become a "pretext for crushing the Tamil people in the interest of a Sinhalese hegemonic state."
(http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print.aspx?Id=2fa65204-93c6-489d-8af5-4c6c3099b3b7)
Wednesday, October 03, 2007
LTTE's Wanni bastion no longer impregnable
Forces have learnt from past debacles:
Next target: Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa on September 10, spelt out the Government's position with regard to the Wanni, without ambiguity at the ceremony held at the Naval Jetty in Trincomalee, when the nation paid tribute to the Navy men who returned to the Trincomalee port following their biggest victory in the sea.
He was very clear in his message that there will be no room for terrorism in the country and that if Wanni is the last bastion of terrorism that is obviously the next target of the Security Forces.
The Wanni operation is not the only message conveyed by him. He also indicated that the military option will be a backed up vehicle to implement the political solution that may be agreed upon at the All Party Representative Committee to solve the decades long conflict in the North and the East.
This means the Government is very clearly in it's resolve in adopting a politico-military approach to the North East conflict. In other words the Government needs to win the battle against terrorism one hundred per cent to facilitate the implementation of a political solution.
But many are looking forward to the defeat of the LTTE militarily in the Wanni which is considered to be the Tiger stronghold where all its military, administrative and political apparatus are concentrated.
Whether the Government conveys this message or not the LTTE is aware that the Security Forces, if not for the external pressure on the Government to hold back its military operations, will definitely conquer the Wanni to liberate the people from the iron grip of the Tigers.
But there are those who also think it will be suicidal for the Security Forces to step into Wanni.They are of the thinking that the Wanni is impregnable . There are many reasons to support this idea since many attempts to penetrate the LTTE heartland had ended in failure.
Jayasikurui (Victory Assured) the longest and costliest battle fought by the Security Forces to capture a 76 Km stretch of road between Vavuniya and Kilinochchi along the Jaffna Kandy A-9 highway was a classic example giving credence to this school of thought.
The LTTE reacted to this operation, launching a counter offensive "Operation Sei Allathu Sethu Madi" (Do or die) compelling the Security Forces to suspend the battle short of its objective of reaching only the Northern town of Mankulam, 32 Km South of Kilinochchi 18 months after the launch of the battle in May 1997.
Defeating LTTE
The subsequent attempts by the Security Forces, such as Ranagosa operation launched in 1999 to wrest control of the areas around Wanni though successful at the initial stage, later turned out to be debacles, leading to many reversals with Security Forces losing control of Kilinochchi, Paranthan and later the biggest debacle in Elephant Pass losing thousands of soldiers.
But the LTTE too suffered heavy losses during these battles though they were able to effectively resist Security Forces' moves to capture the Wanni. With this background, many are of the view that the Security Forces should think twice before attempting to defeat the LTTE in the Wanni.
Another school of thought is that the Government should exert pressure on the LTTE to enter the path of negotiations without launching military operation to liberate Wanni. This idea is grounded on the premise that such an operation would lead to a negative fall out on the international front.
However, the Government is very clear on this score. It wants to militarily defeat the LTTE prior to implementing any political solution. It is not ready to advocate any political solution without crushing the Tiger outfit.
Another idea gaining currency is that the Security Forces should not step into the Wanni at this juncture and that they should seal off the Wanni and bottle in the LTTE thus starving it of supplies, taking into consideration that the outfit is already running low on ammunition specially artillery rounds. This school of thought is based on the human cost involved in any such operation.
There is a justified reason for this thinking given the long duration such an operation would entail leading to suffering of the civilian population.
The other risk involved, in the quest for capturing the Wanni,is the ability of the LTTE to dig in and use the time lag to lobby international support though the outfit is in a weak position.
On the other hand the international community will not condone, the suffering of the civilian population and such tactic would take a comparatively longer period to deplete the LTTE's war chest.
What the Government should be clear about is that it is impractical to wait for longer period to defeat the LTTE in the Wanni since the latter has mastered the tactics of changing scenarios in an unimaginable time. The best example is the four-year Ceasefire offered to them.
The LTTE used this period to strengthen themselves militarily. Different situation
But the situation today is entirely different from that of the period in which Security Forces made unsuccessful efforts to capture the Wanni from the LTTE grip. The situation is more advantageous towards the Security Forces as they are now in a strong position against the LTTE having liberated the entire Eastern province from the LTTE grip.
There may be counter arguments, for instance in the mid of 1990's too the Security Forces launched operations to capture Wanni when the East was fully under the control of the Security Forces. But the bitter truth is that the Security Forces closed many camps in the East to reinforce the battle fronts in the Wanni.
That was done without any plan to hold the area by using any other means. Troops were drawn for the Jayasikurui operation mainly from Trincomalee and Batticaloa without any deployment of Police or any other force to dominate the area. That enabled the LTTE to move into these territories without any resistance and have their establishment in those parts of the East very easily.
But under the present scenario the Defence authorities have not left any room for the LTTE to raise their head again in the East though they deploy the same battalions who fought the battles in the East to dominate the areas in the Wanni too.
The difference, this time is that when troops are drawn out from the newly liberated areas in the East, the Police and the Police Special Task Force have been given the task to dominate the area without leaving any room for the LTTE to make a come back to the East.
Therefore, the East has been completely sealed off to the LTTE in the wake of any offensive launched to capture Wanni. More than 50 Police stations that are going to be opened in the East will do the role played by the Security Forces earlier.
The defeat of the LTTE militarily in the East would help the Police to run the normal civil administration in the East without any hindrance. Therefore the Tiger outfit cannot expect any help from the East to face any military operation in the Wanni.
Another disadvantageous situation for the Tiger outfit is that they have lost all of their recruitment bases in the North and East with the East fully coming under the Security Forces control, meaning, the LTTE cannot have any reinforcement from the East unlike in the past.
Not only in the East they have lost the other major recruitment base in Jaffna as they have completely loss control over the Jaffna population that is estimated to around 400,000. So the LTTE have to solely depend on the Wanni population that is estimated to be around 250,000 to 350,000, for all their requirements.
Different Tactics
One major factor behind the defeats of the Security Forces in the Wanni was due to the military tactics adopted by them to capture Tiger territory in the Wanni. The Tiger outfit was aware from which direction the troops were heading towards the Wanni when troops were engaged in the 18 month long Jayasikurui operation.
That the military tactics adopted by then Commanders resulted in heavy sacrifices of young lives in the costly operation which failed to realise its objective is only too well known.
One big advantage presently accruing to the Security Forces is that it has good military strategists to surprise the LTTE in many aspects without giving clear signals about troops movement.
Therefore, the Security Forces have now been able to scatter the entire fighting strength of the LTTE into different locations without allowing them to muster their strength at one point and launch massive offensive operation against the troops.
That was why the LTTE publicly accepted that they are now engaged in defensive operations in the Wanni to defend their territories. They are now not in a position to risks to muster their strength at one point as they fear troops infiltrations if they leave any weak link point in their defence lines.
Earlier, the LTTE was able to reverse the military victories in the Wanni mainly due to manoeuvrability of its fighting strength estimated to be around 6,000 to different locations to scatter the troops to different battle fronts.
That was the key factor behind the success of the military tactics of the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.
The Security Forces now with a good knowledge of these tactics are now adopting counter strategies used by the LTTE itself to scatter the Forces.
On the other hand the Defence authorities have also taken steps to lessen the additional duties on the Security Forces such as to guard threatened villages, by improving the Home Guard service to a quality service under the Civil Security Department while establishing the State owned Rakna Arakshana Lanka to deploy security personnel to guard economic nerve centres in the South.
Colombo Security
Another key factor that has to be considered is the security in the South as the Tiger outfit which is intent on destabilising the south through their terror activities targeting economic nerve centres and the civilian population.
In this aspect also the Security Forces are now in a better position as the recent operations in the East and also in the South of Mannar have restricted the avenues available with the LTTE to pose a threat to Colombo or any other part of the country.
The loss of the East was a major blow to the LTTE as they made use of the region to bring in explosives and suicide cadres to Colombo. Later they made use of Silavatura Sea Tiger base to implement their terror operations in the South but that option too is now defunct with the capture of Silavathura by the troops.
The only path available to the LTTE to bring in explosives to Colombo is through Omanthai. But, it has become an extremely difficult task with the thorough rigorous checking by the Security Forces at the two road blocks at Omanthai and Medawachchiya.
The fast restructuring of the intelligence networks in the South has also proved profitable for the Security Forces as they could break the LTTE cells in the South during the past one and half years.
That was why the Tiger outfit could not wreak havoc in Colombo by exploding bombs though the LTTE boasted of bringing the fourth Eelam War to Colombo.
The LTTE is facing its worst set back yet in the Wanni in the backdrop of their Eastern debacle. With the deployment of the Security Forces on two fronts in Jaffna and Wanni FDLs the LTTE has to scatter their total strength to defend their territory.
According to intelligence reports, the LTTE has around 6,000 fighting cadres in the Wanni to defend their territory in Jaffna and also in the Wanni.
Wanni situation
They have to depend on some 4,000 cadres to defend the Wanni FDL from Mannar to Kokkuthuduvai. With the major thrust on the West of Omanthai the LTTE have strengthened their presence in its defences West of Vavuniya as they must concentrate on the North Western coast since it is the only life line left for their logistic and other support.
With this severe shortage of man power the LTTE has now deployed civilians and stray dogs to guard the roads in fear of troops infiltrations to their territory and to facilitate 'VIP' movements.
Apart from this the LTTE has to deploy at least 1000 fully trained cadres for the Radha Brigade to provide security for LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.
Under these circumstances the Tiger outfit has to depend on the civilian population in the Wanni for all their requirements. Therefore, the civilian population in the Wanni are now living under extreme pressure of the LTTE.
The LTTE political leaders have now been deployed to be in charge of military activities. Even LTTE political leader S.P. Thamilselvan has not been spared in this as he has been given the task of defending the Pooneryn sector. Therefore, Thamilselvan has to remove his normal outfit and take cover inside a bunker to accomplish the task entrusted to him.
Balraj, the most senior military leader now with the LTTE is also not in good health like his 52 year old leader Velupillai Prabhakaran who is now ailing due to stress.
Therefore, according to Wanni sources Theepan is the only senior leader with the Tiger outfit and he is not a military tactician like his erstwhile colleagues. The leaders who escaped from the Eastern theatre have no recognition in Wanni and they are reportedly in shock due to the experience they had to face in the Wanni.
The low morale of the LTTE leaders has resulted in a large number of the rank of file ditching the outfit but have to confine themselves within the Wanni since they have to cross LTTE checkpoints even to surrender to the Security Forces.
Even with these reversals suffered by the LTTE capturing the Wanni will not be a cake walk to the Security Forces as the Tiger leader is ready to fight to the last man to defend his territory in desperation.
But the commitment of the Security Forces towards achieving the task even under difficult circumstances coupled with the leadership given by the three Forces commanders will ensure overcoming these obstacles if they launch any operation to liberate the civilian population in the Wanni.
It has thus become the duty of the Security Forces to liberate the innocent civilian entrapped in Wanni at this decisive juncture.
(www.sundayobserver.com)
Next target: Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa on September 10, spelt out the Government's position with regard to the Wanni, without ambiguity at the ceremony held at the Naval Jetty in Trincomalee, when the nation paid tribute to the Navy men who returned to the Trincomalee port following their biggest victory in the sea.
He was very clear in his message that there will be no room for terrorism in the country and that if Wanni is the last bastion of terrorism that is obviously the next target of the Security Forces.
The Wanni operation is not the only message conveyed by him. He also indicated that the military option will be a backed up vehicle to implement the political solution that may be agreed upon at the All Party Representative Committee to solve the decades long conflict in the North and the East.
This means the Government is very clearly in it's resolve in adopting a politico-military approach to the North East conflict. In other words the Government needs to win the battle against terrorism one hundred per cent to facilitate the implementation of a political solution.
But many are looking forward to the defeat of the LTTE militarily in the Wanni which is considered to be the Tiger stronghold where all its military, administrative and political apparatus are concentrated.
Whether the Government conveys this message or not the LTTE is aware that the Security Forces, if not for the external pressure on the Government to hold back its military operations, will definitely conquer the Wanni to liberate the people from the iron grip of the Tigers.
But there are those who also think it will be suicidal for the Security Forces to step into Wanni.They are of the thinking that the Wanni is impregnable . There are many reasons to support this idea since many attempts to penetrate the LTTE heartland had ended in failure.
Jayasikurui (Victory Assured) the longest and costliest battle fought by the Security Forces to capture a 76 Km stretch of road between Vavuniya and Kilinochchi along the Jaffna Kandy A-9 highway was a classic example giving credence to this school of thought.
The LTTE reacted to this operation, launching a counter offensive "Operation Sei Allathu Sethu Madi" (Do or die) compelling the Security Forces to suspend the battle short of its objective of reaching only the Northern town of Mankulam, 32 Km South of Kilinochchi 18 months after the launch of the battle in May 1997.
Defeating LTTE
The subsequent attempts by the Security Forces, such as Ranagosa operation launched in 1999 to wrest control of the areas around Wanni though successful at the initial stage, later turned out to be debacles, leading to many reversals with Security Forces losing control of Kilinochchi, Paranthan and later the biggest debacle in Elephant Pass losing thousands of soldiers.
But the LTTE too suffered heavy losses during these battles though they were able to effectively resist Security Forces' moves to capture the Wanni. With this background, many are of the view that the Security Forces should think twice before attempting to defeat the LTTE in the Wanni.
Another school of thought is that the Government should exert pressure on the LTTE to enter the path of negotiations without launching military operation to liberate Wanni. This idea is grounded on the premise that such an operation would lead to a negative fall out on the international front.
However, the Government is very clear on this score. It wants to militarily defeat the LTTE prior to implementing any political solution. It is not ready to advocate any political solution without crushing the Tiger outfit.
Another idea gaining currency is that the Security Forces should not step into the Wanni at this juncture and that they should seal off the Wanni and bottle in the LTTE thus starving it of supplies, taking into consideration that the outfit is already running low on ammunition specially artillery rounds. This school of thought is based on the human cost involved in any such operation.
There is a justified reason for this thinking given the long duration such an operation would entail leading to suffering of the civilian population.
The other risk involved, in the quest for capturing the Wanni,is the ability of the LTTE to dig in and use the time lag to lobby international support though the outfit is in a weak position.
On the other hand the international community will not condone, the suffering of the civilian population and such tactic would take a comparatively longer period to deplete the LTTE's war chest.
What the Government should be clear about is that it is impractical to wait for longer period to defeat the LTTE in the Wanni since the latter has mastered the tactics of changing scenarios in an unimaginable time. The best example is the four-year Ceasefire offered to them.
The LTTE used this period to strengthen themselves militarily. Different situation
But the situation today is entirely different from that of the period in which Security Forces made unsuccessful efforts to capture the Wanni from the LTTE grip. The situation is more advantageous towards the Security Forces as they are now in a strong position against the LTTE having liberated the entire Eastern province from the LTTE grip.
There may be counter arguments, for instance in the mid of 1990's too the Security Forces launched operations to capture Wanni when the East was fully under the control of the Security Forces. But the bitter truth is that the Security Forces closed many camps in the East to reinforce the battle fronts in the Wanni.
That was done without any plan to hold the area by using any other means. Troops were drawn for the Jayasikurui operation mainly from Trincomalee and Batticaloa without any deployment of Police or any other force to dominate the area. That enabled the LTTE to move into these territories without any resistance and have their establishment in those parts of the East very easily.
But under the present scenario the Defence authorities have not left any room for the LTTE to raise their head again in the East though they deploy the same battalions who fought the battles in the East to dominate the areas in the Wanni too.
The difference, this time is that when troops are drawn out from the newly liberated areas in the East, the Police and the Police Special Task Force have been given the task to dominate the area without leaving any room for the LTTE to make a come back to the East.
Therefore, the East has been completely sealed off to the LTTE in the wake of any offensive launched to capture Wanni. More than 50 Police stations that are going to be opened in the East will do the role played by the Security Forces earlier.
The defeat of the LTTE militarily in the East would help the Police to run the normal civil administration in the East without any hindrance. Therefore the Tiger outfit cannot expect any help from the East to face any military operation in the Wanni.
Another disadvantageous situation for the Tiger outfit is that they have lost all of their recruitment bases in the North and East with the East fully coming under the Security Forces control, meaning, the LTTE cannot have any reinforcement from the East unlike in the past.
Not only in the East they have lost the other major recruitment base in Jaffna as they have completely loss control over the Jaffna population that is estimated to around 400,000. So the LTTE have to solely depend on the Wanni population that is estimated to be around 250,000 to 350,000, for all their requirements.
Different Tactics
One major factor behind the defeats of the Security Forces in the Wanni was due to the military tactics adopted by them to capture Tiger territory in the Wanni. The Tiger outfit was aware from which direction the troops were heading towards the Wanni when troops were engaged in the 18 month long Jayasikurui operation.
That the military tactics adopted by then Commanders resulted in heavy sacrifices of young lives in the costly operation which failed to realise its objective is only too well known.
One big advantage presently accruing to the Security Forces is that it has good military strategists to surprise the LTTE in many aspects without giving clear signals about troops movement.
Therefore, the Security Forces have now been able to scatter the entire fighting strength of the LTTE into different locations without allowing them to muster their strength at one point and launch massive offensive operation against the troops.
That was why the LTTE publicly accepted that they are now engaged in defensive operations in the Wanni to defend their territories. They are now not in a position to risks to muster their strength at one point as they fear troops infiltrations if they leave any weak link point in their defence lines.
Earlier, the LTTE was able to reverse the military victories in the Wanni mainly due to manoeuvrability of its fighting strength estimated to be around 6,000 to different locations to scatter the troops to different battle fronts.
That was the key factor behind the success of the military tactics of the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.
The Security Forces now with a good knowledge of these tactics are now adopting counter strategies used by the LTTE itself to scatter the Forces.
On the other hand the Defence authorities have also taken steps to lessen the additional duties on the Security Forces such as to guard threatened villages, by improving the Home Guard service to a quality service under the Civil Security Department while establishing the State owned Rakna Arakshana Lanka to deploy security personnel to guard economic nerve centres in the South.
Colombo Security
Another key factor that has to be considered is the security in the South as the Tiger outfit which is intent on destabilising the south through their terror activities targeting economic nerve centres and the civilian population.
In this aspect also the Security Forces are now in a better position as the recent operations in the East and also in the South of Mannar have restricted the avenues available with the LTTE to pose a threat to Colombo or any other part of the country.
The loss of the East was a major blow to the LTTE as they made use of the region to bring in explosives and suicide cadres to Colombo. Later they made use of Silavatura Sea Tiger base to implement their terror operations in the South but that option too is now defunct with the capture of Silavathura by the troops.
The only path available to the LTTE to bring in explosives to Colombo is through Omanthai. But, it has become an extremely difficult task with the thorough rigorous checking by the Security Forces at the two road blocks at Omanthai and Medawachchiya.
The fast restructuring of the intelligence networks in the South has also proved profitable for the Security Forces as they could break the LTTE cells in the South during the past one and half years.
That was why the Tiger outfit could not wreak havoc in Colombo by exploding bombs though the LTTE boasted of bringing the fourth Eelam War to Colombo.
The LTTE is facing its worst set back yet in the Wanni in the backdrop of their Eastern debacle. With the deployment of the Security Forces on two fronts in Jaffna and Wanni FDLs the LTTE has to scatter their total strength to defend their territory.
According to intelligence reports, the LTTE has around 6,000 fighting cadres in the Wanni to defend their territory in Jaffna and also in the Wanni.
Wanni situation
They have to depend on some 4,000 cadres to defend the Wanni FDL from Mannar to Kokkuthuduvai. With the major thrust on the West of Omanthai the LTTE have strengthened their presence in its defences West of Vavuniya as they must concentrate on the North Western coast since it is the only life line left for their logistic and other support.
With this severe shortage of man power the LTTE has now deployed civilians and stray dogs to guard the roads in fear of troops infiltrations to their territory and to facilitate 'VIP' movements.
Apart from this the LTTE has to deploy at least 1000 fully trained cadres for the Radha Brigade to provide security for LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.
Under these circumstances the Tiger outfit has to depend on the civilian population in the Wanni for all their requirements. Therefore, the civilian population in the Wanni are now living under extreme pressure of the LTTE.
The LTTE political leaders have now been deployed to be in charge of military activities. Even LTTE political leader S.P. Thamilselvan has not been spared in this as he has been given the task of defending the Pooneryn sector. Therefore, Thamilselvan has to remove his normal outfit and take cover inside a bunker to accomplish the task entrusted to him.
Balraj, the most senior military leader now with the LTTE is also not in good health like his 52 year old leader Velupillai Prabhakaran who is now ailing due to stress.
Therefore, according to Wanni sources Theepan is the only senior leader with the Tiger outfit and he is not a military tactician like his erstwhile colleagues. The leaders who escaped from the Eastern theatre have no recognition in Wanni and they are reportedly in shock due to the experience they had to face in the Wanni.
The low morale of the LTTE leaders has resulted in a large number of the rank of file ditching the outfit but have to confine themselves within the Wanni since they have to cross LTTE checkpoints even to surrender to the Security Forces.
Even with these reversals suffered by the LTTE capturing the Wanni will not be a cake walk to the Security Forces as the Tiger leader is ready to fight to the last man to defend his territory in desperation.
But the commitment of the Security Forces towards achieving the task even under difficult circumstances coupled with the leadership given by the three Forces commanders will ensure overcoming these obstacles if they launch any operation to liberate the civilian population in the Wanni.
It has thus become the duty of the Security Forces to liberate the innocent civilian entrapped in Wanni at this decisive juncture.
(www.sundayobserver.com)
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