LTTE K'cholai leader killed

Two LTTE cadres including the leader for Kokkodicholai were killed and an arms haul recovered by the Security Forces following a confrontation in Angodavillvu, Welikanda on Monday evening, the Media Centre for the National Security said.

According to a spokesman for the MCNS troops on a foot patrol came under an LTTE attack on Monday evening in Welikanda. The Security Forces successfully retaliated forcing the Tigers to flee the area. "Two LTTE cadres including one of the Tiger leaders to Kokkodicholai were killed in the confrontation," he told the Daily News.

The troops conducted a search operation following fierce fighting that lasted for nearly three hours and recovered two bodies of Tiger cadres, two T56 riffles, 14 rounds of 40mm ammunition, binoculars, five live grenades, a CDMA telephone, an ID card, five maps and two radio communication sets, the MCNS spokesman said.

He said the dead LTTE cadres have been identified as S.Rajindran alias Ashok a well known LTTE leader in Kokkodicholai and K. Ragunathan, from the LTTE medical team.

Meanwhile, the Security Forces recovered a large stock of arms and ammunition in a search operation in Pankulam, Trincomalee on Monday evening. Troops recovered 197 rounds of T56 ammunition and 49 rounds of 12.7 mm ammunition hidden in an abandoned land.

In a separate incident the Security Forces recovered a claymore mine weighing 10kgs and a detonator code along with a remote control device following a tip off given by a civilian on Monday around 3.30 p.m. in Saravitam lane, Jaffna, the MCNS spokesman said.

(http://www.dailynews.lk/2007/05/09/sec01.asp)

Karuna faction kills the father of Sinthujan -- their first victim in rival camp

Tensions and killings continue to rise in the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) camp divided into two factions -- Karuna Group and Pilaiyan group.

Last night Karuna faction militant cadres led by Iniya Barathy shot and killed Sinthujan’s father Johnson (54 yrs) at Kallaru in the Batticoloa district.

Sinthujan a.k.a Jeyakanthan, a Pillaiyan loyalist, was killed and buried on May 4, 2007 at Kiran. Yesterday, people in the area reported to the Police that a hand was sticking out of the ground. They suspected that there was a dead body buried in the spot.

When the Police exhumed the body they found that was the body of Sinthujan . Eravur Police that exhumed body of Sinthujan removed it to the hospital.

In the meantime, Police began their inquiries by questioning the father of Sinthujan, Johnson. Johnson; father of three children, had alleged that Karuna and his rampaging commanders had killed and buried his son.

Following the police investigation, a team of 15 militants led by Iniya Barathi loyal to Karuna raided the house of Johnson at Kallaru located in the government-controlled area and shot and killed him. They have also warned that Sinthujan wife too was in their hit list.

According to sources, Karuna’s faction has blamed the killing of Johnson to STF police.

Sources in the East told Asian Tribune that the killing of Johnson might hinder a secret negotiation underway to bring the two factions together.

(http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/5662)

Karuna split deepens, associates killed

The split in the Karuna faction has deepened with reports that its spokesman Azad Maulana and close aids of Karuna had fled the country fearing retribution. On Wednesday night a relative of the Ampara military wing leader was shot dead while rumors spread that more Karuna associates were believed to have been shot dead over the last few days by loyalists of the group’s intelligence head Pillayan who split from Karuna following an internal dispute. However, none of the reports could be confirmed as political officials of the Karuna faction were not willing to speak to the media over the emerging reports.

(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2007/05/11/front/06.asp)

International help to locate officer

Sri Lanka government has sought international assistance to locate the missing Intelligence Officer who was attached to Sri Lankan Embassy in Indonesia.

Captain Mohamed Nilam, who was an intelligence official at the Sri Lankan embassy in Jakarta, has disappeared with his wife and children before termination of his term, government said.

Defence spokesman, Minister Keheliya Rambukwella told Sandesaya that Captain Nilam had gone missing two weeks before his term expired.

He said the Sri Lankan government had taken the issue on diplomatic level and informed security authorities in Indonesia.

As Captain Nilam has disappeared with his wife and children, the minister was asked whether the Sri Lankan government consider the officer had vacated his post.

"It seems that he has acted on an agenda of his own", Minister Rambukwella replied.

When told that Captain Nilam had been an LTTE target and it was the responsibility of the government to extend his term for security reasons, the minister said it was not only officer Nilam but there are also other officers whose security had to be ensured by the government.

(http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2007/05/070508_nilam.shtml)

Karuna and Pillaiyan Factions of TMVP Clash in East

Interenecine clashes among and within Tamil armed groups is not a new development. The latest group to be afflicted in this respect is the Tamil Makkal Viduthalaip Puligal (TMVP). Bitter rivalry has ensued between the TMVP’s “national leader” Karuna Amman and its ” supreme military commander” Pillaiyaan. TMVP factions aligned to the leader and commander have clashed in the East.

[In 2004]

In a typical example of the proverbial Tamil saying about pinching the baby and rocking the cradle the Sri Lankan military establishment is now trying to pacify Karuna and Pillaiyaan and evolve a working relationship between both factions. Military intelligence operatives “handling” the TMVP initially practised “divide and rule” tactics and covertly engineered a feud. Now they are overtly engaged in promoting peace. There is however a lurking fear that the split may have gone too far to a stage where patching up may not be possible.

Pillaiyaan was at one time a trusted, loyal disciple of Karuna. When the TMVP leader went abroad to escape assassination squads of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) it was Pillaiyaan and other deputies who held the fort locally. Even when Karuna was holed up at Panagoda camp for security reasons it was Pillaiyaan and others who remained active in the East and Polonnaruwa district.

Ever since Karuna came under complete control of Sri Lankan intelligence the TMVP is being directed by intelligence operatives. Karuna was more like a brand name and had very little control over his group in actual terms. The group had called itself TEMVP (Tamil Eelam Makkal Viduthalaip Puligal ) earlier. But Karuna’s handlers got him to remove the “Eelam” out as it smacked of separatism.

The Karuna faction known as TMVP was not allowed to function as one whole entity. Different commanders like Sinnathamby, Riyaseelan, Mangalan master, Iniyabharathy, Markan etc were given different spheres of influence and were responsible to different handlers. Pillaiyaan was like a “first among equals” among them. Most of the instructions from military intelligence hierarchy to the TMVP was relayed through Pillaiyaan. He was also the “communication channel” between Karuna and the other commanders. In the process Pillaiyaan self - styled himself as supreme commander.

It was Pillaiyaan who helped out with regular supply of cash to Karuna and his family while abroad. Apparently when the LTTE killed eight of Karuna’s men at Kottawa, Karuna lost his ‘treasurer Kuganesan too. Kugan had invested Karuna’s money in different place known only to himself.. All that was lost after Kuganesan was killed.

It was then that Pillaiyaan stepped in and started his taxation cum abduction for ransom racket. Pillaiyaan supplied Karuna with money regularly. He also encouraged a personality cult around Karuna within the TMVP.

The Sri Lankan intelligence operatives were not very happy at the Karuna - Pillaiyaan relationship. They preferred to engineer rivalry and factionalism within TMVP ranks and keep the running dogs of (Sinhala) imperialism on separate leashes. It was also felt that both leader and commander had to be given “knocks” and brought down a peg or two.

In the case of Pillaiyaan his handlers resented the fact that he was running a flourishing extortion racket where full details were not being divulged. While some of the abductions and extortion schemes were run with full knowledge of the handlers there were many other acts being done without their knowledge. Pillaiyaan was masterminding a racket where crores of rupees were filling his coffers. So Pillaiyaan was to be taught a lesson.

As far as Karuna was concerned the military establishment was very pleased with his performance. The sore point however was Karuna’s opposition to the East being fragmented. He also wanted some political power and insisting that an interim administrative council be set up for the entire province and be handed over to him. This was not to the liking of Karuna’s masters who wanted to reduce his clout too.

The best way to teach both leader and commander a lesson was to foster enmity between both.. An intra - TMVP feud would weaken both and enable handlers to exert greater authority over both factions.

A “gentleman” by the name of Krishnan was brought down to Sri Lanka for the purpose.”London” Krishnan whose full name is Krishnapillai is a native of Pungudutheevu in Jaffna. He was a federal party youth activist who went abroad to London in the early seventies. He played a prominent role in organizing and participating at the demonstration at a world cup match in 1975 when Tamil youths protesting Sri Lankan “oppression” invaded the grounds and fell flat on the pitch.

Krishnan later became an overseas activist of the original undivided LTTE. He was largely instrumental in wooing Anton Ballasingham into LTTE folds. When the LTTE split in 1980 Krishnan teamed up with Umamaheswaran and helped form the Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). He was expelled from the PLOTE in 1986 for allegedly embezzling funds collected abroad. When Paranthan Rajan broke away from PLOTE and formed Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) in 1987 Krishnan joined it.
Krishnan later dropped out of ENDLF and became a loner. He was approached by Sri Lankan intelligence in the nineties and has been of great service to them since then.Krishnan had established close rapport with Karuna on instructions from Sri Lankan intelligence.

Colombo was quite unhappy during Karunas short - lived honeymoon with the ENDLF. It was Krishnan who succeeded in breaking up that alliance on the request of Sri Lankan intelligence. Now he was asked to promote enmity between Karuna and Pillaiyaan. Krishnan came down to Colombo and worked on Karuna’s ego, insecurity and lurking jealousy.He also fired Karuna up over Pillaiyaan’s ill - gotten cash. This succeeded to a great extent and soon Karuna and Pillaiyaan were arguing on the telephone about. finances.

Karuna ordered Pillaiyaan to turn over all the money in his possession and submit accounts.Pillaiyaan decided to jump the gun and sent a killer squad to assassinate Iniyabharathy in Batticaloa.Bharaty a Karuna loyalist had been asked by his leader to collect the money and accounts from Pillaiyaan. Iniyabharathy who is implicated in the abduction and murder of “Taraki” Sivaram went up the roof and escaped death.Pillaiyaan also sent killers to bump off Krishnan. But Krishnan had already checked out from the Colombo hotel where he was staying.

With these acts the split came out in the open. Factions began forming around both Karuna and Pillaiyaan. People like Sinnathamby, Iniyabharathi, Riyaseelan, Jeyathaan, Santhiveli Maamaa,Thileepan, Mahilan etc were with Karuna. People like Sinthujan, Sitha master,Markan, Thooyavan, Seelan , Sasi etc were with Pillaiyaan. People like TMVP spokesman Azad Moulana and Mangalan master are neutral.Clashes between both factions began occurring.

Soon cadres loyal to Pillaiyaan began fleeing Batticaloa - Amparai districts to Polonnaruwa and Trincomalee districts. Karuna loyalists began entrenching themselves in Battiicaloa. With areas like Karadiyanaaru and Kokkatticholai coming under army control TMVP cadres loyal to Karuna began moving there in large numbers. Most TMVP offices in the littoral became depleted in personnel.

It appears that the rank and file in the security forces stationed in the East are sympathetic towards Pillaiyaan. This is because it was Pillaiyaan who interacted with them at grass roots level. Also many of the “hela jathika’ Types in Trinco and Polonnaruwa are also partial towards Pillaiyaan. These elements have played a crucial role in sustaining the TMVP.

The military and defence ministry hierarchies favour Karuna at this juncture. They are pleased with the input he provided in the Vaaharai and Paduvaankarai military offensives. They need his expetise in the battles to come in the Wanni too. Karuna was successful in enticing Jeyathaan and some others from the LTTE into TMVP.Also Karuna is now a brand name to mobilise anti - tiger elements. Karuna is necessary till the East is fragmented and Sinhalaised. He may literally and metaphorically outlive his usefulness then.

In a show of mediation the military authorities summoned a peace parley at Vaakarai. TMVP stalwarts from both factions met to thrash out differences. Both Karuna and Pillaiyaan kept away. A compromise in the form of demarcated territorial control was proposed by the handlers.

Areas south of Batticaloa town from Aaraiyampathy to Pottuvil were to be under Karuna’s suzerainty; areas north of B’caloa from Aarumugathaankudiyiruppu to Verugal river were to be Pillaiyaan’s fiefdom. B’caloa town was to be common for both under supervision. The hinterland areas were to be decided upon later.

This demarcation was not to the liking of both factions clamouring to be “sole” representatives of Eastern Tamils. Arguments heated up and led to fisticuffs. At one point Iniyabharathy and Santhively Maama whipped out concealed pistols and fired away. Seelan and six others from Pillaiyaan faction were injured and are hospitalised.

The peace parley ended in pandemonium. Both factions grabbed people from the other faction and took them away as “human shields”. Thus Pillaiyaan factioni took Mahilan and some others as hostages. Karuna faction took Sinthujan and some others as hostages. Ironically the security forces “allowed” both factions to take captives and depart, providing safe escort to both groups returning to B’caloa, Karadiyanaaru and Trincomalee.

Sinthujan and some others were kept at the TMVP office - camp on Bar road in B’caloa town. Sinthujan is the man responsible for abducting and killing seven Tamil rehabilitation Organization (TRO) employees in 2006 January. He also led the gang rape of the TRO’s woman accountant.

Sinthujan and Vijitharan broke out of custody and tried to run away. Karuna loyalists gave chase and gunned them down near the toddy tavern junction. Vijitharan was killed instantaneously but a wounded Sinthujan was dragged away and brutally hacked to death. A Muslim auto rickshaw driver from Kattankudi who was passing by was also injured in the shooting.

Karuna loyalists have also abducted the wife of Seelan who was injured by Santhiveli Maamaa in the Vaakarai shooting. They have also broken into a number of houses belonging to TMVP leaders of the Pillaiyaan faction. Valuables have been looted and furniture destroyed. The houses of Seelan, Sitha master and Sasi were some residences affected.

One happy consequence of the Karuna - Pillaiyaan split is the remarkable drop in abductions for ransom in Colombo and forced conscription in Batticaloa. These activities however are likely to increase once the internal squabbling comes to an end.

Meanwhile military authorities are engaging with Karuna and Pillaiyaan separately to bring about a compromise. It is said that Karuna had to cut his European tour as a result. After promoting a split the handlers now hope to “unite” the weakened factions and manipulate them easily in the future. Such attempts could turn counterproductive because factional friction has can gather momentum to a point of no return.

If the Karuna - Pillaiyaan split becomes permanent the TMVP will be considerably weakened. Internecine warfare will debilitate both factions. It remains to be seen as to how this will affect the Rajapakse regime’s “chinthana” of fragmenting and Sinhalaising the East.With Karuna and Pillaiyaan clashing the ultimate victor could be Velupillai Pirapakaran.

(http://transcurrents.com/tamiliana/archives/319)

Intelligence officer Nilam missing at Jakarta

A top intelligence officer of the Sri Lanka Army, Captain S.H. Nilam, who was the defence attaché at the Sri Lanka Embassy in Jakarta, has gone missing since last month. Another top official at the Jakarta embassy has reportedly received death threats from the LTTE.

State intelligence informed the government that Captain Nilam, his wife and three children had gone missing since April 23, a highly placed government official said.

He said that the acting ambassador in Jakarta, a Tamil, had reportedly received death threats from the Tamil Tigers recently.

The latest development follows the recall of Major General Janaka Perera, who was Sri Lanka’s ambassador to Indonesia, and the appointment of the former Army Chief of Staff, Major General Nanda Mallawarachchi- who has not yet assumed duties-as the new ambassador.

Major General Perera was asked to return to the country during the last week of April, for unknown reasons -- although his term had been expected to end next September.

It is learnt that, with the support of the Indonesian State Intelligence Agency -Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN), Captain Nilam had tipped off the Sri Lanka Government regarding several Sri Lanka bound LTTE arms shipments, and thus curtailed the flow of LTTE weapons to the country during his tenure.

Captain Nilam was in charge of the ‘Millennium City’ safe house when it was raided during the UNP regime. He was sent to Thailand in order to avoid LTTE attempts on his life. Later he was made the Defence Attaché in Indonesia.

(http://www.sinhala.net/LocalNews/SinhalaNet_Full_News.asp?ID=1926#NewsViewBM)

Split in Karuna group reported

The pro-government Tamil militant group led by the former LTTE commander Karuna has reportedly split, with Karuna and his deputy, Pillaiyan, falling out over money and the command structure.

Quoting military sources The Nation weekly said on Sunday that Pillaiyan had fled to Trincomalee from Batticaloa with 150 of his followers.

Pillaiyan, as the man in the field, had resented Karuna's remote control, reliable sources told Hindustan Times.

The Nation said that the infighting had led to the killing of Sindujan, a Pillaiyan loyalist who was the head of the Karuna group in Amparai district.

Sindujan and the group's intelligence chief, Seelan, were called for a meeting where a Karuna loyalist, Iniyabharathi, killed Sindujan. Seelan escaped miraculously, the paper said. The clash within the group had erupted over the distribution of money.

On the day Sindujan was killed, Karuna had invited Pillaiyan to come over for a discussion. But Pillaiyan had chosen not to go as he knew what awaited him, The Nation said.

Those in the know recall that the Karuna-Prabhakaran split in early 2004 had also occurred over the use or misuse of money. The LTTE's financel department and its intelligence chief (Pottu Amman) had alleged misappropriation of funds by Karuna, who was then the Batticaloa and Amparai district commander.

They asked the Supremo, Velupillai Prabhakaran, to take action against Karuna. Prabhkaran summoned Karuna to the Wanni for a discussion. But Karuna chose not to go because he knew what awaited him.

Instead, he split, struck an alliance with the Sri Lankan government, and formed his own Batticaloa Amparai-based politico-military organisation called Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (Tamil Peoples' Liberation Tigers).

Informed sources say that in the fight within the Karuna group, Karuna will have the upper hand because he represents the 'brand'. Given his past as Prabhakaran's deputy, Karuna is likely to get outside support and not Pillaiyan.

It is likely that Prabhakaran will try to get Pillaiyan and his men to come over to his side, taking advantage of the offer of amnesty including jobs overseas.

Pillaiyan may find it hard to survive on his own. But it remains to be seen if he will exercise the option of seeking refuge in Prabhakaran.

(http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print.aspx?Id=28a57907-17be-425e-90fd-fd4f2313e325)

Army’s special forces chief to quit by Sunil Jayasiri

Top Army officer, Colonel Prasanna Silva, the Brigade Commander of the special force which carried out the recent successful operations in the east including the one in Vakarai, has been asked to retire prematurely for unknown reasons, Daily Mirror learns.

Informed sources revealed Colonel Silva had submitted his resignation recently to Army Commander Sarath Fonseka, who had reportedly accepted it. With the new development, Colonel Silva will retire in December this year.

Until the retirement, it is learnt, Colonel Silva has been given a logistic appointment at the Kosgama Army Camp,

Meanwhile, Army Commander Fonseka has appointed Jaffna’s 553 Brigade Commander Nirmal Dharmaratne as the Commander of the Army’s elite special forces with immediate effect. Colonel Silva’s achievements, it is learnt, were personally appreciated by the President at a meeting held soon after the successful operations in the East.

(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2007/05/07/front/2.asp)

The Tamils safety in the capital city should be assured - The statement issued by Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) Supreme Commander Pillayan

Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) Supreme Commander Pillayan in a statement said that In recent days abduction and disappearance of Tamil youths both males and females have been escalated in Colombo . This has caused great fear to the Tamil people who live in Colombo and who come to Colombo for their needs. We are highly worried and shocked over this matter. We should not permit this situation to be continued. A full stop should be kept for the fear of the Tamil people and the Tamil people`s safety in Colombo should be assured.

Clashes are being taken place between the Government troops and Praba Group in North, East. In this condition abduction and disappearance of Tamils; have increased their disbelief. The President and the Government should pay more attention to this matter and should give assurance for their safety. The Government can`t get rid of its responsibility it has in the safety of the Tamil people.

Likewise the Tamil journalists and media institutions are facing threats. The opinions that are sown by a journalist can`t be destroyed by killing him. Our clear position is that unless by opinions, opinions cannot be destroyed by tools. The government should assure the right and the safety of the journalists who are the back- bones of democracy.

In recent days the security arrangements and checking operations have been intensified in Colombo . It is important to save the capital city , the politicians in the capital Colombo , foreign statesmen, economic centers and civilian targets from the terrorists of Praba Group. We accept the responsibility and the duty which the three forces have in this matter. But this security arrangement should not be against a specific nationalitly. During the checking and inquires the Tamils should not be viewed in suspicion. They too are citizens of this country.

The Tamil people are under going untold hardships due to the terrorist acts of Praba Group. It has been long time since the gap increased between Praba Group and Tamil People. Everyone should well realize this. The Sinhalese parties and people should look beyond Praba Terrorist Group and should gain the confidence of the Tamil people. This is the source of great way to solve this problem.

A few days before warning leaflets using our organization`s name was distributed in Athurugiriya, Millennium City area warning the Tamil people of that area to vacate. The over genius (') subjects in the leaflet underlines those who are behind this confederacy act.

No one ever uses their organization`s name to threat. Our organization`s name was used to claim in that leaflet with spelling mistakes. The literature mistakes and grammar mistakes clearly reveals the confederates of the leaflets. Our people well realize that we are not the owners of these hateful, stupid acts.

Our political activities are in view of the rights and safety of our people. We don`t want anything that cannot fulfil our people`s expectations. We see this as a part of a confederacy effort taken by those who are unable to digest our political activities. This indirectly reveals that any dangers may be caused to the Tamil people in order to disgrace our organization`s name.

Therefore I wish to reiterate that it is duty of the Government to assure the safety of the Tamil people and to make way for them to live in a fearless state.

(http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2006/9/8413.html)

Cracks within Karuna faction

An internal strife within the Karuna faction has come to a head on with deputy leader of the group Pillayan falling out and one of his loyalists Sindujan being killed in internecine warfare, military sources said. Pillayan who was the number two in the group and the military leader of the outfit had also escaped an attempt on his life and slipped to Trincomalee with over 150 cadres loyal to him.

In an incident that took place on Thursday the intelligence leader of the Karuna group Seelan and its Ampara district leader Sindujan had been summoned for a meeting where Sindujan was shot and killed by Karuna loyalist Iniyaparithy. Seelan had narrowly escaped after sustaining wounds.

The clash within the group had erupted over an argument between Karuna and Pillayan over disbursement of the group`s funds and the new appointments made within the faction. Afterwards Karuna had ordered his cadres that Pillayan and his loyalists be hunted.

On the day of the killing of Sindujan, Karuna had asked Pillayan to come to Colombo for an urgent meeting with him, which Pillayan had avoided knowing very well that he would be targeted there. It is learnt that the military is in a quandary over the split in the Karuna faction since it was Pillayan who had been close to the fighting cadres of the Karuna faction.

(http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2007/5/14640.html)

Open warfare between Karuna and his deputy Pillaiyan: split due to money and command structure issues

The Karuna Group in the east which broke away from the Vanni-led LTTE has split into two groups, according to sources in Colombo.

The deputy leader Pillaiyan of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal military wing, has broken away from his leader, Murlitharan alias Colonel Karuna. Sources revealed that the falling out has occurred over issues of "money and the command structure".

Asian Tribune reliably learnt that Pillaiyan had also resented the "remote control" approach of Karuna while Pillaiyan was in the field moving with his cadres.

The split ocurred after the two sides engaged in open warfare.

Recently, Pillaiyan who was in Vaharai was summoned to Colombo for a meeting and was ordered to stay in a particular hotel in Colombo. Accordingly Pillaiyan went to Colombo for the meeting.

When he was about to enter the Colombo city, he received an urgent phone call from Seelan that Sinthujan, who was the Commander of the Deep Penetrating Force, was killed. The plan was to send Sinthujan on leave to isolate him from the unit. Accordingly Sinthujan went on leave to his home in Amparai . There in Amparai, he was seized by a group of commanders Inaiyabarathy, Veera, Ranjan, Thileepan and Jeeventiran and brutally killed by ruthlessly assaulting him with crowbars and steel rods. Also Seelan told Pillaiyan that Akilan was shot and he has sustained serious injuries in his hand. Seelan also reported that he was also shot but sustained minor gunshot injuries, but survived from the pursuing killers.

Pillaiyan was also told that there was a move to arrest him in Colombo and already 20 cadres were waiting to grab him in the vicinity of the hotel where he was supposed to go and stay.

Asian Tribune further learnt that nearly 100 cadres under the command of commanders Iniyabarathy, Veera, Ranjan, Thileepan and Jeeventiran ransacked the TMVP offices in the Batticaloa district. When they rounded up the TMVP office located in the Govindan Road Batticaloa, Pradeeb managed to escape. But the rampaging cadres went to his house and chased his wife and her sisters and mother from the house.

As mentioned earlier Seelan who was in charge of Arasady Road Office in Batticalao survived with gunshot injuries when his office was rounded up by rampaging cadres.

Asian Tribune was unable to contact either Pillaiyan or Colonel Karuna for further information.

Sources say that Pillaiyan is now in Trincomalee and there are more than 300 TMVP armed cadres are with him. TMVP commanders Marckan, Sinna Jeyam and others are with Pillaiyan.

Pillaiyan initially wanted to leave Sri Lanka and seek asylum in some other country, but TMVP cadres have urged that he should not leave Sri Lanka and should remain in the country and continue to work for TMVP.

It is learnt Karuna is in Colombo. He came back to Sri Lanka eight months ago.

Before Karuna returned to Sri Lanka, Pillaiyan went to India and made the necessary arrangements to relocate Karuna’s wife and three children safely. After the relocation of the family was done successfully, Pillaiyan arranged to send a common friend from London to bring Karuna back to Colombo.

Once Karuna returned to Colombo, Pillaiyan handed back responsibility of money matters to Karuna, according to a TMVP source.

More details are awaited.

(http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/5630)

LTTE killed fishermen: TN Police

It was the most dramatic disclosure by the Tamil Nadu police in recent memory. The state police chief said on Friday night that it was the ‘Sea Tigers’ who killed five Indian fishermen off the coast of Kanyakumari on March 29.

This is the first time since the May 1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, that the LTTE has been accused of murdering Indian nationals in Indian territory. The killing of the fishermen had taken place in Indian territorial waters south of Kanyakumari and west of Kalpitiya in Sri Lanka.

Tamil Nadu Police Director General D. Mukherjee said in an official statement that the Tigers had shot the fishermen on suspicion that they were spying on their movements. The LTTE men were engaged in ferrying arms and ammunition from one of their ships to the Sri Lankan coast.

In another revelation, the police chief also said 12 Indian fishermen missing since March 4 were actually in the custody of the LTTE after being abducted, along with their boat.

When four fishermen, who survived the attack on them, returned home from the sea on March 29 and revealed that unidentified persons on a civilian boat had opened fire on them, fishermen and political parties had assumed that the Sri Lankan Navy was behind the killings. Two fishermen had died in the boat itself, two vanished into the sea with bleeding bullet injuries, while a fifth man succumbed in hospital after reaching the shore.However, authorities in the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard and intelligence agencies knew immediately on debriefing the survivors that this was not just another instance of firing on Indian fishermen. Often, Indian fishermen transgress into Sri Lankan territorial waters and get shot by the Sri Lankan Navy. These incidents are alleged to take place in the vicinity of Kachchativu, or elsewhere in the Palk Bay.

The Kanyakumari incident was completely different. Firstly, the spot was well inside Indian territorial waters and very far away from the routine areas of patrolling by the Sri Lankan Navy. The victims themselves did not say they were fired upon by the Sri Lankan Navy. They identified one of the vessels of the attackers as ‘Maria’, a civilian boat, and also said the assailants were casually dressed, with some of them being bare-chested.

Chief Minister Mutuvel Karunanidhi shot off a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, giving all these details and released copies of it to the media. He demanded an investigation into the identity of the killers and ‘their international connections’. It was clear that he was indirectly absolving the Sri Lankan Navy but he stopped short of naming the Tigers.

It was much later that the police found out the truth. It was a chance discovery, after the Indian Coast Guard found a vessel by name ‘Maria’ drifting in Indian waters on April 11 along with two Indian fishing boats.

The Coast Guard rounded up the Indians and six Sri Lankan Tamils. Initially, the survivors of the attack failed to identify the vessel as the one involved in the March 29 incident.

On April 23, the investigation was handed over to the ‘Q Branch-CID, a wing of the Tamil Nadu police that specialises in investigating cases involving extremists. Officers experienced in interrogating LTTE suspects were deployed, and the six men opened up. They disclosed that ‘Maria’ was indeed the same vessel involved in the shooting; and that they were all ‘Sea Tigers’ whose routine duty was to ferry arms and ammunition from a mother ship to hideouts on land using fishing boats. However, the men distanced themselves from the killing of the five fishermen, saying another group of ‘Sea Tigers’ were involved. They gave an account of what happened on March 29. The Indian fishermen had come close to ‘Maria’ and asked its inmates if they had any fish to spare, as they themselves had failed to catch any. A Sea Tiger cadre, Manavaalan, had told them that there was no fish on board, but the fishermen were persistent. Suddenly, the LTTE men opened fire on the fishermen. Investigators were told that the ‘Sea Tigers’ had fired at the fishermen on suspicion that they were spying on their activities.

In the course of the interrogation, the police also managed to solve the mystery of 12 fishermen missing since March 4. The group had put out to sea from Sakthikulangara, a fishing village in Kollam district of neighbouring state of Kerala. They were abducted by the ‘Sea Tigers’, and are still now in LTTE custody.

(http://www.sundaytimes.lk/070429/News/101.2news.html)

Former military officer seeking asylum?

Sri Lanka's Intelligence Officer in Jakarta, Capt. Mohamed Nilam has gone missing after he completed his tour of duty. Both the Foreign Ministry, and the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence (DFI) are now trying to ascertain whether he secretly negotiated asylum and fled to a foreign country after failing to persuade the Government to grant him a new posting.

Captain Nilam, who figured in the mistaken Police raid on the Army's intelligence cell at Athurugiriya was regarded as a high profile LTTE target and was posted to Jakarta. Captain Nilam worked with the Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and his private house was used as an intellgence cell for operations in the East. When the Police conducted a raid, a large variety of military hardware including clay more mines were found. Intelligence sources told The Sunday Times Captain Nilam had sought an extended term of three months. "It was granted. During that period his replacement had arrived in Jakarta and he was expected to brief him and remain at the station until the extended period was over. Without anyone’s knowledge he had disappeared with his family," the source said. Lieutenant Commander Tuan Putra Halaldeen has already assumed duties at the Embassy in Jakarta.

Whilst in Jakarta, Captain Nilam was reporting to the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence though he belonged to the Directorate of Military Intelligence.

The assistance of Indonesian authorities has been sought to ascertain flight details of Captain Nilam and his family. Sources close to his family said he was worried to return to Colombo because he was a high profile target for the LTTE. Hence, he had appealed several times to his immediate superiors to use their good offices to get the Government to either get him a separate posting or an extended term.

"All his fervent appeals were contemptuously ignored," the source told The Sunday Times. He said that was the price that had to be paid by an officer who placed his life at risk in playing the role of an intelligence officer.

En route to take up his posting, Captain Nilam and family ran into trouble at the Singapore airport. Upon arrival there to take a connecting flight to Jakarta, he was detected by authorities at the airport carrying pistol ammunition. It was found on the bag of his wife. Accidentally she had failed to check on some ammunition she had held when she travelled along in Sri Lanka with her husband. Top level diplomatic contacts between Colombo and Singapore led to the matter being sorted out so he could resume his flight.

(http://www.sundaytimes.lk/070506/News/100_4_news.html)

The fear of LRRP attacks

A soldier of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) patrols along a rural road in rebel held territory of Kilinochchi, about 270 kilometers (169 miles) northeast of Colombo, Sri Lanka, April 19, 2007. Five years after a cease-fire brought a measure of relief to Sri Lanka, a ferocious ethnic war is again raging between a government dominated by the country's Sinhalese majority and the Tamil Tigers, rebels from the Tamil minority who are probably best known for suicide bombings. (AP Photo/Gemunu Amarasinghe)

The Fear of LRRP

Civilians make their way as a Tamil rebel fighter of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), right, patrols in a rural road in rebel held territory of Kilinochchi, about 270 kilometers (169 miles) north east of Colombo, Sri Lanka,Thursday, April. 19,2007. Day and night, warplanes roar over this rebel-held town as the steady thump of artillery echoes in the distance — a preview, many fear, of a military showdown in Sri Lanka that could leave thousands dead. (AP Photo / Gemunu Amarasinghe)

Captain Nilam Missing

Captain Nilam, the previous leader of SLA deep penetration unit (codename 'Mahasohon Brigade') has gone missing in Indonesia. His family members are also reported to be missing. We cannot confirm whether he was kidnapped by LTTE supporters or whether he went into hiding.

Captain Nilam was working against the LTTE arms trafficking network in Indonesia and his protection was ensured by Mgr Gen Janaka Perera who was the Srilankan ambassador in Indonesia. It is most likely that Captain Nilam went into hiding knowing that LTTE cadres will attempt to assassinate him after the removal of Janaka Perera as ambassador 2 weeks ago.

Captain Nilam who was assigned to the Military Intelligence Corps, lead many successful DPU operations against the LTTE including the assassination of Shankar, Prabhakaran's right hand man.

(http://defencenet.blogspot.com/2007/05/captain-nilam-missing.html)

Some thoughts on Millennium safe house

The proper military concept of a safe house is a secret operational base within an enemy area or in close proximity there to, and dominated by the enemy. The Millennium City Safe House must be the first safe house ever, in a safe area. In fact as the description itself implies that safe houses are only established in unsafe areas. The description "safe" is in relation to an enemy threat of an imminent nature. It could be said that Athurugiriya was even safer than Colombo. An intelligence cell and a safe house are both secret bases, the former being for purposes of obtaining information and intelligence by secretly meeting informants and the latter for varied secret operations such as sabotage, destructions, assassinations, raids and even espionage etc. The main differences being the location and the concerns of secrecy.

A safe house has to be behind enemy lines or in close proximity there to, and absolute secrecy is a must. According to the statement of the Director Military Intelligence [D.M.I.] Capt. Nilam on being recalled to Colombo was initially attached to the "Forward Intelligence Cell", which was then located at the army camp at Kohuwela. This same intelligence cell and not a "safe house" was shifted to the house belonging to Capt. Nilam's wife, within a housing scheme at Athurugiriya. The reference to this secret intelligence cell as a safe house confuses the issues consequent to the discovery of the storage of high explosive materials and lethal weapons therein.

An issue arises of the storage and the establishment of unauthorised arsenal, however temporary, without due regard for the safety and security of the said stores and the neighbourhood too. According to established Military procedure the minimum requirement was the provision of an armed guard at least as a temporary measure until these high explosive materials were transported to and returned as ordered by the D.M.I. These measures would not have been necessary, if in keeping with the usual army procedure, that arrangements were made to return these explosives without delay on the arrival of Capt. Nilam with these lethal stores.

This should also have been the response particularly in view of the very serious allegation that army had plans to blast the bus with the Prime Minister in it, with a thermobaric rocket; and also the Army Commander's assurance denying the existence of such a plan.

The relocation of this "Forward Intelligence Cell" at Athurugiriya from the army camp at Kohuwela as described above cannot be said to be appropriate as the decision to lease the house belonging to Capt. Nilam's spouse as it would also amount to a conflict of interest.

But, there are important requirements for an intelligence cell. That is the assurance of secrecy, security and convenience to those informants visiting this intelligence cell at the new location at Athurugiriya. In fact such informants must be made aware of the risks and other dangers that they may expose themselves to, which also applies to intelligence officers as well. It is most important that the identities of informants are secret and that even from the other informants too. Such exposure would be only if it is a necessity. These requirements appear to have been meaningless as access to this Millennium Park cell was subject to one's identification by the civilian security staff at the gates of The Millennium Park. Further, the informants would be conspicuous on their ethnicity and social status being mostly Tamil LTTE deserters.

According to the D.M.I. Capt. Nilam was at that point of time under "serious threat" from the L.T.T.E. and therefore had to be under the active surveillance of L.T.T.E. agents. According to Capt. Nilam, his information was that he was to be targeted by a suicide bomber. In this context the move from the Kohuwela army camp to Athurugiriya with Capt. Nilam in charge of this intelligence cell is not only inexplicable, but perhaps even suicidal.

It is said that Capt. Nilam and his men were based at this cell to engage in long-range reconnaissance patrols [L.R.R.Ps], and deep penetration fighting patrols. Such patrols are a special task of well trained infantrymen and sometimes of the commandos. Troops from services and non-combatant units are not deployed on such tasks or roles. The D.M.I. and Captain Nilam are both from non-combatant units.

Fighting patrols engage in offensive operations such as ambushes, raids, destruction or attacks on enemy installations, gun position and emery outposts and even abductions of enemy cadres for purposes of interrogation to obtain intelligence etc. These operations and the planning of such operations are the function and responsibility of the combatant formations on the ground in forward positions. Intelligence officers are attached to such formations to furnish the necessary information for the planning of such operations.

The responsibility and function of the Directorate of Intelligence is to obtain and furnish timely and accurate intelligence to the respective operational formations, which is a very important requirement to ensure properly planned successful operations both offensive and defensive. It is not understood, therefore how a group of simple informants were engaged in deep penetration and long-range reconnaissance patrols.

These patrols require a high degree of infantry skills in addition to mental and physical toughness as they are dangerous and risky. The planning of such deep penetration patrols have to be meticulous and provision has to be made for several contingencies, sometimes even for rescue or even betrayal by accompanying informants on some occasions. These patrols may be over several days and communication with the base would be mostly by code requiring a high degree of communication skills too. It would take quite some time to condition even trained infantrymen for such patrols. These patrols are beyond the scope and functions of The Directorate Of Military Intelligence but are under the authority and responsibility of The Directorate Of Operations And Planning. These patrols are launched from forward positions nearest to the enemy area to be patrolled, and not from alleged "Safe Houses" very many miles away.

Covert Operations are also a very important form of military operations particularly in the context of anti-terrorist action. These operations have to be handled with caution. There is always the risk of infiltration by L. T. T. E. agents etc. It has been reported that once these agents entrusted with explosives for such a mission had straight away taken the entire lot of explosives and handed them over to the L.T.T.E. The L.T.T.E. would have obtained a wealth of information too from this agent. The handling of such "informants" or more appropriately "agents" is a skilled and a dangerous task. There was also the exposure of the training of an informant in the firing of thermobaric rockets at the Panaluwa Range. The bane of our military effort against the L.T.T.E. terrorists over the last twenty years has been the lack of accurate and timely information. This was also a finding by the Court of Inquiry into the debacles at Pooneryn. This was also undoubtedly a factor in the subsequent debacles at Mullaitivu and Elephant Pass. Good timely and accurate intelligence is an all-important factor in military operations against terrorists.

Furthermore, the expenditure on intelligence is secret and also not subject to audit. In addition to the requirements mentioned it is desirable that the Director of Intelligence is an officer with a combatant background and operational experience. It should be so in respect of the other officers too as far as possible. Such officers would be better equipped to assess and evaluate the intelligence in the correct perspectives, and exploit them to the best advantage.

There was an alleged involvement of army personnel in election violence particularly at Udathalawinna, where several civilians have been killed by shooting. The suspects are mostly serving soldiers, and there was some information or perhaps speculation that of one the suspects was hiding in Millennium City hideout, which by then had become an open secret.

What is not understandable is this thermobaric rocket and other explosive materials being still retained in an unauthorised location and readily available for use in spite of the assurance to the UNP hierarchy by the Commander of the Army that there was no such preparation to blast the bus with the prime minister in it. According to the D.M.I., he had ordered that the explosives be removed on the 28th of December 01.

This had not happened, although it should have been a first priority task. The police raid was on the night of 2nd January 02. What did eventually happen should be viewed in the light of the possible dangers such as a fire even accidental, or sabotage or even betrayal similar to the fate of the Police Inspector at the Dehiwela Police Station. In that context Capt. Nilam would need to have been mindful of the threat to him by a suicide bomber as the "cease-fire" had been proclaimed only a couple of weeks ago.

(http://www.southasianmedia.net/index_opinion4.cfm?id=20997)

Intelligence officer Nilam missing By Sunil Jayasiri

A top intelligence officer of the Sri Lanka Army, Captain S.H. Nilam, who was the defence attaché at the Sri Lanka Embassy in Jakarta, has gone missing since last month. Another top official at the Jakarta embassy has reportedly received death threats from the LTTE.

State intelligence informed the government that Captain Nilam, his wife and three children had gone missing since April 23, a highly placed government official said.

He said that the acting ambassador in Jakarta, a Tamil, had reportedly received death threats from the Tamil Tigers recently.

The latest development follows the recall of Major General Janaka Perera, who was Sri Lanka’s ambassador to Indonesia, and the appointment of the former Army Chief of Staff, Major General Nanda Mallawarachchi- who has not yet assumed duties-as the new ambassador.

Major General Perera was asked to return to the country during the last week of April, for unknown reasons -- although his term had been expected to end next September.

It is learnt that, with the support of the Indonesian State Intelligence Agency -Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN), Captain Nilam had tipped off the Sri Lanka Government regarding several Sri Lanka bound LTTE arms shipments, and thus curtailed the flow of LTTE weapons to the country during his tenure.

Captain Nilam was in charge of the ‘Millennium City’ safe house when it was raided during the UNP regime. He was sent to Thailand in order to avoid LTTE attempts on his life. Later he was made the Defence Attaché in Indonesia.

(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2007/05/05/front/2.asp)

Navy recovers new ‘killing’ device after Jaffna Islands leader, deputy commit suicide

The navy has recovered what an authoritative official termed as a suicide device which has not been previously used by the LTTE.

An authoritative navy official speculated that the device may have been developed recently to be used against individual targets. "It is a small device packed with steel balls to carry out an individual assassination."

According to him, naval troops recovered the device following Sunday’s confrontation with a small group of LTTE cadres including Eelamaran, in charge of the Jaffna Islands and his deputy Udayan at Suruvil, Velani in Kayts. Eelamaran and Udayan had committed suicide by exploding two suicide devices after troops surrounded a kovil where they were holed up. Contrary to reports that they were shot dead by troops, they committed suicide, The Island learns.

They were among five LTTE cadres who died in the confrontation. Troops recovered the suicide device from one of the bodies, the official said. Troops also recovered three T 56 weapons, one 9mm pistol, three 9mm pistol magazines one pouch, two cyanide capsules and seven hand grenades.

The SLN had recently arrested Udayan’s wife after troops recovered a sub machine gun, two claymore mines and some ammunition during a search of her premises in Kayts.

The incumbent of the Kovil was also killed in the cross-fire.

The Kayts hit came hot on the heels of the recovery of 1000 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, one kg of TNT explosives, four claymore mines, six electrical detonators, six non-electrical detonators, two kgs of C4 explosives, 150 grams of PAB 3A explosives, eight hand grenades and one meter long detonator cord in the Uddappuwa area.

(http://www.island.lk/2007/05/02/news2.html)

The Sri Lankan soldier – then and now by Gaston Perera

This is not just another sunshine story. This is not the gushing rhetoric of a jingoist. This is not the adulatory rapture of an armchair strategist. This is not even the self-congratulatory slant of a military communiqué.

No, it is none of these. It is the cold, deliberate, studied, professional assessment of the Sri Lankan soldier made by the world’s foremost military power. This is an extract from a top secret report prepared by the Department of Defense of the United States on the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Armed forces in 2002. The above citation is extracted from excerpts of that report published in The Island of April 26.

This is not, therefore, the passing opinion made at the drop of a hat by an uninformed amateur. This is the balanced and impartial conclusion of a group of specially appointed expert professionals pronounced after a careful evaluation.

And what is that conclusion? The dictionary meaning of ‘impressive’ is ‘capable of impressing by its outstanding quality’ or even ‘awe-inspiring’. That is the conclusion of those officials of the US Department of Defense. They find the Sri Lankan soldier capable of impressing by his outstanding qualities. They have also clearly and unambiguously stated the reasons why they find the Sri Lankan soldier ‘impressive’. He is capable of putting up with ‘tremendous hardship’. Yet at the same time his ‘fighting spirit’ never falters.

No one can fail to be proud that our fighting men should be acclaimed so highly by their peers. But quite apart from the fillip it gives to national pride, there is quite another significance and value in this conclusion. Amazing as it may seem, it only repeats and confirms an identical evaluation of our fighting men made nearly half–a-millennium ago by the most implacable and ruthless enemy of the Sinhala people.

Five hundred years ago, in the early 17th Century, the Portuguese waged a bitter campaign to subjugate the island. The history of their attempts has been recorded by Portuguese chroniclers such as Fernao de Queyroz in his monumental work "The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon." Queyroz, just like the US Department of Defense, is full of admiration for the Kandyan soldier of those times for his capacity to put up with hardship –

"They are wiry, light-footed, run like the deer, and with no baggage other than their arms and a cambolyn for clothing and bed, some apas and rotriz of, as it were, parched wheat or dry avela of rice, they go for days on a campaign, under a scorching sun or drenching rain, marching many leagues in a few hours ---."1 (page 96)

What we have here is not only a tribute to the agility and mobility and survival techniques of the ordinary Kandyan rank and file on the march, but also a graphic description of the actual hardships endured by him.

These are the hardships endured on the march.

Elsewhere the same Queyroz has painted a picture of the harsh and austere rigours of their camp life. –

" --- a sheet wrapped round the waist which at night serves for a coverlet--- the ground serving for a mattress, a stone a piece of wood or else one of their own arms, for a pillow ---." (page 83)

So much for the Kandyan soldier’s capacity to bear with hardship on campaign 500 years ago.

It is also the same Queyroz, as well as other contemporary Portuguese observers - Menezes, Ribeiro, Bocarro - who have commented in glowing terms of the other aspect the US Department of Defense found "impressive" about the Sri Lankan soldier – their "fighting spirit".

This is Queyroz speaking of the Kandyan soldier charging the enemy –

"--- in the fury and dash with which they attack, they do not yield to Europeans --." (page 23)

Or the almost fanatic abandon and ferocity he displayed on the battlefield –" --- put themselves at the mouths of the arquebuses with such hardihood that in the narrowest of passes it happened some threw their bows at the throats of the Portuguese and laid hands on their firelocks."

Elsewhere also he refers to their "warlike nature", or "the spirit of these people against foreign dominion" and "their determination and constancy".

Other Portuguese commentators are equally lavish in their admiration. Ribeiro calls them "a race of people so warlike." Menezes also agrees calling the "Zingalas naturally warlike" and uses epithets which were later echoed by Queyroz –

"--- the impetus and fury they display in the greatest danger is due more to inborn courage than to barbarism...." (page 547)

Bocarro is equally fulsome in his admiration for the Sinhala soldier and says –

"--- the Chingalas fought with notable courage and resolution." (page 30)

These were the views of the Portuguese in the 17th Century. Centuries later in British times too there were observers who echoed the identical sentiments about the "fighting spirit" of the Kandyans. Henry Marshall in his "Ceylon – A General Description" says of them –

"The Kandyans --- display a brave and persevering spirit, particularly in resisting and repulsing invaders." ( page 15)

These assessments and evaluations of the 17th Century Portuguese have a significance that even the report of the US Department of Defense does not have. The latter is from a detached, uninvolved third party’s conclusions made only in response to a specific request. The Portuguese evaluations come from implacable, ruthless enemies of the Sinhala people whose sole aim was to subjugate its peoples and destroy its culture and religion.

In assessing the courage and valour of a people in war, the most convincing evidence of their fighting qualities would be the verdict of those who actually fought them and felt the bite of their steel. That is why this unsolicited and voluntary verdict of the Portuguese, who fought the islanders for more than a century and the Kandyans for nearly half a century, carries such weight and is of special significance.

But then, so what? The Portuguese said it 500 years ago; the US Department of Defense says it today. So what flows from that? Ought we to give ourselves a national pat on the back and say ‘We told you so’?

I think the moral of the story is slightly different. I think the moral of the story is that historically speaking, the Sri Lankan soldier has been inured to hardship in warfare and has been an excellent fighting man. Half-a-millenium of foreign domination could not destroy that fighting spirit. Western colonialism with all its corrosive effect on culture and religion has done nothing to erode that.

Those fighting qualities are still there. It is there on the battlefield. It is equally there, prominently displayed, on the cricket field. There is a grit and tenacity in the Sri Lankan soldier without any flamboyance and bravado.

(http://www.island.lk/2007/05/02/midweek3.html)