Thursday, September 23, 2004

Leadership changes show LTTE may get tough (NEWS ANALYSIS):

[India News] New Delhi, Sep 22 : Crucial changes Tamil Tiger guerrillas have made in their ranks in Sri Lanka's east portend trouble ahead despite mounting concern voiced by Western diplomats over escalating tensions in the country.

Guerrillas of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have suddenly become conspicuous by their absence in government-held areas in the eastern district of Batticaloa after a long, long time.

This, Tamil sources say, could only mean that the rebels have been pulled back to LTTE-controlled areas in the east or even in the north, probably for further training or military regrouping.

The absence of LTTE cadres in areas held by Colombo was noticed just before the LTTE appointed 'Colonel' Bhanu, head of its mortar regiment, in place of Ramesh, the Batticaloa-Amparai chief who succeeded Karuna, the former regional commander who revolted in March against Tigers boss Velupillai Prabhakaran.

Karuna made his way to Batticaloa from the LTTE-held north along with Ramesh on the weekend of Sep 11-12 after extensive consultations with Prabhakaran.

The LTTE leadership is clearly unhappy with Ramesh, probably on more than one count.

Ramesh was Karuna's deputy when the latter revolted. Ramesh did not side with Karuna and instead fled to the Prabhakaran-held north. In the first public protest in Batticaloa then, Karuna supporters had burnt Ramesh's effigies and ridiculed him for "running away".

There were reports then that Ramesh had quietly asked Karuna to leave the region for his own good and safety.

The Karuna revolt ended in early April. By May, there was intense speculation that Ramesh would be replaced by Karikalan, a former close associate of Karuna who too had sided with Prabhakaran. That did not happen.

Since then, however, remnants among Karuna's supporters who are said to be regrouping, in all possibility with the tacit backing of Sri Lanka's military intelligence, have carried out some notable attacks on LTTE personnel and the group's high-profile supporters.

According to Tamil sources, the LTTE feels that Ramesh has failed to check the growth of Karuna (whose present whereabouts are a mystery) and the collusion between Karuna's men and the Sri Lankan military intelligence that can prove destabilising in the long run.

In contrast, LTTE hit squads have been much more successful in Colombo, eliminating Karuna's men and other anti-LTTE activists at will.

The appointment of 'Colonel' Bhanu is a firm sign that the LTTE is planning something deadly. Simultaneously, one senior LTTE activist who had become very active in the region is Ramanan who also enjoys same rank as Bhanu's and is a hardcore Prabhakaran loyalist.

"The fact that the LTTE has to appoint a northern man to manage the east also shows the group's desperation," a Colombo-based diplomat told IANS.

Norwegian special envoy Erik Solheim has clearly failed to persuade Colombo and the LTTE to resume peace talks, which have been stalled since April 2003. This is the task he came to achieve when he visited Sri Lanka last week.

The Tamil Tigers, true to their past, have simply brushed aside growing appeals from the West to stop recruiting children into their ranks and to be flexible in their approach to the peace process.

The LTTE insists that future talks can he held only around its demand for a powerful interim administration in Sri Lanka's north and east. Critics say that the proposal is a stepping-stone to an eventual free Tamil Eelam state.

On Monday, Canada's ambassador in Colombo, Valerie Raymond, travelled to Kilinochchi in the island's north where the LTTE has its political headquarters to ask the Tigers to show flexibility.

Her trip followed similar appeals from the US and the European Union.

None of this has had any effect. And those who know Prabhakaran realise that such appeals mean nothing to the LTTE boss who remains obsessed with the idea of seceding Sri Lanka's northeast to form an independent country.

--Indo-Asian News Service

( http://news.newkerala.com/india-news/?action=fullnews&id=32453)

Wednesday, September 22, 2004

Heavy fight in eastern Sri Lanka on the cards

Eastern Sri Lanka

A new outfit calling itself the 'Thamilar National Brigade' and claiming to be headed by former LTTE renegade leader Karuna has called upon the youths and girls to join its cadres to fight against the Wanni leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran.

In leaflets distributed in the east, the new brigade has asked the people whether they want to simply be onlookers to the injustices being perpetrated by the Wanni leadership or they sought liberation by joining the brigade. "Our struggle will not cease till the people in our district are liberated. We are confident that the Wanni Tigers could be driven away if you join the brigade," the leaflet said.

Pirbakaran posters defaced.

Special Correspondent, September 22. Posters bearing the LTTE leader Pirabakaran's photos have been spray painted with black paint and defaced at several store-fronts in Toronto overnight.

Reports from Toronto say that Canadian public are also becoming increasingly annoyed by the display of these posters and banners. However, it is not clear who spray painted the posters in several Toronto suburbs. Several store-owners removed the damaged posters in the morning fearing reprisals by the LTTE operatives.

The Tamil radio and TV channels operated by LTTE-fronts in Toronto, are asking all Tamils living in the city to participate in the Pongu Thamil rally on Saturday.

(www.theacademic.org)

Road side explosion in Batticaloa north [TamilNet, September 21, 2004 11:26 GMT]

A claymore mine was triggered by an unidentified person in Panichchankerni, 60 kilometres north of Batticaloa, Tuesday. No one was hurt in the explosion. An LTTE official in Batticaloa alleged that an informant working with the Sri Lanka army had set off the explosion. He said the improvised device may have been aimed at two local LTTE cadres who had passed the Panichchankerni bridge minutes before the explosion.

'Bouncing' mine kill soldier [TamilNet, September 22, 1998 18:52 GMT]

An SLA soldier in foot patrol was killed in Sangaththaanai in Jaffna around 8 a.m. this morning when an anti-personnel mine (APLM) blew up on him. SLA sources said that this APLM is new type that has been rarely used in Jaffna. They said the mine springs out of the ground to burst shrapnel in the direction of the victim. It is hence deadlier than other APLMs they said.

Suicide bomber threat sustains support for war [TamilNet, September 22, 1997 12:00 GMT]

The Colombo public have an abhorrent fear of suicide bomb attacks. The threat seems ever present, even though there have been no suicide attacks in the capital for nearly two years. Surprisingly, the spectre of the suicide bomber is being revived time and again by the Sri Lankan government itself. The fear generated by the official warnings is sustaining public support for the government's war in the Tamil homelands.

Last week the Sri Lankan police said they had raided a house near a military airbase close to the capital, Colombo and seized equipment intended for use by suicide bombers. The police claim to have subsequently apprehended 5 bombers but warn that several others are at large.

The police say they have seized jackets used for carrying bombs, rocket launchers and an automatic rifle, and claim that the bombers were planning to hit the Ratmalana air force base.

In January 1996, three men drove a truck packed with explosive into the Central bank building, devastating Colombo's financial district. There have been no suicide bomb attacks since then, though a parcel bomb exploded on a train in July 1996.

However the Sri Lankan government regularly issues warnings of imminent suicide bomb attacks by Tamil 'infiltrators' who are said to be present in the capital.

Arrests are also regularly announced, though in most cases, no charges have been brought against the alleged bombers, and only one man has been tried (allegedly for involvement in a bomb attack in 1995).

The discovery of arms caches within the city are also frequently reported. Roadblocks and check points have long been a regular feature in the city.

The regular police announcements fuel the apprehensions of the city's occupants. This fear has mobilised the Sinhala public's support for the government's costly war in the Tamil homelands, the logic being that if the government destroys the LTTE, the threat of bombs would recede.

The security forces go to considerable lengths to reinforce the climate of fear. Massive search operations are mounted every so often, involving hundreds of policemen for several hours, ostensibly 'looking for suicide bombers'.

Some Sri Lankan military officials are openly contemptuous of such operations. After a six hour search caused massive traffic jams around the President's residence, one official observed that "If indeed there was a suicide bomber, the huge traffic outside the president's house would have been an ideal to set off an explosion and cause maximum destruction"

Tamil residents and neighborhoods are particularly targeted in these operations. Mass arrests of Tamils are routine. Even long-established residents are picked up outside their homes or places of work.

The Sri Lankan police often say they are seeking the public's cooperation for information about 'suspicious' people in their neighborhoods. As a result, the Tamil residents of the city are as a whole viewed with suspicion by the Sinhalese.

When visitors (particularly youths) go to Tamil homes, a police patrol will often arrive shortly afterwards: a watchful neighbor would have alerted them of possible 'bombers'. Arrests at night are common place, as are random searches of vehicles during the day.

The recent discovery of suicide bombers near Colombo comes at a time when the Sri Lankan government needs to mobilise public support for its controversial 'devolution proposals' which it claims will end the war. In this light, a revival of the public's fear of bombings in the capital may not be unhelpful. Some of the Sri Lankan government's announcements

14 June 96 Police claim to have arrested 5 suicide bombers.

28 June 96 Defence sources inform media that 17 suicide bombers are in Colombo.

08 July 96 Government announces immediate training for security forces to face suicide bombers.

16 August 96 Colombo police claim to have arrested 4 female suicide bombers.

27 August 96 Defence sources tell Colombo media that 12 female suicide bombers are in Colombo.

19 September 96 Police claim suicide bombers planning to hit high ranking police officers.

06 October 96 Colombo police chief says 25 female suicide bombers are in Colombo.

08 October 96 After massive search operation, police arrest 30 people alleged to have supported suicide bombers in Colombo .

09 October 96 Police arrest 20 alleged suicide bombers after high profile search.

29 October 96 Defence sources claim to have disrupted plans to send 35 suicide bombers to Colombo.

21 November 96 Defence sources claim to have uncovered a plan to kill Education minister with suicide bombers.

28 November 96 Colombo police claim 4 female suicide bombers are in Colombo to attack politicians.

03 December 96 Police claim to have arrested 17 suicide bombers, including 5 women.

06 December 96 Defence ministry claims 50 suicide bombers are arrested in Vavuniya detention camps, enroute to Colombo.

31 January 97 Police claim 5 suicide bombers arrive in Colombo.

03 February 97 Police claim to have arrested a female suicide bomber.

12 March 97 Police claim to have arrested 5 suicide bombers.

19 March 97 Police claim 4 suicide bombers arrive in Colombo.

30 March 97 Police claim to have arrested a senior suicide bomber.

08 May 97 Police claim suicide bombers are in Colombo disguised as soldiers.

22 May 97 Police chief claims at least 12 suicide bombers arrive in Colombo.

28 May 97 Police warn public to be alert for suicide bombers.

Bhanu vs. Ramesh: Military prowess as against Karuna's regionalism call By Champika Liyanaarachchi

Prabhakaran moves to consolidate East before talks

In the prolonged absence of faith and will, the two vital elements necessary for any paradigm shift in the thinking of the government and the LTTE to break the deadlock, the subject of peace is now been relegated to one used by the protagonists to sling mud at each other.

In place of trust building last week we witnessed how both President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the LTTE stooped down to the lowest levels of political posturing since the ceasefire, taking on each other in a bid to show who made a bigger contribution to peace - the government or the LTTE.

President Kumaratunga accused the LTTE of being ; 'inflexible,' and 'indecisive' and that it used dilatory tactics to delay the resumption of peace talks while the LTTE retaliated by charging that the President has done nothing so far other than 'mouthing her intentions to restart the peace process".
And this at a time when the constituency and the international community were eagerly awaiting confidence building by both parties to break the stalemate and return to the negotiating table.
With this kind of talking to the gallery heightening the degree of acrimony between the two parties, one wonders where the peace process is heading, leave aside the resumption of peace talks.
Amidst these charges and counter charges the LTTE also moved to make a strategic change in the Eastern command- replacing Ramesh who is an Easterner with war veteran Bhanu from the North.
Immediately after Bhanu (a northerner) was appointed a series of rumours came from the East indicating that there was a major revolt by the ordinary Tamils against his appointment as the new Eastern Commander of the LTTE.
While the appointment is very likely to have earned the apprehension of the Tamils in the East and proven the point that Karuna wanted to make, that the Easterners are not getting their due place in the Tigers hierarchy, it was later proven that most of these reports on anti-Bhanu demonstrations were simply speculative.

And that includes the reports on a protest in the LTTE-controlled Kokkadicholai, against the appointment of the new Eastern commander.

However, the absence of strong moves to oppose Bhanu does not at all mean that everything is rosy in the East.

The relative silence is largely attributed to the degree of liberty enjoyed by the civilians in the LTTE-controlled areas.

Since the revolt of Karuna the easterners have witnessed the kind of punishment available for those who side with the former eastern commander, or those who raise their voices against the Tigers. And having witnessed how throes of fellow civilians faced the guillotine at the hands of Tigers for their allegiance to Karuna and his men, the civilians even those in the government-controlled areas do not want to take chances by going against the LTTE decree.

The appointment of Bhanu made despite the disappointment of the civilians, is a well calculated move by the LTTE, and its advantages far outweigh the disadvantages.

Tigers are well aware of the disadvantages of going for talks as long as the issue of regionalism promoted by Karuna is not resolved to their advantage.

It knows for sure that though not immediately, even at a later stage, the division between the northern and eastern Tamils would be used by the government to break the Tiger arguments.

Consolidating its power in the East is the number one item on the Tiger agenda and hence the decision to send a seasoned war veteran, in place of a weak regional leader, to wipe out the rivals and take full control of the East.

This means major onslaughts on anti-Tiger groups in the days to come, after the relative peace in the East in the last few days.

On the other hand, the rumours on Ramesh's loyalty coupled with so many attacks on Tiger cadres during the past few months, may have disturbed the LTTE seniors, prompting his replacement. But, even Bhanu will not be able to provide that blanket security for all the Tiger cadres.

The way power was transferred and the mysterious exit of Ramesh to Wanni over the weekened after his arrival in the East following the demotion, suggests that all was not well within the LTTE as regard the Eastern command.

And the Tiger hierarchy will make sure that no LTTE strongman from the East would hereafter play regional politics and attempt to carve out a distinct identity for himself as well as the region detached from the North, which is very likely to be exploited by southern leaders.

This is the message conveyed to the Easterners by the appointment of Bhanu, a total northerner born and bred in Jaffna.

Born in Ariyalai in Jaffna, Bhanu who joined the LTTE in 1980 is one of the few remaining LTTE seniors who were trained in India.

He belonged to the third batch of Tiger cadres trained in south India - Indian 3- and had received special training in explosives.

Bhanu's first stint in the East started in 1990 when he got a demotion from Jaffna to Batticaloa after failing to carry out orders from LTTE Jaffna seniors Imran and Pandiyan.

However being a tough fighter, his services were sought after by the northern cadres at various instances, even while he was in the East.

In 1992 Bhanu was promoted as a special operations commander in the East and the following year as a special commander.

However what finally consolidated his position as one of the most reliable military operations commanders was the LTTE attack in Mullaitivu which came on July 16, 1996.

Bhanu was one of the forefront military leaders in the attack during which the Tigers overran the Mullaitivu camp causing a humiliating defeat to the army.
In addition to this he had taken part in many others including the 1994 attack on the Jaffna fort.

By the time he was made the Eastern commander last week, Bhanu was commanding both the mortar regiment as well as LTTE's elite infantry regiment 'Jeyanthan'.

Therefore he is militarily far superior to Ramesh, his predecessor who was appointed immediately after Karuna's defection and who was removed last week over possible issues over loyalty and command.

Born in Kalawanchikudi on September 18, 1964 Ramesh joined the LTTE in 1985, five years after Bhanu's enlistment.

Ramesh belonged to the 3rd batch of Tigers trained under the Batticaloa regiment and was recruited to the Kumarappan group of the 49 base in Karadiyanaru.

He initially came under regiment leaders Aruna and Nizam and was sent to Wanni in 1990 for special training in advanced infantry and was also in sea operations.

Unlike Bhanu who took part in major operations, Ramesh was better known for his ambush attacks.

However both are known for their excesses and atrocities against civilians.

On October 15, 1991 Ramesh led a group of LTTE cadres to a Muslim majority area in Palliyagodella, in the Polonnaruwa - Trincomalee border and killed 142 Muslim civilians after gunning down 12 army personnel manning the village checkpoint.

During his first stint in the Eastern province Bhanu too had engaged in the massacres in the Sinhala villages in Ampara and Polonnaruwa.

Irrespective of the strategic importance of having a leader of the calibre of Bhanu at the helm of affairs in the East, the appointment makes a mockery of the LTTE's popular slogan that land should belong to the sons of the soil in as much as the North and East should belong to the Tamil speaking people.

The disappointment over the appointment of a northerner, is very likely to have far reaching negative consequences despite Bhanu's talents as a seasoned military man.

He may consolidate the LTTE command in the East and to a certain extent prevent Tiger cadres from becoming the targets of other groups. But, in the process renegade Eastern commander Karuna will receive greater credence given his prophetic call for regionalism.

As for the peace process, what the President and the government should understand is that puerile attempts to sell peace through banner headlines in state newspapers will only reduce them to a bunch of clowns unless those slogans are backed by suitable pro-peace moves.

Otherwise they will only further substantiate the Tiger position that the President is only 'mouthing her intentions to restart the peace process'.

On the other hand the Tigers will learn the lesson of their life and the strength of people's power, if they continue to use military power to crush pluralism in Tamil polity and go for talks portraying a distorted version of the reality in the East.

After all, the day that LTTE loses public support, that will also mark the end of its clout in any part of the country - North or East.

Monday, September 20, 2004

Security Report Srilanka - Police Commandos open fire on LTTE boat in Ampara [22 Feb 2001]

Police Special Task Force (STF) personnel lying in ambush, opened fire on a LTTE boat, which later disappeared with their casualties at Kanchikudiaru tank in Ampara district on the afternoon of February 21, the Special Media Information Centre (SMIC) said.

Terrorist radio transmission confirmed that three of their cadres were injured and one was missing. It also revealed the names of those injured as Chulaban, Saththian, Wisuanath and the missing one as Saundaraj. There were no casualties among the STF troops.

LTTE mortar fire was reported from Muhamalai Ponnar and Nagarkovil on February 20 and 21. One soldier was wounded in Ponnar on the same day around 2 pm due to mortar fire of the terrorists. On soldier sustained injuries due to an anti-personnel mine on February 21.

Engineer troops on a clearing operation recovered 34 anti-personnel mines from the Muhamalai area and 38 anti-personnel mines from the Eluthumadduval area on February 20. These anti-personnel mines were defused.

On February 21 engineer troops in Madduvil on a clearing patrol recovered two improvised explosive devices and five anti-personnel mines, which were later destroyed.

Security Forces operating in Kaithady recovered 1139 rounds of T56 ammunition, 660 rounds of machine gun ammunition and one light machine gun drum on February 21.

Thursday, September 16, 2004

LTTE 'pistol groups' targeting informants: report By V.S. Sambandan

COLOMBO MARCH 23. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has reportedly sent two pistol groups here to kill Tamil informants and those in the island's military intelligence who were behind last year's killing of senior rebel leaders, a newspaper report said here today.

The issue of the Tigers' pistol groups, which finds mention at times in sections of the media, has resurfaced with last week's gunning down of a Tamil informant, Ragupathi, on the outskirts of the city — reportedly the fourth "informant'' who was killed by the LTTE's pistol group for his role in the Army's Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol which eliminated some LTTE leaders inside rebel-held territory before last year's ceasefire agreement.

Military analysts see the patrol, which reportedly eliminated some Tiger leaders, as among the factors that pushed the rebels towards cessation of hostilities.

"For more than 15 months now, Tiger cadre had launched a bitter campaign to eliminate the informants and punish civilians in the East who have been helping them'', a report in The Sunday Times said.

All four victims till now reportedly hailed from Batticaloa district, where the Army patrol is said to have been active.

The newspaper gave the name of the first of such victims as V. Vidyarthan, "who was abducted and killed'' last January in Batticaloa.

Last July, Lance-Corporal Savundarajan, ``was abducted and killed'', also in Batticaloa.

In December, another informant, Ganeshamoorthy Tillekerajah, was shot dead. Ragupathi, who was shot dead by "two men on a motorcycle'' on March 11 was the fourth victim, the newspaper said.

The Patrol had run into a controversial fiasco before the ceasefire was signed last February, when police raided one of their safe houses and the operation which was under wraps, came into the public.

A presidential inquiry commission is not probing the fiasco, the newspaper reported.

SLMM head meets LTTE commander


The new head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, Trygve Tellefsen, met the LTTE Trincomalee area commander, "Colonel'' Pathuman, and the Trincomalee district political head, Tilak on March 21, the Tamilnet web site reported.

Maj. Gen. Tellefsen, who has taken charge from Trond Furuhovde, discussed issues relating to movement of LTTE cadres in the eastern Trincomalee district, the report said.

The three eastern districts, which together have a near equal mix of the island's three main ethnicities is a volatile flashpoint and is considered by political analysts as the "weakest spot'' in the fragile peace process.


Copyright 2000 - 2004 The Hindu





Reverberations of a 'safe house' massacre by Frederica Jansz

Another safe house and another botch-up. This is what on the surface at least appears to have happened when eight youth were murdered in cold blood as they lay asleep on the floor of a two storied house at Kottawa off the Malabe Road.

Already identified as being members of what is now termed the Karuna faction, the killings are another in where more than a dozen people have been murdered over this last month. All the killings have been attributed to the LTTE taking revenge on a renegade Tiger.

Theories

The only credible assumption to this theory may arise from the fact that it was the LTTE that informed journalists in the south of the brutal murders at Kottawa last Sunday.

A senior LTTE cadre telephoned a well known Tamil journalist just 10 minutes after the shooting and told him that persons identified as being Karuna loyalists have been murdered at a house in Kottawa off Malabe Road. The police and apparently the military too were later alerted to the killings by the journalists who acted on the LTTE tip.

Since the murders last week there have been many theories and counter theories. The Kottawa house rented to give shelter to the renegades is believed to have served as a safe-house. Whether the seven Tamils and one Sinhalese killed in the shoot-out were working as spies for Sri Lanka's military is not yet established. The Defence Ministry and the army however have vehemently denied such speculation insisting that neither the seven Tamils nor the one Sinhalese man had any links to the military or police.

What they were doing inside this house - who they were waiting for; what was the purpose of their having rented out this house; and for how long did they intend to stay; are all questions that still beg answer. The fact is the entire investigation is shrouded in secrecy and the police are under very strict instructions not to leak information. Reliable sources said the rent paid per month for this house was Rs. 11,000. Who paid the rent is not yet clear.

One aspect however is crystal clear and that is that these killings clearly portray the fact that despite a ceasefire, the violence that has plagued Sri Lanka for two decades is nowhere near ending.

Neighbours living around the mystery house maintain they noticed nothing amiss before the killings, but said later they "heard" many vehicles pass their homes which they believed were visitors for people in this house. Asked to describe what kind of vehicles they were, they say they do not know.

Facilitators pessimistic

The LTTE being the first to inform the south about the killings said from the inception that seven of those murdered were part of the Karuna faction. The LTTE however have not claimed responsibility but insist the killings were carried out by dissidents within the Karuna group. The LTTE later announced on its website that these victims had been killed by "dissidents" within the Karuna faction and that the killers had later sought refuge with the LTTE last Sunday morning, having fled Colombo after committing the murders. Hours before the government was even aware of the killings some web sites both Tamil and foreign had broken the story.

The government has refrained from identifying the LTTE as the killers. Deputy Defence Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake would only trot out the same lame statement he made when an attempt was made on the life of UPFA Minister Douglas Devananda by saying none of the murders or attempted murders are a threat to the peace process or the ceasefire agreement between the LTTE and the government. According to Wickremanayake the killings are all a result "of internal conflicts" within the LTTE and so, he is of the opinion the government need not worry.

Wickremanayake's complacency is not matched by the international community. Deputy Chief of Mission, Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, Hagrup Haukland three days after the Kottawa murders said "as far as we are concerned this is a very serious incident and one that certainly does not make our work any easier on the ground."

His comments are backed by the Norwegian facilitators. Norway's Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgessen told journalists last week following his meetings with both the government and the LTTE that the ceasefire is very seriously under threat, warning that such incidents all contribute to an erosion in confidence building measures to kick-start peace talks. "What we see is a frozen war starting to melt on the edges" Helgessen said, maintaining that recent violence in the east and Colombo had contributed greatly to a high degree of mistrust between the government and the LTTE. "The ground situation is unhelpful in restoring confidence between the two parties," he reiterated.

But Helgessen's pessimism was quickly downplayed two days later when Media Minister Mangala Samaraweera was quoted saying Oslo is exaggerating the current situation and that the peace process is nowhere near breaking down.

Whatever the government's position on the overall ground situation, they are heavily contradicted by members and organisations of the international community who have been closely monitoring the conflict situation in Sri Lanka.

Human Rights Watch (HRW), a U.S. based independent nongovernmental organisation said in a media release Wednesday, "A spate of killings between factions of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) threatens Sri Lanka's ceasefire... More than a dozen people have been murdered over the last month in apparently politically motivated killings attributed either to the LTTE or a faction led by the LTTE's former eastern commander, Colonel Karuna, who broke away from the LTTE in March 2004."

No army personnel

HRW's release further referred to last Sundays killings in Kottawa saying, "Even before the police were notified of the killings, the LTTE announced that these victims had been killed by 'dissidents' within Karuna's own faction, and stated further that the killers had sought and received refuge with the LTTE." The killers according to the LTTE contacted the Tigers after arriving in the Amparai District on Sunday morning.

The LTTE commenting on the incident said in their website that "dissidents within the renegade Karuna group killed seven associates of Mr. Vinayagamoorthy Muraleetharan (Karuna) because of differences within the group." LTTE also said that Karuna associates "were accommodated at a military intelligence safe house in Kottawa, in the outskirts of Colombo."

The LTTE continues to accuse the government of being involved with pro-Karuna loyalists and have accused the army of using these men to serve as military intelligence operatives in the east. The government has vehemently denied the accusation. However, sections of the local media as well and international press have reported that the government's denials lack credibility.

The seven dead Tamils at Kottawa were identified as Kuhanesan, Castro, Kesavan, Ruban, Atparan, Vikky and Vimalkanth.

Kuhanesan acted as the second in command to Karuna in the renegade group. According to press reports and the LTTE's media release, Kuhanesan was one of the 14 members of the renegade group arrested in June at a Buddhist temple in Hingurakgoda at Polonnaruwa, before being released apparently at the intervention of military intelligence.

Defence Secretary Cyril Herath denied the eighth man among the dead was an army intelligence officer. "The Directorate of Military Intelligence of the Army Headquarters categorically denies army's involvement in the above incident and Sri Lanka Army further assures that no military intelligence operative is among the dead," the Defence Ministry stated in a press release. The military claims the eighth man was a tractor driver from Polonnaruwa unknown to the military and government.

Credibility in doubt

What he was doing with the Karuna associates is however a significant aspect to this incident. The fact that the body of a Sinhalese was found at the scene of the killings places the military and the government in a bad light, lending doubt to the credibility of their denials that the men were not part of a para-military group working for the Sri Lanka Army.

Time is running out

Reports of Bandaranaike escorting Karuna to Singapore first appeared on Thursday week before, when an MP of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) protested the involvement of the Tourism Minister in assisting Karuna.

Bandaranaike subsequently denied any involvement but the government did not clarify the matter further other than to get a state sponsored daily to issue a one paragraph story last Monday denying The Sunday Leader report.

When District MP for Jaffna, M. K. Sivajilingam raised the matter in parliament, Anura Bandaranaike said, "I have never had any contact with (Karuna) before his defection or after his defection from the LTTE. I have never indulged in the part time of accompanying unknown persons to any destination in the world."

However, Sivajilingam, speaking to The Sunday Leader, said Bandaranaike along with two Special Task Force (STF) personnel accompanied Karuna to Singapore. He also said Karuna did not use the VIP lounge at the Katunayake airport but instead used the lounge meant for intelligence officials.

Sivajilingam said that it has finally been proved beyond doubt that cabinet ministers have strong links with Karuna and declared that the Sri Lanka government and the President should not continue to live in denial.

"We are not worried about whether Bandaranaike accompanied Karuna or not but the real issue is that the government is attempting to conceal the fact that it has links with Karuna. The government and the President should stop lying to the nation that Karuna is not close to the government for now it is an established fact," he said.

The LTTE meantime increased its charges against the government and the latter's involvement with Karuna and his loyalists. LTTE Political Wing Leader S. P. Tamilselvan issued a dire warning to the government saying that it was pushing Sri Lanka to a situation of war. "The LTTE will not start the war but if the government imposes it on us we are ready to fight," he said. Elaborating further he said, "If the government fails to realise the ground realities we will have to take some serious decisions."

And with the warnings from Tamilselvan and Vidar Helgessen came another. This one was from Major General Trond Furuhovde, head of Sri Lanka's Monitoring Mission who rubber-stamped what his deputy, Hagrup Haukland also said. "The SLMM has strongly urged the government to take meaningful and effective action to curb the activities of paramilitary groups including that of Karuna faction and the EPDP," Furuhovde, was quoted telling S. P. Tamilselvan, when they both met in Kilinochchi.

(www.sundayleader.lk , 1st August, 2004)

Neighbours clueless by Shezna Shums and Dharisha Bastians

A curious eeriness envelopes the little residential area along the Kottawa-Malabe Road where eight of Karuna's supporters were brutally killed last Sunday. At 12 noon, there is no activity in the area to speak of and most of the houses remain padlocked from outside. First impressions create a doubt as to whether there can be human habitation in the area at all.

Two policemen stand guard at the house in which the killings took place. Even now, the neighbourhood does not seem to have grasped the enormity of the calamity that struck virtually at their doorstep.

When The Sunday Leader visited the area the roads were literally deserted. The house directly opposite the place where the murders took place was closed up as the owners were at work. People in the neighbouring houses appeared to be going about their work, very quietly. They told The Sunday Leader that when they heard the shots that Sunday morning, they thought they were firecrackers being lit for a wedding nakatha and didn't think twice about it. It was only after the police and the media arrived at the scene at about 11 a.m., did the neighbours realise what had happened.

According to a report by the National Intelligence Bureau, the killings took place at around 3:20 a.m. at a house owned by Prasad Kulasekera who is currently in India. The new tenants moved in on July 2.

Kusuma Gunewardena lives with her retired husband and two children just across the little gravel lane down which the crime took place. "We really don't know who leases out these houses. Unless we stand near the gate, we can't see any movement either. But recently I commented to my daughter that since the new people moved in, the vehicles arriving at the area had increased considerably. However, none of us knew which house the vehicles were going to," said Gunewardena.

Despite the criticism being levelled at the police about the fact that they had to be tipped off by a media report, the fact remains that in this particular neighbourhood a murder in broad daylight could go unnoticed for days, perhaps weeks.

"The police scolded us for not being more vigilant," said Disna Siriwardane, a mother of two living close by. "I suppose they had a point. None of us know each other very well, and we rarely venture out of our houses at all," she said, adding that the incident had made her become extremely shaky once night falls.

As for the scene of the crime, Siriwardane said she didn't even know there was a house down that lane until she heard about the shooting. Studying the surroundings, it's easy to see why such a house would be used to store hideaways. The gravel lane at the bottom of which the house is situated is completely blocked from view of those travelling along the road by grass grown over five feet tall and fairly dense forestation beyond. The only place from which the house and the activities going on inside could be seen, would be from the house directly opposite, where the neighbours said a couple lived with their young daughter.
The Kottawa-Malabe Road is a much travelled one and just beyond this little sleepy neighbourhood, is a bustling junction and plenty of activity. How many such ghost neighbourhoods must there be in Colombo and its suburbs, and what kind of activities are going on in them is anyone's guess.

(www.sundayleader.lk , 1st August, 2004)

STF has made their presence felt in the east - Ranaviraja by Harischandra Gunaratna

Government has taken a decision to sanction the recruitment of 2500 cadres to be trained as commandoes in the Special Task Force (STF) for which the treasury has allocated funds, said Tilak Ranaviraja , Secretary to the Ministry of Internal Security yesterday. We have also looked in to the short comings faced by the STF, particularly procurement of sophisticated arms which is an immediate necessity for the commandoes and President Chandrika Kumaratunga has assured that priority will be given to fulfil these requirements, he said. I salute the STF for the exemplary role played by them during the last two decades as a para military unit of the police. The Special Task Force (STF) has performed a tremendous job in providing security and defending the nation from the enemy, sacrificing their lives and limbs. They have played in special role where national security is concerned and assisting the police in the operational areas," Ranaviraja said adding that the police commandoes have made their presence felt very much in the operational areas in the East .

Ranaviraja explaining the increasing crime rate in the country said plans are afoot to seek the assistance of the STF to bust crime which has reached alarming proportions. He expressed his confidence in the STF saying that "With the type of training the knowledge and skills you have acquired you could help police reduce the crime rate in the country."

The government will provide all assistance to achieve your goal and meet your dedicated theme " victory assured," he said.

The Secretary to the Ministry of Internal Security inspecting a guard of honour accorded by the STF commandos at the S4:02 PM headquarters yesterday. On his right is STF Commandant DIG Nimal Lewke.

Some thoughts on Millennium safe house by a Military Analyst

The proper military concept of a safe house is a secret operational base within an enemy area or in close proximity there to, and dominated by the enemy. The Millennium City Safe House must be the first safe house ever, in a safe area. In fact as the description itself implies that safe houses are only established in unsafe areas. The description "safe" is in relation to an enemy threat of an imminent nature. It could be said that Athurugiriya was even safer than Colombo. An intelligence cell and a safe house are both secret bases, the former being for purposes of obtaining information and intelligence by secretly meeting informants and the latter for varied secret operations such as sabotage, destructions, assassinations, raids and even espionage etc. The main differences being the location and the concerns of secrecy.

A safe house has to be behind enemy lines or in close proximity there to, and absolute secrecy is a must. According to the statement of the Director Military Intelligence [D.M.I.] Capt. Nilam on being recalled to Colombo was initially attached to the "Forward Intelligence Cell", which was then located at the army camp at Kohuwela. This same intelligence cell and not a "safe house" was shifted to the house belonging to Capt. Nilam's wife, within a housing scheme at Athurugiriya. The reference to this secret intelligence cell as a safe house confuses the issues consequent to the discovery of the storage of high explosive materials and lethal weapons therein.

An issue arises of the storage and the establishment of unauthorised arsenal, however temporary, without due regard for the safety and security of the said stores and the neighbourhood too. According to established Military procedure the minimum requirement was the provision of an armed guard at least as a temporary measure until these high explosive materials were transported to and returned as ordered by the D.M.I. These measures would not have been necessary, if in keeping with the usual army procedure, that arrangements were made to return these explosives without delay on the arrival of Capt. Nilam with these lethal stores.

This should also have been the response particularly in view of the very serious allegation that army had plans to blast the bus with the Prime Minister in it, with a thermobaric rocket; and also the Army Commander's assurance denying the existence of such a plan.

The relocation of this "Forward Intelligence Cell" at Athurugiriya from the army camp at Kohuwela as described above cannot be said to be appropriate as the decision to lease the house belonging to Capt. Nilam's spouse as it would also amount to a conflict of interest.

But, there are important requirements for an intelligence cell. That is the assurance of secrecy, security and convenience to those informants visiting this intelligence cell at the new location at Athurugiriya. In fact such informants must be made aware of the risks and other dangers that they may expose themselves to, which also applies to intelligence officers as well. It is most important that the identities of informants are secret and that even from the other informants too. Such exposure would be only if it is a necessity. These requirements appear to have been meaningless as access to this Millennium Park cell was subject to one's identification by the civilian security staff at the gates of The Millennium Park. Further, the informants would be conspicuous on their ethnicity and social status being mostly Tamil LTTE deserters.

According to the D.M.I. Capt. Nilam was at that point of time under "serious threat" from the L.T.T.E. and therefore had to be under the active surveillance of L.T.T.E. agents. According to Capt. Nilam, his information was that he was to be targeted by a suicide bomber. In this context the move from the Kohuwela army camp to Athurugiriya with Capt. Nilam in charge of this intelligence cell is not only inexplicable, but perhaps even suicidal.

It is said that Capt. Nilam and his men were based at this cell to engage in long-range reconnaissance patrols [L.R.R.Ps], and deep penetration fighting patrols. Such patrols are a special task of well trained infantrymen and sometimes of the commandos. Troops from services and non-combatant units are not deployed on such tasks or roles. The D.M.I. and Captain Nilam are both from non-combatant units.

Fighting patrols engage in offensive operations such as ambushes, raids, destruction or attacks on enemy installations, gun position and emery outposts and even abductions of enemy cadres for purposes of interrogation to obtain intelligence etc. These operations and the planning of such operations are the function and responsibility of the combatant formations on the ground in forward positions. Intelligence officers are attached to such formations to furnish the necessary information for the planning of such operations.

The responsibility and function of the Directorate of Intelligence is to obtain and furnish timely and accurate intelligence to the respective operational formations, which is a very important requirement to ensure properly planned successful operations both offensive and defensive. It is not understood, therefore how a group of simple informants were engaged in deep penetration and long-range reconnaissance patrols.

These patrols require a high degree of infantry skills in addition to mental and physical toughness as they are dangerous and risky. The planning of such deep penetration patrols have to be meticulous and provision has to be made for several contingencies, sometimes even for rescue or even betrayal by accompanying informants on some occasions. These patrols may be over several days and communication with the base would be mostly by code requiring a high degree of communication skills too. It would take quite some time to condition even trained infantrymen for such patrols. These patrols are beyond the scope and functions of The Directorate Of Military Intelligence but are under the authority and responsibility of The Directorate Of Operations And Planning. These patrols are launched from forward positions nearest to the enemy area to be patrolled, and not from alleged "Safe Houses" very many miles away.

Covert Operations are also a very important form of military operations particularly in the context of anti-terrorist action. These operations have to be handled with caution. There is always the risk of infiltration by L. T. T. E. agents etc. It has been reported that once these agents entrusted with explosives for such a mission had straight away taken the entire lot of explosives and handed them over to the L.T.T.E. The L.T.T.E. would have obtained a wealth of information too from this agent. The handling of such "informants" or more appropriately "agents" is a skilled and a dangerous task. There was also the exposure of the training of an informant in the firing of thermobaric rockets at the Panaluwa Range. The bane of our military effort against the L.T.T.E. terrorists over the last twenty years has been the lack of accurate and timely information. This was also a finding by the Court of Inquiry into the debacles at Pooneryn. This was also undoubtedly a factor in the subsequent debacles at Mullaitivu and Elephant Pass. Good timely and accurate intelligence is an all-important factor in military operations against terrorists.

Furthermore, the expenditure on intelligence is secret and also not subject to audit. In addition to the requirements mentioned it is desirable that the Director of Intelligence is an officer with a combatant background and operational experience. It should be so in respect of the other officers too as far as possible. Such officers would be better equipped to assess and evaluate the intelligence in the correct perspectives, and exploit them to the best advantage.

There was an alleged involvement of army personnel in election violence particularly at Udathalawinna, where several civilians have been killed by shooting. The suspects are mostly serving soldiers, and there was some information or perhaps speculation that of one the suspects was hiding in Millennium City hideout, which by then had become an open secret.

What is not understandable is this thermobaric rocket and other explosive materials being still retained in an unauthorised location and readily available for use in spite of the assurance to the UNP hierarchy by the Commander of the Army that there was no such preparation to blast the bus with the prime minister in it. According to the D.M.I., he had ordered that the explosives be removed on the 28th of December 01.

This had not happened, although it should have been a first priority task. The police raid was on the night of 2nd January 02. What did eventually happen should be viewed in the light of the possible dangers such as a fire even accidental, or sabotage or even betrayal similar to the fate of the Police Inspector at the Dehiwela Police Station. In that context Capt. Nilam would need to have been mindful of the threat to him by a suicide bomber as the "cease-fire" had been proclaimed only a couple of weeks ago.

(www.dailymirror.lk/2004/02/06)

Media urged to be cautious when using military terms

Military spokesman Colonel Sumedha Perera has urged media personnel to be cautious when they deal with issues regarding the glossary of military terms.

Colonel Perera, referring to a discussion which took place on the Sirasa News Line programme on March 26 between 7.30 am and 8.30 am regarding a safe house maintained by military intelligence personnel at Millennium City, Athurugiriya, has explained the military's point of view on the reference made to the 'Safe House'.

He was described a safe house as 'a house or a flat provided with suitable cover and held at the disposition of the intelligence service for secret meetings or the temporary lodging of an agent under safe conditions. It is difficult to maintain a safe house within an enemy concentration area, where it would be particularly vulnerable and they are more often used i an area outside enemy territory where the intelligence service enjoys some measures of protection.

"Further according to American Intelligence pamphlet 'In the Intelligence Trade, a safe house is a secret refuge for spies engaging in covert operations and in the Glossary of Intelligence Trade Idioms defined safe house as a 'seemingly innocent house or premises established by Intelligence organisations for conducting clandestine activities in relative security.'

"Therefore, Army Headquarters is of the opening that it is best to leave issues of this nature to professionals in this particular field."


(www.sundayobserver.lk)

Minister awaits President's letter

Interior Minister John Amaratunga on Friday said he was anxiously waiting to receive a letter from the President directing him to launch investigations into the police raid at the 'safe house' at Millennium City, Athurugiriya.

The Minister said that he had not received any letter from the President regarding this issue and added he will give an appropriate answer when he received the letter.

(www.dailynews.lk)

LTTE Weapons Being Unloaded And Personnel Recruited While UNF Looks On by Suranimala-The Seeing Eye Of Serendib For LankaWeb

A second unloading of an LTTE Arms Shipment off a container in the high seas carried out yesterday under cover of darkness by a flotilla of Sea Tigers under the eyes of the Sri Lankan Navy under orders from its high command to stay aloof has been reported in a shocking turn of events which must not only embarrass the Wickremasinghe Administration but must also expose the indifference of the Defence and Foreign Ministries which have failed to take prompt action in remaining passive and content to resort to meaningless rhetoric full of lame excuses as in the case of the previous unloading of Arms by Sea Tiger Flotillas in early January where both events went relatively unnoticed or deliberately ignored by the authorities and reliable sources have learned that there is strong speculation within Sri Lanka that these shipments have been unloaded with the full knowledge of the Administration which has turned a blind eye to its reality.

The implications it carries towards National Security based on what it believes to be a necessity in order to preserve the Peace Process is the most stupendous display of apathy uptodate where Messers.Wickremasinge, Marapone and Fernando have shown little emotion or response towards the concerns of many worried Sri Lankans now asking many relevant questions as to what is going on and why there is every indication that the UNF Government has set itself on a path of self destruction should the Tigers unleash yet another wave of terror based on the manner in which they have re-commenced arming themselves and recruiting new personnel?.Based on fact and not conjecture!

Many LTTE propagandists overseas are alleged to have openly proclaimed that "their targets and objectives now seem to be within easy reach" and appear to have been on course ever since the UNF victory at the December Election while also stating that it would be a mere matter of time before their strategy of cunning will finally reap huge benefits for them one way or the other and are patting themselves on their backs in disbelief that something which seemed unattainable during the tenure of the PA Administration is now well within their sights and that they expect to easily infiltrate into Sinhalese populated areas, have free movement in once Restricted Waters which were controlled and secured by the Sri Lankan Navy and their greatest expectations lie in recovering control of the Northern and Eastern Provinces in their preliminary push towards Eelam which they have in fact presented to the discerning eye in their latest demands.

The fact that these might not be vain boasts have been proven in the past especially considering the LTTE attacks on the International Airport and Air Base and the planning behind what proved to be their capability of implementing the element of surprise very effectively and are the Security Forces likely to be caught napping yet again? Will there also be more ridiculous raids such as the one involving crack Secret Task Force Officers as in the Athurugiriya Safe House to embolden the LTTE and reveal chinks in the armour of National Security directives while hog tying it prior to another LTTE offensive?

Although these proclamations might be sheer speculation on the part of the LTTE propagandists and doomsday may never be real, when considering the realities of their status quo as proscribed terrorists being pursued by International Law Enforcement Agencies, although within the parameters of Territorial Sri Lanka attempts by the near sighted Administration to manipulate the jurisdiction in favour of LTTE demands while citing the Peace Process and its importance is very possible though hopefully not without stiff Presidential Opposition even though it appears to be onerous for the President who must surely be faced with the dilemma of appeasing more than one entity rather diplomatically while asserting her bounden duty to the Sinhala Nation without compromising its Security. A vital consideration which the Wickremasinghe Admisitration seems unconcerned about while the weapons stockpiles and the headcount of new LTTE recruits are increasing rather alarmingly!

Supreme Court rules police violated rights of LRRP group

Supreme Court ruled yesterday that the fundamental rights of five members involved in undercover operation known as Long Range Reconnaissance Petrol (LRRP), had been violated by the police team led by ASP Kulasiri Udugampola. This police team raided an army safe house at Millennium City, Athurugiriya in January 2002, amidst the protest of the Army commander. The police team comprised of CI M A E Mahendra, IP M M B J Mohottigoda and SI R A P Dharmaratne.

The petitioners of this case were Cpt S H M Nilam, P Ananda Udalagama, H M Nissanka Herath, I Edirisinghe and Mohamed Hilmy. The court determined that fundamental rights – freedom from torture, right to equality, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention of the petitioners were violated.

The court awarded Rs 800,000.00 to each petitioner as compensations and costs. Rs 750,000.00 of this will be payable by the state and the balance will be payable by ASP Udugampola in his personal capacity. 29 patriotic intelligence operators had already been murdered by the LTTE because of this exposure. The lives of the petitioners and their immediate family members are also under threat of the LTTE.


(30 January, 2004)

Key anti-LTTE operative shot dead by V.S. Sambandan

COLOMBO, JULY 31. A key anti-LTTE intelligence operative, Kandiah Yogarasa (better known as `PLOTE Mohan') was shot dead in the heart of Colombo city this morning by suspected LTTE gunmen.

Mr. Mohan (41) was gunned down with a 9 mm pistol around 11.20 a.m. local time on the normally busy Duplication Road, in the heart of the city. Military analysts see today's killing as "a prize hit" by the Tigers who "have been gunning for him for several years." An eyewitness saw Mr. Mohan being shot dead, "but was unable to describe the killers." The lone witness to the murder "is not sure if the assailants were on a motor-cycle or a van, but had said that they escaped in a vehicle," a senior police officer said.

Eight spent 9 mm cartridges were seen scattered near Mr. Mohan's blood-swamped body, which lay spread-eagled on a sidewalk near a popular shopping mall. There were no other casualties, primarily because the normally crowded road was nearly empty as the nation was on Poya (full moon) holiday, for the second time in a month — popularly defined as blue moon.

High up on hit list

The gunning down of the Mr. Mohan, described as one who was "very high" on the LTTE's hit-list, was literally the `once in a blue moon' strike as he "was truly feared by the Tigers and escaped several attempts in the east," a former militant said. As Mr. Mohan "was very fastidious about his personal security, the murder in broad daylight is shocking."

The slaying, he said, is seen as "a clear indication that the LTTE is not for a peaceful negotiated settlement." Concerned over the continued attacks on anti-LTTE operatives, defence analysts said the Government was "using them and abandoning them to appease the LTTE to come back to talks."

The Norwegian facilitators on Wednesday cautioned that Sri Lanka's "frozen war" was "starting to melt at the edges." Oslo also saw the declining security situation — a fallout of the rebellion by the LTTE's former military commander, V. Muralitharan — as the "bigger impediment" to restarting the stalled peace talks, compared to "differences in the agenda between the Government and the Tigers."

Pre-emptive strike

Today's murder brought Sri Lanka's most-feared `Black July' month — which saw a suicide-bomb attack on July 7 and a massacre near Colombo last Sunday — to a bloody end. Military analysts see in the killing of Mr. Mohan "a pre-emptive strike by the Tigers, as he would have played a key role when fighting resumes." The LTTE has not commented on the killing.

Mohan, who joined the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) in 1983, left the group in 1994, and emerged as a key anti-LTTE operative. More recently, he was reportedly linked to the military's Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs) before the February 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA) was signed. Defence sources viewed the hits on LTTE leaders by the Deep Penetration Units of the LRRP as a key factor for the Tigers to enter talks in 2002. After the CFA several "Tamil informants" linked to the LRRP, were shot dead in Colombo and in the east.

© Copyright 2000 - 2004 The Hindu

Sri Lanka’s Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol

The British Refugee Council Sri Lanka monitor reported in April 2003:

"LTTE negotiator Anton Balasingham claimed in a speech on 7 April in Geneva that the Sri Lankan government’s Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) had infiltrated the Tiger-controlled areas of the northern Vanni region.Mr Balasingham says that a claymore remote-controlled mine was recently found on a road on which LTTE leader V Prabhakaran was scheduled to travel. A search operation was ordered and thousands of Tigers combed the jungles of Vanni to apprehend LRRP members.

The LRRP is part of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), directed from a secret location in Athurugiriya. According to Colombo newspaper Sunday Times, this safehouse was raided on 2 January by Kandy police, who found weapons and arrested six soldiers. Unauthorized operations were alleged, and police filed a case against Army chief Lionel Balagalle and Director of DMI Kapila Hendavithana. A Commission headed by former High Court judge Dharmasiri Jayawickrema is probing DMI operations conducted from the safehouse in Athurugiriya.

The LTTE claim that the LRRP is trained by foreign intelligence services and responsible for the killing of LTTE leaders, Col. Shanker, Col. Nisam and Lt. Col. Gangai Amaran. They say others such as Col. Balraj, Col. Jeyam and political leader SP Thamilchelvan have also been targeted. The Army have denied LRRP operations in the north-east, but say that LTTE hit squads have penetrated the capital Colombo.

Sources allege that Tiger intelligence chief Pottu Amman has issued an order for the elimination of all members of the LRRP and other informants. According to press reports, at least 20 military intelligence operatives have been murdered since the ceasefire in February 2002. Former LTTE member Lingasamy Devarasa, was shot on 26 April by two people who arrived in an autorickshaw. He later died in hospital. The incident took place at Kohuwela in Colombo. Mr Devarasa had helped in LRRP operations in Batticaloa District.

Another LRRP operative and former member of Tamil group PLOTE, K R Ragupathy was killed in Mt Lavinia on 18 March. The security forces have introduced new security measures in Colombo, including checkpoints to track down the Tiger hit squads. Observers believe that the Tigers may have informants within the military and warned that there will be more deaths."

(www.tamilnation.org , 7 April 2003)

Deep penetration hit squads: deep probe essential by: D. B. S. Jeyaraj

Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP), also referred to as deep penetration hit squads are very much in the news today. Reputed political commentators are hailing President Kumaratunga for officially sanctioning the LRRP project and giving the green light for hits on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) command structure. The continuing inquiry of the Athurugiriya arsenal regularly throws up fresh yet sordid details of how a deadly 'secret weapon' like the LRRP covert action programme could be subverted for purposes not originally intended. It was the Athurugiriya incident that exposed the LRRP secret to the world at large.

Media reports reveal that persons connected with the LRRP are being systematically hunted down by the Tigers. An elaborate campaign is underfoot to blame conscientious police officers for doing their duty diligently and make them scapegoats for the LRRP fiasco. Efforts are being made to deflect attention away from the frightening ramifications of that episode and propagate a viewpoint that the country's national security has been compromised. Army Commander Lionel Balagalle has appointed a military court of inquiry with a restricted mandate that can only result in that tribunal functioning as a 'kangaroo court' and arrive at an obvious and foregone conclusion.

There is however much obfuscation and distortion of the real facts surrounding the LRRP covert action programme. The trial by media of the persons involved can only disclose partial truths. The loaded probe commissions initiated by Balagalle whose hands are extremely unclean on this matter cannot be informative in an impartial sense either. Persons involved in the Athurugiriya incident have been threatening to seek 'justice' for quite a while now without translating their words into action. Such a course of action should be welcomed as judicial proceedings held in an open court could shed more light on the dark and murky LRRP project.

Justice

It is doubtful whether those 'affected' by the Athurugiriya arrest will ever come forward and seek a legal remedy despite the self-righteous howls because of the dictum 'seek justice with clean hands.' Even if such a development occurs, the trial could only elicit part of the truth. What is required therefore in the larger interests of the country is a full-fledged public probe into the whole LRRP project with special emphasis on what transpired at Athurugiriya. Such a probe could de-mystify the LRRP hit squad project for what it is worth and prevent vested interests from misusing such types of covert activity for ulterior purposes.

Engaging in covert action projects to combat the Tamil guerrilla movement was first mooted in the mid-eighties when Lalith Athulathmudali was national security minister and Ravi Jayewardene security advisor under the J.R. Jayewardene government. Various blueprints were formatted by Israeli Shin Beth operatives and ex-SAS British mercenaries The go-ahead was given for some acts. The most notorious of these were some of the massacres of Sinhala civilians in the border areas. Hit squads impersonating Tamil militants executed them. Others involved fomenting friction between Tamils and Muslims in the east.

When the LTTE succeeded along with other groups in confining the army to military camps in the peninsula and creating a semi-liberated state in Jaffna, attempts were made to infiltrate and assassinate top Tiger figures. It is unclear as to how successful these missions were but Lalith Athulathmudali himself boasted to some foreign correspondents that the assassination attempt on former LTTE Jaffna Commander Sathasivampillai Krishnakumar alias Kittu was a "hit" scored by Sri Lankan intelligence. It was not publicised much in the Colombo based media. Subsequently Athulathmudali's claim was disputed by other observers who felt it was an internal matter. After the fall from grace of Gopalaswamy Mahend-rarajah alias Mahattaya the assassination bid on Kittu was also attributed among many things to his machinations.

The setting up of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols to infiltrate LTTE controlled territory and assassinate top Tiger leaders was proposed to the Kumaratunga regime in 1996. It was suggested first by 'freelancing' intelligence consultants linked to the state. Plans were formulated in furtherance of this idea by Lionel Balagalle who was then the director of military intelligence. It is an open secret in defence circles that the LRRP project was fathered by Balagalle himself who was very much attached to this pet project.

Covert action

When the LRRP project proposal was submitted to President Kumaratunga for approval she rejected it out of hand. Kumaratunga, to her credit, abhorred such types of covert activity then. With her background of being involved in fiery French student politics of the late sixties, Chandrika hated all types of covert action for which the CIA was blamed then. Kumaratunga's policy as president was to defeat the LTTE militarily and not indulge in low level covert action. The project was shelved temporarily.

It was resurrected in the aftermath of the assassination attempt on Kumaratunga in December 1999. Kumaratunga re-elected as president was angry and vulnerable. Shedding her earlier inhibitions she approved two covert action projects. One was the elimination of persons suspected of being LTTE supporters or sympathisers in the south. Intelligence operatives had already monitored activity of some targets and had even established links with some of them.

After getting the go-ahead signal, a high profile Tamil lawyer cum politician was decoyed away from home and gunned down brutally in Colombo. A red herring that a Sinhala fascist outfit was responsible was strewn across the trail. The reaction to the killing was tremendous with a massive public outcry. With the finger of guilt being pointed by many to the then occupant of Temple Trees, the powers that be became worried about continuing with that project and so it was put on hold. Thus many other Tamils on that list are alive today.

The second project of setting up LRRP teams was also approved by Kumaratunga in 2000 but that too was put on the backburner because of the fallout to the first phase of the "elimination of the Tiger network." Also, the Norwegian facilitated peace process had begun and attempting to infiltrate the Wanni and assassinating LTTE leaders in the Wanni would have been problematic then. Subsequently in 2001 the governing elite in Colombo found the ongoing peace process an embarrassment. It was decided to provoke the Tigers into abandoning their unilateral ceasefire and resorting to war again. The LRRP plan of assassinating top LTTE leaders was regarded as suitable to goad the Tigers into war again.

Terrorism

Even as the plan was being put into action the armed forces launched a massive operation code-named 'Agni Kheela' to retake Elephant Pass. It was routed conclusively by the LTTE. This made the defence top brass realise that invading and acquiring Tiger territory through frontal assaults was ruled out for the time being. So insidious LRRP hit squads had to be deployed not only to disrupt the peace process but also as a means to hit back at the enemy. The state had been reduced to the level of 'terrorism.' If the LTTE could infiltrate the concrete jungles of Colombo and wipe out human targets, the LRRP too could do so in the north east jungles was the logic. The successful LTTE attack on Katunayake spurred the deep penetration squads further.

The LRRP was a top secret project launched covertly by military intelligence. But Defence Ministry circles say that Lionel Balagalle was personally supervising the programme from its inception. Specially trained commandos and from the special forces were deployed. Also inducted were Tamil and Muslim ex-militants from the north east. They brought in the intelligence input and knowledge of terrain required. The Muslims were from the home guard units doubling up as groups known as 'Jihad' and 'Hizbullah' etc. The Tamils were ex-LTTE men from the 'Mahathaya' faction, members of the EPRLF's 'Razeek' group and from the PLOTE faction led by Mohan. Some of these were inducted into the army as regulars while others collaborated on an assignment basis. Some Tamil civilians were also paid well to provide information and safe houses.

The LRRP squad made its first big hit by exploding a claymore mine at Kokkavil. LTTE Political Wing Chief, S.P. Thamilchelvan was targeted but the wrong vehicle was blown up and it was only the bodyguard who succumbed. Thamilchelvan was on his way to meet Norwegian Peace Envoy Erik Solheim at Mallavi. The LTTE charged publicly that the "claymore blast was set off by a deep penetration team of the Sri Lanka Army." Defence Ministry Spokesman Sanath Karunaratne denied government forces were responsible. "We have no involvement whatsoever in this," Karunaratne said. "This is an area where we don't have our troops."

Thereafter, several such attacks occurred at regular intervals in the north east. Top LTTE leaders were targeted. Among those killed were Pirapaharan's close friend and confidante, Col. Shankar, the head of the LTTE Air Wing. Lt. Col. Gangai Amaran, the deputy chief of the Sea Tigers was killed. Major Nizam, the eastern regional intelligence head was also killed. Among those who escaped assassination attempts were Thamilchelvan, Deputy Military Chief, Balraja, Wanni Commander, Jeyam, Batticaloa-Amparai Commander, Karuna Amman and Eastern Regional Political Commissar, Karikalan.

Denial

The LTTE's accusations that an army deep penetration squad was responsible was denied by the state. Instead counter propaganda that the killings were due to internecine fighting between LTTE cadres was propounded. Ironically the army denials were believed by many in the south because they never thought the armed forces were capable of such successful strikes. On the other hand, the armed forces enjoying some degree of success through the LRRP project could not flaunt it publicly. They were denying the only successful project they had launched in many years.

This was because the LRRP project, though euphemistically termed as covert action, was nothing but an exercise in cold blooded assassination. It was a glaring example of state terrorism. If the LTTE was terrorist because it targeted prominent government figures in Colombo and killed innocent civilians as 'collateral damage,' the LRRP assassinations also could be described as terroristic. It was not top LTTE leaders who alone died, but also civilians. A pathetic example was the blowing up of a tractor with civilians at Vaakharai in the east. Thus, in spite of the high degree of success achieved, neither the government nor the armed forces could take public credit for it. No democratically elected government claiming to fight a just war and dependent on western aid could own up publicly to deploying killer squads deliberately. Likewise no self-respecting army could claim responsibility either.

The LRRP activity however troubled the LTTE greatly. The Tiger reputation of impregnability and invincibility had been eroded greatly. Moreover the LTTE supremo Pirapaharan himself was vulnerable. The Tigers combed the north east jungles and border areas with their leopard commandoes and also the border security forces. The intelligence wing conducted a deep and wide ranging search. Also top LTTE leaders changed their mode of travelling in a bid to avert attention.

Windfall

The LTTE was successful to some extent initially in identifying civilian accomplices and uncovering safe houses in the east. Five persons including a woman were executed and 29 claymore mines seized. A Tiger suicide bomber exploded himself in Batticaloa town and killed three Tamils working on the deep penetration project as part of military intelligence.

A major windfall for the LTTE was when the Tigers arrested a group of five men in the western regions of Batticaloa in December last year. They were suspected to be LRRP squad members. It was a heterogenous mix of Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala persons. Although some initial publicity was given in LTTE journals, a news blackout set in soon after. Obviously, the Tigers were keeping the matter under wraps for further interrogation and information gathering. Interestingly there was not a whimper in the south regarding this development.

This was understandable because officialdom could not accept openly that the killer squad was theirs. It was thought then that the LTTE would expose the capture of LRRP men at a conveniently time and embarrass the state. It is now believed that upon finding the group had been responsible for some killings the squad had been executed. Also, much information about the inner workings of the LRRP squads was also gleaned. This however was not put to much use as the December 5 elections saw Ranil Wickremesinghe becoming premier, leading to a transformation of the political climate.

The discovery of an arms cache including thermobaric weapons at Athurugiriya along with 66 LTTE uniforms and cyanide capsules was a further revelation and confirmation of the LRRP phenomenon. It proved among other things that the deadly and destructive thermobaric fire bombs were being used by the army. Balagalle had denied such allegations earlier as these weapons are tabooed by most civilised nations. Few governments would use them against their own people.

Dirty tricks

Moreover the discovery of LTTE uniforms, cyanide capsules and the presence of Tamil speaking personnel indicated that the 'dirty tricks department' was capable of conducting terrible acts and pinning the blame on the LTTE.

Interestingly enough and to the eternal shame of any professional army, the arrested persons through media outlets blew their cover wilfully. No covert action group or person would ever own up if captured or arrested but the Athurugiriya crowd did so. They claimed that they had engaged in LRRP work in the east and that they were in Colombo in that respect. In one move, the covert action programme was exposed by persons wanting to be freed from arrest, After an inexplicable initial silence, Balagalle also began to support the group who were later released.

It was widely suspected that there was a plot to assassinate Wickremesinghe and pin the blame on the LTTE. The squad in Athurugiriya was thought to be part of that. The explanation proffered eagerly by the arrested persons that they were part of a LRRP team was seen as an excuse to avoid apprehension. Patriotism and interests of national security inevitably invoked by anyone needing to hide anything sinister were bandied about. What many suspected was that the covert action programme was being abused to wipe out a political rival.

There were also reports that the five arrested at Athurugiriya had nothing to do with the LRRP squads at all. The police officer investigating the case has been pilloried and pressurised but nevertheless continues with his probe in a dogged manner. If Defence Minister Marapone and Internal Security Minister Amaratunga realise the gravity of the situation there is no doubt that the matter would not be treated in this way. But then certain ministers of this government are proving to be great disappointments in political acumen and administrative efficiency.

The Athurugiriya arsenal affair and consequent publicity provided the LTTE and the world with ample proof of deep penetration squads. It was indeed hilarious to see a bunch of 'toughies' claiming to be covert actionists pleading for clemency by admitting they were covert operatives; probing policemen were being accused of compromising national security. Suddenly the LRRP secret became a public achievement. Kumaratunga was praised for sanctioning such state terrorism. It was portrayed as the single biggest military achievement of the armed forces.

Stark reality

In fact the LTTE was perceived as being prepared to talk peace only because the Tigers feared the LRRP teams. It was indeed pathetic to see knowledgeable persons ignoring the stark reality behind the covert action project and proclaiming it to be a 'legitimate' success. It was like the American public lulling itself into a false consciousness about the Vietnam war through Sylvester Stallone and Chuck Norris movies. The LTTE however obtained the concurrence of the government in tabooing the deployment of LRRP squads in the north east in the ceasefire accord. The Tigers also got the CFA to stipulate that no Tamil paramilitary group would be allowed to function in the north east with arms. The Tigers thought that with these ceasefire agreement provisions, the deep penetration squad problem would go away. But it did not and the next twist was when the LTTE discovered signs of a plot to place explosives at a point close to where LTTE Leader Pirapaharan was staying. It was this that influenced the LTTE into staging massive security arrangements for the LTTE leader's press conference on April 10.

With the rekindling of suspicion that the deep penetration squads were being activated again, the Tigers began a hard response. Without adequate proof, complaining to the monitoring mission was ruled out. Instead a counter strike was planned. Intelligence Wing Chief, Pottu Amman travelled to the Eastern Province on a special mission to strengthen the intelligence network there. An important aspect of that enterprise was to focus on the activity and support structure of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols. Thereafter, reports are emanating about Tamils involved in the covert action project being targeted, one in Colombo too was shot and wounded. As long as state agencies cover up the covert activity and target the LTTE in more ways than one, retaliatory responses will recur.

Total dismantling

What is needed therefore at this juncture is the total dismantling of this covert action project. If LRRP acts continue clandestinely, then the Tigers too are likely to reciprocate. Moreover, the LTTE would eliminate Tamil collaborators as vengeful punishment and also to demolish the LRRP structure. Censuring and compelling the LTTE to desist from such activity can be successful only if the Directorate of Military Intelligence stops its provocative acts. The dogs of war must be called off by both sides.

In order to ensure that the Ranil Wickremesinghe government should know clearly and exactly all the ramifications concerning the LRRP project, it is imperative that the government knows what is happening in order to protect itself. There are many observers who feel that the government has not awoken to the harsh reality behind the Athurugiriya arsenal. It is very necessary that a detailed investigation be launched into the entire covert action project particularly at a time when Kumaratunga and cohorts are planning a prime ministerial 'change.' The deep penetration hit squads need to be probed deeply in the interests of national security and the nation at large.

(The Sunday Leader - August 11, 2002)