Another LTTE offensive by D.B.S. JEYARAJ

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam launches a multi-pronged attack on Sri
Lankan military installations in the Jaffna peninsula.

LARGE-SCALE fighting has erupted again in the predominantly Tamil Jaffna peninsula in the north of Sri Lanka. The latest confrontation began around midnight on March 26 when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) launched a multi-pronged offensive o n military installations in the peninsula. For the people of Sri Lanka, factual news about the situation is hard to come by owing to the censorship in force. On the other hand, news reports in the print, electronic, audio and visual Tamil media outlets a broad, along with information gained over the telephone from informed sources in Jaffna, provide an insight into the LTTE's war strategy in the peninsula and related developments.

The LTTE is adopting a different military strategy in the peninsula (see "Tactical shift", Frontline, January 7, 2000). The prize targets are Jaffna town and the Elephant Pass military complex. There are four underlying principles beneath the curr ent strategy.

First, the LTTE does not want a repeat of the fiasco of 1991 when it attacked the Elephant Pass camp directly, and is avoiding an all-out onslaught. Second, the Tigers are looking to cut off all access and supply routes to the Elephant Pass isthmus and s trangulate the forces stationed there. Third, the LTTE had already entered the peninsula through points in the eastern and southern coasts and established entrenched positions that the Army has been unable to demolish; it now seeks to extend these positi ons further. Fourth, the Tigers are keeping in reserve a large contingent on the northern mainland, which could be deployed to capture Jaffna town.

What is unfolding in the peninsula is stage four of the third phase of "Operation Oyatha Alaigal" (Unceasing Waves). The first phase was in Mullaitheevu in July 1996, and the second in Kilinochchi in September 1998. In the third phase, the first stage wa s played out in the eastern sector of the northern mainland of the Wanni and the second stage in the western sector; both happened in November 1999. The third stage was launched in December 1999 and was focussed on the southern, southeastern and eastern flanks of the peninsula.

The LTTE began occupying the coastal areas of Vettilaikerny, Kattaikkadu, Aaliyawalai, Uduthurai, Mulliyan, Thattuvaankoddi and Nallathannithoduvaai in the southeastern sector of the peninsula. It also seized Pullaveli to the north of Elephant Pass and K urinchatheevu to the west of the Pass. It had earlier taken Paranthan and Umaiaalpuram to the south of the Pass, on the northern mainland.

Consequently, Elephant Pass was encircled on almost all sides and all access and supply routes were cut off - except for Iyakkachi to its north. The LTTE siege of Elephant Pass in 1991 was broken only by establishing a beachhead in the Vettilaikerny-Katt aikkaadu region. Subsequently, permanent camps were set up to ensure smooth supplies by the sea route. Prior to the current round of fighting, the Iyakkachi camp, along a bend on the strategic A 9 Highway, served as the gateway to Elephant Pass. Supplies came by road from Jaffna via the Kandy road.

The LTTE has also established fixed positions on the southwestern sectors of the peninsula - in east Ariyalai, Koilakkandy, Thanankilappu and Keratheevu. Boats plying the Jaffna lagoon from the Pooneryn, Nagathevanthurai and Sangupiddy areas of the mainl and serve a logistical purpose. A battery of long-range artillery guns maintained on the Pooneryn coast fire intermittently across the lagoon into the Thenmaratchy sector of the peninsula. A key focus is Kilaly on the southwestern coast of the peninsula. Between 1990 and 1995, when the LTTE was in control of Jaffna, the Kilaly ferry was for long the transit point for persons entering and exiting from the peninsula.

In response to the "creeping advantage" that the Tigers were gaining in the peninsula, Colombo stationed the entire 54 Division in the Elephant Pass sector. More important, the elite 53 Division, which consists of crack commando forces trained in Pakista n and in the United States and the special air brigade, was deployed on the east coast of the peninsula. This division was in the vanguard of successful military operations in Jaffna during 1995-96 and in the Wanni in 1997-98. Further, Colombo newspapers quoting military intelligence sources warned of a heavy build-up by the LTTE in the mainland areas south of the peninsula. Apparently, the armed forces were planning a major operation aimed at recapturing LTTE-held areas in the peninsula and the mainlan d when the LTTE struck. News reports indicate that the LTTE pre-empted an attack by the armed forces by some 48 hours.

AROUND midnight on March 26, LTTE cadres infiltrated military lines and launched a commando-type raid on an artillery installation and ammunition dump in the general area of Pallai, which is a key junction to the north of Elephant Pass on the Jaffna-Kand y road. At least 11 pieces of artillery were decommissioned. The artillery points, installed in a fan-like formation, controlled the roadway beyond Pallai on the A 9 Highway. This operation was conducted by squads of the LTTE commando division known as " Siruthai" (Leopard).

At about the same time, LTTE cadres also seized strategic points on the Jaffna-Kandy road. LTTE pickets were established to the north of Pallai in Muhamalai, Indrapuram and Ithavil. The LTTE has taken over an area 4.5 kilometres long and 1.5 km wide, ent renched itself in this swathe and fortified its positions. If the Tigers are able to hold on to this position, no road transport is possible along this road from Iyakkachi and Elephant Pass to Jaffna. That the Tigers perceive a big strategic value in thi s is clear from the fact that Balraj, their deputy military chief who is second only to Velupillai Prabakaran in the LTTE hierarchy, is leading them in this area.

The Sri Lankan armed forces are trying hard to dislodge the LTTE from this position. There have been frequent exchanges of artillery fire. At least two offensives led by the armoured and mechanical divisions have been conducted and the LTTE has withstood both these. The Tigers also claim to have captured two South African-made "Buffel" tanks and three armoured cars and destroyed two tanks and five armoured cars. The LTTE has established an artillery division named after former Jaffna commander Kittu and is putting together an armoured division named Victor after the former "commander" of Mannar. Bhanu, former commander of Jaffna and Mannar, is in charge of both of these and assists Balraj.

The armed forces have been forced to take a circuitous route - turning west from Pallai, and passing through Puloppalai and Kilaly and proceeding by the southwestern coast to Kachai and then heading east to the Jaffna-Kandy road at Kodikamam. However, th ere are reports that LTTE artillery is pounding the Kilaly-Kachai-Kodikamam area. All passenger traffic has been stopped along the Jaffna-Kandy road from the south of Chavakachcheri. One can conclude from this that the Army's land route to Elephant Pass is now under pressure.

Owing to the ban on civilian traffic, more than 15,000 displaced persons who wish to flee the battle zone are trapped. In addition, all governmental work and activities by non-governmental organisations have come to a standstill. A serious humanitarian c risis is brewing: the displaced persons do not have access to adequate food, shelter and medicines. The Catholic Church meets some of these needs, but it does not have enough resources. Meanwhile, Tiger propagandists are accusing the troops of deliberate ly restricting civilian movement in the war zone so as to utilise them as human shields or buffers.

THE Iyakkachi camp and the Elephant Pass complex too are under attack. LTTE cadres have kept up an artillery barrage and have both the camps under virtual siege from points to the north and northeast of Iyakkachi in Sangathaar Vayal and Kovil Vayal and p oints in the southeast of Elephant Pass at Thattuvankotti and to the west at Kurinchatheevu. Consequently, although the LTTE has not conducted a direct assault, Elephant Pass and Iyakkachi are marooned, and will remain so - unless the military balance in these areas changes dramatically.

Even as the attacks in the Pallai-Muhamalai area were launched on March 26, LTTE cadres initiated a number of attacks on points along the east coast. The east coast, known as the Vadamaratchy East division, extends about 30 km from Point Pedro to Thalaia dy, bounded on one side by the sea and on the other by the Jaffna lagoon. It is sparsely populated, and fishing is the primary means of livelihood.

LTTE cadres launched their attack from Nelliyan, a tiny hamlet in the interior to the west of Thalaiady. A ferocious attack was unleashed on the military complex of Thalaiady-Maruthankerni-Chembianpattru. Chembianpattru is about 2 km north of Thalaiady; Maruthankerni is less than a kilometre to its west. The three make up the vertices of a triangle that includes a military complex that served as the operational headquarters of the 53 Division. Fighting erupted also on the Soranpattru-Maasaar areas on th e road going west from Maruthankerni to join the Jaffna-Kandy road at the Puthukkaadu junction.

Simultaneously, other Tiger groups attacked the camp on Maamunai and Amban further north along the coast between Chembianpattru and Nagarkovil. Official press releases stated that in the face of the LTTE attacks, the armed forces withdrew - first from th e smaller Amban camp, then from the larger Maamunai camp and finally from the massive complex at Thalaiady-Maruthankerny-Chembianpattru. Acco-rding to official communiques, the Army is repositioning itself: it is abandoning the coastal strip and reinforc ing positions in the interior to the west of the lagoon. This strategy is aimed at containing LTTE encroachment in the interior areas.

As a result, the LTTE is now in control of the eastern coast up to Kudarappu to the south of Nagarkovil. It has taken new territory stretching to about 14 km. There are, however, three other camps - in Nagarkovil, Manalkaadu and Vallipuram - along this c oast between the LTTE positions and Point Pedro, the northernmost point of the peninsula. Women cadres of the LTTE's Sothiya brigade now hold the newly taken areas on the east coast.

The attack was a joint operation undertaken by the Charles Anthony infantry division and the Sea Tigers division. Tiger cadres were ferried by sea from Challai on the Mullaitheevu coast, which was under LTTE control, and dropped off at points between Nag arkovil and Vettilaikerny, including Chembianpattru and Thalaiady. The Sea Tigers were led by Veerendran and the land-based cadres by Vasanthan, of whom little is known.

While these attacks were on, Theepan, LTTE commander in the Kilinochchi area, led about 400 cadres on foot across the Chundikulam lagoon (which is now marshy) in the southeast of the peninsula. These cadres enhanced the Tiger presence in the south and so utheast of the peninsula and launched an attack on Army positions in the Vathirayan area to the west of Vettilaikerny and east of Elephant Pass.

The armed forces have put up stiff resistance. If the Tigers break through beyond Vathirayan, Elephant Pass is likely to be assailed from another point. But since the LTTE now controls the eastern seaboard from Kokkuthoduvaai in Mulaitheevu district on t he mainland to Kudaarappu on the Jaffna peninsula, it is no longer dependent on the sea route. Except during the monsoon season, the Chundikulam lagoon can be crossed on foot.

The British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) Tamil service on the radio, Tamil Osai, has meanwhile drawn attention to other serious developments. It reported that some Army positions in the interior of Kudathanai, Mulli, Kodikamam, Manthuvil and Varani a reas had been vacated and the personnel redeployed. This, according to the BBC, means that the Tigers can circumvent Army positions by taking a circuitous path by the lagoon shore and proceed to places such as Anthanathidal, Kappoothu, Mattuvil and Vadha ravathai without facing the Army anywhere. Given the geography of the peninsula, particularly the porous lagoon, the Tigers can reach the Vadamaratchy and Thenmaratchy areas and certain parts of the Valigamamam sector through this route.

The LTTE also attempted to cross the lagoon and seize Kilaly on the southwest, but the armed forces have repulsed them. The LTTE's objective appears to be to seize the Maruthankerny-Puthukkaadu road on the east of the A 9 Highway and the Pallai-Puloppala i-Kilaly road on the west while holding on to its positions on the Jaffna-Kandy road. If it does this, it will have succeeded in bisecting the lower portion of the peninsula and trapping the troops at the Elephant Pass and Iyakkachi garrisons. At the sam e time it persists with its strategy to encircle the troops without attacking Elephant Pass directly.

A significant aspect of the current phase of fighting is the LTTE's excessive reliance on long-range artillery. It is stated that only a force of around 1,500 cadres is used for direct combat in the peninsula. These cadres have been drawn from the infant ry, commando, artillery and armoured divisions as also the women's brigades and the Sea Tigers. As is customary whenever the Tigers are militarily successful, the LTTE propaganda machinery abroad claims that the overall strategy was drawn up by Prabakara n.

Of great concern to the Sri Lankan Government is the view that is gaining ground that the Tigers are planning to attack Jaffna shortly. LTTE ideologue and political adviser Anton Balasingham stated in an interview to the pro-LTTE fortnightly Tamil Gua rdian that the Tigers would soon be at the gates of Jaffna town, the cultural capital of Sri Lankan Tamils. Reports from Sri Lankan intelligence agencies have reinforced Colombo's apprehensions.

These reports state that LTTE cadres are being ferried into the peninsula from Sangupiddy to Keratheevu. And, armaments are being stockpiled in Thanankilappu and East Arialai on the peninsula, evidently in anticipation of a massive military operation. It is also stated that senior military commander Karuna alias Karuna Amman is waiting along with about 1,000 cadres on the mainland coast adjacent to the peninsula. Colombo's fear is that the LTTE may use Thanankilappu or Ariyalai as a launch-pad for onsla ughts on Chavakachcheri or Jaffna town or both. Even if the Tigers cannot capture Jaffna at present, a lightning raid can inflict military, political and psychological damage.

While the current round of fighting seems to be centred on Elephant Pass, one cannot rule out a surprise twist to events. Given its established positions in the peninsula, the LTTE is capable of changing course and targeting Jaffna town, Chavakachcheri o r Point Pedro. Colombo knows that even if the LTTE cannot seize these places, it would have scored a symbolic and psychological victory merely by launching an attack, particularly if it targets Jaffna. When it lost Jaffna, the LTTE suffered a loss of fac e. According to Tiger sources, Prabakaran has vowed that the Tigers will be in Jaffna by the end of this year.

As compared to Jaffna, Elephant Pass is not vital for the LTTE because although it is the gateway to the Jaffna peninsula, it has never been under LTTE control. Even when the LTTE retained control over much of the peninsula and the northern mainland, Ele phant Pass was not in its grasp. Nor was it militarily significant. Further, the terrain around the Elephant Pass camp does not support an all-out attack or a direct siege, a lesson learnt in 1991 when the LTTE launched Operation Tharai Kadal Aahayam (La nd Sea Air). It is possible, therefore, that Prabakaran may seek to take Jaffna rather than Elephant Pass. His current strategy of strangulating the camp may be a protracted but relatively practical course. But the fall of either Jaffna or Elephant Pass would be demoralising to the armed forces.

On the other hand, despite LTTE successes and claims, the armed forces cannot be written off, on account of two factors. One is that the number of LTTE cadres in the peninsula is dangerously low and even these are sandwiched between the 54 Division (Elep hant Pass) and the 53 Division (Pachilaipalli) in one sector and the 51 Division (Vadamaratchy) and 52 Division (Thenmaratchy) in others. The numbers are against the LTTE.

Second, the advantage of an air force is palpable, and here the LTTE suffers. The current exercise has witnessed incessant aerial bombardment and shelling by the Air Force. A number of LTTE boats have been destroyed and expeditions foiled. Further, given the situation on the ground and at sea, the skies have considerable logistical importance for the armed forces. The LTTE's anti-aircraft wing, led by Shankar, has attempted to counter the Air Force with missiles and .50-calibre long-range guns, but the air advantage has enabled Colombo to contain the LTTE to an extent.

(On March 30, a military transport plane crashed near Anuradhapura town in northcentral Sri Lanka, killing 36 security personnel and the crew of four. The Antonov-26 aircraft was transporting troops out of Jaffna; it was owned by a private company and ch artered by the Air Force which is hardpressed for planes to maintain an air bridge to the peninsula. Initial reports blamed the crash on "technical failure", but the Government has appointed a four-member committee comprising defence personnel to investi gate the cause. The Air Force also suspended civilian flights from the peninsula following the crash.)

President Chandrika Kumaratunga is in an unenviable position as she sees her war-for-peace strategy crumbling. Yet she perseveres and keeps herself informed of battlefront developments round the clock. After a recent meeting of the emergency war council, she instructed the three Service chiefs to relocate to the Palaly base in Jaffna until the current LTTE advance is halted. "Stay in Jaffna and do your duty," was her crisp command. Kumaratunga has also gone on record that there would be no ceasefire or withdrawal of troops from Jaffna "even if the LTTE kills me".

After 10 days of fighting, the LTTE said that about 100 of its cadres had been killed. The Defence Ministry said that around 200 of its men were killed or were missing in action, and that nearly a 1,000 others had been injured. Unofficial estimates of th e casualty figures on both sides are considerably high. Predictably, each side exaggerated the casualty figures in respect of the other.

The current LTTE offensive comes at a time when a peace initiative has been undertaken with Norway acting as a facilitator (Frontline, March 17, 2000 ). As a prelude to talks, the LTTE wanted a ceasefire to be put in place and the armed forces in Jaffna confined to the barracks. The government, however, did not agree to this. Colombo ruled out a ceasefire, but said that it would consider a gradual troops withdrawal after talks started. It was then that the LTTE launched its attack.

Although the fighting rages, how long it will last and what course the conflict will take will depend on the LTTE's ability to sustain its current drive, particularly its ability to maintain its artillery barrage. Reports from the warfront state that the LTTE is able to fire artillery regularly and intensely. On the other hand, the ability of the armed forces to take effective countermeasures will also have a bearing. It seems likely that the conflict will be a prolonged one, with intermittent lulls nec essitated by logistical requirements.

(http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1708/17080520.htm)

The taking of Elephant Pass

For the first time in the history of the 'Tamil Eelam war', the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has seized control of Elephant Pass, the gateway to the Jaffna Peninsula. A graphic account of the Tigers' strategy and its successful implementation.

THE military balance in Sri Lanka's Tamil-dominated Northern Province has undergone a drastic transformation after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) seized the vast military complex in the area around Elephant Pass, or Aanai Iravu as it is know n in Tamil. The Elephant Pass isthmus was of strategic importance as it linked the northern mainland known as Wanni with the Jaffna Peninsula. Both the Jaffna-Kandy road, the A-9 Highway, and the railway line to Jaffna run through Elephant Pass, and the narrow strip of land was in a sense the gateway to Jaffna.

The fall of Elephant Pass marked the first time in the history of the "Tamil Eelam war" that the area had come under the LTTE's control. The Dutch colonialists first built a small fortress in 1776, which was converted in modern times into a resthouse for tourists. After Independence a permanent garrison was set up there to check illicit immigration, smuggling and unlawful transport of timber. As the intensity of the ethnic conflict escalated, the strategic importance of Elephant Pass also increased. The small camp gradually expanded into a sprawling complex. At one time, the Elephant Pass base and the satellite camps covered an area about 23 km long and 8-10 km wide.

To celebrate the capture of Elephant Pass, the LTTE organised a flag-raising ceremony at 9 a.m. on Sunday, April 23. According to Tiger media outlets, hundreds of LTTE cadres and a large number of Tamil civilians who serve as members of an auxiliary forc e known as "Thunaippadai" watched as the crimson-and-gold LTTE flag was hoisted by 'Colonel' Bhanu. As Bhanu, 38, stepped back and saluted the flag, LTTE fighters fired ceremonially in the air, and seven artillery field guns fired three shells each. Ther eafter, Bhanu addressed the gathering.

In his speech, Bhanu said this was only the first step in "the war to liberate our homeland" and there would be "many more battles". The valour and sacrifices of the LTTE fighters, he said, had made it possible to realise the "dream of annihilating Aanai Iravu". The camp, established by the Dutch over 200 years ago, had for long remained "a symbol of alien domination" and divided the Tamil people of the peninsula from the mainland, Bhanu said, and added: "Now it is no more. After we transport all that n eeds to be removed from here we will raze this place to the ground except for a small structure to remind ourselves of this oppressive symbol... Our enemies will not be allowed to return and occupy this place in the future."

Paying tributes to the memory of "all our comrades who laid down their lives in this battle and the campaigns before," Bhanu said that the LTTE fighters had succeeded because of the "very intricate attack plan drawn by our national leader and commander-i n-chief (Velupillai Prabakaran), the smooth execution of the plan by his lieutenants and the courageous fighting done by the cadres." The victory, he said, was a sign of "more things to come". Sweets were then distributed.

What followed immediately afterwards was rich in symbolism, and marked a defining moment for the LTTE. Groups of hand-picked civilians and some Tiger cadres in uniform walked along the Elephant Pass causeway on the isthmus that links the Wanni area with the peninsula. One group walked northwards from the mainland to the peninsula, and another went southwards from the peninsula to the mainland. The significance of this "walk" was that for the first time in living memory there were no barriers or men in k haki to stop the people crossing to and from the peninsula. For the Tamil civilians, a symbol of oppression had been eradicated.

Ten years ago Bhanu had been in a similar situation. On September 26, 1990, the 350-year-old Fort in the heart of Jaffna town had fallen to the LTTE; triumphant Tiger cadres led by Bhanu raised the LTTE flag at the Fort. Bhanu, who hailed from Ariyalai, was then Jaffna district commander. He had earlier served as Mannar commander. However, when an operation led by him against an army outpost at Thachan Kadu failed, resulting in the death of many LTTE cadres, Prabakaran demoted him. Bhanu was sent to the Wanni area for a while, but a few years later his position was restored and he was entrusted with a crucial assignment.

Bhanu was ordered to raise an artillery unit for the LTTE, and this he did competently. Initially, the LTTE depended on artillery seized from the army after successful raids; later the LTTE procured artillery equipment on the black market and transported them by sea to Wanni. The LTTE allegedly recruited foreign mercenaries on a contract basis to teach them the finer points of artillery deployment. Today, the LTTE's artillery unit is named after former Jaffna commander Kittu, and is still commanded by B hanu.

Pleased with Bhanu's work, Prabakaran is believed to have directed him to establish an armoured unit. Again, in the initial stages the LTTE could use only a few armoured cars and tanks seized from the armed forces. It is also rumoured that a renegade Sin hala army officer imparted some rudimentary training to the Tigers on the use of armoured vehicles. Later vehicles were purchased in the international arms market and shipped to Wanni. The armoured unit, named after former Mannar commander Victor and com manded by Bhanu, is still in a fledgling state.

The artillery and armoured units played a crucial role in the fighting in the Wanni region. They were responsible for checking the advances of the armed forces. In recent times the style of LTTE fighting in positional warfare situations has undergone a d ramatic transformation. Owing to their artillery power and armoured vehicles, the Tigers can hold off the army from afar with the minimum number of casualties. The nature of the war is increasingly becoming conventional, with heavy reliance on stand-off weapons.

In the recent fighting around Elephant Pass, the LTTE's artillery and armoured units again played a big role and enabled the LTTE to seize control within a short period with relatively few losses. In fact, Bhanu was given the honour of raising the flag a s an acknowledgement of the contribution of the Kittu and Victor units. Interestingly, Prabakaran does not hoist the flag or pose before the LTTE's video cameras after a victory. He lets his deputies who fought on the battlefield take the credit. It is, however, stated that it is Prabakaran who plans and coordinates operations.

THE recent LTTE victory at Elephant Pass was the result of an elaborate but simple strategy drawn up by Prabakaran. It is said that Prabakaran analyses the LTTE's military defeats for mistakes and draws lessons from them for use in subsequent campaigns. In that respect, a failed attempt by the LTTE to capture the Elephant Pass camp in July-August 1991 must have yielded many lessons. That campaign was codenamed "Tharai, Kadal, Aahayam" (Land, Sea and Air) and lasted 53 days. The LTTE, by its own admissio n, lost 573 cadres; more than 1,500 others were injured. In terms of manpower and morale, these were crippling losses.

The Sri Lankan armed forces were able to beat back the LTTE that time owing to two factors. The first was the tenacity of the besieged troops led by a talented officer Sarath Fonseka and the grit with which they held on despite the overwhelming odds. The second was Operation Balavegaya, led by the late Generals Denzil Kobbekaduwe and Vijaya Wimalaratne. They established a beach-head at Vettilaikerny on the east coast and then fought their way through to the army personnel trapped inside the Elephant Pas s camp. Thereafter the camp was converted into a large base by absorbing almost all the buildings in the vicinity, including the salterns and the school. Satellite camps were established at Vettilaikerny, Kattaikadu and Pullaveli. Thus, a safe supply rou te by sea and land was ensured. After Operation SathJaya in 1996, Paranthan and Kilinochchi, to the south of Elephant Pass on the mainland, too were linked up with Elephant Pass. The Kilinochchi-Elephant Pass-Vettilaikerny base became a sprawling complex that housed an entire division and was considered impregnable.

Given these circumstances, Prabakaran resorted to a strategy to take Elephant Pass by gradually encircling and enfeebling the troops inside by cutting off supplies and strangulating the base. The idea was to avoid a frontal assault that would have led to the loss of many lives, since the armed forces had numerical and logistical superiority.

The LTTE strategy was made easier by the second phase of Operation Oyatha Alaigal (Unceasing Waves) in September 1998, in which Kilinochchi was taken. Thereafter the LTTE began to creep in on Paranthan, to the south of Elephant Pass on the mainland. In a series of short, swift campaigns that went unreported in the Colombo media, the camps at Karadipokku, Paranthan Junction, the Paranthan Chemical Corporation complex and finally at Umaialpuram, between Paranthan and Elephant Pass, were taken. Umaialpuram and Iyakachchi were the two points where the troops at Elephant Pass could get drinking water. (The water within the Elephant Pass base was too brackish for consumption.)

THE first stage of the LTTE campaign to take control of the peninsula was launched on December 11, 1999 (see "Tactical Shift", Frontline, January 7, 2000). The camps at Vettilaikerny and Kattaikadu on the east coast and Pullaveli to the north of E lephant Pass were taken in a land-sea joint campaign. An unsuccessful assault was conducted on the western flanks of Iyakachchi, but no direct attack was launched on the main base at Elephant Pass. The Iyakachchi camp, five km to the northwest of Elephan t Pass, is situated along a bend on the A-9 Highway. With the fall of Vettilaikerny, Kattaikadu and Pullaveli, the land-sea supply routes to Elephant Pass were cut off, and the only way through was along the A-9 Highway from Chavakachcheri. The LTTE cond ucted some limited operations that were aimed at stepping up the pressure on Iyakachchi without achieving any breakthrough.

Meanwhile, the 53rd Division of the Sri Lanka Army was brought in to relieve the pressure on the 54th Division deployed in the Elephant Pass sector; it was stationed at the Pachilaippalli and Vadamaratchy East Pradeshiya division camps. The 53rd Division was an elite force that had been trained by the United States and Pakistan.

The second stage of the LTTE campaign, a multi-pronged assault, unfolded on March 26, 2000 (see "Another offensive", Frontline, April 28). A joint operation led by Vasanthan of the Charles Anthony Infantry division and Veerendran of the Sea Tigers took control of the Chembiyanpattru-Maruthankerny-Thalaiady complex that housed the 3rd operational headquarters on the Vadamaratchy east coast. These were on the land strip between the Bay of Bengal and the Jaffna Lagoon. The army then vacated the camp s at Maamunai and Amban; the soldiers relocated to positions to the west of the lagoon.

Simultaneously, a squad from the LTTE "Siruthai" (Leopard) Commando brigade raided Pallai, the largest junction to the north of Iyakachchi on the A-9 Highway, and decommissioned at least 11 pieces of artillery. A contingent led by the LTTE's deputy milit ary chief Balraj then took a swathe of the Jaffna-Kandy road between Pallai and Eluthumattuvaal. These included the areas around Arasakerni, Ithavil, Indrapuram. Muhamaalai and Kovil Kadu. With this, the LTTE effectively cut off the main road link betwee n the Elephant Pass/Iyakachchi camps and Jaffna. On April 10, the armed forces recaptured a major portion of the road but failed to dislodge the Tigers completely.

There was, however, a circuitous route that helped maintain a road link. At Pallai, a road branched off westwards from the A-9 Highway towards Kilali via Puloppalai and then headed north towards Kachchai and Allippalai; from there it ran east towards Kod ikamam, at which point vehicles could get back onto the Jaffna-Kandy road again. However, this route came under intense pressure from the LTTE which fired artillery barrages at Kilali from Pooneryn across the lagoon.

Also on March 26, the LTTE's Kilinochchi commander Theepan led a team of men across the dried-up Chundikulam lagoon on the southeast of the peninsula and established positions in the Mullian and Vannankulam region. But the team ran into the Forward Defen ce Lines and was prevented from advancing towards Elephant Pass in the Vathirayan area.

The third and decisive stage of the LTTE campaign was played out around noon on Tuesday, April 18. A Leopard commando raid saw the LTTE take control of the Maruthankerny causeway, which enabled it to proceed westwards on the Maruthankerny-Puthukadu Junct ion road, which links the east coast and the A-9 Highway. The Puthukadu Junction is between Iyakachchi and Pallai. The LTTE proceeded along the southern areas of Muhavil, Soranpattru and Maasaar, after demolishing a 40-foot bund put up by the army as a d efence measure. The Tigers headed south on the A-9 Highway and reached the northern sector of the Iyakachchi camp. In effect, Elephant Pass and Iyakachchi were marooned.

Thereafter, the LTTE mounted a fierce attack on the Iyakachchi camp from Kovil Vayal and Sangathaar Vayal. As the fighting intensified, the Tiger cadres to the southeast of Elephant Pass broke through and began assailing the camp. The armoured and artill ery units led by Bhanu pounded the base and inched forward. The telecommunication tower in the Elephant Pass base was damaged; all telephone lines to the north were severed.

At a critical juncture the bulk of LTTE cadres led by Balraj abandoned the A-9 Highway and joined the fighting around Iyakachchi after setting up two "cut out" posts to the north of Pallai and south of Eluthumattuvaal to prevent an army advancement. Heav y fighting in and around Iyakachchi began on April 20. The Tigers positioned themselves to the south of the camp and cut it off from Elephant Pass.

Iyakachchi fell on April 21. The LTTE entered the camp and destroyed ammunition dumps and buildings. Thereafter, the theatre of war shifted to Elephant Pass. The LTTE advanced on Elephant Pass from the north, northeast and southeast. There was heavy exch ange of fire all through that long night, and even as the fighting was on, the army began to move out. By 11-30 a.m. on April 22, the large garrison at Elephant Pass "vacated" it. The LTTE marched in at 2-30 p.m. the same day. The flag was hoisted on Apr il 23.

AFTER the LTTE's stage-by-stage build-up against Elephant Pass, the abrupt capitulation by the security forces came as an anti-climax. Curiously, however, the LTTE, which had until then put out news at each successful stage of the campaign, did not annou nce the fall of Iyakachchi on April 21; it announced that news along with news of the fall of the Elephant Pass camp. This perhaps implies that after taking control of Iyakachchi, the LTTE was supremely confident that Elephant Pass would fall soon or had advance knowledge that the troops there would withdraw within hours of the Iyakachchi debacle.

The security forces vacated Elephant Pass only after they received orders to that effect from the defence establishment. Army commander Srilal Weerasooriya instructed Chief of Staff Lionel Balagalle to issue the order, which was sent by personal courier to Elephant Pass. Commanding Officer Brigadier Egodawela received it at 10 p.m. on April 21.

The retreating troops initially started moving out to Pallai, 14 km away, along the A-9 Highway, but when the LTTE thwarted them, they took to a disused rail track and a sandtrack to its west. From Pallai, the soldiers headed west for the relative safety of Kilali. But when Tiger mortars pounded this route, the army used another circuitous route - a dirt track going northwest from Elephant Pass to Kilali through Kurinchatheevu, Oorvanikanpattru and Thanmankerny. On this longer route, however, many soldi ers succumbed to heat and dehydration, apart from the unceasing LTTE shells.

Nevertheless a good number of the troops moved out from Elephant Pass, mostly on foot. Before leaving, they spiked some artillery pieces, but even so the LTTE seized some powerful guns, including 152-mm artillery guns, and a number of tanks and armoured cars, besides other arms and ammunition. A preliminary list released by the LTTE reveals a mind-boggling armoury. Elephant Pass was in many ways a military debacle for Colombo.

ALTHOUGH there were more than 15,000 troops in the Elephant Pass base and there are fewer than 5,000 LTTE cadres in the peninsula, the army was defeated because it was a demoralised force. Many factors had contributed to the lowering of troop morale. The frequent change of commanding officers was one factor, and the LTTE's repeated victories against the elite 53rd Division, the "Pride of the Army", were another. The haphazard manner in which the 53rd Division was plunged into combat caused many problems at the top. One dissenting commanding officer, Brig. Gamini Hettiaratchy, was transferred. Another officer, Gen. Sisira Wijeysinghe, went on sick leave. Brig. Sivali Wanigaseker was sent in as acting command.

The defence establishment's decision to move the troops out of the Elephant Pass base was, however, forced on it primarily by a shortage of drinking water. The camp was equipped with machinery for desalination of water, but it had broken down and not bee n repaired. The availability of potable water in Umaialpuram and Iyakachchi had perhaps lulled the forces into complacency. However, when Iyakachchi came under siege, the water crisis in the overcrowded base became unmanageable. Ironically, the Elephant Base base had ample quantities of canned food and dry rations; after taking over the camp, the LTTE distributed these to civilians in the Wanni area.

Defence Ministry sources estimate that over 1,000 LTTE cadres were killed in the three phases of fighting from December 11, 1999. The LTTE claims that only 303 of its cadres were killed, including 35 casualties in the battle for Elephant Pass. The Tigers further claim that over 1,000 soldiers were killed; the Army, however, says that only 80 of its men were killed and over 100 are missing in action. Subsequently the Tigers returned through the Red Cross the bodies of 126 soldiers, of which 28 were ident ified. Among the top Army officers who were killed were Brig. Percy Fernando, Col. Bhatiya Jayatilleke, Col. Neil Akmeemana and Lt. Col. Hewage Hewawasam. On the Tigers' side, the women's brigade chief, 'Lt. Col.' Lakshiya, was reported killed.

The Elephant Pass debacle shocked people across the country. Sri Lankan Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte, however, sought to put a brave face on the defeat. Addressing a ministerial function, he said that the "setback" at Elephant Pass ought to be seen as a "natural phenomenon in wars of this nature... We have to accept both victories and setbacks in the same manner."

In a televised address to the nation, President Chandrika Kumaratunga stated that her Government "has unequivocally decided to protractedly and relentlessly pursue with the military operations". Kumaratunga had made some abrupt changes in the defence str uctureure barely days before the fall of the Elephant Pass base, and established a National Security Council. Retired Chief of the Army Staff Rohan Daluwatte was placed in overall charge of the three Services. Gen. Janaka Perera was made Northern Provinc e Commander and General Sarath Fonseka the Jaffna Commander.

After a brief lull following the LTTE's taking of Elephant Pass, fighting erupted again. The LTTE called on all civilians from Pallai to Kodikamam, including Eluthumattuvaal and Mirusuvil, to relocate to safe areas. Thereafter, LTTE cadres moved along th e A-9 Highway and seized the camps at Pallai and Soranpattru north, which the armed forces abandoned after a brief show of resistance. The LTTE units then linked up on the A-9 Highway from the north of Pallai to the south of Eluthumattuvaal.

The Tigers then launched a two-track assault on Kilali. One column proceeded on the 18-km dirt track from Elephant Pass to Kilali along the coast. Another moved westwards from Pallai to Puloppalai and then on to Kilali. Both columns reached the Kilali ar ea, but as on May 5 they had not made further progress. A rumour, however, spread in Colombo, and a few newspapers carried reports, that Bhanu had been killed at Kilali. However, there has been no reliable confirmation of this.

The LTTE also opened another flank with an attack on Nagar Kovil on the Vadamaratchy east coast. The Tigers as well as the army were engaged in heavy exchange of fire in the Kilali, Nagar Kovil and Pallai-Eluthumattuvaal areas.

MEANWHILE, the armed forces have begun constructing massive defences along a diagonal line from Kilali on the west through Eluthumattuvaal to Nagar Kovil in the east. Further, several small camps like those at Varany, Mathagal, Chankanai, Vaddukkoddai, M ahiyapiddy, Navaly, Chulipuram and Kandarodai have been closed. Troops are being redeployed in the frontline areas. The army's immediate priority is to prevent the LTTE from advancing to Jaffna town or the Palali-Kankesanthurai tri-Services base complex.

There is intense speculation about how the LTTE will advance further. Will it head north on the A-9 Highway? Or will it proceed from Kilali to Chavakachcheri through Kachchai or Kodikamam? After reaching Chavakachcheri will it head for Jaffna or for Pala ly? Will it move north along the Vadamaratchi coast via Nagar Kovil and take control of Point Pedro, Velvettithurai and Thondamanaru? From Thondamanaru will it go for Palaly through Valalai or Jaffna through Atchuvely? Or will it move to Jaffna or Chavak achcheri from Ariyalai or Thanankilappu after bringing in the 1,000-plus reserves stationed under Karuna's command in the Pooneryn region on the mainland? All these questions trouble not only the army but also the civilians who do not want to be caught i n the line of fire. Given the intense artillery barrages, the civilians' plight is precarious.

The anticipated progress of the LTTE has also raised concerns about the future of around 35,000 troops in the peninsula. The fear is that the Tigers, with their rapid mobility and artillery firepower, could quickly take over the entire peninsula includin g Jaffna and Palaly and besiege the Palaly-Kankesanthurai complex. If that happens, there may not be time enough to evacuate troops from the peninsula. The Sea Tigers and the LTTE's anti-aircraft unit, which possess missiles, could restrict the troops' s ea and air movement. This would leave the troops marooned and defenceless. A "Dunkirk-like evacuation" may then become necessary and the possibility of securing India's assistance for this purpose is being explored.

There is however another view -that although the situation is quite bleak, the hysteria and panic about the necessity for a rescue operation are unfounded. Those who subscribe to this view believe that if troop morale is restored and adequate countermeas ures are taken, the LTTE juggernaut can be halted, and eventually pushed back. In any event, the belief is that there is no immediate cause for alarm about the fate of Palali. By May 6, Colombo appeared to be veering around to the position that the troop s were rallying gamely and that it would be possible to stop the LTTE's advance.

Whichever way the situation unfolds in the coming weeks, one thing is certain: while the guns around the gateway of Elephant Pass may have fallen silent after a long time, the Jaffna Peninsula will not see peace in the immediate future.

(http://www.flonnet.com/)

by JaSeptember's campaign without equal Janaka de Silva

THE LTTE unleashed a counter offensive code-named Operation Unceasing Waves IV,' last Tuesday September 26. Supported by heavy artillery and mortar bombardment Leopard' Commando units of the LTTE launched a six pronged attack on the Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagar Kovil axis from their staging areas at Alipalai, Pallai and Kudarappu around 1600 Hrs on 26 September. They succeeded in punching through the first bunker line of the three fortified defence lines which were established by the army following the fall of EPS in the LTTE's Operation Unceasing Waves III' in April/May.

The army's southern defences extended from the strategic naval camp at Kilali on the Jaffna Lagoon to Nagar Kovil on the south-eastern shoreline of the Jaffna peninsula. Fierce pitched battles were being fought with bunkers and several army mini-camps falling and some bunkers changing hands several times. Having breached the forward defence lines, the LTTE spearheaded an advance of some 3kms on to Eluthumadduval through Muhamalai along the A9 Jaffna-Kandy road. Mig 27 Ground Attack Jets joined the fray around midnight, pounding LTTE positions. Battles were raging even on Wednesday with casualties mounting up on both sides.

Both the military and LTTE exaggerate enemy' casualty claims while playing down the number of their men killed and wounded. Since independent verification is not possible, one can only consider the conflicting reports with liberal doses of salt.' Whilst the military claims that only 23 soldiers were KIA and 200 wounded in this LTTE counter-attack, LTTE claims to have killed more than 150 soldiers and wounded over 500.

The government controlled Special Media Information Centre has so far given the casualty figures as 180 killed and 600 wounded since the latest outbreak of hostilities began on September 3. However, it is now common knowledge that, on the very first leg of Operation Rivikirana' more than 265 including seven officers sacrificed their lives and more than 750 were wounded.

Operation Unceasing Waves IV,' also saw the LTTE gaining ground near the key naval pier of Kilalai, which is the southernmost point of the army defences in the Jaffna peninsula. These were the first military reversals the army experienced since the September 3 Rivikirana' fiasco.

Though the military claims to have repulsed the LTTE counter-attack with the SMIC claiming to have killed 73 Tiger cadres for the loss of 23 soldiers killed and some 200 wounded, in Tuesday's battles alone, the reality may be quite different. Medical Corps and Sri Lanka Air Force Casvac sources say that dozens of flights were laid on for the evacuation of troops wounded in action. The almost constant drone of An-32Bs and Y-12s flying from the early hours of the morning and even late at night alert residents of Ratmalana, that something more than usual is up.

The action in the Jaffna peninsula was not limited to the LTTE's Operation Unceasing Waves IV.' In the wee hours of Tuesday morning, around 0130 Hrs, SLA mounted an operation code named Kinihira II' moving on Maduvil, north-west of Sarasalai, some seven kms from Jaffna town. The objective of the operation appears to be to expand the army's area of control north-westwards of Chavakachcheri. By 0900 Hrs, troops regained a further 10 square kms of territory in Maduvil North, re-opening an important supply route to Chava; SMIC claimed 13 army killed and 45 wounded in the action. The army claims to have routed the LTTE and inflicted heavy enemy casualties with over 50 enemy killed in this action. In a diversionary attack, troops from Ariyalai attacked a LTTE bunker line killing twelve.

Anuruddha Ratwatte, Deputy Minister of Defence was quick to make-hay-while-the-sun-shines. The sun did indeed shine upon the Sri Lanka Army, through the dark stormy clouds, which had beset them the weeks before. After the Operation Rivikirana' fiasco, in which the army took over a thousand casualties, the LTTE may not have expected the army's surprise thrust towards Colombuthurai on Sunday 10 September (particularly after the heavy losses inflicted upon the army by the LTTE). The army was able to wrest control of about 3ks further south-eastwards from their positions on the outskirts of Jaffna, taking Navatkuli and the Navatkuli Bridge.

Ratwatte made it a point to maximise the mileage to be gained in the forthcoming elections by these tactical moves' and immediately flew to Jaffna on 12 September, joined by Lt. Gen. Rohan Daluwatte, Chief of Defence Staff and the three service commanders.

Why Ratwatte did not join up with the group of journalists and cameramen in their guided tour of the battlefront on Wednesday September 20 is a mystery. He could have repeated his little number of jumping off' helicopters etc. Would have won him more votes than he would by the current operation he is conducting.

Last Tuesday 26, another group of selected journalists were flown to Jaffna by the government, but they could not visit the area the army claimed it captured on Tuesday due to continued fighting in the area.

Deputy Minister Ratwatte was again absent, probably pre-occupied with problems in the homefront.'

Unlike the time he answered' the May-Day' from besieged soldiers, when the LTTE was hard on the heels of the army; when he sought to apportion blame on the senior officers of the military for the withdrawal syndrome' etc., this time he had none to blame. Lt. Gen. Rohan Daluwatte attempted to emulate his one time commander Lt. Gen. Cecil Waidyaratne by offering to resign his post for the failure of the September 3 Operation Rivikirana.'

During his visit in May, the deputy minister of defence went on record (on national television, at that) to blame the senior officers of the military (specially, those at Palaly HQs at the time of his arrival on the May 18). One would recall that Maj. Generals Janaka Perera, Sarath Fonseka and Nihal Marambe together with a host of other officers were rushed to north from their posts in Colombo in an attempt to stem Unceasing Waves.' It was their skill, expertise and efforts which in reality halted the terra at the gates of the city of Jaffna and turned the tide of the battle.

Lines would have certainly been drawn on maps and positions marked thereupon to indicate their own and enemy positions, lines of attack, withdrawal etc. as they must, which is a standard practise and requirement in the planning and execution of any military operation. Having chosen the path of politics as his career and not the noble profession of soldiering and unfamiliar with such military practices, the Ratwatte may be excused for his ignorance. But he would be well advised that military operations require military decisions and not political decisions. The time and place for political decisions is not the battlefield - the cabinet or parliament is a more suitable forum for that sort of thing.

What is important is not whether or not the deputy minister can read a military map or whether or not his decision was military or political, not so much that (if at all) the senior military officers in Palaly HQs were plagued with a withdrawal syndrome.'

By informing the general public on national TV, that, before his arrival on May 18, senior officers were only planning withdrawals and that he had to put a stop to the withdrawal mentality' and draw a line on the retreat and say that "the army will not move an inch back from the positions they held," the deputy minister demolished whatever confidence the general public had in the military. A military which is sustained by the public - by their taxes and their sons and daughters. A politician who has neither son nor daughter in uniform perhaps cannot be expected to understand this reality. It is indeed a great pity that the honourable ministers, elected members and those from the national lists, who claim to make great sacrifices, who feel burdened about the poor and downtrodden (going by the campaign speeches we hear these days from various platforms) and plead with the public for a chance to rule the roost, have not contributed their children to the war effort.

According to government media reports, Ratwatte during his last visit to Jaffna, is supposed to have exhorted troops to maintain pressure' on the LTTE in order to retake lost territory in the Jaffna peninsula.

It is this sheer irony of the fact, that, the person who is supposed to give political leadership to the troops in battle, which involves upping the morale and the fighting spirit of the troops, encouraging them in their efforts etc. goes and does just the opposite: which is tantamount to betrayal of the trust that the military has placed on their political leadership.

Little wonder that, whilst soldiers are going AWOL (Absent Without Leave) in their thousands, officers too are putting up their papers in their droves. Due to this element of morale downing,' military commanders at all levels had their work cut out for them, to uplift the sagging morale of the troops. It was then left to the Multi Barrelled Rocket Launchers and Artillery which indeed helped, contributing both in their fire-power support and elevating the ebbing morale and fighting spirit of our troops.

The past few weeks' military operations highlighted the penchant of the army to conduct offensive operations every Sunday. This may seem like a good idea to some, but the LTTE may not take it lying down on this day-of-rest' for long. Routine and regularity not being the best course of action if one was not to advertise one's intentions; particularly, when an underlying political strategy shadows military tactics. The success of Kinihira -II launched last Tuesday may have put paid to the impetus of the pre-emptive strike, which the LTTE thought to mount by Operation Unceasing Waves IV.'

Troops having successfully thrust towards and taken Chavakachcheri in Operation Kinihiri' through Sankathaanai along the A-9 and towards Vannaathipaalam on the Kopay-Kaithady road, opened up a third front in the Colombuthurai-Ariyalai East axis, along the south-eastern side of Jaffna town. Within three hours, troops were able to take the outskirts of Chavakachcheri town, where the LTTE resisted the troop advance in fierce fighting. Artillery and mortars were in action throughout Sunday and well into Monday. Two counter-attacks launched by the LTTE were beaten back by the army with liberal use of MBRL rockets and massive artillery and mortar bombardment. The town of Chavakachcheri, the second largest city in the Jaffna peninsula, which at one time boasted of a population of over 100,000 was levelled to rubble and virtually a ghost-town with just the ruined shells of buildings flattened by artillery, mortars and rockets.

There were no civilian casualties, for there were none within the city, as they had all departed during the LTTE offensive in May. Superior firepower prevailed and the troops consolidated their positions in expectation of the next counter attack by the LTTE.

The tours arranged by the government for journalists (two in as many weeks) to confirm military claims that Chavakachcheri was in government hands has given credence to speculation that, the army is not only conducting a military campaign but also doing their bit (no doubt at the bidding of their political masters) of campaigning for the October 10 elections. The publicity derived will perhaps be helpful. Not only in the war effort but also in the political arena as well. In a war that has been fought spanning two decades, based more on political decisions' than on military strategy, in the run-up to the parliamentary elections, there is concern about the impact of the current round of military activity on the conduct of the polls, where it is becoming more and more apparent that, the timing of military offensives are determined by political imperatives.

For once, both the deputy minister of defence and the chief of defence staff were united in their task - assigned to them by their commander in chief, theirs was to do or die' - perhaps not literally; but more metaphorically so - politically.

In the face of heavy casualties on the first leg of Operation Rivikirana' on September 3, the military mustered its reserves and threw in all they had into battle, in order to achieve this objective. The month of September will no doubt go down in the military history of Sri Lanka as a campaign without equal. Never has the army mounted operation after operation, week after week. Operation Kinihiri-II is the fourth operation mounted in as many weeks.

Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickramanayake, a well known proponent of the military option,' is reported to have declared at a public rally during his election campaigning, that EPS (Elephant Pass) would be under government control by election day, October 10. Such a statement from no less a person than the prime minister, cannot be easily discarded as election rhetoric.

Meanwhile, while all the attention was focused on the northern front and the election campaigning' the LTTE stepped up its operations in other areas including Colombo and in particular in the east. Unlike in 1994, when the army cleared the east in preparation for the then elections, today, the status quo has changed. As before, Prabhakaran may yet be a decisive factor in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, if not in the north, then perhaps in the east. The attrition in the east has been consistent and casualties have been mounting in typical guerrilla style operations where the claymore and the ambush reign supreme.

(http://www2.lanka.net/sundayleader/2000/Oct/01/index.html)

Fall of Thoppigala imminent, says Eastern Commander

The fall of the only remaining LTTE bastion in Thoppigala is imminent, Eastern Commander Major General Parakrama Pannipitiya said.

The Major General addressing media personnel in Vakarai yesterday, emphasised the need for a vibrant civil administration in the area to ensure the smooth functioning of the day-to-day life of the people.

He said only five per cent of Thoppigala is in the hands of the Tigers and according to information, the LTTE was planning to flee the area amidst the impending military operations.

The resettlement of all displaced families in Vakarai is almost complete and the task would be over once certain infrastructure shortcomings are overcome, he said.

The resettlement of people in 79 Grama Niladari Divisions are to be completed in the near future, Major General Pannipitiya said.

The resettlement of people in the recently captured Grama Niladari Divisions of Porathivu, Vavunathivu and Pattipola will commence on May 14.

Eleven schools out of 12 are open at the moment and 11 SLTB buses ply to the nearby major towns in the area from Vakarai.

Other infrastructure facilities will also be developed soon, he said.

(http://www.dailynews.lk/2007/05/11/sec02.asp)

LTTE K'cholai leader killed

Two LTTE cadres including the leader for Kokkodicholai were killed and an arms haul recovered by the Security Forces following a confrontation in Angodavillvu, Welikanda on Monday evening, the Media Centre for the National Security said.

According to a spokesman for the MCNS troops on a foot patrol came under an LTTE attack on Monday evening in Welikanda. The Security Forces successfully retaliated forcing the Tigers to flee the area. "Two LTTE cadres including one of the Tiger leaders to Kokkodicholai were killed in the confrontation," he told the Daily News.

The troops conducted a search operation following fierce fighting that lasted for nearly three hours and recovered two bodies of Tiger cadres, two T56 riffles, 14 rounds of 40mm ammunition, binoculars, five live grenades, a CDMA telephone, an ID card, five maps and two radio communication sets, the MCNS spokesman said.

He said the dead LTTE cadres have been identified as S.Rajindran alias Ashok a well known LTTE leader in Kokkodicholai and K. Ragunathan, from the LTTE medical team.

Meanwhile, the Security Forces recovered a large stock of arms and ammunition in a search operation in Pankulam, Trincomalee on Monday evening. Troops recovered 197 rounds of T56 ammunition and 49 rounds of 12.7 mm ammunition hidden in an abandoned land.

In a separate incident the Security Forces recovered a claymore mine weighing 10kgs and a detonator code along with a remote control device following a tip off given by a civilian on Monday around 3.30 p.m. in Saravitam lane, Jaffna, the MCNS spokesman said.

(http://www.dailynews.lk/2007/05/09/sec01.asp)

Karuna faction kills the father of Sinthujan -- their first victim in rival camp

Tensions and killings continue to rise in the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) camp divided into two factions -- Karuna Group and Pilaiyan group.

Last night Karuna faction militant cadres led by Iniya Barathy shot and killed Sinthujan’s father Johnson (54 yrs) at Kallaru in the Batticoloa district.

Sinthujan a.k.a Jeyakanthan, a Pillaiyan loyalist, was killed and buried on May 4, 2007 at Kiran. Yesterday, people in the area reported to the Police that a hand was sticking out of the ground. They suspected that there was a dead body buried in the spot.

When the Police exhumed the body they found that was the body of Sinthujan . Eravur Police that exhumed body of Sinthujan removed it to the hospital.

In the meantime, Police began their inquiries by questioning the father of Sinthujan, Johnson. Johnson; father of three children, had alleged that Karuna and his rampaging commanders had killed and buried his son.

Following the police investigation, a team of 15 militants led by Iniya Barathi loyal to Karuna raided the house of Johnson at Kallaru located in the government-controlled area and shot and killed him. They have also warned that Sinthujan wife too was in their hit list.

According to sources, Karuna’s faction has blamed the killing of Johnson to STF police.

Sources in the East told Asian Tribune that the killing of Johnson might hinder a secret negotiation underway to bring the two factions together.

(http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/5662)

Karuna split deepens, associates killed

The split in the Karuna faction has deepened with reports that its spokesman Azad Maulana and close aids of Karuna had fled the country fearing retribution. On Wednesday night a relative of the Ampara military wing leader was shot dead while rumors spread that more Karuna associates were believed to have been shot dead over the last few days by loyalists of the group’s intelligence head Pillayan who split from Karuna following an internal dispute. However, none of the reports could be confirmed as political officials of the Karuna faction were not willing to speak to the media over the emerging reports.

(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2007/05/11/front/06.asp)

International help to locate officer

Sri Lanka government has sought international assistance to locate the missing Intelligence Officer who was attached to Sri Lankan Embassy in Indonesia.

Captain Mohamed Nilam, who was an intelligence official at the Sri Lankan embassy in Jakarta, has disappeared with his wife and children before termination of his term, government said.

Defence spokesman, Minister Keheliya Rambukwella told Sandesaya that Captain Nilam had gone missing two weeks before his term expired.

He said the Sri Lankan government had taken the issue on diplomatic level and informed security authorities in Indonesia.

As Captain Nilam has disappeared with his wife and children, the minister was asked whether the Sri Lankan government consider the officer had vacated his post.

"It seems that he has acted on an agenda of his own", Minister Rambukwella replied.

When told that Captain Nilam had been an LTTE target and it was the responsibility of the government to extend his term for security reasons, the minister said it was not only officer Nilam but there are also other officers whose security had to be ensured by the government.

(http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2007/05/070508_nilam.shtml)

Karuna and Pillaiyan Factions of TMVP Clash in East

Interenecine clashes among and within Tamil armed groups is not a new development. The latest group to be afflicted in this respect is the Tamil Makkal Viduthalaip Puligal (TMVP). Bitter rivalry has ensued between the TMVP’s “national leader” Karuna Amman and its ” supreme military commander” Pillaiyaan. TMVP factions aligned to the leader and commander have clashed in the East.

[In 2004]

In a typical example of the proverbial Tamil saying about pinching the baby and rocking the cradle the Sri Lankan military establishment is now trying to pacify Karuna and Pillaiyaan and evolve a working relationship between both factions. Military intelligence operatives “handling” the TMVP initially practised “divide and rule” tactics and covertly engineered a feud. Now they are overtly engaged in promoting peace. There is however a lurking fear that the split may have gone too far to a stage where patching up may not be possible.

Pillaiyaan was at one time a trusted, loyal disciple of Karuna. When the TMVP leader went abroad to escape assassination squads of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) it was Pillaiyaan and other deputies who held the fort locally. Even when Karuna was holed up at Panagoda camp for security reasons it was Pillaiyaan and others who remained active in the East and Polonnaruwa district.

Ever since Karuna came under complete control of Sri Lankan intelligence the TMVP is being directed by intelligence operatives. Karuna was more like a brand name and had very little control over his group in actual terms. The group had called itself TEMVP (Tamil Eelam Makkal Viduthalaip Puligal ) earlier. But Karuna’s handlers got him to remove the “Eelam” out as it smacked of separatism.

The Karuna faction known as TMVP was not allowed to function as one whole entity. Different commanders like Sinnathamby, Riyaseelan, Mangalan master, Iniyabharathy, Markan etc were given different spheres of influence and were responsible to different handlers. Pillaiyaan was like a “first among equals” among them. Most of the instructions from military intelligence hierarchy to the TMVP was relayed through Pillaiyaan. He was also the “communication channel” between Karuna and the other commanders. In the process Pillaiyaan self - styled himself as supreme commander.

It was Pillaiyaan who helped out with regular supply of cash to Karuna and his family while abroad. Apparently when the LTTE killed eight of Karuna’s men at Kottawa, Karuna lost his ‘treasurer Kuganesan too. Kugan had invested Karuna’s money in different place known only to himself.. All that was lost after Kuganesan was killed.

It was then that Pillaiyaan stepped in and started his taxation cum abduction for ransom racket. Pillaiyaan supplied Karuna with money regularly. He also encouraged a personality cult around Karuna within the TMVP.

The Sri Lankan intelligence operatives were not very happy at the Karuna - Pillaiyaan relationship. They preferred to engineer rivalry and factionalism within TMVP ranks and keep the running dogs of (Sinhala) imperialism on separate leashes. It was also felt that both leader and commander had to be given “knocks” and brought down a peg or two.

In the case of Pillaiyaan his handlers resented the fact that he was running a flourishing extortion racket where full details were not being divulged. While some of the abductions and extortion schemes were run with full knowledge of the handlers there were many other acts being done without their knowledge. Pillaiyaan was masterminding a racket where crores of rupees were filling his coffers. So Pillaiyaan was to be taught a lesson.

As far as Karuna was concerned the military establishment was very pleased with his performance. The sore point however was Karuna’s opposition to the East being fragmented. He also wanted some political power and insisting that an interim administrative council be set up for the entire province and be handed over to him. This was not to the liking of Karuna’s masters who wanted to reduce his clout too.

The best way to teach both leader and commander a lesson was to foster enmity between both.. An intra - TMVP feud would weaken both and enable handlers to exert greater authority over both factions.

A “gentleman” by the name of Krishnan was brought down to Sri Lanka for the purpose.”London” Krishnan whose full name is Krishnapillai is a native of Pungudutheevu in Jaffna. He was a federal party youth activist who went abroad to London in the early seventies. He played a prominent role in organizing and participating at the demonstration at a world cup match in 1975 when Tamil youths protesting Sri Lankan “oppression” invaded the grounds and fell flat on the pitch.

Krishnan later became an overseas activist of the original undivided LTTE. He was largely instrumental in wooing Anton Ballasingham into LTTE folds. When the LTTE split in 1980 Krishnan teamed up with Umamaheswaran and helped form the Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). He was expelled from the PLOTE in 1986 for allegedly embezzling funds collected abroad. When Paranthan Rajan broke away from PLOTE and formed Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) in 1987 Krishnan joined it.
Krishnan later dropped out of ENDLF and became a loner. He was approached by Sri Lankan intelligence in the nineties and has been of great service to them since then.Krishnan had established close rapport with Karuna on instructions from Sri Lankan intelligence.

Colombo was quite unhappy during Karunas short - lived honeymoon with the ENDLF. It was Krishnan who succeeded in breaking up that alliance on the request of Sri Lankan intelligence. Now he was asked to promote enmity between Karuna and Pillaiyaan. Krishnan came down to Colombo and worked on Karuna’s ego, insecurity and lurking jealousy.He also fired Karuna up over Pillaiyaan’s ill - gotten cash. This succeeded to a great extent and soon Karuna and Pillaiyaan were arguing on the telephone about. finances.

Karuna ordered Pillaiyaan to turn over all the money in his possession and submit accounts.Pillaiyaan decided to jump the gun and sent a killer squad to assassinate Iniyabharathy in Batticaloa.Bharaty a Karuna loyalist had been asked by his leader to collect the money and accounts from Pillaiyaan. Iniyabharathy who is implicated in the abduction and murder of “Taraki” Sivaram went up the roof and escaped death.Pillaiyaan also sent killers to bump off Krishnan. But Krishnan had already checked out from the Colombo hotel where he was staying.

With these acts the split came out in the open. Factions began forming around both Karuna and Pillaiyaan. People like Sinnathamby, Iniyabharathi, Riyaseelan, Jeyathaan, Santhiveli Maamaa,Thileepan, Mahilan etc were with Karuna. People like Sinthujan, Sitha master,Markan, Thooyavan, Seelan , Sasi etc were with Pillaiyaan. People like TMVP spokesman Azad Moulana and Mangalan master are neutral.Clashes between both factions began occurring.

Soon cadres loyal to Pillaiyaan began fleeing Batticaloa - Amparai districts to Polonnaruwa and Trincomalee districts. Karuna loyalists began entrenching themselves in Battiicaloa. With areas like Karadiyanaaru and Kokkatticholai coming under army control TMVP cadres loyal to Karuna began moving there in large numbers. Most TMVP offices in the littoral became depleted in personnel.

It appears that the rank and file in the security forces stationed in the East are sympathetic towards Pillaiyaan. This is because it was Pillaiyaan who interacted with them at grass roots level. Also many of the “hela jathika’ Types in Trinco and Polonnaruwa are also partial towards Pillaiyaan. These elements have played a crucial role in sustaining the TMVP.

The military and defence ministry hierarchies favour Karuna at this juncture. They are pleased with the input he provided in the Vaaharai and Paduvaankarai military offensives. They need his expetise in the battles to come in the Wanni too. Karuna was successful in enticing Jeyathaan and some others from the LTTE into TMVP.Also Karuna is now a brand name to mobilise anti - tiger elements. Karuna is necessary till the East is fragmented and Sinhalaised. He may literally and metaphorically outlive his usefulness then.

In a show of mediation the military authorities summoned a peace parley at Vaakarai. TMVP stalwarts from both factions met to thrash out differences. Both Karuna and Pillaiyaan kept away. A compromise in the form of demarcated territorial control was proposed by the handlers.

Areas south of Batticaloa town from Aaraiyampathy to Pottuvil were to be under Karuna’s suzerainty; areas north of B’caloa from Aarumugathaankudiyiruppu to Verugal river were to be Pillaiyaan’s fiefdom. B’caloa town was to be common for both under supervision. The hinterland areas were to be decided upon later.

This demarcation was not to the liking of both factions clamouring to be “sole” representatives of Eastern Tamils. Arguments heated up and led to fisticuffs. At one point Iniyabharathy and Santhively Maama whipped out concealed pistols and fired away. Seelan and six others from Pillaiyaan faction were injured and are hospitalised.

The peace parley ended in pandemonium. Both factions grabbed people from the other faction and took them away as “human shields”. Thus Pillaiyaan factioni took Mahilan and some others as hostages. Karuna faction took Sinthujan and some others as hostages. Ironically the security forces “allowed” both factions to take captives and depart, providing safe escort to both groups returning to B’caloa, Karadiyanaaru and Trincomalee.

Sinthujan and some others were kept at the TMVP office - camp on Bar road in B’caloa town. Sinthujan is the man responsible for abducting and killing seven Tamil rehabilitation Organization (TRO) employees in 2006 January. He also led the gang rape of the TRO’s woman accountant.

Sinthujan and Vijitharan broke out of custody and tried to run away. Karuna loyalists gave chase and gunned them down near the toddy tavern junction. Vijitharan was killed instantaneously but a wounded Sinthujan was dragged away and brutally hacked to death. A Muslim auto rickshaw driver from Kattankudi who was passing by was also injured in the shooting.

Karuna loyalists have also abducted the wife of Seelan who was injured by Santhiveli Maamaa in the Vaakarai shooting. They have also broken into a number of houses belonging to TMVP leaders of the Pillaiyaan faction. Valuables have been looted and furniture destroyed. The houses of Seelan, Sitha master and Sasi were some residences affected.

One happy consequence of the Karuna - Pillaiyaan split is the remarkable drop in abductions for ransom in Colombo and forced conscription in Batticaloa. These activities however are likely to increase once the internal squabbling comes to an end.

Meanwhile military authorities are engaging with Karuna and Pillaiyaan separately to bring about a compromise. It is said that Karuna had to cut his European tour as a result. After promoting a split the handlers now hope to “unite” the weakened factions and manipulate them easily in the future. Such attempts could turn counterproductive because factional friction has can gather momentum to a point of no return.

If the Karuna - Pillaiyaan split becomes permanent the TMVP will be considerably weakened. Internecine warfare will debilitate both factions. It remains to be seen as to how this will affect the Rajapakse regime’s “chinthana” of fragmenting and Sinhalaising the East.With Karuna and Pillaiyaan clashing the ultimate victor could be Velupillai Pirapakaran.

(http://transcurrents.com/tamiliana/archives/319)

Intelligence officer Nilam missing at Jakarta

A top intelligence officer of the Sri Lanka Army, Captain S.H. Nilam, who was the defence attaché at the Sri Lanka Embassy in Jakarta, has gone missing since last month. Another top official at the Jakarta embassy has reportedly received death threats from the LTTE.

State intelligence informed the government that Captain Nilam, his wife and three children had gone missing since April 23, a highly placed government official said.

He said that the acting ambassador in Jakarta, a Tamil, had reportedly received death threats from the Tamil Tigers recently.

The latest development follows the recall of Major General Janaka Perera, who was Sri Lanka’s ambassador to Indonesia, and the appointment of the former Army Chief of Staff, Major General Nanda Mallawarachchi- who has not yet assumed duties-as the new ambassador.

Major General Perera was asked to return to the country during the last week of April, for unknown reasons -- although his term had been expected to end next September.

It is learnt that, with the support of the Indonesian State Intelligence Agency -Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN), Captain Nilam had tipped off the Sri Lanka Government regarding several Sri Lanka bound LTTE arms shipments, and thus curtailed the flow of LTTE weapons to the country during his tenure.

Captain Nilam was in charge of the ‘Millennium City’ safe house when it was raided during the UNP regime. He was sent to Thailand in order to avoid LTTE attempts on his life. Later he was made the Defence Attaché in Indonesia.

(http://www.sinhala.net/LocalNews/SinhalaNet_Full_News.asp?ID=1926#NewsViewBM)

Split in Karuna group reported

The pro-government Tamil militant group led by the former LTTE commander Karuna has reportedly split, with Karuna and his deputy, Pillaiyan, falling out over money and the command structure.

Quoting military sources The Nation weekly said on Sunday that Pillaiyan had fled to Trincomalee from Batticaloa with 150 of his followers.

Pillaiyan, as the man in the field, had resented Karuna's remote control, reliable sources told Hindustan Times.

The Nation said that the infighting had led to the killing of Sindujan, a Pillaiyan loyalist who was the head of the Karuna group in Amparai district.

Sindujan and the group's intelligence chief, Seelan, were called for a meeting where a Karuna loyalist, Iniyabharathi, killed Sindujan. Seelan escaped miraculously, the paper said. The clash within the group had erupted over the distribution of money.

On the day Sindujan was killed, Karuna had invited Pillaiyan to come over for a discussion. But Pillaiyan had chosen not to go as he knew what awaited him, The Nation said.

Those in the know recall that the Karuna-Prabhakaran split in early 2004 had also occurred over the use or misuse of money. The LTTE's financel department and its intelligence chief (Pottu Amman) had alleged misappropriation of funds by Karuna, who was then the Batticaloa and Amparai district commander.

They asked the Supremo, Velupillai Prabhakaran, to take action against Karuna. Prabhkaran summoned Karuna to the Wanni for a discussion. But Karuna chose not to go because he knew what awaited him.

Instead, he split, struck an alliance with the Sri Lankan government, and formed his own Batticaloa Amparai-based politico-military organisation called Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (Tamil Peoples' Liberation Tigers).

Informed sources say that in the fight within the Karuna group, Karuna will have the upper hand because he represents the 'brand'. Given his past as Prabhakaran's deputy, Karuna is likely to get outside support and not Pillaiyan.

It is likely that Prabhakaran will try to get Pillaiyan and his men to come over to his side, taking advantage of the offer of amnesty including jobs overseas.

Pillaiyan may find it hard to survive on his own. But it remains to be seen if he will exercise the option of seeking refuge in Prabhakaran.

(http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print.aspx?Id=28a57907-17be-425e-90fd-fd4f2313e325)

Army’s special forces chief to quit by Sunil Jayasiri

Top Army officer, Colonel Prasanna Silva, the Brigade Commander of the special force which carried out the recent successful operations in the east including the one in Vakarai, has been asked to retire prematurely for unknown reasons, Daily Mirror learns.

Informed sources revealed Colonel Silva had submitted his resignation recently to Army Commander Sarath Fonseka, who had reportedly accepted it. With the new development, Colonel Silva will retire in December this year.

Until the retirement, it is learnt, Colonel Silva has been given a logistic appointment at the Kosgama Army Camp,

Meanwhile, Army Commander Fonseka has appointed Jaffna’s 553 Brigade Commander Nirmal Dharmaratne as the Commander of the Army’s elite special forces with immediate effect. Colonel Silva’s achievements, it is learnt, were personally appreciated by the President at a meeting held soon after the successful operations in the East.

(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2007/05/07/front/2.asp)

The Tamils safety in the capital city should be assured - The statement issued by Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) Supreme Commander Pillayan

Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) Supreme Commander Pillayan in a statement said that In recent days abduction and disappearance of Tamil youths both males and females have been escalated in Colombo . This has caused great fear to the Tamil people who live in Colombo and who come to Colombo for their needs. We are highly worried and shocked over this matter. We should not permit this situation to be continued. A full stop should be kept for the fear of the Tamil people and the Tamil people`s safety in Colombo should be assured.

Clashes are being taken place between the Government troops and Praba Group in North, East. In this condition abduction and disappearance of Tamils; have increased their disbelief. The President and the Government should pay more attention to this matter and should give assurance for their safety. The Government can`t get rid of its responsibility it has in the safety of the Tamil people.

Likewise the Tamil journalists and media institutions are facing threats. The opinions that are sown by a journalist can`t be destroyed by killing him. Our clear position is that unless by opinions, opinions cannot be destroyed by tools. The government should assure the right and the safety of the journalists who are the back- bones of democracy.

In recent days the security arrangements and checking operations have been intensified in Colombo . It is important to save the capital city , the politicians in the capital Colombo , foreign statesmen, economic centers and civilian targets from the terrorists of Praba Group. We accept the responsibility and the duty which the three forces have in this matter. But this security arrangement should not be against a specific nationalitly. During the checking and inquires the Tamils should not be viewed in suspicion. They too are citizens of this country.

The Tamil people are under going untold hardships due to the terrorist acts of Praba Group. It has been long time since the gap increased between Praba Group and Tamil People. Everyone should well realize this. The Sinhalese parties and people should look beyond Praba Terrorist Group and should gain the confidence of the Tamil people. This is the source of great way to solve this problem.

A few days before warning leaflets using our organization`s name was distributed in Athurugiriya, Millennium City area warning the Tamil people of that area to vacate. The over genius (') subjects in the leaflet underlines those who are behind this confederacy act.

No one ever uses their organization`s name to threat. Our organization`s name was used to claim in that leaflet with spelling mistakes. The literature mistakes and grammar mistakes clearly reveals the confederates of the leaflets. Our people well realize that we are not the owners of these hateful, stupid acts.

Our political activities are in view of the rights and safety of our people. We don`t want anything that cannot fulfil our people`s expectations. We see this as a part of a confederacy effort taken by those who are unable to digest our political activities. This indirectly reveals that any dangers may be caused to the Tamil people in order to disgrace our organization`s name.

Therefore I wish to reiterate that it is duty of the Government to assure the safety of the Tamil people and to make way for them to live in a fearless state.

(http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2006/9/8413.html)

Cracks within Karuna faction

An internal strife within the Karuna faction has come to a head on with deputy leader of the group Pillayan falling out and one of his loyalists Sindujan being killed in internecine warfare, military sources said. Pillayan who was the number two in the group and the military leader of the outfit had also escaped an attempt on his life and slipped to Trincomalee with over 150 cadres loyal to him.

In an incident that took place on Thursday the intelligence leader of the Karuna group Seelan and its Ampara district leader Sindujan had been summoned for a meeting where Sindujan was shot and killed by Karuna loyalist Iniyaparithy. Seelan had narrowly escaped after sustaining wounds.

The clash within the group had erupted over an argument between Karuna and Pillayan over disbursement of the group`s funds and the new appointments made within the faction. Afterwards Karuna had ordered his cadres that Pillayan and his loyalists be hunted.

On the day of the killing of Sindujan, Karuna had asked Pillayan to come to Colombo for an urgent meeting with him, which Pillayan had avoided knowing very well that he would be targeted there. It is learnt that the military is in a quandary over the split in the Karuna faction since it was Pillayan who had been close to the fighting cadres of the Karuna faction.

(http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2007/5/14640.html)

Open warfare between Karuna and his deputy Pillaiyan: split due to money and command structure issues

The Karuna Group in the east which broke away from the Vanni-led LTTE has split into two groups, according to sources in Colombo.

The deputy leader Pillaiyan of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal military wing, has broken away from his leader, Murlitharan alias Colonel Karuna. Sources revealed that the falling out has occurred over issues of "money and the command structure".

Asian Tribune reliably learnt that Pillaiyan had also resented the "remote control" approach of Karuna while Pillaiyan was in the field moving with his cadres.

The split ocurred after the two sides engaged in open warfare.

Recently, Pillaiyan who was in Vaharai was summoned to Colombo for a meeting and was ordered to stay in a particular hotel in Colombo. Accordingly Pillaiyan went to Colombo for the meeting.

When he was about to enter the Colombo city, he received an urgent phone call from Seelan that Sinthujan, who was the Commander of the Deep Penetrating Force, was killed. The plan was to send Sinthujan on leave to isolate him from the unit. Accordingly Sinthujan went on leave to his home in Amparai . There in Amparai, he was seized by a group of commanders Inaiyabarathy, Veera, Ranjan, Thileepan and Jeeventiran and brutally killed by ruthlessly assaulting him with crowbars and steel rods. Also Seelan told Pillaiyan that Akilan was shot and he has sustained serious injuries in his hand. Seelan also reported that he was also shot but sustained minor gunshot injuries, but survived from the pursuing killers.

Pillaiyan was also told that there was a move to arrest him in Colombo and already 20 cadres were waiting to grab him in the vicinity of the hotel where he was supposed to go and stay.

Asian Tribune further learnt that nearly 100 cadres under the command of commanders Iniyabarathy, Veera, Ranjan, Thileepan and Jeeventiran ransacked the TMVP offices in the Batticaloa district. When they rounded up the TMVP office located in the Govindan Road Batticaloa, Pradeeb managed to escape. But the rampaging cadres went to his house and chased his wife and her sisters and mother from the house.

As mentioned earlier Seelan who was in charge of Arasady Road Office in Batticalao survived with gunshot injuries when his office was rounded up by rampaging cadres.

Asian Tribune was unable to contact either Pillaiyan or Colonel Karuna for further information.

Sources say that Pillaiyan is now in Trincomalee and there are more than 300 TMVP armed cadres are with him. TMVP commanders Marckan, Sinna Jeyam and others are with Pillaiyan.

Pillaiyan initially wanted to leave Sri Lanka and seek asylum in some other country, but TMVP cadres have urged that he should not leave Sri Lanka and should remain in the country and continue to work for TMVP.

It is learnt Karuna is in Colombo. He came back to Sri Lanka eight months ago.

Before Karuna returned to Sri Lanka, Pillaiyan went to India and made the necessary arrangements to relocate Karuna’s wife and three children safely. After the relocation of the family was done successfully, Pillaiyan arranged to send a common friend from London to bring Karuna back to Colombo.

Once Karuna returned to Colombo, Pillaiyan handed back responsibility of money matters to Karuna, according to a TMVP source.

More details are awaited.

(http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/5630)

LTTE killed fishermen: TN Police

It was the most dramatic disclosure by the Tamil Nadu police in recent memory. The state police chief said on Friday night that it was the ‘Sea Tigers’ who killed five Indian fishermen off the coast of Kanyakumari on March 29.

This is the first time since the May 1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, that the LTTE has been accused of murdering Indian nationals in Indian territory. The killing of the fishermen had taken place in Indian territorial waters south of Kanyakumari and west of Kalpitiya in Sri Lanka.

Tamil Nadu Police Director General D. Mukherjee said in an official statement that the Tigers had shot the fishermen on suspicion that they were spying on their movements. The LTTE men were engaged in ferrying arms and ammunition from one of their ships to the Sri Lankan coast.

In another revelation, the police chief also said 12 Indian fishermen missing since March 4 were actually in the custody of the LTTE after being abducted, along with their boat.

When four fishermen, who survived the attack on them, returned home from the sea on March 29 and revealed that unidentified persons on a civilian boat had opened fire on them, fishermen and political parties had assumed that the Sri Lankan Navy was behind the killings. Two fishermen had died in the boat itself, two vanished into the sea with bleeding bullet injuries, while a fifth man succumbed in hospital after reaching the shore.However, authorities in the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard and intelligence agencies knew immediately on debriefing the survivors that this was not just another instance of firing on Indian fishermen. Often, Indian fishermen transgress into Sri Lankan territorial waters and get shot by the Sri Lankan Navy. These incidents are alleged to take place in the vicinity of Kachchativu, or elsewhere in the Palk Bay.

The Kanyakumari incident was completely different. Firstly, the spot was well inside Indian territorial waters and very far away from the routine areas of patrolling by the Sri Lankan Navy. The victims themselves did not say they were fired upon by the Sri Lankan Navy. They identified one of the vessels of the attackers as ‘Maria’, a civilian boat, and also said the assailants were casually dressed, with some of them being bare-chested.

Chief Minister Mutuvel Karunanidhi shot off a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, giving all these details and released copies of it to the media. He demanded an investigation into the identity of the killers and ‘their international connections’. It was clear that he was indirectly absolving the Sri Lankan Navy but he stopped short of naming the Tigers.

It was much later that the police found out the truth. It was a chance discovery, after the Indian Coast Guard found a vessel by name ‘Maria’ drifting in Indian waters on April 11 along with two Indian fishing boats.

The Coast Guard rounded up the Indians and six Sri Lankan Tamils. Initially, the survivors of the attack failed to identify the vessel as the one involved in the March 29 incident.

On April 23, the investigation was handed over to the ‘Q Branch-CID, a wing of the Tamil Nadu police that specialises in investigating cases involving extremists. Officers experienced in interrogating LTTE suspects were deployed, and the six men opened up. They disclosed that ‘Maria’ was indeed the same vessel involved in the shooting; and that they were all ‘Sea Tigers’ whose routine duty was to ferry arms and ammunition from a mother ship to hideouts on land using fishing boats. However, the men distanced themselves from the killing of the five fishermen, saying another group of ‘Sea Tigers’ were involved. They gave an account of what happened on March 29. The Indian fishermen had come close to ‘Maria’ and asked its inmates if they had any fish to spare, as they themselves had failed to catch any. A Sea Tiger cadre, Manavaalan, had told them that there was no fish on board, but the fishermen were persistent. Suddenly, the LTTE men opened fire on the fishermen. Investigators were told that the ‘Sea Tigers’ had fired at the fishermen on suspicion that they were spying on their activities.

In the course of the interrogation, the police also managed to solve the mystery of 12 fishermen missing since March 4. The group had put out to sea from Sakthikulangara, a fishing village in Kollam district of neighbouring state of Kerala. They were abducted by the ‘Sea Tigers’, and are still now in LTTE custody.

(http://www.sundaytimes.lk/070429/News/101.2news.html)

Former military officer seeking asylum?

Sri Lanka's Intelligence Officer in Jakarta, Capt. Mohamed Nilam has gone missing after he completed his tour of duty. Both the Foreign Ministry, and the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence (DFI) are now trying to ascertain whether he secretly negotiated asylum and fled to a foreign country after failing to persuade the Government to grant him a new posting.

Captain Nilam, who figured in the mistaken Police raid on the Army's intelligence cell at Athurugiriya was regarded as a high profile LTTE target and was posted to Jakarta. Captain Nilam worked with the Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and his private house was used as an intellgence cell for operations in the East. When the Police conducted a raid, a large variety of military hardware including clay more mines were found. Intelligence sources told The Sunday Times Captain Nilam had sought an extended term of three months. "It was granted. During that period his replacement had arrived in Jakarta and he was expected to brief him and remain at the station until the extended period was over. Without anyone’s knowledge he had disappeared with his family," the source said. Lieutenant Commander Tuan Putra Halaldeen has already assumed duties at the Embassy in Jakarta.

Whilst in Jakarta, Captain Nilam was reporting to the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence though he belonged to the Directorate of Military Intelligence.

The assistance of Indonesian authorities has been sought to ascertain flight details of Captain Nilam and his family. Sources close to his family said he was worried to return to Colombo because he was a high profile target for the LTTE. Hence, he had appealed several times to his immediate superiors to use their good offices to get the Government to either get him a separate posting or an extended term.

"All his fervent appeals were contemptuously ignored," the source told The Sunday Times. He said that was the price that had to be paid by an officer who placed his life at risk in playing the role of an intelligence officer.

En route to take up his posting, Captain Nilam and family ran into trouble at the Singapore airport. Upon arrival there to take a connecting flight to Jakarta, he was detected by authorities at the airport carrying pistol ammunition. It was found on the bag of his wife. Accidentally she had failed to check on some ammunition she had held when she travelled along in Sri Lanka with her husband. Top level diplomatic contacts between Colombo and Singapore led to the matter being sorted out so he could resume his flight.

(http://www.sundaytimes.lk/070506/News/100_4_news.html)