A DMI Long Ranger speaks out

Despite the calm in battle areas, and the nation's attention focused on the upcoming peace talks, the intelligence community was jolted into action this week.

A warning went out that a group of Tiger guerrillas had arrived in the city from Batticaloa. Their mission – to carry out reconnaissance to identify members of the now well known Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP), or deep penetration groups, that have carried out attacks inside guerrilla dominated territory.

Since a "cessation of hostilities" between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is now in force, the task of the group, a senior Intelligence official says, is not to carry out assassinations. He believes it is to identify those responsible, their addresses and other details. "They want to be ready to take on those targets if an opportunity arises," he adds.

He may be right in his assessment. But that is not to say that in the past the LTTE has not carried out attacks when a ceasefire or "cessation of hostilities" has been in force.

On July 13, 1989, the leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), and then Parliamentarian Appapillai Amirthalingam, was assassinated by an armed group. This occurred when President Ranasinghe Premadasa was locked in peace talks with the LTTE. The latter strongly denied allegations that its cadres were involved.

That phase of the negotiations broke down in June, 1990 triggering off "Eelam War Two." Later, Anton Balasingham, now LTTE's chief negotiator, admitted publicly that the guerrillas had assassinated Mr. Amirthalingam. That came during talks which were bi-lateral. However, this time, Norway is playing the role of a facilitator and has obtained assurances, both from the Government and the guerrillas, not only to ensure the truce holds but also to formally incorporate it into a full fledged ceasefire agreement.

But the reason for the presence of the guerrilla group from the east in Colombo is the direct outcome of the Police raid on the Army's Safe House at Athurugiriya on January 2. The sequence of events that followed was to formally confirm the existence of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols and their activities.

Operations by LRRPs, or deep penetration groups, is not confined only to a single apparatus in the Army. There are in fact three distinct units, each specialising in infiltrating enemy lines and carrying out devastating attacks. But only the activities of the Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), one of the organs that directed and controlled LRRP operations, came to light following the raid on the Safe House at Athurugiriya. This was a "rear base" for the DMI's long range patrol units. They also had "forward operations bases" in secret locations in the east from where they ventured out to take targets in guerrilla held areas.

In the coming weeks, the Supreme Court, the nation's highest judicial institution, will hear details about how the DMI's long range patrols operated, how they took on targets and continued to maintain secrecy until the ill conceived Police raid on the Safe House blew it all. An officer and four soldiers have filed different Fundamental Rights violation petitions where they have given hitherto top secret details of how they operated and what happened to them. Some of the highlights in the petitions appeared in The Sunday Times last week though names of those involved were withheld in view of the serious security threats it would pose them. However, some sections of the media, of course unwittingly, gave the names of those concerned when reporting that they had filed petitions in the Supreme Court.

While the cases of the DMI's heroes are awaiting hearings from the Supreme Court, Tiger guerrillas have embarked on a massive witch hunt to round up those helping the LRRP team of DMI. At least three of them have been summarily executed. That included a boatman, who under cover of darkness, helped ferry LRRP teams across a river in Manmunai (Batticaloa) to guerrilla controlled areas. Hundreds of families in uncontrolled areas in the Batticaloa district are being questioned by guerrilla cadres to ascertain whether they helped the LRRP teams. Those identified face instant death. It is in this backdrop that the guerrilla group from Batticaloa has entered the City.

The actions of two specialised Army apparatus dealing with Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols still remain a top secret. Some of their prized achievements, which are bold and daring, cannot be revealed. However, in the case of the DMI, the activities of its own LRRP teams have become privy to the LTTE after the raid on the Safe House at Athurugiriya. In the coming weeks, more details will become public when the Supreme court begins hearings. How does the Military Intelligence directorate's LRRP teams operate ? How have they acquired targets ? What are the dangers they face ?

The answers came in an exclusive The Sunday Times interview with a member of the LRRP team. He spoke on grounds of strict anonymity. For obvious reasons, some of the remarks he made had to be withheld. Yet the story he related rings true to the motto of Britain's Special Air Services (SAS), one of the world's most elitist commando units - Who Dares Wins.

He sat in the front seat of a double cab. The stubble on his face shows he had not shaved for a couple of weeks. The muscular arms betrayed his identity.

He keeps thumping on the dashboard every now and then. At times he is restless. He could not stretch his long legs. He places his right leg on the seat to feel comfortable but soon takes it off to look outside. He seems alert to something which he fears would happen. We are on the edge of a football field, just off a main road near a construction company. It seems it was instinct, the survival techniques they are taught.

I asked him to relate one of his forays. I have chosen to identify him only by one of the call signs he used on an assignment which is unrelated to this story. "Golf Whisky," was given a task by the Directorate of Military Intelligence last year. Together with two colleagues, he left the Army Camp at Vavunativu near Batticaloa. Having dodged minefields during a delicate trek in the night, they arrived at dawn in a jungle patch. They remained there for the whole day and did not venture out for fear of detection. They used long range binoculars to see movement of people including guerrilla cadres and survived on ration packs. At night, just past 10 p.m., they moved out.

Using Night Vision Devices (NVD), they trekked towards an area where they were to accomplish their mission. They had been well briefed, not only on the target but also on the terrain. "We moved with our back packs and weapons all throughout the night. Before dawn, we always found a place to hide. It has not been easy. On one occasion, we were worried after seeing a group of civilians. But they thought we were LTTE men, "Golf Whisky" said.

It was November 17, last year, when we took up position near a mound after placing claymore mines in the direction of a road. It was almost late evening when they spotted a double cab coming along. There were some seated inside. Behind, in the cab area, at least two guerrilla cadres carrying weapons were watching either side of the road. Suddenly, the claymore mine exploded throwing the double cab, now a wreck, off the road. From a distance it looked mangled. "We managed to move back and spent the night in a thicket. We knew that we had hit an LTTE vehicle. That was all we knew as we began our trek to base," he said.

Spending a night in an area which had a thick outgrowth, "Golf Whisky" and his two colleagues settled down to another meal. This was also from the ration pack. One slept whilst the other two took turns watching. Sleep was restricted to less than an hour or so but "Golf Whisky" says "we cannot enjoy that sleep. We are conscious somebody can ambush and kill us. It is more a case of keeping our eyes shut. But that helps," he adds.

It was only after they returned to base that they discovered they had accomplished their target. "Major Mano" or "Oscar" (his radio call sign) was killed. "Major Mano" was a key guerrilla cadre. During security forces operations in the North, he was the man tasked to monitor all SF communications. He was also one of a handful of guerrilla leaders consulted by LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, when major attacks were planned.

"Major Mano" had not only undergone basic guerrilla training but has also been taught radio communications.

At the time he was killed, he was the guerrilla in charge of LTTE communications network in the east. He had been fluent in English, Sinhala and Tamil. Intercepts of radio conversations prior to the attack showed that he was so fluent in Sinhala that he pronounced words in such a way it gave the impression he was a Sinhalese.

"We only saw the claymore mine explode damaging the vehicle. Confirmation of "Major Mano's death came later during both radio intercepts and on the Tamilnet website," said "Golf Whisky."

"Major Mano" was a close associate of LTTE's leader for the east, Karuna. He had been involved in countering security forces offensives during "Operation Riviresa" and "Operation Jaya Sikurui." Following the guerrilla seizure of Elephant Pass, he had moved to the east. As the man in charge of communications network in the East, he had been responsible for jamming security forces radio communications periodically.

"There are successes and there are frustrations too," says "Golf Whisky." In July, last year, they were tasked to take on the LTTE military wing leader for Batticaloa district, "Jim Kelly." They trekked guerrilla dominated terrain for seven days in this operation in Batticaloa south. They waited for their quarry to arrive but he did not turn up. They were forced to abandon mission and return to base. On another occasion in September last year, they waited for another target to arrive in a location in Batticaloa north. Three days after they had moved in, just at the time the man was expected, very heavy rains broke out. Visibility became poor and there was no sign of any vehicle. They were forced to return to base.

One of their prize achievements, "Golf Whisky" boasts took place on June 6 last year. This was when they launched a claymore mine attack on "Lt. Col. Nizam" alias November Mike (his radio call sign) in Kokkadicholai. He was the military intelligence wing leader of the LTTE for the Eastern province and masterminded almost all the major guerrilla suicide missions in Colombo. That included the suicide bomber attack on then Minister of Industrial Development, C.V. Gooneratne, at the Ratmalana junction on June 9, 2000. "Lt.Col. Nizam" was a senior LTTE cadre who received training in a base in India. The string of electricity transformer explosions in various parts of Sri Lanka, including the City and attacks on telecommunications installations had been planned and directed by this former Eastern province intelligence wing leader.

On November 26 last year, the LRRP team ventured into Pulipanchakal. Here too it carried out a claymore mine attack killing two senior members of the LTTE mortar group in Batticaloa, "Major Swarnaseelan" and "Captain Devadas." They were later identified as specialists in handling 81 mm and 120 mm mortars. This was followed by another attack on December 3, last year. Though a top LTTE cadre was expected, the claymore mine exploded when an Isuzu Elf vehicle was passing by It killed three guerrillas.

What would you say is your most unforgettable experience, I asked "Golf Whisky." He smiled and paused for a long while. I asked whether it was a secret. "No," he replied. "The target was so near, so close. Then the unexpected happened," he said striking his hand hard on the double cab dashboard. He did not hide his frustration.

It was December 21, last year. Two LRRP teams from the DMI had been tasked to take on two important targets. If successful, they would have been their biggest accomplishment. But it was not to be.

One LRRP team went behind guerrilla lines in Kokkadicholai (Batticaloa bowl) whilst the other slipped into "Beirut," (Batticaloa Central) known to be one of the major LTTE bases in the east. Their targets ? LTTE's Military Commander for the East, Karuna and one of his close confidantes, Ramesh. They had entrenched themselves in a secret location and were ready.

The men had spent almost five days, sleeping in jungle areas during day and trekking during the night.

On December 24, last year, their encrypted radio communication set crackled. It was orders from the Directorate of Military Intelligence to abort mission and return to base. The reason – the LTTE had announced a "cessation of hostilities" and the Government had decided to reciprocate.

"The return journey was very troublesome," says "Golf Whisky." There were at least two different occasions when they feared they would be spotted. The third time, they had to divert course after a woman spotted them. "We were not sure whether she identified us or whether she thought we were LTTE. We did not want to take a chance. We had to divert course and this took a long time," he said.

There are occasions when we have been spotted. In one such instance, we had to radio the nearest Police Special Task Force (STF) base. "We gave details of our location. Mortars began to rain ahead of us. That helped us to make a hasty retreat," said "Golf Whisky".

On December 27, the men returned to their Safe House in Athurugiriya. Some of the weapons they carried from there to another "forward operations" Safe House somewhere in Batticaloa were returned. Others remained at Athurugiriya when the Kandy Police headed by SP Kulasiri Udugampola, raided the premises.

The weapons they took were from five different military installations – Army Headquarters, Panagoda, Kosgama, Kadawata and Maradana. They had to be accounted, documented and returned to the officers who issued them. Some also had to be returned to the Regimental Headquarters of the Military Intelligence Regiment.

One of the reasons for the delay was the lack of a typewriter at the Safe House at Athurugiriya. The document had to be therefore prepared at an Army camp in Kohuwala. It began on December 29, last year. The next day was a Sunday. Hence, the preparation of documents was concluded on December 31. Since January 1, 2002, was declared a half holiday by the Army, they were to be returned during the following days. But the raid came on January 2.

I asked "Golf Whisky" whether he had encountered difficult moments. His mood changed and the smile on his face faded away. The soft heart behind the tough man began to show when he appeared choked with emotion. "I lost a good friend during an LRRP operation," he says. What happened ? "He was caught red handed by the Tigers with a claymore mine in his hand. This compromised his mission. The man was tortured," he said in soft tones.

"They hung the claymore mine with a rope around his neck and paraded him many times before civilians. Thereafter, he was shot dead," said "Golf Whisky." Was he a regular soldier or a former guerrilla cadre now enlisted to Army ranks ? "I am sorry I cannot tell you that. All I can say is that he was a very good friend. He has saved my life during an LRRP operation. I am sad to miss him," he added.

That speaks a lot for a breed of men whose grit and determination is little known. But their tales have now become a public secret after the ill conceived Police raid, which none other than Defence Minister, Tilak Marapana, has described was a publicity stunt.

(http://sundaytimes.lk/020210/sitrep.html)

Army holds jaya pirith, Tigers warn of bloodbath

• Both sides accuse each other of intensifying hostilities
• Foreign Ministry issues tough guidelines for visits by diplomats to North, East
  
• How the German envoy took Italian Ambassador to hospital

The LTTE mortar attack on diplomats, United Nations and Government officials twelve days ago has had its sequel.
Colombo-based foreign diplomats have now been banned from undertaking visits to operational areas in the North and East without the express permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such permission, the Ministry has said in a note to Colombo-based diplomatic missions, should be obtained three weeks ahead of a planned visit. The note sent out last week calls upon them to adhere to this procedure which had also been laid out in previous notes.

This in effect means that no other Minister will be able to sponsor visits for diplomats to the operational areas without the express approval of the Foreign Ministry. A high ranking Government official, who did not wish to be named, said yesterday such Foreign Ministry approval would only be granted in consultation with the Ministry of Defence. "That is to ensure security conditions in the areas the diplomats planned to visit were normal and the visits did not hinder any ongoing operational activity by the Security Forces," the official said.

The ruling came as senior Government officials took stock of the events that unfolded after the February 27 mortar attack on the Weber Stadium in Batticaloa. This began when an Air Force Mi-17 helicopter touched down with diplomats, UN and government officials at the Weber Stadium in Batticaloa.

It has come to light that there were no contingency plans and even the diplomats were forced to fend for themselves in the ensuing melee. Some of the events, which Government officials have come to know, have led to concerns at the highest levels.
One such instance was the experience of German Ambassador Juergen Weerth. He was upset to find his Italian colleague, Pio Mariani lying on the ground bleeding with a head injury. There was so much of panic and confusion that those in the Stadium were rushing for cover from the mortar attacks. There had been no one to help the diplomats and UN officials who were not familiar with the area or with what was going on. Mr. Weerth helped the Italian envoy stand up. He had his right hand across Mr. Mariani's shoulder and walked him out of the stadium. There had been more signs of panic on the road outside. People were running. Motorists were tooting their horns to make a hurried get away.

Ignoring the confusion, Mr. Weerth had walked towards two armed soldiers who were on duty along the roadside. He had asked one of them for directions to the hospital. He pointed the area, some distance away. It took another soldier, a good Samaritan who was driving in that direction in an empty Army vehicle, to offer the two envoys a lift to the hospital. He dropped them there and drove away.

The two envoys were first directed to an Out Patients Department (OPD). Evidently, some hospital staff did not recognize them. Perhaps they thought the duo were tourists or foreign journalists. One of staffers was to remark that senior hospital officials were busy since the Minister of Disaster Management and Human Rights, Mahinda Samarasinghe and some diplomats had arrived in Batticaloa.

Ambassador Weerth had walked towards a person clad in a shirt and tie. He had assumed the person was someone in authority at the hospital. He was right. It was a doctor who was in the management staff. Upon being introduced, the doctor took the two envoys into a larger room which was a hive of activity. More doctors there were busy with various chores. Some attending to the wounds of Security Forces personnel just brought in, others tending to patients and the nursing staff cleaning fresh wounds of those hit by the mortars.

Ambassador Mariani was promptly put on a wheeled stretcher. His head injury, the result of a small piece of shrapnel hitting the back of his head, was cleaned and surgically dressed. A Government official in Colombo said that at this stage, there was a comical diversion. A hospital staffer walked up to Ambassador Weerth to tell him he had visited Germany thrice. He asked whether the German envoy could arrange a Schengen Visa for him. This visa entitles a traveller to visit any European Union country instead of Germany alone. Mr. Weerth was diplomatic enough to tell the staffer that the matter could be discussed later and to kindly pay attention to Mr. Mariani. By then, Minister Samarasinghe had realized that the two envoys were missing from the group that arrived at the Weber Stadium. He had sent a vehicle to get them transported from the hospital to the office of the Deputy Inspector General (DIG).

Last week's report on this page made reference to the Ambassador for France in Sri Lanka who was one of those who arrived at the Weber Stadium. Inadvertently his name was given as Jean-Bernard de Vaivre. He was the former Ambassador. The name, as pointed out in a note to the The Sunday Times by the Press Service of the Embassy of France in Sri Lanka should be Michel Lummaux. Yet, ironic enough that the Embassy's Press Service does not seem to be aware that their own Colombo website (http://www. ambafrance-lk.org) gives the name of the former Ambassador Mr.de Vaivre. Perhaps Mr. Lummaux should get his own Press Service to correct this to include his name. That will help more Sri Lankans to know that Mr. de Vaivre has long been replaced.

The days that followed the mortar attack on Weber Stadium have seen enhanced military activity in the East. Security Forces have begun assaults on several Tiger guerrilla positions both in the Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts. In Trincomalee the focus is to prevent the guerrillas from using the contiguous land route north of the strategic port city and to prevent them from expanding their bases in the area. One such base is said to be in Kumburupiddy where measures are under way to expand. Military officials say supplies to this base were being moved by sea through the eastern coastal village of Kuchchaveli (north of Trincomalee). Some areas dominated by the guerrillas have now been brought under Security Forces control.

In the Batticaloa district, the main focus of the Security Forces, as previously announced, has been Toppigala. This week has seen a rapid exodus of civilians from the area. One time residents, who were eye witnesses, say small groups of Security Forces were moving in stealthily to search and destroy guerrilla hideouts. This has raised fears among civilians that they may be caught up in escalated hostilities in the weeks to come. This has triggered off the civilian exodus. Contrary to reports that an all out land based offensive (backed by air cover) had begun, Army sources confirmed yesterday "small group" attacks by Special Forces and Commandos were continuing in and around Toppigala and other areas. They said the measures adopted were forcing the guerrillas to flee from place to place.

The Army and commandos of the Police Special Task Force (STF) are also undertaking joint operations against Tiger guerrillas. On Friday eight STF commandos were killed in a guerrilla ambush at Periyapullumalai in the Batticaloa district. Four of the commando bodies, taken away by the guerrillas, were handed over yesterday to the members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to be handed over to the STF.

On the other hand, guerrilla pistol groups are also reported to have infiltrated Batticaloa town and its environs with plans to attack targets said to include top Security Forces, Police and Government officials. The Army captured Vakarai and its environs in a two stage operation that began on October 30 and officially ended on January 15, this year. Enhancing the military activity in and around Toppigala is other military action, the result of the guerrilla mortar attacks on the Air Force Base and the Weber Stadium on February 27. Security Forces have begun shelling guerrilla positions in areas near Batticaloa including Eravur, Kiran, Vellaweli, Vavunativu and Paddipallai. This has also led to an exodus of civilians in the villages for fear they may get caught up in the battles that would follow.

These developments come as the Army concluded week-long religious ceremonies countrywide to invoke blessings for them to conduct all its activities successfully. A signal sent out early this month by Colonel K.R.P. Rowel, (on behalf of the President of the Buddhist Bala Mandalaya of the Army) to Security Forces Commanders, Divisional Commanders, Sector Commanders and Deputy Sector Commanders said:

"Chanting of the Jaya Piritha and conducting of Bodi Pooja"
"The Army Commander has advised that steps should be taken by headquarters, units and sub units to chant the Jaya Piritha and conduct Bodhi Pooja for a week long period continuously from March 2, 2007 enabling the Army to conduct all its activities successfully and that lives of all soldiers including the Army Commander are protected.

"Accordingly steps should be taken to organize to hold the Bodhi Pooja and chant the Jaya piritha at the temples close to the army camps or within the camps at Headquarters, unit or sub unit level without endangering the lives of those taking part in such events. You are advised that all information about the events organized at headquarters, unit or sub unit level should be conveyed before 10.00 a.m. March 2, 2007 so that the details could be forwarded to the Commander of the Army.

"Only for sectors and sub sectors - Make arrangements to chant the Jaya Piritha and hold Bodhi Pooja in the main temples in your area as advised above and send the details of such programmes." The religious ceremonies came at a time when there are clearly signs of an escalation of military activity not only in the East but also in the North. This is in addition to the western seaboard and the guerrilla dominated Wanni.

Last Monday, LTTE Political Wing leader S.P. Thamilselvan warned Norway's Ambassador Hans Brattskar that "the present soft approach of the international community towards the GOSL (Government of Sri Lanka) is not going to change its plans and will only contribute to worsening situation leading to bloodbath in the island." According to the LTTE Peace Secretariat website Mr. Thamilselvan had briefed Ambassador Brattskar "about the serious human rights and humanitarian situation." He had also pointed out that the "GOSL is showing no sign of letting up on its military intent and is continuing with its daily attacks on the people in the east." The website added, "Thamilselvan also pointed out that LTTE intelligence gathering has revealed large scale military personnel and equipment being moved into Manalaru (Weli Oya) near Mullaitivu."

Interesting enough, even before Mr. Thamilselvan had complained of a build up by the Security Forces at Weli Oya, the guerrillas have adopted a number of counter measures fearing an advance. Additional cadres, including specific groups tasked to carry out mortar attacks, have been positioned. New trenches were being dug to further fortify their defence lines. Guerrilla intelligence cadres have been tasked to observe the frontlines of Army positions.

The security establishment in Colombo, however, holds a different view. They say there is evidence that the LTTE was making hectic preparations in several key areas. They include plans to attack Government-held Jaffna peninsula. Groups of guerrilla cadres have infiltrated the peninsula to carry out attacks on troops. The guerrillas have warned that civilians leaving the peninsula by sea would be targets. Guerrilla positions in the line that divides Security Forces held areas were being fortified with additional cadres and weaponry including mortar and artillery.

Other areas where there have been guerrilla build up, they say, are Mannar and Vavuniya. In Mannar north the LTTE had poured in large number of additional cadres. This is to provide depth to their defended localities in the event of a Security Forces advance. The LTTE had believed such an attack was possible along the coastal stretch north of Mannar - a move that would have the Sea Tiger base at Viduthaltivu, a nerve centre of Sea Tiger activity, vulnerable.

In Vavuniya, fears of confrontations between the Security Forces and the guerrillas have led to a departure of civilians. LTTE pistol groups and other infiltrated cadres have stepped up attacks on troops and police. The number of incidents in the town area in the past weeks has increased. The move has prompted Security Forces to step up search operations. It has led to arrests of guerrilla suspects from whom troops have learnt of plans to step up violence.

The Army has just raised its 57 Division. Named as officiating General Officer Commanding (GOC) is Brigadier S.R. Manawaduge. He was earlier Director (Plans) at Army Headquarters. There will be three Brigades under this Division each under the charge of a Lieutenant Colonel.

The two sides, the Security Forces and the Tiger guerrillas, have again accused each other of preparing for enhanced hostilities. Mr. Thamilselvam warns the worsening situation would lead to "bloodbath in the island." The Army, on the other hand, has held Jaya Pirithas and Bodhi Poojas countrywide to "conduct all its activities successfully and that lives of all soldiers including the Army Commander are protected."

Amidst the increased fighting in the east, threats in the North and other areas, the coming weeks will, no doubt, show how the undeclared Eelam War IV is headed. War has clearly taken precedence over peace and portends to continue.

(http://www.sundaytimes.lk/070311/Columns/sitreport.html)

We are ready to fill political vacuum in East: Karuna by Chris Kamalendran

The leader of the Tamil People’s Liberation Tigers(TMVP) Karuna Amman’s reported appearance in the east, once again brought him into the limelight. In a telephone interview with The Sunday Times, Karuna reiterated his group’s commitment to the democratic process and said that they are looking forward to early elections in the east so that his party could enter the political mainstream. He also denied that his group was involved in child conscription, abductions as well as extra judicial killings in and around Colombo. Excerpts:

• After a long lull you made your presence in the east last week

After we broke away from the LTTE we are totally immersed in the political mainstream. We asked for protection from the then President Chandrika Kumaratunga, but she turned down our request. As a result I lost my deputy Bhavan and my brother Reggie – both killed by the LTTE. It was only thereafter that we decided to organise an armed wing for our own protection. Now we have a political wing as well as a military wing.

• Was this armed wing formed to fight the LTTE ?

This wing was formed not to fight a war. We have capable cadres who can give protection to our political activities as well as defend us against the LTTE.

• You say that you are now involved in mainstream politics, so how do you justify having a military wing ?

Yes, we do have a military wing and when the government can give us assurance of our complete security and when the LTTE is totally defeated, we will lay down our weapons.

• Was your reappearance linked to the security forces taking over Vakarai?

My appearance in the east was purely to motivate the people politically because we have strong support from the people of the east. So I decided to go among the people and create a political consciousness among them. Very soon the entire eastern province will be brought under government control. The LTTE has lost nearly 60 % of the ground they held earlier and the main supply route has been cut off. Vakarai was an important supply route to bring men and materiel from the north to the east and vice versa.

• Is the loss of Vakarai and Sampoor a serious setback for the LTTE ?

Yes. Now the LTTE only holds a small extent of land in the east and very soon these areas too will fall to the forces. Now they are struggling without regular military supplies and cadres. Also many LTTE cadres are deserting the organisation.

• Once the east is liberated, do you have an assurance from the government that it will provide assistance including financial aid to develop the area?

We hope the government will listen to us. Once the east is cleared, elections should be held and we will contest the polls whether it is for the provincial council or for the local bodies. We are laying the ground work for our political campaign.

• Do the people in the east have faith in your group?

The Tamils there need a genuine political leadership which they have been deprived of for many years. We will fill that vacuum. This is the first time that civilians living in the LTTE areas of Kokkadicholai and Karadiyanaru have moved into government controlled area. In the past, when the Tamils were harassed by the forces, they moved into LTTE territory. This shows they have lost faith in the LTTE.

• There are allegations that the TMVP is aiding and abetting the government forces?

These allegations have been made by none other than the LTTE. We function independently. We are not para military. It was Prabhakaran who functioned as one during the IPKF period.

• What kind of relationship do you maintain with the government?

We have a close relationship.Our political members have a close relationship even at a ministerial level.

• Why has your party still not been registered ?

Since the Provincial Council and Local government elections in the east have been continuously postponed, certain legal impediments are delaying the registration process.

• Until now we have heard of government –controlled areas and LTTE-controlled areas in the east. Your visit to the east has raised questions whether the TMVP too controls areas in the east

We are indeed functioning in this area for the past two years although it is not known. We reached an agreement with the UNICEF last month, for them to visit our camps in the east. We are involved in civil administration in the areas under our control. We have no intention of having a massive military build up in the areas under us nor are we going to fight the government forces. We have cadres in these camps only to defend ourselves against LTTE attacks.

• From where do you get funds and material including arms to maintain your cadres ?

We must thank the Tamils in the east for supporting us financially. When we broke away we had stored arms in various places in the east and now we are using them.

• How is the balance of power in the eastern province – how is it shared between the government forces the LTTE and the TMVP ?

The LTTE has almost been totally defeated in the east. After losing Vakarai and Sampoor , they have lost the key areas. We have a strong political base and we have opened many political offices in Batticaloa and Trincomalee..

• There are complaints that your cadres are harassing Tamil civilians in Batticaloa and adjoining areas?

I do agree with you. Some of our cadres and supporters are using our names and harassing our people. Within the next two months this will change.

• What is the reason behind the LTTE’s hold weakening in the east?

The decline of the LTTE in the east began with my leaving the group. I was in control of the fighting cadres in the east when I was in the LTTE. I have fought many battles and the best fighters from this area are those whom I groomed. All this time LTTE cadres in the north were depending on us. In the meantime the Lankan forces have reorganised and become more disciplined and hence more stronger.

• The UNP has charged that you are running a parallel army in the east?

I deny that. We are not a stooge of any political party and we operate independently. We are the voice of the people in the east.

• Do you agree with the LTTE saying that they are the sole representatives of the Tamils?

No. There was some truth in it before I broke away but now they cannot claim that they are the sole representatives. Nearly 5000 cadres from the east have died. I repeatedly reminded Prabhakaran that I cannot sacrifice any more in the battlefield. This is how the rift began between us. Today we represent a section of the Tamil people.

• There are allegations that the TMVP is involved in conscriptions, child recruitment, abduction of civilians and that it has torture chambers in the Welikanda area and is involved in extra judicial killings in and around Colombo?

Certainly not. We are only fighting against the war monger Prabhakaran. In the past it was the LTTE that was engaged in abductions and child conscriptions although it was blamed on us. Had we forcibly recruited the fighters they would have run away by now. It is a fact that under-aged boys come to join us. If they do, we hand them over to the UNICEF at our Meenaham office in Batticaloa. We have handed over nearly 20 such boys in recent months. We are not responsible for the abductions and extra judicial killings in and around Colombo, although we have been blamed.

• What type of political solution do you expect from the government?

We expect an honourable solution under a unitary state because it can bring unity and better understanding among all communities. All three communities live in peace in the eastern province even now. So it is unfair to ask for a separate state. Demanding a separate state has been disastrous for the Tamils in the past and we will not fight against the government forces.

• None of the successive governments and Sinhala leaders have sincerely addressed the grievances of the Tamils? So do you believe the present government will be any different?

In the past the Tamil leadership failed to put forward a feasible proposal to address the ethnic problem. I have battle field experience therefore I know how difficult it is to achieve our rights through an armed struggle. Negotiations are the best method to achieve them.

• Have you put forward any proposals of your own?

When we were engaged in an armed struggle, we did not put forward any sensible proposals. We believe in a solution within a unitary state with wide devolution of power to the north and east with special benefits to develop the north and east both in the fields of education as well as economics.

• Is there any possibility that the TMVP will reunite with the LTTE in the Wanni?

No, that is only a dream.

(http://www.sundaytimes.lk/070311/News/115news.html)

Shock killings jolt Tigers into action

It was an unusually peculiar week, both for Tiger guerrillas and the security forces. Each appeared to be concerned about what the other was up to.

For the guerrillas, a retaliatory strike to avenge the September 26 killing of leader Velupillai Prabhakaran's confidante, Shankar alias Vythialingam Sornalingam, appeared uppermost. So much so, one leading state intelligence arm predicted a reprisal attack within 48 hours.

Nothing untoward, however, happened except the discovery of a suicide jacket at the Viharamahadevi Park in Colombo. Bomb disposal experts of the Police Special Task Force (STF) took charge of the jacket containing 4.5 kilogrammes of C-4 plastic explosives.

A report to the Ministry of Defence by the STF Commandant Nimal Gunatilleke, cast some doubts on its authenticity. The lining was made of rexine material compared to the regular denim cloth used by suicide cadres. The batteries meant to activate the explosives were wrapped in a small polythene bag and lay inside the jacket. One might argue it was being carried by a guerrilla cadre from one point to another, a highly unlikely move in view of easy detection.

Moreover, discovery of suicide jackets in the past occasions have been only at hideouts raided by security forces or the police. This is perhaps a rare and unusual case, where a suicide jacket supposed to have been carried by a guerrilla cadre in a polythene packing, has been left behind in a park during transit. Certainly not good news for those who strive hard to tell the international community Colombo is safe.

That discovery apart, one should not be lulled into belief that a revengeful reprisal is not on the cards. There is every indication of guerrilla preparations though they may not hurry purely to confirm intelligence forecasts. A recent example is the time taken for a reprisal attack after the Sri Lanka Air Force was ordered to bomb targets in the north beginning June 30. What is now known clearly to be a retaliatory strike came on July 24, when Black Tiger cadres carried out attacks on the SLAF base and the adjoining Bandaranaike International Airport.

Shankar's death, like those of a few key guerrillas in the recent past, for which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) pointedly accuses "deep penetration patrols of the Army," has jolted the Tiger hierarchy. Their leader, Mr. Prabhakaran has not only ordered his senior cadres to take precautions but has also put into place other measures to avert what he feels are incursion and attacks by the Army.

The Political Headquarters of the LTTE, shifted some weeks ago from Mallavi to Kilinochchi, has been heavily fortified. So are other military installations in Puthukkudiyiruppu and surrounding areas, according to reports reaching Colombo.

Sources in non governmental organisations serving in the area spoke of guerrilla cadres being tasked to picket roads used by senior members every day. Civilians have also been debarred from more roads and other localities frequented by Tiger guerrillas. In some areas, picketing tasks, these sources said, have been placed in the hands of armed female groups who have been assigned sectors. Guerrilla groups have formed "Vigilance Committees" with civilian groups in practically every village. Their task is to provide early warnings to the LTTE leadership. "Leopard Commando Units" (or Sirithapulikal) and "Border Force" (Ellai Padai) cadres, these sources said, had also been tasked to seal off suspected routes of infiltration into the Wanni. But the area is so wide it would be impossible to block all routes.

Shankar's killing on September 26, when the LTTE commemorated the 14th death anniversary of Thileepan, a cadre who ended his life in a fast unto death demanding the withdrawal of Indian Peace Keeping troops in 1987, has renewed fresh allegations against the Army over other deaths.

The catalogue includes the death of "Lt. Col" Kangai Amaran (real name Anthony Johnson), his bodyguard Thasarthan and "Major" Das Rajan at Ethawetunuwewa (near the Weli Oya sector) on June 29. He was the deputy leader of Sea Tigers. His child was also killed and another cadre injured. Guerrilla Intelligence Wing leader for Batticaloa, "Major" Nizam was killed on June 14. LTTE Political Wing leader, Thamil Chelvan escaped death but his vehicle was damaged in an explosion close to Madhu Church in March. Thereafter, Thamil Chelvam had a narrow escape again when his convoy was hit by an explosion when he was on his way from Kokavil to Mallavi for a meeting with Norwegian Special Envoy, Eric Solheim on May 15. LTTE military wing leader Balraj also escaped death miraculously from an explosion in the Wanni in July this year. The chain of events has also raised fresh concerns for the security of Mr. Prabhakaran himself.

A striking feature of all these incidents, for which the LTTE is accusing the Army, is the use of claymore mines. All the attacks had been carried out with the use of only these mines.

The claymore mine has its origins in World War II. A German named Schardin devised an anti-tank mine in 1944 which consisted of a round, flat dish with explosive with a concave plate of steel on its face. He then turned it on its side and fired it. Incredibly, the plate was blown off and went through the front of a Panther tank at 80 metres range. After the war the Americans took the idea and swapped the steel plate for steel slugs. A very effective anti-personnel weapon was born.

The claymore fires metal balls over a fan shaped area to a range of 100 metres, shredding anyone unlucky enough to be in the way. It can be activated manually or electrically fired by command or tripwires. During the Vietnam war, the Viet Cong used to strap them to tall trees surrounding likely helicopter landing zones. When any choppers came into land, the Viet Cong fired the mines and took out the aircraft. Both Tiger guerrillas and the security forces use claymore mines.

Repeated security forces denials they were not responsible for Shankar's killing or the previous incidents appear to have failed to allay guerrilla suspicions. This is confirmed by recent intercepts of guerrilla radio communications. A sampling of conversations between one major base and other smaller ones in the Wanni gives an idea:

June 29: ……Now they are hanging around here. If seen, open fire. There is no need to ask us…

…… they are in guerrilla uniforms and shorts. They come like us. There are times we mistake them for our movements. They come during times we move… If our people have not informed in advance that they are coming, open fire. Later we can see who they are……

June 30: …… don't forget. Look for wires. Always check…..

July 2: …….. From a distance our people have seen the Army people. They have attacked them….

….. a little while ago they have gone. Two or three have come. There are marks of their footprints….

July 5: ……why didn't you wait till they come close… Why did you attack from a distance….

…..without running, speak from the same place.. Ask….. not to make a noise…….

Quite clearly, the guerrillas are worried about the recent developments. They are pre-occupied with the task of strengthening the security of their leader and others, in addition to securing their installations. Despite denials by the Army, worries of surprise attacks on them appears to be of serious concern. Whilst focusing greater attention to this aspect, the guerrillas have also been busy making other preparations.

Sources in non governmental organisations speak of hectic activity both in the Wanni and in the east. Movement of loaded trucks, suspected to be carrying military hardware, training activity for both guerrilla cadres and civilians, were among preparations under way. Added to this were reports of preparations by Sea Tigers practicising manoeuvres in the seas off Mullaitivu.

It is in this backdrop that the security establishment in Colombo reviewed the posture of Tiger guerrillas in the past many weeks and the weeks to come. The emerging consensus was that the guerrillas did not want to risk international exposure by carrying out any major attack at this juncture, particularly in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington.

"They were particularly careful to avoid condemnation for attacking civilian targets or facilities," one high ranking intelligence source told The Sunday Times. He said they were particularly conscious of the US State Department review this month of 29 groups that are classified as terrorist organisations but added this did not in anyway mean they would not attack military targets.

And on Friday the State Department re-designated the LTTE as a terrorist organisation together with 27 other groups world-wide. Since declaring a unilateral ceasefire on Christmas eve, last year, and renewing it monthly, the LTTE invited the Government for peace talks and refrained from major offensive military action, scrupulously avoiding civilian targets.

This, and other measures, senior security officials believe, were pitched to draw the attention of the international community, particularly the State Department. Now that they have been redesignated, the focus turns to the battle front.

This indeed is the dilemma for the Government. Since ordering air raids by the Air Force on targets in the north and drawing a devastating retaliation in the form of attacks on the airbase and the adjoining international airport at Katunayake, all major offensive operations have been put on hold. So are air attacks barring targets in the high seas. Hence, security forces have remained on a defensive posture ever since the failed "Operation Agni Khiela" (Rod of Fire) in April.

Pressure from the international community to resume peace talks have once again prompted the Government to make diplomatic contacts with Norway, which is playing the role of facilitator. Whether the LTTE, now armed with stronger reasons including the PA-JVP Memorandum of Understanding (which debars devolution of power for an year), would agree to talks remains the crucial question. Under such circumstances, it is Hobson's choice for the Government. Whilst asking the security forces to refrain from major offensive operations, they would have to maintain a stepped up defensive posture to deal with the new guerrilla threats. In fact, in the past six months, this is what they have been doing. This week is no exception.

Last Friday (October 5) was not particularly an auspicious one for the Sri Lanka Air Force. Troops on board Antonov 32 transport planes left Ratmalana in the morning but were unable to land at the Palaly airbase. On two successive flights, pilots observed heavy cloud cover and had to return to base. Later in the day, however, they were successful.

October 5 was also a day of significance in the LTTE calendar. Eleven Tiger guerrilla cadres, including Kumarappa, then Batticaloa leader and Pulendran, a Trincomalee cadre known for carrying out several civilian massacres, were arrested by the Sri Lanka Navy in 1987. It was when they arrived in Sri Lankan waters from Tamil Nadu in a boat with weapons on board. Whilst a debate over their arrest ensued, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) took custody of the group and held them in a building in the security forces complex in Palaly.

When the group's request for meals to be delivered from their homes were allowed, cyanide capsules were smuggled in. When the then Minister of National Security, late Lalith Athulathmudali, ordered that they be flown to Colombo, the men bit the capsules and committed suicide. Only one survived. Just five days later, Indian troops switched from their peace keeping role to fight the LTTE when they launched "Operation Pawan" on October 10.

On Friday morning, Air Force top brass were further frustrated when they found it difficult to scramble fighter jets into the sky to attack a logistics run, some 25 nautical miles in the deep seas off Mullaitivu. That time too, the cloud cover was heavy.

It was shortly after noon on Friday when the now depleted "Operation Waruna Kirana," the Naval blockade off the north eastern shores, observed a cluster of Sea Tiger boats. They had in fact been warned the previous day of a possible logistics move. Visibility that day was very poor and the radar range, as a result, was very short.

Two Fast Attack Craft each from the Northern and Eastern Naval area were rushed to the location. In addition, the Israeli built Fast Missile Vessel (FMV) "SLNS Nandimithra," which was in the vicinity was also diverted. They soon noticed seven Sea Tiger boats heading towards the shore from the deep sea.

A confrontation ensued. Three hours later, it became clear that one logistic boat and Sea Tiger attack craft were destroyed. A Dvora Fast Attack Craft was also damaged.

Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, told The Sunday Times at least 20 Sea Tiger cadres were killed in the encounter. There has been no word from the LTTE about its casualties. A sailor who was injured and was being moved by boat to Trincomalee succumbed to his injuries. Two others were wounded. It came to light that the guerrillas were smuggling in stocks of diesel and petrol. The origin of the consignment is not known.

In a separate incident at Palampattaru, near Trincomalee, a Navy route clearing patrol was ambushed between the Naval Headworks, the source of water supply to Trincomalee, and Palampattaru, 14 kilometres south west of Trincomalee. Two sailors were killed and one wounded in the incident.

Vice Admiral Sandagiri today accompanies Defence Secretary, Chandrananda de Silva, on a visit to Malaysia. Their itinerary will include visiting the annual Aerospace and Maritime Exhibition in Kuala Lumpur to be declared open tomorrow by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed.

The Navy's only Advanced Offshore Patrol Vessel (AOPV), "SLNS Sayura," obtained from India, has already left Colombo on a voyage to Kuala Lumpur. It is to co-incide with the exhibition and a fleet review sponsored by the Malaysian government. It was this AOPV that was to form the platform for the Navy's Air Wing, a project which has since been abandoned.

At last Friday's National Security Council, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga heard Vice Admiral Sandagiri describe the Navy's latest success in the seas off Mullaitivu.

But there is no doubt the Navy will face much bigger threats from the guerrillas in the coming weeks. So will the battle areas, particularly the east, as the guerrillas fine tune their preparations. For the security forces now on a defensive posture, and a Government still chasing elusive peace, only the coming weeks will tell where the guerrilla offensives – ahead of their annual "Heroes Week" next month – will lead.

(http://lakdiva.org/suntimes/011007/sitrep.html)

Tigers vow revenge over Shankar killing as naval encounters continue

A Police Special Task Force (STF) radio in- tercept of a Tiger guerrilla radio communication early this week led to an interesting revelation.

A guerrilla leader from the north, apparently angry over the failure of Sea Tigers to destroy a shipload of Police and troops on board "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH," during deep sea battles off Point Pedro on September 16 (Situation Report – September 23), was berating a local leader in Trincomalee district. The latter responded somewhat apologetically they were not sure whether the cargo vessel was carrying civilians or security forces personnel.

But senior intelligence officials scoffed at the intercept as a propaganda ploy. "They knew very well there were security forces personnel on board," declared one of them. "This is rhetoric to mislead us. Their radio conversations during the attack leave no doubt they were fully aware," he added. Unable to successfully accomplish their mission that day, it seemed the guerrillas were engaging in a bit of psychological operations.

Be that as it may, last week's exclusive disclosure in these columns of the miraculous escape of 1324 persons – 12 Navy personnel, 89 Policemen, 1209 soldiers and a 14 member crew – on board the "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH," has ruffled quite a few feathers.

The cargo vessel left Trincomalee on September 14 and was due to arrive at Kankesanturai port around dawn on September 16. However, a flotilla of over 20 Sea Tiger boats, some with suicide cadres on board, surrounded the cargo vessel and launched fierce attacks 26 miles north east of Point Pedro. This attack, if successful, would have led to a national tragedy the consequences of which would have been frightening. Details of this incident appeared in these columns last week. Eleven Navy personnel were killed in the fighting. Another ten on board a Coastal Patrol Craft though classed as missing in action are feared dead.

Last Sunday itself, Defence Secretary Chandrananda de Silva sought an immediate report from the Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri. The ink on last week's The Sunday Times had hardly dried when the report was ready. It was dated September 23 (Sunday) though it was delivered the next day. This is what Vice Admiral Sandagiri told Defence Secretary de Silva:

"The JOH (Joint Operations Headquarters) indicated request to transfer backlog of SLA (Sri Lanka Army) troops to KKS (Kankesanturai) from Trincomalee vide reference.

"Navy Headquarters proposed "MV Lanka Muditha' or "MV Induruwa Valley" for the task with the dates they are available for the task vide……

However, CGES (Commissioner General of Essential Services) had chartered the vessel "MV Pride of South" disregarding proposal made by Navy Headquarters..

"Although Sea Worthiness Certificate of "MV Pride of South" indicates speed of 14.5 knots, it was observed during a voyage she had made good an average of 6.5 during entire passage.

"Since a slow moving vessel is more vulnerable to enemy attacks than high speed vessels, more escort craft are required for "MV Pride of South."

"In view of the reasons enumerated above, it is requested that CGES be informed to charter medium sized vessels which perform at least 10 to 15 knots for troops transfers.

"It is further requested to inform CGES that SLN (Sri Lanka Navy) be consulted prior to chartering vessels for military purposes."

Vice Admiral Sandagiri has made some damning disclosures in his report. Firstly, he has revealed that despite a Sea Worthiness Certificate expressly speaking about a speed of 14.5 knots, to use his own words, "during a voyage she had made good an average of 6.5 during entire passage." This was obviously not the voyage from Trincomalee to Kankesanturai on September 16 that ended up in near disaster. According to his own Commander in charge of Eastern Naval Area, Rear Admiral Dayananda Dharmapriya, he had "observed vessel at an average speed of 04 knots throughout passage."

Admiral Sandagiri also concedes that "since a slow moving vessel is more vulnerable to enemy attacks than high speed vessels, " more escort craft are required for "MV Pride of South" – a point which Rear Admiral Dharmapriya made in a message to Navy Headquarters on September 14 in an attempt to persuade them not to send the Police and troops on that cargo vessel. Yet, his efforts proved futile. He had warned Navy Headquarters, as reported last week, through three different messages, one as early as June 9, last year.

Though late, it is salutary Vice Admiral Sandagiri has now endorsed a recommendation made by his COMEAST (Commander, Eastern Naval Area, Rear Admiral Dharmapriya), in his message to Navy Headquarters on September 18. This is what he said "……Strongly recommend when chartering vessels for troops/defence cargo transfers SLN team to inspect and ascertain suitability of such vessels for the task."

Vice Admiral Sandagiri also appointed a Navy Board of Inquiry to probe the September 16 attack. It is headed by Commodore Dhammika Samarawickrema and comprises Captain Ravi Wijegoonewardene, Commander Asela Fernando and Lt. Cmdr. D.P.M. Perera.

Despite all this, one important question that remains unanswered is why repeated warnings sent out by COMEAST not to utilize "Pride of South" since it would be hazardous were not heeded by those at Navy Headquarters. As reported last week, Navy Headquarters dismissed all these warnings with a message to COMEAST which said "Your 182034. Incongruous. Note that SLN has no involvement in chartering ships for military commitments. What is provided by CGES been utilized."

The question is raised again as to how the lives of 1324 persons becomes incongruous ? There is no argument that the lives of those who travelled that day by "MV Pride of South" were in near peril. If the Sea Tiger attack succeeded, it would have posed a serious problem to the PA-JVP Government and threatened its very existence. The fact that it did not happen does not absolve the responsibility of those who placed the lives of the Police, Navy and Army personnel in jeopardy for 13 hours.

If one is to go by the asser-tions of an official or officials at Navy Headquarters, any vessel, even one hardly seaworthy would be allowed to carry hundreds of troops since it was being provided by a state agency. On the other hand, there is no gainsaying the Government should probe how the Commissioner General of Essential Services acquired a cargo vessel which purportedly held a Sea Worthiness Certificate for a speed of 14.5 knots but in reality was as slow as a sea turtle . Ironically, this has come about after the Government had withdrawn the responsibility of chartering vessels from the Navy after a string of alleged irregularities. One need hardly explain why this happens.

A sad aspect in the conduct of the ongoing separatist war in the past seven years is the lack of transparency and accountability. Paradoxically those responsible for serious lapses and severe losses have won plum positions. Others responsible for loss of valuable lives are free to repeat their adventures. And here is a case where 1324 policemen and troops faced near death and disaster. This episode, like many others, will also go into the limbo of forgotten things.

Worries for the Navy were not over with the drama on Sunday, September 16. The very next Sunday (September 23) a string of sea battles off Mullaitivu was to cause more concern, particularly in the backdrop of previous warnings that guerrillas were expecting a shipload of weapons from Kampuchea.

Four Fast Attack Craft were patrolling the seas some 15 nautical miles off the coast of Mullaitivu around 7.45 a.m. last Sunday (September 23) when they observed on their radar a cluster of boats. They were around 30 nautical miles from land. Ahead of them, some 50 nautical miles away, there were also two gunboats on patrol. Simultaneously the FACs reported the sighting of the cluster to the headquarters of Northern Naval Area and Eastern Naval Area.

Suspecting that a major logistics move was under way, COMNORTH (Commander, Northern Naval Area, Commodore Upali Ranaweera) sent four Fast Attack Craft. His eastern counterpart, COMEAST (Commander, Eastern Naval Area, Rear Admiral Dayananda Dharmapriya) rushed four Fast Attack Craft and followed with two more an hour later.

As the Navy flotilla closed in, they reported there were seven boats in the cluster – three logistics boats and four attack craft. A gunfight ensued around 10 a.m. By then, the two gunboats had sighted two ships. Fears grew the guerrillas may be preparing to carry out a mid sea transfer of weapons. The logistics boats, it was felt, were in the vicinity to move the cargo to the shores of Chalai, where a main Sea Tiger base is located.

When news of the incident reached Colombo, there was hectic activity, unusual on a Sunday. Chief of Defence Staff, General Rohan de S. Daluwatte, rushed to the Joint Operations Command Headquarters located inside the Army Headquarters complex. Joining him there were the service commanders – Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle (Army), Air Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody (Air Force) and Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri. Even before crisis talks could begin, the previous week's incident involving "MV Pride of South" was very much in the mind of Vice Admiral Sandagiri. "They (The Sunday Times) have taken us apart today," he said and asked those present "have you seen it."

But that did not distract the attention of those present. They began focusing on the fighting that was now going on in the deep seas off Mullaitivu. Initial reports spoke of one of the ships behaving suspiciously. When there was no response to radio calls made by one of the gunships, warning shots were fired over the bow.

Deputy Defence Minister, Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte, rushed into the JOC to join the conference and monitor developments. News reached that two more gunboats from headquarters of COMEAST were speeding towards the location of the two ships. By then Sea Tigers had dispatched eight more boats from the shores of Chalai. They were moving around in two clusters and were heading to help the seven boats engaging Naval craft.

Air Force Commander, Air Marshal Weerakkody immediately ordered Israeli built Kfir interceptor jets to take off from Katunayake to bomb guerrilla boats. During the first sortie itself, Kfirs hit two logistic boats, just three miles from the coast at Chalai. They burst into flames. The jets returned to Colombo but more sorties were thwarted by thick cloud cover and heavy rain.

Two more boats, attack craft, were destroyed by Naval gunfire. The heavy fire emanating from the two logistic boats hit by Kfir jets resembled a ball of fire. Naval craft saw from a distance some cargo being dumped. It turned out to be barrels. One of the barrels were picked up. It was later brought to Trincomalee and was found to contain petrol.

Senior Navy officials say 20 Sea Tiger cadres and 22 Black Tiger cadres were killed in the fighting. There were no casualties to the Navy. The guerrillas, however, have remained silent about their casualties.

By then news reached from COMEAST that one cargo vessel, a container carrier, was on innocent passage. The second was still suspicious. Gunboats made contact with the unidentified vessel and found it was heading from Calcutta to Bombay, a journey that encompasses a voyage skirting around Sri Lanka via eastern, southern and western deep seas. It was a small tanker and suspicions still lingered around.

Navy Headquarters officials say they sought permission from the Indian High Commission in Colombo to board the vessel and conduct a thorough check. The small tanker was ordered to proceed towards Trincomalee. At the harbour mouth, it was checked by Navy personnel who boarded it. Nothing incriminating was found and the vessel was allowed to proceed. It turned out that this small tanker was going from Bombay to Calcutta.

It became clear that the Navy's latest deep sea encounter occurred when the guerrillas were trying to smuggle in a consignment of petrol in barrels. The vessel that brought the cargo, suspected to be from the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, is believed to have escaped.

That raises the question of what happened to the cargo vessel from Kampuchea, expected with a consignment of weapons including Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRLs), boats and weaponry for Sea Tigers. The Sunday Times learnt the defence establishment now has credible evidence to believe part of the shipment had already been smuggled in. The alert to prevent attempts to smuggle in more weapons continues.

A more significant event in the north, predicted by the Special Branch, the intelligence arm of the Police Department, that Tiger guerrillas would launch attacks on or before September 26 to re-capture the Jaffna town did not materialize. The Special Branch warning (Situation Report – September 9, 2001) said "the LTTE plan to launch a major attack to re-capture Jaffna on or before 26th September, 2001, which co-incides with the death anniversary of Thileepan and to keep their promise to the Tamil masses…."

The report which spoke of a heavy build up of LTTE cadres gave details of how the attack would be carried out. The intelligence hierarchy reacted cautiously to this report after a similar warning led to air raids on guerrilla positions in the north in June, this year – a move which drew retaliation in the form of Black Tiger attacks on the Sri Lanka Air Force base and the adjoining Bandaranaike International Airport at Katunayake.

However, guerrilla attacks on security forces positions in the north did occur on the night of September 26. They came in the form of artillery and mortar barrages falling on some areas in Kodikamam and Nagar Kovil. Security officials were expecting this on account of the 14th death anniversary of Thileepan. He ended his life through a death fast from a specially built dais near Nallur Kandasamy Temple in 1987, demanding the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka. The death anniversary is marked with religious ceremonies during daytime and gunfire directed at some security forces positions during the night.

This time, however, the artillery and mortar barrages on Kodikamam and Nagar Kovil prompted the security forces to believe it was a diversionary tactic. They feared the guerrillas would attack somewhere in the east last Sunday night. It was only by Monday evening it became clear the stepped up artillery and mortars attacks in the north had another reason – a very high ranking Tiger guerrilla cadre had been killed in a claymore mine explosion. And the LTTE was pointedly accusing the security forces of carrying out the attack on Shankar alias Vaithyalingam Sornalingam.

An LTTE statement said: "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in an official statement issued from its headquarters in Vanni today (26th September) strongly condemned the killing of one of its senior leaders Colonel Shankar. A deep penetration commando unit of the Sri Lanka Army triggered a claymore mine on Col. Shankar's vehicle and he was killed on the spot. The incident occurred around 10.45 am near Oddusuddan in the heart of Vanni, Northern Sri Lanka.

"Col. Shankar has been an active participant in the Tamil people's freedom struggle for nearly two decades. He was a close confidante of the LTTE leader, Mr. Velupillai Prabhakaran and accompanied him in the first historic meeting in the Vanni with Oslo's Special Envoy, Erik Solheim, in November 2000.

"Provocatively, Col. Shankar's killing occurred on the anniversary of the death during hunger strike of Lt. Col. Thileepan, a day of profound sadness amongst the Tamil people. The LTTE leadership shares the Tamil people's outrage and treats the killing of a senior leader with utmost gravity.

"Whilst maintaining to the international community that it is committed to a negotiated settlement, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga's regime has repeatedly sought to sabotage the Norwegian peace initiative and continued its military operations. As a result of repeated Sri Lankan acts of aggression, formal and informal efforts to de-escalate the conflict have proved futile. The attack on Col. Shankar and the date chosen for it highlights the Sri Lankan government's ongoing determination to seek the military option in solving the Tamil national question. Prospects for peace talks through Norwegian facilitation, stalled earlier through Colombo's efforts to sideline Mr. Solheim have been further set back by the killing of this senior LTTE cadre."

Military spokesman and Director, Media at Army Headquarters, Brigadier Sanath Karunaratne, denied any security forces involvement in the killing of Shankar. "They (the LTTE) should know better. We had no hand in the matter at all. Their accusations are false," he told The Sunday Times.

Shankar is no ordinary LTTE cadre. A former employee of Air Canada where he served as an airframe engineer, he was on holiday in Sri Lanka when the unfortunate ethnic violence occurred in July 1983 – the one event which triggered off the 19 year long separatist war. Instead of returning to Canada, he enrolled with the LTTE and has held several important positions. He was at one time a personal bodyguard of Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran with whom he was very closely associated. He was also the head of LTTE's "Air Wing" and was one time helping guerrilla cadres to fly microlight aircraft.

When the late President Ranasinghe Premadasa chose to hold peace talks with the LTTE in 1989, Shankar flew in with other members of the LTTE delegation from the Wanni jungles in a Sri Lanka Air Force helicopter to Colombo frequently. Intelligence officials who accompanied him on these flights often spoke of Shankar being personally assigned to follow matters relating to the talks and report back directly to his leader. This was whilst then political wing leader Yogi headed the team of LTTE negotiators.

Shankar is said to have been travelling in a double cab along the Puthukkudiyiruppu-Oddusuddan road when a claymore mine exploded killing him on the spot. Though it is known that he was to take part in a Thileepan commemoration meeting, it is not clear whether he was on his way to the meeting or was returning when the incident occurred.

Despite the vehement denials, both by Brigadier Karunaratne and the Ministry of Defence, persistent LTTE accusation that a "deep penetration commando unit of the Sri Lankan Army triggered a claymore mine on Col. Shankar's vehicle" killing him has raised a serious issue – a possible Tiger guerrilla retaliation.

The security establishment has become alive to this threat and have not only enhanced security precautions for top rung military and police officials but have also warned security installations which are possible targets. These include those in the Weli Oya sector and the Eastern province. There have also been warnings of possible attacks on Mannar island. Weaponry from LTTE bases in Kilinochchi are reported to have been moved towards Viduthalthivu for this purpose. Some warnings speak of a retaliatory strike in the next few days. Even the security of VVIP and VIP politicos have been strengthened after protection groups said they wanted to take no chances.

One security source likened Shankar's affinity to Tiger leader Prabhakaran to be almost similar to the relationship the latter enjoyed with his erstwhile friend and colleague, Charles Anthony. It was to avenge the security forces killing of Charles Anthony, his close friend and confidante that Mr. Prabhakaran triggered off the first LTTE landmine explosion at Tinnelveli, near Jaffna in July 1983, that killed 13 soldiers – the event that triggered off ethnic violence in July 1983. He also named his son Charles Anthony and later gave the same name to a "battle hardened" fighting unit.

And now, 19 years later, threats of an impending retaliatory strike will not only dim further prospects for any peace talks but also propel a military, which has refrained from offensive action since "Operation Agni Khiela," in April this year, to go into high gear.

Whether a Government, still saddled with a political crisis and a deteriorating economy, can cope with the new situation now developing is the billion dollar question. More so with Tiger guerrillas poised to attack military targets and the international community, now rallying together to fight terrorism, urging Sri Lanka to talk peace. That appears to be the new no win situation for Sri Lanka.

(http://lakdiva.org/suntimes/010930/sitrep.html)

A bit of politics in the Army: Tilak Marapana

"By and large the Sri Lanka Army is very disciplined. Officers and soldiers are a law abiding group. But I am sad to say a little bit of politics have crept in," says Defence Minister Tilak Marapana.

He was responding to a question on politicisation of the Army during an interview with The Sunday Times.

Mr. Marapana said the Pahalatalawinne murders and other incidents in Kandy showed some politicians have been trying to use the armed forces to achieve their sinister purposes. "It is very unfortunate that there is this very small handful of people who lent themselves to this type of activity. I can assure you we will deal with them," he declared. He stressed that it was necessary in the greater interest of the Army to identify them. It would also be for the good of the country.

He noted that there was a very high degree of politicisation in the Police. During the last seven years, as a lawyer, I have had numerous occasions when people complained to me about the Police. When UNP supporters made complaints, they were not entertained. Police have been extremely partial. MPs have complained in Parliament about this.

Mr. Marapana's comments on the raid by Kandy Police on the Army's Safe House at Athurugiriya, during the same interview, appeared in these columns last week. Here are some of the other questions and the answers given by Mr. Marapana.

Q: On being the first Sri Lankan, other than Presidents or Prime Minister, to separately hold the portfolio of Defence:

A: Defence or, for that matter any other portfolio, one holds is directly responsible to the Prime Minister. I am not on my own. I have to consult the Prime Minister before making important decisions. That way I am not the sole authority. I cannot do anything I want on my own.

Q: How do you feel about taking over this portfolio ?

A: I feel we would have been able to do a better job (on the conduct of the separatist war) if we were better focused with regard to our objectives. I feel we have not given sufficient thought and consideration to the many facets that are involved.

Q: Can you identify some of them ?

A: The military strategy over how we have tried to curb the terrorist movement. I am not only talking about the last few years but right from the beginning. It could have been nipped in the bud. It was allowed to grow and ultimately escalate into this present situation. Our strategies have all been ad hoc.

Secondly, I feel that even with regard to military procurements, we have spent unnecessary sums of money in buying very valuable and sophisticated weaponry. I don't think all that was necessary.

Q: You speak of strategies. Can you give an example of how it failed and how you hope to rectify them ?

A: In the first place, I have no intention at all in waging war with the LTTE at the moment. We have embarked on a peace mission and our target today, and my role as Defence Minister, is not to plan strategy to attack but merely to ready ourselves to defend. I would have to ensure important installations and territory in our control are protected. We are on a defensive posture than on an aggressive one. Most of the past operations failed because there was no proper application of the mind.

Q: How do you view the peace talks:

A: I sincerely believe that we are going to succeed in this. It is my belief that the LTTE, however and whatever others may say, are serious in their endeavours. We have approached the peace process with some degree of professionalism. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, has been constantly advocating a peaceful settlement. This is not something he has said just yesterday and the day before. He has been consistent.

Q: What about training of security forces, particularly during talks

A: The normal training is there. That part of the training is necessary to keep our soldiers fit so they will not become sluggish. That type of training has been done in the past during times of peace. You cannot allow a soldier to remain without training. He has to be put through the rigors.

Q: There has been complaints of LTTE recruitment, re-training and re-arming. What is your response ?

A: Our intelligence reports certainly do not show that they are training on such a large scale. They also must be training their cadres the same way we impart normal training. They may continue that. The recruitment may be because there are vacancies in their ranks. They may be doing what we are doing to maintain the forces at the present level.

Q: What are your comments about widespread corruption in procurements ?

A: Complaints about them have been lodged with the Commission Investigating Bribery or Corruption. I take it that these investigations will continue.

(http://sundaytimes.lk/020203/sitrep.html)

SLA soldier's body handed over

The body of a Sri Lanka Army (SLA) Deep Penetration Unit (DPU) soldier was handed over to the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) in Kilinochchi on Monday.

The military in a statement acknowledged the handover, but insisted that the soldier was 'missing' from its front-lines in Mannar and was not a member of the DPU.

As reported by us, on Sunday a DPU team was ambushed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in the village of Periya Thampaanai, in Vavuniya North.

One LTTE cadres and two members of the Tamil Eelam Auxiliary Force also died during the confrontation.

(http://www.tamileditors.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1518&Itemid=1)

Raid on Army safe house a publicity stunt-Marapana

The Police raid on the Army's Safe House at Athurugiriya was ill conceived and the harsh treatment meted out to the Officer and men was very bad says Defence Minister, Tilak Marapana.

He told The Sunday Times in an exclusive interview that the information Police provided in a bid to further extend the detention of the Army officer and men was "hopelessly inadequate." "I made it very clear to the Police that I don't want the Prevention of Terrorism Act abused," Mr. Marapana said.

He was commenting on the January 2 raid by Kulasiri Udugampola, SP, Special Operations (Kandy Division), on a Safe House run by the Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence at the Millennium City in Athurugiriya. By his own admission, Mr. Udugampola carried out the raid without the knowledge of either the Inspector General of Police or the DIG in charge of Kandy Division. He seized an array of weapons, arrested an officer and five soldiers.

It later turned out that the men and material belonged to the Army's highly successful Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) – a long standing secret which became public together with the identities of the men. The men were detained for three days on a Detention Order issued by the SSP in charge of Kandy Division under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Subsequent detention, which required a Detention Order from the Ministry of Defence, was refused by Mr. Marapana.

"The initial raid, even if it was justified because they were misinformed about the state of affairs, the Army Commander (Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle) and the Director of Military Intelligence (Brig. Kapila Hendavithana), informed the Police that this was an Army location," Mr. Marapana pointed out.

He said: "They told Police that the persons who had been arrested are Army personnel and that the items that were recovered were Army property. The officer and men have been authorised by the Army to carry out operations using these items. No lesser person than the Army Commander informs of that to the Police and from that point onwards I think the Police are to be blamed.

"I can understand if they did not arrest the Army personnel. But they have arrested them, kept them in confinement and from the reports that I got, they have not been treated that well when they were in Police custody. That is why when the Police applied to me for a Detention Order, having kept them in detention for the period that the law authorised them to do so, I refused. I flatly refused because the material they submitted to me to justify the detention was hopelessly inadequate. There is nothing that they have unearthed in that investigation which seemed to suggest that these people (the Army personnel) had been acting other than on orders from their superiors in the Army. They were very legitimate orders.

Asked whether the raid and arrest of the Army men led to the disclosure of a "top State secret," Mr. Marapana replied "Well, I would not say this is such a secret. Certainly our enemy would have known of the existence of the LRRP. Nor is the raid on the location. These people used it to come and leave their equipment. Nothing else happened there. It was only a so called Safe House that could have been shifted anywhere.

"But as far as the personnel involved, the fact that their identities have been revealed will create a problem not only for them but their families too. More serious than anything else, I feel the harsh treatment that has been meted out to them is very bad. Having done their duty and when they find that they are arrested, detained and ill treated in this way, they are completely demoralised. That is the aspect I am more worried about than anything else.

Commenting on the LTTE crack down on what they call "collaborators" with the LRRP teams, after the Athurugiriya raid, including the killing of one alleged informant, Mr. Marapana said "these are very confidential matters between these men and their informants. I don't want to probe into that area."

However, he added " Then again, if they had been informants of his group information has leaked as a result of the interrogation or the harsh treatment meted out to these Army men, then someone has made these things public. That is also another aspect that needs to be considered. "

Asked whether the wide publicity generated soon after the raid, even before the investigations had commenced, was the beginning of the matter being publicised, Mr. Marapana said "This is the most objectionable part of the whole episode. They (the Police) went with the media to raid this house. This implies that their main target was to get some publicity out of this whole episode.

"That is what makes me suspect the bona fides of the Police team to some extent. If they had the national interest at heart and if they really thought that there is a place frequented by Army people with this type of deadly weapons, then one would not have expected them to take the media, go and make a big show of it. They would have in the first place mounted surveillance and gathered information about the house. That is to find out what exactly these people are up to. The raid should have been the last step.

"Instead, the moment they receive information, they run to the nearest "Camera Shop" and bring all those media personnel. You can't blame them. This is just a publicity stunt and nothing more than that.

Asked to comment on moves by the officer and men to file Fundamental Rights Violation pleas before the Supreme Court, Mr. Marapana said " It is their legal and constitutional right to resort to any legal remedy they have."

Commenting on the clashes between Police and Army in Kandy, Mr. Marapana declared "That is a minor incident. Of course, it has escalated into a major one and incidents like this happen time and again. Just like it happens, they subside too.

"Not that I condone the actions of the Army officers in coming back a second time. What happened was a slight altercation. The vehicle of an Army officer had been parked in a manner to obstruct traffic. The traffic sergeant had asked the driver to remove the vehicle.

"Following an altercation, the reports I have got is that the Army personnel had gone back to their camps and brought another crowd of Army people. I don't know whether this is true or false.

"But these are the reports I have got. If that is the case, it is high handed action on the part of the Army. I am sure the Army Commander will deal with those persons for that type of conduct. The investigation report is not yet concluded. The Army Commander has already apologised to the Mahanayakes and the Diyawadana Nilame. The Army Commander and the IGP are jointly investigating this matter.

"I don't think there is evil or hatred between the Army and the Police. These are incidents that happen time and again. They are not to be taken all that seriously."

During the interview with The Sunday Times, Mr. Marapana also answered questions on wide ranging matters concerning defence and security.

(http://lakdiva.org/suntimes/020127/sitrep.html)

DPU Unit ambushed, one soldier killed

A Sri Lanka Army (SLA) Deep Penetration Unit (DPU) has been ambushed inside the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) administered village of Periya Thampaani in Vavuniya North.

LTTE cadres have recovered the body of an SLA soldier, along with night vision goggles and other 'highly sophisticated' military equipments.

The body is being taken to Kilinochchi, and will be handed over to officials from the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) as soon as possible.

In recent weeks, SLA DPU units have launched several attacks against civilians in the area.

Last week, a school principle and an education authority officer were killed when the SLA exploded a claymore mine at them.

The following day, a family of four were seriously injured in a similar attack, while on their way to church.

The DPU carries out mine attacks inside LTTE administered areas. In recent weeks it had made good use of the low presence of LTTE cadres in areas surrounding Madu Church, the most revered Christian shrine on the island.

(http://www.tamileditors.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1513&Itemid=1)

Media victories, military victories and realities By Iqbal Athas

Ceasefire defunct, both parties prepare for escalation of undeclared war

Unlike in the movies where coming attractions are heavily advertised, it is just the opposite when it comes to the military.

Secrecy becomes the key element for safety and success of troops. The fundamental precept is not to alert the enemy. Not to warn them that tons of bombs would fall from the sky during air raids or fierce attacks would be thrust upon them when ground troops begin their assault. Not to rush them to be prepared.

This concept is among the basics inculcated to officers and men in all conventional military outfits around the world. More than 2,500 years ago, Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu underscored the essence of secrecy in his treatise The Art of War. Commenting on tactics, he said, "To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. Nor is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole empire says "Well done!!"

"True excellence is to plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and balk his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. But his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage..."

But, in Sri Lanka, the separatist war of near two decades, interspersed by phases of ceasefires and peace talks, has many firsts or preponderant peculiarities that are unmatched. The greater part of the war has been under a State of Emergency and resultantly during long regimes of censorship. The ongoing undeclared Eelam War IV, is no different. There are constraints on reportage. This is particularly after the Prevention and Prohibition of Terrorism and Specified Terrorist Activities Regulations. Thus, perhaps Sri Lanka is the only nation in the world where direct access to theatres of conflict has remained denied to the media.

There may be reasons, either good or bad. It comes at a time when the gulf between the military and the media in the developed world has narrowed dramatically. The military now goes to war with the media. Embedded journalists join the foot soldiers or travel in battle tanks and troop carriers to report from the war zones. People throughout the world, including Sri Lankans, are able to see from their bedrooms and living rooms the goings on in other conflict zones, like for example, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechniya or until recently in Nepal.

A question that merits greater study is why the gulf between the media and the defence establishment has widened in Sri Lanka. Barring some exceptions, successive administrations have, perhaps quite efficiently, succeeded in telling their story, be it the whole truth, half truth or no truth. The response to "dissenting" or different versions, more than anytime in the past, has become vicious and insidious. They are not to counter such versions but to target those who author them. For obvious reasons, one cannot bare details of these sinister and shameless campaigns to hide the truth through intimidation and by infusing fear. Thus, "media victories," if one looks in retrospect over the past two decades, have largely overtaken "military victories." Some battles have been won in the news pages, prime time TV or radio and lost on the ground.

On the other hand, there have also been "military victories" over the years that have been exceptional. Successive Governments failed to take maximum advantage of some of them. The best example is the series of operations codenamed Riviresa to re-capture the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE. It began on October 17, 1995. Weeks later, the conclusion of four different phases of the operation led to Security Forces taking full control. That is how the Jaffna peninsula, barring some small areas, is still under Government control.

Whatever the merits or demerits of the arguments for or against the CFA, the signing of this document was only possible because of the one time People's Alliance Government (PA). It is the PA regime's military action that led to the re-capture of the Jaffna peninsula. Without that re-capture, a CFA would not have been viable since the LTTE would have continued to dominate the peninsula. They were also, at that time, dominating most parts of the Wanni. Thus, from an LTTE perception the need for a ceasefire agreement would not have arisen. Hence, the CFA was built on the PA Government's military success.

That Ceasefire Agreement signed by the then UNF Government with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) turned five years last Wednesday. The resultant ceasefire is the longest though fighting escalated in the latter period. A statement received by the Colombo based media on Thursday night saw the LTTE, for the first time; drop a bombshell about the CFA. In their own words, they described how useful the five-year-old document has been.

The statement declared that the CFA "recognized Tamil Eelam's de facto existence, with its unique characteristics: a distinct population; a government comprising a defence force; a police force, a judiciary, a civil administration and other institutions for effective governance of a people, and capability of entering into agreements with other governments with a line of control reflecting the ground reality of the existence of the Tamil homeland demarcated with recognized borders. The CFA recognized the balance of power between the GOSL and the LTTE and was premised on this balance of power."

So, at long last, the LTTE has publicly admitted the benefits that flowed from the CFA - the creation of a state in waiting. And equally significant, the concluding paragraph of the statement said, "The marginalization of the 2002 CFA, which would have been a step towards just peace, has destroyed the confidence of the Tamil people and their expectations regarding future peace efforts. The Sri Lankan Government's ongoing war of aggression, aimed at the subjugation of the Tamil people under the guise of 'war on Terrorism,' will add to the bloodstained pages of the island's history. It has also compelled the Tamil people to resume their freedom struggle to realize their right to self-determination and to achieve statehood."

The LTTE's seven page statement traces, from its point of view, the events that have occurred since the CFA was signed. It is strongly critical of President Rajapaksa and his administration. It says that humanitarian and human rights crisis is deepening. An international bias against the LTTE, it argues, has strengthened Government's intransigence and encouraged an even more hard line.

The statement assumes the character of a "charge sheet" being served on the Government. There are overtones of a military response in the light of this.

What does the LTTE mean by saying that the ongoing "war on terrorism" will add to "bloodstained pages of the island's history"? What does it mean when they say that it has also "compelled the Tamil people to resume their freedom struggle to realize their right to self-determination and to achieve statehood"?

Is it a re-iteration of their previous assertions that they were veering away further from the CFA to the battlefield? Is it a forewarning of things to come?

This is the third time in the past three months that similar statements have been made. On "Maveerar (Great Heroes) Day" on November 27, last year, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran declared "the uncompromising stance of Sinhala chauvinism has left us with no other option but an independent state for the people of Tamil Eelam…" In a statement issued after talks Norway's special envoy to the peace process, Jon Hanssen Bauer held with Political Wing leader, S.P. Thamilselvan in Kilinochchi, in December, last year, the LTTE warned that a "military solution will steadily push the island into monumental irrecoverable state of destruction."

In the coming weeks and months that will naturally turn the focus to the battlefields of the north, east and other parts of the country. In the weeks that preceded the launch of Operations Riviresa, then Deputy Minister of Defence, Anuruddha Ratwatte, who once had undisputed control over the military, made a string of public announcements that Security Forces would soon re-capture Jaffna peninsula. It later became very clear that the LTTE had, taking the cue, evolved counter measures.

Whilst preparing to resist a military advance, to cause maximum damage to men and material, they immediately embarked on counter measures. Most of their military equipment was moved hurriedly across the Kilali lagoon to Wanni mainland. When the LTTE lost Jaffna in December 1995, it was widely believed then that the guerrillas had received the severest blow to their military machine. Yet, barely eight months later, on July 18, 1996, they carried out a conventional style attack on the Mullaitivu Security Forces complex, then headquarters of the 225 Brigade.

Shocking statistics

Deputy Defence Minister Ratwatte told Parliament on August 7, 1996 that the strength at the Mullaitivu military base was 1407. They were made up as follows: Army 1268, Navy 9, Police 49 and civilians 81. "We can conclude as killed in action only 12," he said. The ICRC had handed over 415 bodies which were not identifiable and a further 43 have been categorized as Missing in Action (MIA). With a tight censorship in force, the matter ended there.

Shocking details of the incident were later unearthed by a four member Army Court of Inquiry headed by Major General (now retired) Patrick Fernando. Their 125 page report, with its contents still unpublicized, revealed that two officers and 62 soldiers had returned. With the 12 declared dead and 64 who returned, those who were then declared missing were 1331 Security Forces personnel. Together with the civilian staff, the toll of those now established as dead in the incident, still the worst single one in Sri Lanka's military history is 1627 persons. That number includes the 71 troops engaged in Operation Trivida Pahara, launched as a rescue effort. The Court of Inquiry findings revealed that nearly Rs. 290 million rupees of military and other hardware were destroyed, damaged or was seized by the guerrillas.

In the recent weeks, some military top brass have not confined their plans to attack the LTTE and re-capture Toppigala (north west of Batticaloa) to closed door conferences or to the National Security Council. Departing from customary military tradition, they have announced publicly that their next target would be Toppigala. Thus, the LTTE has been put on notice. The logical choices for them would be to stay put, fight and withdraw when they come under heavy pressure. They did so in Sampur and later in Vakarai. The Army has focused on Toppigala since a larger concentration of guerrilla cadres fled to that area when they hurriedly vacated Vakarai. Intelligence sources speak of cadres stockpiling food. How the guerrillas fled is still a hot topic, with the Army insisting that they moved by sea. However, the Navy argues it was through land routes. They claim that their radars had not monitored large scale boat movements during that period.

Toppigala, also known as Baron's Cap (or Kudumbimalai in Tamil) is located north west of Batticaloa. Whilst the area is made up of thick jungle, paddy and chena cultivations lay on the outer fringes. It is fed by water from Tharavikulam, Vadamunai and Vakaneri tanks. There are four different access routes to the area - Padiyatalawa - Pullumalai Road, Batticaloa-Pullumalai Road, Chenkaladi-Pullumalai Road and the Ampara Central Camp - Batticaloa Road (off the main Polonnaruwa - Batticaloa highway)

Toppigala, where LTTE groups that fled the Vakarai area are reportedly concentrated in numbers, has been a hideout for guerrillas for over 20 years. This makes it different from Sampur, where a large LTTE concentration developed during the period of the ceasefire. When it was re-captured by the Security Forces in September, last year, they moved to Vakarai. The latter coastal town fell to the Army in January, this year.

The fact that a military offensive is in the offing in Toppigala has triggered off an exodus of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from the area. The Korale Pattu South Division in the Batticaloa district, which encompasses the Toppigala area, has until last Monday recorded an exodus of 1,952 families or 7,640 persons. This is in the Batticaloa district. Those who have fled to IDP centres in the Trincomalee district are 835 families or 2,963 persons. This brings the total to 3,139 families or 11,710 persons. Officials say the number would be higher when those who have sought shelter outside IDP centres are taken into consideration.

By last Monday, the IDP count in the two districts stood at 20,812 families or 76,224 persons. The task of resettling them, particularly those from Vakarai, has become a formidable task. The subject figured at a top level conference in Trincomalee chaired by the Governor, Rear Admiral (retd.) Mohan Wijewickrema. In view of the reluctance of IDPs to return for fear of resumption of hostilities, representative groups are now being taken on conducted tours. They have been told to observe the normalcy brought about by the Security Forces before deciding to return.

The Army's 22 Division has given authorities the areas where re-settlement should not be carried out in the Trincomalee district. In other areas, particularly those near the strategic port, re-settlement would be 50 metres away from the main highway and 500 metres away from the coastline. The authorities in the two districts have set a target date of March 31, this year, by which time all IDPs should be re-settled.

This task will be daunting particularly in Vakarai and surrounding areas. Those who are to be re-settled will be required to undergo security screening. Police and Security Forces personnel will thereafter have to be present to prevent large scale infiltration and attacks. It will thereafter become a task to prevent the guerrillas, who are shifting from one ground to another as the Security Forces move in.

In the run up to the publicly declared push for Toppigala, troops have also begun limited operations to smoke out guerrilla positions south west of Trincomalee. One such operation got under way on Thursday in Kadawana, west of the Habarana-Trincomalee highway. In this area, the LTTE is said to have re-established a camp that had remained shut down. This is widely believed to be an area the guerrillas used to cross to their northern hideouts. Hitherto all offensive operations have focused largely on the eastern side of the highway. The Air Force has also carried out repeated air attacks on Kumburupiddy, north of Trincomalee, where the LTTE had expanded a base.

These developments come amidst a continuing military build-up by the LTTE in and around the Jaffna peninsula, as reported last week. There were reports this week that newly trained cadres were being deployed in their rear defences and other localities. The regular cadres were being moved to their frontline defended localities astride the one time Muhamalai entry-exit point. Food and ammunition stocks were being moved in large quantities to their front lines. Another unusual feature has been a series of lectures given by medical personnel to the senior cadres who are to be deployed on offensive roles. That is on how to cope with casualties including their evacuation from battle zones.

The Security Forces, no doubt, will be compelled to plan out counter insurgency operations in the wake of the new threats that are looming. Though in a much smaller sense, some of the observations a bulky US Army Counter Insurgency manual made public on December 15, last year, contains some interesting parallels. This manual spells out the American military doctrine and security policies for counterinsurgency (COIN). It is the first such manual since the end of the Vietnam war 30 years ago.

The introduction notes that the US possesses overwhelming military superiority. It notes, "This capability has pushed its enemies to fight US forces unconventionally, mixing modern technology with ancient techniques of insurgency and terrorism. Most enemies either do not try to defeat the United States with conventional operations or do not limit themselves to purely military means. They know they cannot compete with the US forces on those terms. Instead, they try to exhaust US national will, aiming to win by undermining and outlasting public support. Defeating such enemies presents a huge challenge to the Army and Marine Corps. Meeting it requires creative effort by every Soldier and Marine." Though in a lesser way, the same equation applies to the Sri Lankan Security Forces. In conventional terms, the LTTE is no match for them.

The manual says, "One common feature of insurgencies is that the government that is being targeted generally takes awhile to recognize that an insurgency is occurring. Insurgents take advantage of that time to build strength and gather support. Thus, counterinsurgents often have to "come from behind" when fighting an insurgency. Another common feature is that the forces conducting COIN operations usually begin poorly.

"Western militaries too often neglect the study of insurgency. They falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones. In fact, some capabilities required for conventional success - for example, the ability to execute operational maneouvre and employ massive fire power - may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations. Nonetheless, conventional forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these capabilities to defeat insurgents; they almost always fail."

The manual asserts, "the military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents. They learn how to practice COIN and apply that knowledge."

For nearly two decades, Sri Lankan Security Forces have battled the Tiger guerrillas. Their strengths have grown and their arsenal has expanded. Billions of rupees have been poured to achieve higher levels of sophistication. More are now being poured as military procurements increase. Now, bigger challenges lay ahead as the protagonists flex their muscles disregarding the almost defunct five-year-old CFA.

(http://www.sundaytimes.lk/070225/Columns/sitreport.html)

Three LTTEers killed by STF by Rafik Jalaldeen

Three LTTE cadres were killed and several others injured when the STF beat back a Tiger attack on the Kohambagasthalawa Home Guards post on the Ampara-Mahaoya Road last morning. A Home Guard was killed in the incident, the Media Centre for the National Security (MCNS) said.

According to a spokesman for MCNS LTTE cadres attacked the Home Guard post in Kohambagasthalawa yesterday around 8.00 a.m. STF reinforcements were rushed to the scene.

The attack was successfully repulsed resulting in the deaths of three LTTE cadres with several others injured. The confrontation lasted for three hours and the Tigers fled from the area in the face of the retaliation, he added.

The spokesman said in a subsequent search of action, Security Forces recovered three hand grenades and three firearms. Meanwhile, 12 civilians were injured when a claymore mine went off in Aranthalawa, Ampara on Tuesday night.

The MCNS spokesman said 12 civilians travelling in a van from Nindavur to Kandy were injured when the LTTE detonated a claymore mine. The explosion took place opposite the plaque constructed to commemorate 30 Buddhist Monks and four civilians killed by the LTTE on May 1987 in Aranthalawa.

(http://www.dailynews.lk/2007/02/15/sec15.asp)