Friday, July 21, 2006
Vahaneri incident brings an end to paramilitary politics
The Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) has adamantly maintained that the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) is not involved in the shadow war conducted against the Tamil people and the LTTE since December 2005. It has held fast to its position that this shadow war is a clash between the LTTE and other Tamil paramilitary groups.
The attempted attack by a large SLA battalion that had penetrated into the LTTE area of Vahaneri in Batticaloa must be tested against the above stance of the GoSL. Twelve bodies of SLA soldiers were captured after this attack and SLMM has confirmed that the location of the attack was in fact an LTTE area.
Does this mean that the GoSL has rejected the CFA signed by the two parties and endorsed by the international community?
The GoSL has been attempting in several ways to break the CFA and force another war on the Tamils. The GoSL also wants the LTTE to be blamed for restarting the war. It has therefore continued to provoke the LTTE with its attacks on the LTTE and extrajudicial killings of Tamil civilians.
Although the LTTE has not continued to take part in direct talks, it has exercised patience and flexibility to protect the CFA environment thus avoiding a full scale war. It is to break this patience of the LTTE that the GoSL has ordered the large scale attack at Vahaneri. Had the GoSL forces succeeded in the attack and had all its members escaped back to GoSL controlled area, then the GoSL would have claimed that it had no involvement in that attack. At Vahaneri, the SLA, that had so far penetrated into the LTTE areas in small groups of four and five, had moved in with dozens of members for the attack.
The GoSL has flatly rejected the call to remove the paramilitary groups from the Northeast as agreed upon in the CFA and called for by the international community. Even the Secretary General of the GoSL Peace Secretariat has ascertained this position of the GoSL.
The GoSL believes that removing the paramilitary groups is detrimental to its interests. If the paramilitary groups are removed then the GoSL will lose its convenient scapegoat to blame its military attacks.
Exploiting the paramilitary phenomenon and staging elaborate dramas to posture as seeking a resolution to the conflict are not new for the Sinhala governments. These tactics have been used by previous Sinhala leadership as well. Tamil people have understood these tactics of the Sinhala side through long experience. It is this realization that is creating a huge upsurge among Tamils.
The GoSL still continues with these dramas in an attempt to dupe the international community. It is the hope of the LTTE that the international community will see through these deceptions of the GoSL.
The removal of the paramilitary group is not the only CFA clause that the GoSL has rejected. Other political and economical issues have also been rejected by the GoSL. The ban on fishing along the Northeast coast is continued by the Sri Lankan Navy. The SLA is restricting the transport of fuel and building materials into LTTE areas. Many humanitarian projects undertaken by the INGOs have been interrupted by the restriction on building materials.
The truth is that the Tamil people have not enjoyed the fruits of the four and a half years of peace. Tamil people have continued to face destruction of life and property, displacement, and refugee life.
The present ground reality is that it is only the military strength of the Tamils that will deliver them a peaceful life and dependable livelihood and respectability. The need of the time is for the Tamils to come together to defeat the Sinhala military schemes to gain their freedom. It is only the Tamil unity and the Tamil military strength that will determine the fate of the Tamils.
(http://www.sibernews.com/)
Humanitarian workers injured in SLA attack
The Sri Lanka Army (SLA) Deep Penetration Unit (DPU) exploded a claymore mine at around 3pm today, injuring four workers of North-East Irrigated Agriculture Project (NEIAP), deep within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) administered region of Mannar district.
"The DPU may have targeted the NEIAP vehicle in the believe that LTTE cadres were traveling in it," speculated reports from Colombo.
However, a civilian from Mannar said: "NEIAP vehicles are clearly marked on all sides, including the roof. The occupation forces are targeting humanitarian agencies so that they will flee, and we would be left to starve to death."
Indeed the latter speculation from the civilian in Mannar appears to be confirmed by a pattern of attacks by the SLA on humanitarian agencies working in the Tamil Homeland.
Workers of Tamils Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) and CARE International have been targeted in the past.
(http://www.sibernews.com/)
The Significance of the Vakeneri Incident
did not show much respect for the dead either. The bodies were simply handed to the next-of-kin. The MR government even placed the blame for the incident on the SL soldiers for straying into Eelaam territory. Few Governments would have treated their own soldiers in such disrespect. But this is the usual Hela style. Meanwhile the MR government immediately proclaimed its readiness to continue the cease-fire, in case anyone had any doubts about this. Of course the LTTE does not observe any cease-fire.
The reason for the behaviour of MR is not hard to find. It is that he has no policy for countering the terrorism of the LTTE. There has never been any example of this kind of cringing subservience to a terrorist group in any part of the world. Indeed it is only possible with the Helas of SL. The blame for this should not only be laid on the corrupt political leaders of the country. It is also shared by the hordes of Hela MR devotees, especially in the Hela expatriate groups.
This incident shows the growing recognition of Eelaam as a reality in Sri Lanka. It is now well on the way to de jure recognition. When one-seventh of the country has been given over to a terrorist, and GOSL dare not trespass into his territory, the cries of "Heladiva" and "Sinhaleh" of the Hela "patriots" must sound hollow.
Meanwhile the Hela patriots have maintained a stony silence. They are more interested in SL "maids" slaving for Arabs in Lebanon and earning foreign exchange for the corrup Helas at home, than in their own soldiers killed by the LTTE. Of course they have missed the lesson of Lebanon entirely. This is that Israel is prepared to attack of sovering country to defeat terrrorism. In SL the terrorists are treated with honour and even given a large chunk of the country. Of course the LTTE have killed more than the Hizbollah.
(http://www.lankaweb.com/)
Eastern camps of Wanni Tigers will be attacked – Karuna faction
Karuna faction has stated that not only the civilians in the East but also in the North should be freed from the Wanni Tiger harassment which has been their demand for over the past few years.
It further states that all taxes collected from the civilians should be stopped. It has emphasized that all arrangements have been made to influence the Wanni Tigers on this with the assistance of the civilians in the East in the near future.
(http://www.lankatruth.com/full_story/2006/july/21/20060721_8.htm)
Thursday, July 20, 2006
Claymore explosion kills three Mannar civilians
Saminathan Jacob, 58, Simion Regin, 22, and Simion Antony Gnanapragasam, 17 of Kokupadaiyan area in Musali DS division were returing with their loaded tractor to Kokupadaiyan when their tractor hit a claymore mine buried along the road by the Deep Penetration Unit (DPU) of the Sri Lanka Army.
The tractor was destroyed in the explosion. All three occupants died on the spot, civil society sources said.
Their bodies were taken to Silavathurai hospital, hospital sources said.
The site where the explosion took place is located about 30 km off Mannar town.
(http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=18657)
4 NEIAP officials wounded in DPU Claymore attack
A lady officer was among the wounded, according to initial reports.
Details of the officials were not available at the moment.
An Ambulance has been sent from Murunkan District Hospital, medical sources said.
Additional Government Agent of Mannar has rushed to the area, District Secretariat sources in Mannar said.
Sri Lankan DPU teams have been active in the area targeting LTTE cadres. 3 civilians were killed in a Claymore attack by a DPU team in the area 20 days ago.
(http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=18861)
Three Tamil auxiliarists wounded in DPU Claymore attack
One of the three wounded were in serious state.
The auxiliarists were on a regular road clearing patrol, Tamileelam Police sources said.(http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=18858)
'Colombo is procuring weapons from Pakistan'
There have been at least four suicide attacks and hundreds of assassinations in the past months. Is LTTE serious about peace?
Yes. It is up to the government to engage LTTE and reach a solution that is acceptable to the Tamils.
Hundreds of Tamils have been killed by LTTE, including eminent Tamil politicians, at least six of them from TULF.
It is regrettable that these killings occurred. It should not have happened.
Is it fear for your own life that prevents you from criticising LTTE?
No. no.
But other Tamil politicians who criticised LTTE have been killed.
As I said it is regrettable. It is horrible.
Do you think LTTE are the sole representatives of the Tamil people?
They are the representatives of Tamil people in the current negotiations based on the mandate given by the people in the last general elections.
Election monitors from European Union had stated that the elections were rigged by LTTE.
Well, there would have been some overenthusiasm by the Tamils for this election. Tamils in uncleared areas (LTTE-controlled territory) had been deprived of their votes in a number of elections.
How independent of LTTE is TNA? Why does it not tell LTTE to stop the killings?
We have told them. We oppose all killings. We oppose the extrajudicial killings taking place in the north and east. We have indicated this to President Mahinda Rajapakse.
There are people disappearing everyday in the north and east. There have been gruesome killings and there have been no investigations by the government.
But it is LTTE that stands accused of a bulk of the killings which have taken place following the ceasefire.
There are killings and killings. It is not only LTTE which is killing in this country. There are killings from both sides.
How do you see LTTE leader Anton Balasingham's apology for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi?
Well, it's a realisation of the grave mistake that has been made.
LTTE is preparing for war and is giving combat training to thousands of civilians. Aren't you disappointed?
The government too is preparing for war. The government military too is recruiting. It is procuring weapons from Pakistan.
(
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-1778792,prtpage-1.cms)
Sri Lanka clash kills 12 soldiers by Simon Gardner
Nordic monitors and Red Cross officials said they had seen the corpses, while the military said a 13th soldier was still missing and four others were injured.
The Tigers insisted they had shot dead 22 people in the firefight, and said the balance likely belonged to a breakaway faction of former comrades led by renegade commander Karuna, whom they accuse the military of helping to mount attacks.
Kayal Viliyan, a senior rebel in the Tigers' eastern political office in the district of Batticaloa, told Reuters that around 60 troops had entered Tiger territory and been surrounded by about 200 rebels.
"We have found 22 bodies, and we are still searching," he said by telephone from Batticaloa. "They came into our area and we retaliated ... We have captured one soldier."
"The government does not want to admit the number of Karuna people killed in the attack," he added.
It was not immediately clear why the Tigers did not show the Red Cross evidence of any dead Karuna fighters killed in the clash in Batticaloa, where the dividing line between government- and rebel-held areas is often porous and ill-defined.
"Our patrol was fired upon with heavy weapons and mortars, close to an army camp. Additional troops were rushed to the area, and when they arrived, the Tigers surrounded them," said a military spokesman, Brigadier Prasad Samarasinghe.
"The 22 figure is wrong. Until we recover the bodies we have 13 missing in action."
BODY EXCHANGE
The Red Cross is due to coordinate the handover of the bodies of the slain soldiers on Saturday.
The incident came as Sri Lanka's navy rained mortar shells on Tamil rebel positions in the neighbouring northern district of Trincomalee in a separate incident after suspected snipers killed one sailor and injured one.
On Thursday, suspected Tiger rebels shot dead three soldiers and a political rival in northern Sri Lanka. The ambushes and military clashes have killed more than 700 people so far this year and strained the 2002 truce to breaking point.
Sri Lanka's tortuous peace process is deadlocked and teetering on the verge of collapse. Government and rebels are sharply divided over the Tigers' demands for a separate homeland for minority Tamils in the north and east.
Diplomats and analysts fear escalating violence could push the island back into a full-fledged war that would punish the $23 billion economy and the tourist industry.
However, in a rare exchange of goodwill, the Tigers said on Friday they would release a policeman they have detained since September 2005, when he entered their territory without permission to track down a suspected foreign paedophile.
Two fellow policemen were earlier released, one in a prisoner swap. The release of the third, due on Saturday, comes after President Mahinda Rajapakse allowed Tiger media coordinator Daya Master to be rushed to Colombo for treatment for a heart condition.
However, many in the Sinhalese-majority south have little compassion for the Tigers after two decades of civil war that have killed more than 65,000 on both sides.
"Why is the government protecting killers?" asked 32-year-old Roshan Chaminda, secretary of the National Movement Against Terrorism, as dozens protested outside the top-end Apollo hospital. "He is a terrorist organisation leader. They kill Tamil, Sinhalese, Muslim and anyone else against them," he said.
(http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=
2006-07-14T132225Z_01_SP240874_RTRUKOC_0_UK-SRILANKA.xml&pageNumber
=0&imageid=&cap=&sz=13&WTModLoc=NewsArt-C1-ArticlePage3)
12 soldiers killed in Tiger clash
Nordic monitors and Red Cross officials said they had seen the corpses, while the military said a thirteenth soldier was still missing and four others were injured.
The Tigers said that they had shot dead 22 people in the firefight, and said the balance likely belonged to a breakaway faction of former comrades led by renegade commander Karuna, whom they accuse the military of helping to mount attacks.
Kayal Viliyan, a senior rebel in the Tigers’ eastern political office in the district of Batticaloa, said that around 60 troops had entered Tiger territory and been surrounded by about 200 rebels.
“The government does not want to admit the number of Karuna people killed in the attack,” he added.
It was not immediately clear why the Tigers did not show the Red Cross evidence of any dead Karuna fighters killed in the clash in Batticaloa.
(http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,25689-2270684,00.html)
Wednesday, July 19, 2006
SLMM meets SLA soldier under LTTE captivity
Head of SLMM for Batticaloa district Sari Rask and his deputy attended the meeting.
Daya Mohan, LTTE political head of Batticaloa was present on behalf of the LTTE.
Mr Karunaratne told the SLMM members that SLA group entered the LTTE-held area under the orders of SLA commanders, and that the LTTE fighters attacked them first when their group advanced towards Vakaneri.
12 Sri Lankan troops, 4 Tiger fighters were killed during the encounter.(http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=18853)
LTTE cadre killed in clash with SLA DPU in Trincomalee
SLA soldiers fled from the area leaving a live claymore mine and other weapons at the site.
They also took back those injured soldiers, LTTE sources said. It is not known if there were any casualties on the SLA side.
LTTE sources in Sampoor said one LTTE cadre Lieutenant Kuilan, (Thevananthan Vino of Anpuvallipuram), was killed in the encounter.(http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=18847)
LTTE hands over bodies of 12 soldiers
SLMM spokesman Thorfinnur Omarsson said the appeal had been conveyed to the LTTE to secure the release of Lance Corporal Wijeyapala Karunaratna, but no response was received till yesterday afternoon.
The appeal came after the LTTE yesterday handed over 12 bodies of soldiers at Chenkaladi in Batticaloa to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The bodies were then transported to the Valaichchenai hospital where post-mortems were conducted before they were handed over to the army.
The ICRC after taking possession of the soldier’s bodies had asked the LTTE cadres at Illupadicheni to give access to the injured soldier, allowing Dr. Gianluca Russo of the Italian Red Cross who was part of the ICRC team to check the medical condition of the wounded soldier. LTTE representatives responded that they would need approval from their leaders to allow access for the ICRC doctor.
LTTE Batticoloa district political wing leader Daya Mohan, however, said the ICRC might be allowed such access soon. The Military says the soldiers were killed during search and route clearing patrol in the government-controlled Vakaneri area, but the LTTE claimed they had entered five kilometres into an LTTE-controlled area.
Meanwhile SLMM chief Ulf Henricsson yesterday met LTTE political wing leader S.P.Thamilselvan in Kilinochchi and took up the issue about the soldier’s release.
The LTTE lodged a strong protest with the SLMM, complaining about alleged infiltration by the army into the rebel-held areas.
(http://www.sundaytimes.lk/060716/news/Enlarge.html)
Home guards to the fore by Chandani Kirinde
Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera who was appointed Director General of the 30,000 strong Home Guard Force (HGF) in April this year has taken measures to recruit, train, equip and deploy additional home guards in areas vulnerable to LTTE attacks, particularly after the Kebitigollewa bus massacre. In an interview with The Sunday Times, he spoke on the importance of protecting the villagers and said the bunker line to protect them would become a reality in the coming weeks. Excerpts:
Q:What is the background to the creation of the home guard unit?
A:The unit was created in 1985 to protect villages from LTTE attacks because at that time the army was unable to guard every village. The government gave weapons to selected youth in each village. Initially there was no payment involved neither did they have uniforms. Gradually the demand for their services grew and they were paid and were also given uniforms.
Q: Can you comment on your appointment as the Director General of the Home Guard Force?
A:After the ceasefire agreement when the situation was relatively peaceful, the importance of the home guard unit decreased and these people found other jobs. This year with the escalation in violence, villages are once again facing the threat of LTTE attacks. In the light of this the government wanted to re-organise the Home Guard Force. I was appointed in April by the President as DG in addition to my duties as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy.
Q: What have been your main tasks since taking up this appointment?
A:During the first week, I did a study of more than 400 villages that are under threat, the exact number of home guards deployed in each village and also the minimum number required to protect each village in keeping with the recommendations of the army. I also recruited 5000 people from the affected areas. They underwent a two week training programme at Army and Special Task Force (STF) camps before being deployed.
Q: On what basis were they deployed?
A:They were deployed according to specifications of the Army and the STF .We have also begun issuing weapons to selected civilians on the recommendation of the police. This is meant as a deterrent against attacks on the homes of villagers.
Q: What kind of training has been given to the home guards?
A:They have been trained in the use of T- 56 automatic rifles, shot guns and repeater guns. They have also been given training in field craft and the general law. But the training doesn’t stop there. There are training teams that will visit each village regularly to continue training them as well as motivating them.
Q: What are the most vulnerable areas?
A:The Ampara district, parts of Moneragala, Trincomalee, Kantalai, Vavuniya and parts of Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa and Puttlam. This is the threatened belt.
Q: Since the Kebitigollewa tragedy, the villagers are refusing to return to their homes till the bunker line is put in place to secure their villages. Can you comment?
A:These villagers need not be afraid to return to their homes once the Forward Defence Line (FDL) is established in the coming weeks. The work on the bunker line will also start very soon.
Q: How bad is the threat to the areas excluding Kebitigollewa?
A:I believe the situation is now under control. The required number of men will be trained and deployed in the villages and it will be their responsibility to protect the villagers. We have selected youth from their own villages because when they have to protect their own kith and kin they would do a better job than a person from outside. It is the responsibility of the army and the STF to supervise them. Responsible residents in the village including priests, retired teachers should also be vigilant of their activities and report to me if there are any lapses on the part of the home guards.
Q: How important is the Home Guard Unit for the security of the country?
A:I believe it is important as these threatened villages are a major component of the national security. If these villagers leave their homes and head south it could destabilise the whole country. So these villages have to be protected and the Home Guard Force is there to do just that. This is why the unit must be further strengthened. It is also the responsibility of every citizen in the country to ensure the security of these people by way of contributing in whatever way they can.
Q: Any future plans for the Home Guard Unit?
A: I think the government has plans to make it a permanent force. Now it is an auxiliary force .
(http://www.sundaytimes.lk/060716/columns/sitrep.html)
Little light at the end of the tunnel by Chandani Kirinde and Nalaka Nonis
One month after the Kebitigollewa tragedy, The Sunday Times goes back...
The sounds of wailing have died down in the villages around Kebitigollewa. A few plastic wreaths lie on top of the mass grave, where 67 people lie buried. The place where the jam-packed commuter passenger bus was hit by the explosion shows no signs of the deadly incident that snuffed out so many lives in a few seconds. What remains today are abandoned homes, deserted roads and closed schools. Hundreds of villagers fled their homes to take refuge in safer environs with only a few of the brave choosing to stay behind.
This is the sad plight of the villagers of Indigollewa, Yakawewa, Halmillawetiya, Thalgahawewa, Meegaswewa and Kalugahawewa for whom the nightmare of that tragic day is far from over. While government authorities as well as the military and police are trying to persuade the villagers to return to their homes, they are far from reassured.
Today the area around the Kebitigollewa town is dotted with white tents to which mainly women and children have been confined while the majority of men who are employed in the home guard force are away on duty. The last time they fled their villages after a terrorist attack in the area in 1995, they remained displaced for over five years and it was only after the 2002 February Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) that many of the villagers returned home.
J.Dhanapala of Halmillawetiya is one among the few still staying on in his village since that fateful day. Of the 86 families that resided there, only nine remain.” Seven people from our village died, some of who were my relatives. But I was born here and I have lived here thorough all the years of the conflict and I will not go now,” a defiant Mr.Dhanapala said.
The terrorist attack has struck a severe blow to the economic conditions of the villagers many of whom are farmers. “We have no income at all since the attack. We cannot go to our paddy fields, we cannot go into the jungle to collect bees honey or sand, both of which gave us a good income. We are surviving on what we had collected before the attack,” he said.
Several weeks before the attack on the bus, two of the villagers were shot dead by the LTTE and some of them had also seen foot prints which they believed belonged to LTTE cadres. “We asked for additional security and for the road to be cleared but nothing was done till the attack on the bus,” he lamented.
The tragedy has affected the young and old alike. One and half month old Tharushi Kavinda was just 15 days old when the incident occurred. Blissfully unaware of the cruel goings on around her, Tharushi now sleeps on the ground with a tent to shelter her from the scorching sun. Her mother Swarnamala and grandmother are with her while her father who is a home guard is on duty in the village at Yakawewa which is now abandoned expect for policemen and home guards who have been assigned there on duty.
“The security is inadequate for us to return to the village. There are no buses plying on the road and if a child falls sick, there is no way for us to come to the Kebitigollewa town after dark,” Swarnamala said.
A single CTB bus started plying on the road last Wednesday, nearly a month after the attack, but many of the villagers are scared to travel on the same route although the sides of the road have been cleared by the army who also carry out a route clearing operations each morning.
Today about 500 families live in five temporary shelters- including tents and a temple premise-close to the Kebitigollewa town.Less than 100 families remain in the six villages that were affected. Many have also moved into homes of relatives in safer areas.
An official of the Divisional Secretariat in Kebitigollewa said the displaced are being provided with dry rations and security. However many of the displaced were worried that the lack of sanitary facilities and water shortage could lead to health hazzards if they had to stay in the tents for a long time.
The Kebitigollewa Madya Maha Vidyalaya which was transformed into a massive funeral parlour to place the coffins of the bus attack victims is also slowly returning to normality with students trickling back to school since last Wednesday.
Two students of the school were among those killed in the blast while another was injured. The displaced villagers who were staying in the school since the tragedy were last week moved into tents and other temporary shelters. The school reopened fully last Wednesday but the authorities are still facing the problem of accommodating about 400 additional students from Halmillawetiya School that closed after the attack.
Kebitigollewa MMV principal W.S.Seneviratna said the displaced students would be admitted to the school but additional class rooms would be needed to accommodate them. “ We have adequate staff but we need more room for these students. We have about 50 students in each class at present so we cannot take in anymore,” Mr.Seveviratne said. He added that the Chief Minister of the North Central Province Bertie Premalal Dissanayake who visited the school on Wednesday had assured that a temporary building would be put up within two weeks to accommodate the displaced children.
The villagers say if they are to return to their homes, a bunker line should be established along the area between the North Central Province and Mullaitivu- the area from where the terrorists infiltrate these villages. Director General of the Home Guard Force Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera said this would become a reality soon with the forward defense line in place and the strengthening of the home guard units.
So while the government grapples with the task of reassuring the villagers to get them to return to their homes, the villagers watch and wait to see if the promises of strengthening security becomes a reality so that they can go back home.
(http://www.sundaytimes.lk/)
Defeat to separatism: the Yan Oya basin theory by Sumedha
The aim of the Tamil separatist groups, including the LTTE, is to establish a separate state of Eelam by merging the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. Once this proposed state of Eelam is established the conflict would be continued for the purpose of extending its territory in the first instance to the hill country and subsequently to other parts of Sri Lanka. The ultimate objective would be to establish a country of their own for the 118 million Tamil population in the world by conquering the Sinhala motherland and annihilating its 14 million Sinhala population.
To achieve their first aim of linking the northern province with the eastern province of Sri Lanka, a continuous land mass inhabited by Tamils must be established. This aim can never be achieved unless and until the Yan Oya basin is ethnically cleansed by driving away its Sinhala population to the southern parts of the country. Part of Mullaitivu,Vavuniya, Anuradhapura and Trincomalee districts together form the Yan Oya basin. It was a granary of the ancient Sinhala people during the reign of both King Mahasen and King Maha Parakramabahu. Rice produced from its fertile fields which were irrigated by major tanks such as Padaviya and Wahalkada was exported to China from the harbour at Puhulmotte, which is now referred to as Pulmudai.
The aim of the separatist terrorists next was to bring pressure on the Sinhala population by attacking the border Sinhala villages of this basin and through terrorism to create an exodus of the Sinhala people to the southern parts of the country. To counter this the Army was deployed by the government for the protection of the Sinhala villages in this basin. Yan Oya basin thus became the gateway to Eelam and had to be defended if separatism was to be defeated. If this basin falls into the hands of separatist terrorists the north will be merged with the east and with Trincomalee as the capital of Eelam, the process of establishing the new state would be completed.
The importance of the Yan Oya basin can never be over emphasized, but sadly it seems that both the past UNP government and the present PA government have failed to understand the importance of this basin to protect the unity and territorial integrity of our motherland. No suitable strategy has been evolved to date for the defence of this all important basin. The situation has now deteriorated to such an extent that there is a regular exodus of its Sinhala population daily to the safer southern parts of the country as a result of intensified LTTE threats and attacks in this basin.
On October 25, 1995, a comprehensive report predicting imminent attacks on Sinhala villages bordering the Kebethigollewa-Padaviya road was forwarded to the General Officer Commanding the Second Division of the Army. In this report it was pointed out that several Sinhalese living in these villages had been abducted by the LTTE and that the LTTE would gather information from those who had been abducted to stage attacks on these Sinhala villages.
As a precautionary measure to prevent such attacks this report recommended the immediate construction of a bunker line to cover the gap of fourteen kilometres that existed between the forward defence line of Weli Oya and Vavuniya. It was suggested that this bunker line be started from Padavi Parakramapura in the Anuradhapura district and extended to Periyapuliyalankulam in the Vavuniya district. The construction of 280 bunkers forward of an abandoned road mutually supporting each other and dominating a well laid out minefield in front of the bunker line would have effectively provided adequate defence to bridge the gap through which the terrorists were constantly staging attacks deep into the Kebethigollewa area in the Anuradhapura district.
The initiator of this report was informed that the proposal had been submitted through the Commander of the Army to the Deputy Minister of Defence for necessary action. The gap was however never sealed and since then many Sinhala villages have been attacked as predicted in the report. More than twenty Sinhala villages in the Kebethigollewa divisional secretariat area have been abandoned since and 35% of its population has been reduced to refugee status. More than one hundred Army, Police and civilians have been killed since and many more wounded by LTTE raids conducted through this gap in the forward defence line.
The recent attack on three armoured vehicles killing twelve soldiers and causing a substantial loss in military equipment, the value of which would far exceed the construction cost of the proposed bunker line of fourteen kilometres, indicates the adverse results of not using common sense. The attack on the Kanugahawewa police post on January 18, 1997 during which the LTTE killed twenty one policemen and two homeguards and injured another eighteen policemen could also have been avoided if this bunker line had been constructed as suggested in the said report.
It is also common sense that the closest route to Kandy from Colombo is through Kegalle and not through Kurunegala. Without heeding to common sense and constructing fourteen kilometres of bunker line to bridge this gap, work has begun on the construction of a 21 kilometre bunker line for the same purpose. The tremendous advantages of the bunker line proposed in the report has been totally overlooked due to lack of common sense. One such advantage is that it would have enabled the use of manpower and defence material in the existing bunker line from Periyapuliyalankulam to Kuda Katchikudiya which is seven kilometres in extent that would become redundant with the establishment of the proposed bunker line from Periyapuliyalankulam to Padavi Parakramapura. Therefore man-power and defence stores would have to be found only for seven kilometres as opposed to thrice that requirement for the bunker line now under construction.
With the increase in distance from 14 kilometres to 21 kilometres, a longer period of time would be required to seal the gap and once completed would provide a longer frontage for possible LTTE attacks. The proposed new bunker line will also be hugging some populated villages and many abandoned villages. If an attack is staged on the bunker line by the LTTE, innocent civilians in these villages may be caught up in the crossfire. This new bunker line under construction from Kuda Katchikudiya in the Vavuniya district to Morakewa in the Anuradhapura district will not therefore induce the Sinhala population who have left Ralapanawa, Kelepuliyan-kulama, Kunchuttuwa, Vihara Halmillewa, Halmillewatiya, Dutuwewa, Yakawewa, Indigollewa, Kanugahawewa, Kele Nikawewa, Thalgas-wewa, Maha Nikawewa and Morakewa to return to their homes as they would fear to live close to the new bunker line anticipating possible LTTE attacks. All these abandoned villages could however be resettled if the bunker line is established from Padavi Parakkramapura to Periya-puliyalankulam.
The establishment of the bunker line from Padavi Parakkramapura to Periya-puliyalankulam will make the main supply route to Padaviya perfectly safe from possible attacks by terrorists. It would also enable the route from Medawachchiya to Kebethi-gollewa to be used without fear once more. The road from Kebethigollewa to Vavuniya could also be reopened for safe use.
If, however, the situation that now prevails is allowed to continue unabated it will result in a shortage of essential commmodities in the interior areas of the Yan Oya basin very soon as many lorries that transport these items do not go there any longer due to the risk involved. There is also the danger of buses and other forms of transport being attacked on this insecure road. When free movement is not possible to this area both for people and essential commodities the exodus of the population out of this inaccessible area in search of safer habitats in the south is inevitable.
This article has been written to awaken the common sense of those responsible for the security of our motherland to correct mistakes that have resulted in the loss of valuable life and equipment and with a view to reversing the situation even at this late stage by evolving a sensible strategy to provide adequate security for this all important Yan Oya basin and thereby to defeat the aims and objectives of the separatist terrorists who are systematically engaged in a process of ethnic cleansing in this area.
It is the people who live and work in these areas that can best see the imminent future dangers to this area. The author of this article has lived in more than 50 LTTE affected villages with these innocent people in their humble dwellings and with the wealth of information gathered from this exercise is making these facts available to those who are in authority with the sincere hope of receiving a positive response.
(http://lakdiva.com/suntimes/970126/news3.html)
Could Kebitigollewa have been averted? by Lt. Col. A.S. Amarasekera
It’s not too late to establish the FDL suggested way back in 1995 and protect these villages.
The Sinhala villages in the Kebitigollewa divisional secretariat area first came under LTTE threat during the Eelam war II. These threats intensified and several villages were attacked around 1990.
Kelebogahawewa, Konwewa and Veherawewa in the Padaviya divisional secretariat area were the northern most villages of the Anuradhapura district, bordering the Vavuniya district. These were the first to be attacked by the LTTE during the Eelam war II, with several innocent villagers being hacked to death. These threats and attacks extended southwards and many villages such as Mahakollewa, Kudakollewa, Siyambalagaswewa, Nambakadawewa, Nelligollakadawewa, Hammillapotanawewa, Hettigamawewa, Walalubindawewa, Kuda Hettiagamawewa, Manewa, Nikawewa, Kandagahawewa, Meneriwewa, Maha Etambagaskada and Indigollewa were abandoned.
In 1993, villages such as Dikwewa, Yakawewa, Maha Kanugahawewa, Palu Hammillewa, Halmillawetiya, Puliyankulama, Kongollewa, Maha Kandigala, Kuda Relapanawa, Kuda Kandigala, Maha Relapanawa, Maha Halmillewa, Kuda Halmillewa and Viharahalmillewa came under LTTE threat. Even Kunchuttuwa, Olugaswewa and Kele Puliyankulama, Sinhala villages on the Kebitigollewa-Vavuniya main road, faced the threat.
Many Sinhala families, therefore, moved into camps put up for internally displaced persons (IDPs) close to the Kebitigollewa town.
Around 1995, Talgahawewa, Maha Nikawewa, Morakewa, Herath Hammillewa and Tammannewa were attacked and several villagers massacred by the LTTE. The main road from Kebitigollewa to Padaviya was under threat. To make this main road safe, a bunker line was constructed from Kebitigollewa to Bogashandiya, a distance of about 25 kilometres.
However, the Jaya Sikuru Operation of 1997 resulted in the establishment of a forward defence line from Kanagarayankulam to Nedunkeni and all the villages south of this line were rendered safe from LTTE threats and attacks. The people who were living in camps returned to their villages. Even the villages of Kele Bogahawewa, Konwewa and Veherawewa in the Padaviya divisional secretariat area were resettled.
With the collapse of the forward defence line from Kanagarayankulam to Nedunkeni in November 1999, the Sri Lanka Army requested the villagers of Kele Bogahawewa, Konwewa, Veherawewa and Kambilliyawa to withdraw to Padavi Parakramapura and these villages were abandoned once more. Thus a situation was once again created wherein the LTTE was able to threaten and attack all these villages. However, due to the so-called Ceasefire Agreement of 2002, the LTTE refrained from attacking the villages in the Kebitigollewa area.
These villages came under LTTE threats and attacks once more in May 2006. The June 15 claymore mine attack that claimed the lives of 67 innocent civilians travelling in a bus, has shown the imperative need to prevent further LTTE attacks.
The lack of security in these villages in the Anuradhapura district — far south of the so-called LTTE controlled area — has to be addressed without further delay. These villages are terrorized by small LTTE gangs that are able to infiltrate this area due to the absence of a forward defence line between Padavi Parakramapura in the Anuradhapura district and Mahakachchakodiya in the Vavuniya district.
The present police posts that are south of the villages along the Kebitigollewa-Madukanda road or the bunker line along the Kebitigollewa-Bogaswewa road that has been constructed east of the villages, are of little use to prevent any LTTE infiltration, let alone protecting the villages from threats and attacks. The maximum these police posts or the present bunker line is able to do is to give some form of protection to the road by first clearing the road each morning and then stationing pickets to prevent possible claymore mine attacks.
A comprehensive project proposal was submitted recently to the Defence Secretary to establish a 14-mile forward defence line between Pirappammaduwa and Buddhangala. The police personnel and home guards now deployed to protect the eight-mile Madukanda-Kele Puliyankuluma stretch and the 15-mile Kebitigollewa-Bogashandiya stretch could be re-deployed to meet the manpower requirement of the new forward defence line.
Since the suggested forward defence line will traverse a distance of only 3.5 miles in the Vavuniya district, which also happens to be in the Vavuniya South Sinhala divisional secretariat area, with the balance distance of 10.5 miles in the Anuradhapura district, there is no reason for the non-implementation of this defence line, as it is well within the government-controlled area. Such a defence line will not only give security to the villages now threatened but will also make it possible to resettle people in the villages that have been abandoned. It will also make it difficult, if not impossible, for LTTE terrorists to use a land route from the Mullaitivu district to the Trincomalee district through the Anuradhapura district.
In May 1995 when I was the Officer Commanding Troops in Anuradhapura , I submitted a letter to the Divisional Commander of the Second Division, Sri Lanka Army then headquartered at Ranasevapura, Anuradhapura. The relevant part of that letter is reproduced elsewhere.
Probably, due to the lack of resources, my suggestions were not implemented. I was subsequently appointed the Manpower Mobilization and Disaster Relief Coordinator in the Second Division. One of my duties was to ensure that there was no exodus southwards of people from the villages under threat. By October 1995, the situation was becoming critical in the villages of Kebitigollewa. Many villages had been abandoned and there was a large camp for IDPs in the Kebitigollewa town.
On October 25, 1995, I wrote my second letter in Sinhala to the Divisional Commander, recommending once more the establishment of the forward defence line between Periyapuliyalankulam and Padavi Parakramapura. I went to the extent of obtaining 2,000 roofing sheets from a Sinhala youth organization in Abu Dhabi and these were donated to the Sri Lanka Army to be utilized for the construction of the bunker line, but nothing happened. I still have in my possession a signal received from the Divisional Command dated November 10, 1995, wherein it is stated in Sinhala that my letter of October 25, 1995, had been received and that my ideas and suggestions had been forwarded through the Army Commander to the Deputy Minister of Defence.
If my suggestion had received the necessary attention and the forward defence line had been established then, or even subsequently after the forward defence line between Kanagarayankulam and Nedunkeni collapsed, many valuable lives could have been saved.
Learning from the past mistakes of political leaders, I sincerely hope the Defence Secretary will be able to persuade the present political leadership to seriously consider the proposal submitted by me to alleviate the plight of the innocent people living in these Sinhala villages which are under LTTE threat, without further delay.
Excerpts from the letter to the Divisional commander
Defence of border villages
The three cardinal principles of defence — All-round defence, Mutual support and Defence in depth — were incorporated for the first time by 2VIR troops at Ulukkulama, where bunkers were constructed every 50 metres with each providing its own all-round defence and mutually supporting each other.
Defence in depth was achieved by setting up a Platoon Headquarters at a considerable distance in depth followed by the Company Headquarters and then a Battalion Headquarters. This concept is now followed from Kudakachchikudiya to Tantirimale, a distance of 35 to 40 miles with around 750 to 800 bunkers. This form of defence has proved successful over three years, reducing troop casualties to a bare minimum and causing no casualties among the civilian population.
This, however, is a troop intensive method, which if extended from Periyapuliyalankulam in the Vavuniya district to Padavi Parakramapura in the Anuradhapura district, covering a distance of about 10 miles, would provide a complete defence to numerous Sinhala villages in the Kebitigollewa division. Six miles of the ten miles could be manned by relocating the bunkers from Periyapuliyalankulam to Kuda Kathcchikudiya leaving about 80 more new bunkers requiring about 500 troops. The advantage of such an action would be making the police posts at Kele Puliyankulama, Puduwa and Dutuwewa redundant, together with the detachment at Indigollewa and Etambagaskada. The police stations at Kebitigollewa and Padaviya will also be safe from possible attacks. Furthermore, it will also make the main supply route to Padaviya safe for use. The road from Vavuniya to Kebitigollewa could also be made usable.
Due to non-availability of troops this proven bunker line method has been substituted by locating police posts or army detachments in the border villages of Kebitigollewa, Padaviya, Horowupotana and Pemaduwa divisional secretariat areas of the Anuradhapura district for the purpose of providing village security.
While the detachments or police posts thus established are able to provide for themselves all-round defence, through the construction of mutually supporting bunkers around the established camp, defence in depth and mutual support from the closest reinforcement point have always been lacking, either due to non-availability of adequate resources or the distance involved.
This point was well demonstrated when Kele Puliyankulama was attacked on May 10, 1995. The closest point of reinforcement, the Kebitigollewa police station six miles away was unable to rush reinforcements in time to avoid disaster.
The detachments or police posts that are located in such isolation are targets inviting enemy attacks. As a result of seeking administrative advantages and camp comforts, lives have been lost in many of these isolated detachments and police posts. This trend will continue, unless alternative methods are adopted. When the police post or detachment is overrun, it creates fear in the minds of villagers and forces them to abandon their villages and move southwards.
The alternative to living in isolated police posts or army detachments is for the personnel to form independent mobile groups that could live under canvas tents which could be moved from location to location. This type of group could be moved into border villages where while half perform duties as buddy pairs in fortified bunkers, the other half could rest in the canvas tents, which could be relocated from time to time thus never offering a fixed target to the enemy.
The resting troops could reinforce the troops on duty in the event of attack. This method will make the enemy who uses concentration of force to achieve success vulnerable as the resting reinforcements could attack the enemy concentration rapidly.
The police or home guards must also be trained by attaching them to army buddy pairs thus building confidence in them to face enemy threats and attacks from well fortified bunkers at the outer perimeter of each village. As the police and home guards gain enough confidence the army could be withdrawn to be relocated forward of the village in the jungle to kill the enemy before they approach the village. In such a deployment the troops will work as buddy trios, with the army groups never permanently located at a jungle base, but shifting their location from time to time. This action will confuse the enemy and enable the troops to dominate the jungle, forward of the border village.
These suggestions if implemented will contribute towards saving valuable life and equipment. I, therefore, sincerely hope they will receive your consideration with a view for future implementation.
(http://www.sundaytimes.lk/)
Tuesday, July 18, 2006
Sri Lanka's Military to deal with Karuna cadres sternly by Munza Mushtaq
Brigadier Samarasinghe told the “Asian Tribune” that, "anyone unauthorized possessing arms operating in government-controlled areas will be arrested. No mercy will be shown on anyone or any group," he stressed.
He also scoffed at recent reports appearing on the LTTE Peace Secretariat which claimed that Tiger cadres had arrested a person who claimed to be a Karuna cadre named Jayachandran on July 7th, who had said claimed the Karuna group and Sri Lankan army (SLA) provided him with claymore mine materials to carry out an attack against the LTTE. Jayachandran had also claimed that the Karuna group members and 50 Sri Lanka Army troops escorted him into the LTTE area for the attack.
Brigadier Samarasinghe noted however that neither he nor the military were "bothered with such false negative propaganda against the security forces."
The military spokesman also maintained that the security forces were at no given time housing any armed group in government controlled areas.
(http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/1138)
Friday, June 16, 2006
SLA attacks inside LTTE area on 1 June
On 1 June a claymore attack, carried out by the Sri Lankan Army, in Vedivaiththakal village in Nedunkerni in Vavuniya district, killed one LTTE auxiliary force member and injured another. Varothayan Sritharan was the person killed in the incident.
On the night of 1 June at 7.30 pm at the Kakayan Forward Defense Lines (FDL) in Vavuniya, SLA carried out a shelling attack killing one member of the LTTE.
(http://www.sibernews.com/)
Give up east, at what cost? by Dharmeratnam Sivaram
On Thursday the Tigers took four buses which ply between Batticaloa and Valaichenai. The incident occurred near the spot where more than forty soldiers were killed very recently. Troops were tense. Traffic was held up for a long time.
It was apparent that the army was worried that the buses had been taken for the purpose of mounting an attack on its exposed positions in the interior to the southwest or its semi- beleagured camps on the road from Chenkaladi to Valaichenai.
Many usually well informed local people were, however, of the opinion that the vehicles had been taken by the LTTE to transport villagers in areas under their control to meetings which are being held widely to mark the Annai Poopathy week.
On Friday the Tigers attacked the commandos of the elite Special Task Force at Pulukunawa, a remote village in the Ampara district, killing more than sixteen of them. Though there may be little connection between the attack and the hijacking of the buses, it is still difficult to rule out the distinct possibility of the vehicles being used in preparations for a major offensive in the east which in the LTTE's view may thoroughly tilt the military balance in the region in their favour.
The army on the road between Valaichenai and Chenkaladi might for sure heave a sigh of relief only in the event of the buses being recovered or returned in the near future without incident.
There are seven military camps between Valaichenai and Chenkalady - a distance of eight miles. Of these the camps at Kinnaiady and Kalmadu which is near Kalkudah, control vulnerable approaches to the main road from the sea and from the interior.
A camp was established at Kaluwankerni on the coast east of Vantharumoolai to control the increasing activities of the Sea Tigers in the area which had made the army's positions on Chenkaladi - Valaichenai road doubly vulnerable. Despite this the security forces have been taking very heavy casualties on this route. First, the army lost more than sixty five soldiers (according to a local body count) in an encounter at Santhiveli, after which a camp was set up near the place and then at Mavadivempu it took more forty five casulaties - which later increased to about fifty two.
Why is the army so vulnerable in this relatively small area despite having such a large number of camps? The answer to this will throw some light on the general security situation in this part of the island.
The control of the trunk road between Chenkaladi and Valaichenai, which is a vital segment of the Main Supply Route to the district on its north western side, is precarious because immediately to its west and to its north lie vast areas which are held by the LTTE. The area covered by the seven army camps is therefore like a fragile islet in a hostile wilderness.
It takes hours every day for the army to clear short distances on the road before it can allow any traffic, including its own, to pass. This daily routine has become quite dangerous now. It is also sapping the strength of the camps. Though this is a high risk area, the situation which obtains in other sectors of the Batticaloa district is more or less the same.
The military balance in Batticaloa can be tentatively described as follows: The government is trying to ensure its hold on the district despite withdrawing a substantial number of troops to the north, by controlling three of the five strategic access routes to the region.
The three area, the Welikanda - Batticaloa road, the Kalmunai - Batticaloa road and the network of narrow dust roads from the Central Camp - Bakkiella area in the Ampara district to Mandoor and Vellaveli in the Batticaloa district.
The other vital access routes - the road from Maha Oya to Chenkaladi is under the full control of the LTTE beyond the derelict village of Pullumalai. The coastal road from Mutur to Batticaloa is in the hands of the Tigers between Kiliveddi and Kayankerni which is a few kilometers north of Valaichenai.
The three main access routes which are under the control of the security forces are under constant pressure from the Tigers who hold the hinterlands on the edges of which these routes lie.
The Welikanda - Batticaloa road is held by the army and the other two access routes are supervised by the STF. The strength of the army and the STF in their respective areas of operation seems to be adequate only to keep the routes precariously safe enough to ensure civilian and military traffic during daytime. They do not obviously have the ability or power to 'soften' LTTE positions in the hinterlands.
The security forces have engaged in major offensives like Operation Rivikirana and small scale Special Forces operations in the hinterlands to take the pressure of the three access routes. The massacre of twenty-six STF commandos in Vellaveli and the attack at Vantharumoolai show that the major offensives which were aimed at destroying the LTTE's military potential in the interior quite substantially, have had no effect.
Such offensives in the past were meant to keep the Tigers on the run, giving them little time between one major operation and the other to regroup and reestablish vital supply bases and sources.
Despite reports in the press that the recent big operations into the Tiger held hinterlands - the most popular in the military communique being Thoppigala have been quite successful in dispersing the LTTE. The pressure keeps increasing almost daily on the access routes which are under security forces control. Ex-Tamil militants who have undertaken deep penetration operation into the Thoppigala area say that the LTTE maintains vast base complexes there with permanent concrete structures which do not, according to them, seem to have been touched by artillery fire.
The LTTE's military network is so large in this area and supplemented by widely-strewn groups of auxillary forces that it is virtually impossible to score a hit and make a safe withdrawal they say. Although this may be the case in the Thoppigala and Vakarai regions, Special Forces operations have been somewhat more successful in bringing some pressure on the LTTE's mobility in the Paduvankarai hinterland.
This is mainly due to the influence which the Mohan's group still retains there. Special Forces Ops are carried out on a smaller scale by other Tamil groups as well.
In Eelam War Two the Mohan group operating with commandos of the Special Forces regiment were quite successful in bringing the LTTE's activities in Paduvankarai almost to a standstill after it ambushed and killed serveral key Tiger leaders including David.
Special Forces Ops are facilitated greatly in this region by the pervasive intelligence network cultivated and maintained by Mohan and his boys. They have an exceptionally large number of informants, infiltrators and moles who help them pick their targets with extreme precision. They have also been able to place explosive devices in Tiger camps.
But the LTTE seems to have become really alarmed after Mohan ambushed and killed Kalanesan and another Tiger who was travelling with him. Kalanesan was at that time believed to be the chief of LTTE's civilian intelligence organisation. It was discovered later, according to Mohan's associates, that the person who was killed along with Kalanesan, was Tharma, supposed to be the most senior operative in the LTTE's intelligence wing in the district.
Such S.F. operations being the most effective way of hitting at the LTTE now, Mohan has become indispensable to the government which at one time cried foul, at the work of his 'handlers' in the military intelligence like 'Captain Munaz'.
It has to therefore turn a blind eye to some of his non-military activities which in the past drew flak from human rights groups. However, the withdrawal of the larger portion of the Special Forces regiments to the north for the purpose of carrying on a counter insurgency campaign against the LTTE in the Valikamam sector and the closure almost all the camps in the interior, have now placed severe limitations on the operations of the Mohan group.
This has been further compounded by the manner in which the LTTE has devised its counter strategy.
Firstly, the Tigers withdrew all their important leaders to bases in the deep jungles about which Mohan and the military intelligence seem to have very scanty information. This happened soon after the killing of Tharma and Kalanesan. It was widely reported at that time that Karikalan, who was the most prominent of those who were 'withdrawn' thus, had been recalled to Jaffna by the Tiger leadership which was not happy with his statements to the press.
Karikalan in fact never went to Jaffna but remained in one of the remote base complexes, appearing regularly to meet the public at the LTTE office in Vakarai. No one it should be pointed out here, is able to carry out Special Forces operations in the vast Vakarai region.
There are few or no ex-Tamil militants or LTTE surrendees who know the area or who can cultivate a stable network of informants and infiltrators. This makes the Vakarai region virtually free of the deep penetration operations which seem to be a greater headache to the LTTE than large scale offensives.
Secondly, the LTTE has taken to road and area clearing operations before they permit their leaders to move into places considered vulnerable to S.F. ambush and attack. The public have to sometimes wait till eleven thirty in the morning at the LTTE office in Arasadythivu near Kokkaddicholai to meet officials.
One rarely comes across key Tiger leaders in the Paduvankarai region now. But one can see many ordinary cadres going about on motorbykes - some of which were captured from the army in Koduvamadu near Chenkaladi.
The LTTE has also made matters worse for Special Forces Ops by deploying auxiliary forces drawn from the large population of dispossessed paddy and chena cultivators in the hinterlands who were driven out of their lands during Eelam War Two by the army which believed that the prevention of cultivation could deprive the Tigers of essential food supplies - a method which appears to have worked in South America and Malasiya.
The presence of these militias which are armed with the FLN self-loading rifles now considered redundant by the LTTE, according to Mohan's boys, has made safe withdrawals after attacks in the interior virtually impossible in certain regions. They also say that LTTE surrendees are of little use these days because they (surrendees) do not know much about the key camps in the interior.
Therefore, with the major offensives not producing the desired effect in the hinterlands and with the S.F. operations losing their former impact, the task of taking the steadily increasing pressure on the three access routes to the Batticaloa district, off has become impossible. On the other hand the LTTE has made the following gains:
a) undisputed control of all the strategic hinterlands of the district plus the southern extreme of the Trincomalee district which is contiguous with Vakarai.
b) the ability to destabilise the three main supply routes at will, an ability which may eventually become power to interdict all military movement on them if the government were to concentrate in the north for a sufficiently long period.
c) the control of a large stretch of coast south of Ilankaithurai Muhathuvaram in Trincomalee district to north of the Kalkudah bay.
d) Recruitment. The Tigers have opened three recruitment centres (called Puthiya Poralihal Inaiyum Seyalaham in Tamil) in the Kokkaddicholay, Arasadithivu and Paddipalai. In recent months 47 boys and girls have joined the organisation from the village of Kokkaddicholai alone. A steady flow of recruits is reported from almost all the villages in the hinterlands.
This briefly is the fate of all the vast investments that the military made in pacifying the east between 1990 and 1994. Can the new investment made in the Jaffna peninsula yield dividends which can offset the abandonment of the vast investment of military resources in the east?
Two Tigers stalwarts killed in an uncleared area
Karuna Faction has carried out this attack about 10:45 last night.
(http://www.lankatruth.com/full_story/2006/June/20060616/20060616_6.htm)
Army denies false propaganda by Tiger terrorists
The report alleges that “Tamil Auxiliaries” on a road clearing patrol recovered a body of a person who they claim to be a soldier of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA). They say the soldier was killed during an exchange of fire between Nainamadu and Puliyankulam on the Nedunkerni road on Tuesday (13 June).
It also reports “The Auxiliaries seized boots and ammunitions” allegedly used by the Deep Penetration Unit of the Sri Lanka Army.
Also found by the Auxiliaries was one bag with ‘SLA’ markings.
The news report carried two photographs of the equipment and of the body.
It is an open secret that the Tigers are in possession of equipment and other military hardware including communication equipment captured from SLA during past operations against Security Forces.
Apparently the Tigers have used a few of these very same items for their advantage to justify their claim.
This is one of the innumerable instances the Tigers have attempted to tarnish the image of the Sri Lanka Security Forces in the eyes of the international community.
On June 12th an Officer was reported missing from the Forward Defence Line (FDL) Omanthai. On June 05th another Officer was reported missing from Vavuniya.
The possibility of the body to be that of one of the missing cannot be ruled out. The Tigers have a long history of resorting to the abduction of both military and civilians.
The above incident reported on 14.06.06 by the pro-Tiger media could be linked to another instance of their fabrication and false propaganda drive.
(www.lankatruth.com)
DPU agent killed, one captured, two trapped in Batticaloa
The two DPU attackers were still hiding in the jungle area. A cordon and search operation by the Tiger cadres was going on, Mr. Daya Mohan said.
The rescue team of the DPU, was attacked as they crossed the Batticaloa lagoon.
The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP), known as the Deep Penetration Unit (DPU), was given instructions to attack civilian targets, the captive has told the Tigers, according to Mr. Daya Mohan.
The DPU attacker in LTTE custody, has also revealed that their team was behind the Claymore attack, last week, in Pattipalai and another attack, at Thandiyadi Maveerar cemetary in Batticaloa.
The DPU rescue team had gone to the Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) office in Batticaloa earlier on Thursday and robbed the office, according to the captured LRRP attacker.
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission officials would be contacted Friday morning with the details from the captured Deep Penetrating Unit member, Daya Mohan further said.
(http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=18526)
Another penetrating SLA soldier gunned down, Claymore attack averted
Vavuniya district Political Head of the LTTE, Gnanam, handed over the dead body of the Sri Lankan DPU trooper to the ICRC officials. SLMM officials were also present at the Vavuniya district political secretariat of the LTTE in Puliyankulam where the body was handed over to the ICRC, sources added.
Meanwhile, a pickup vehicle narrowly escaped from a Claymore attack Thursday morning in Puliankulam area, Tamileelam Police sources in Kilinochhci said.
(http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=18515)
SLA soldier from DPU gunned down, Claymore attack averted
Vavuniya district Political Head of the LTTE, Gnanam, handed over the dead body of the Sri Lankan DPU trooper to the ICRC officials. SLMM officials were also present at the Vavuniya district political secretariat of the LTTE in Puliyankulam where the body was handed over to the ICRC, sources added.
Meanwhile, a pickup vehicle narrowly escaped from a Claymore attack Thursday morning in Puliankulam area, Tamileelam Police sources in Kilinochchi said.
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(http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=18515)
Second SLA soldier killed in LTTE area while trying to lay claymore mine
One SLA soldier was killed. His body is presently in Kilinochchi in preparation for handing over to the SLA tomorrow.
The dead soldier was wearing striped LTTE uniform like the other SLA soldier killed two days ago in LTTE area of Vavuniya district.
In the meantime a claymore attack by the SLA DPU in Kanagarayankulam in Vavuniya did not cause any damage. Several items left behind by the SLA team were found near the site.
(http://www.sibernews.com/the-news/tamileelam/second-sla-soldier-killed-in-ltte-
area-while-trying-to-lay-claymore-mine-200606154598/)
Wednesday, June 14, 2006
ARMY COUNTERS FALSE PROPAGANDA BY TIGER TERRORISTS
The report alleges that “Tamil Auxiliaries” on a road clearing patrol recovered a body of a male purported to be a Sri Lankan Army (SLA) soldier killed during an exchange of fire between Nainamadu and Puliyankulam on the Nedunkerni road on Tuesday (13 June).
It also reports “The Auxiliaries seized boots and ammunitions” allegedly used by the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) of the Sri Lanka Army.
Also found by the Auxiliaries was ONE bag with ‘SLA’ markings.
The news report carried two photographs of the equipment and one of the body.
It is an open secret that the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) are in possession of equipment and other military hardware including communication equipment captured from SLA during past operations against Security Forces.
Apparently the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) have used a few of these very same items for their advantage to justify their case.
This is one of the innumerable instances the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) have attempted to tarnish the image of the Sri Lanka Security Forces in the eyes of the international community.
On June 12th an Officer was reported missing from the Forward Defence Line (FDL) Omanthai. On June 05th another Officer was reported missing from Vavuniya.
The possibility of the body as one of the missing cannot be ruled out. The Tamil Tigers (LTTE) has a long history of resorting to the abduction of both military and civilians.
The above incident reported on 14.06.06 by the pro-LTTE media could be linked to another instance of LTTE fabrication and false propaganda.
(http://www.army.lk/morenews.php?id=858)
Eight killed in the north
International truce monitors say that they expect Tamil Tigers to hand over the body of the alleged Sri Lanka Army (SLA) soldier killed in rebel-held territory on Tuesday.
The LTTE said two of their members and a Sri Lanka Army (SLA) soldier were killed near Vavuniya in the rebel-held territory.
There has been a gunfire between the SLA and the LTTE in the area, Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) spokesman Thorfinnur Omarsson told BBC Sandeshaya.
Monitors who visited the scene have reported that the alleged SLA soldiers were not wearing military uniforms.
Setting up claymore mines
The SLMM is to make a ruling on the incident after receiving the body, Omarsson said.
But the SLA rejected LTTE claims that their soldiers entered rebel-held territory to set up claymore mines.
“Two soldiers have been abducted by the LTTE in last few days,” military spokesman Brigadier Prasad Samarasinghe told bbcsinhala.com.
Rejecting the LTTE claims, he said it one of those soldiers might have been killed in Vavuniya.
"It will only be clear when we recieve the body".
Transporting drugs
Meanwhile, Major Kamal Kariyawasam has been arrested in Vavuniya while transporting 15kg of drugs.
Describing it as “a disgrace” Brig. Samarasinghe said he should be brought into a military court.
In Jaffna, a soldier was killed by a sniper and an LTTE member was shot dead in Jaffna.
The spokesman accused the LTTE pistol group of killing a 56-year old civilian near Jaffna hospital.
Two home guards have been killed in Vavuniya, he added.(http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2006/06/printable/060614_sla_ltte.shtml)
Three killed in clash between LTTE and Sri Lankan forces
The clash occurred Tuesday in Nedunkerny village, the rebels said on their Web site.
Thorfinnur Omarsson, a spokesman for the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, a group of independent European cease-fire monitors, said ``it is apparently true'' that soldiers dressed in rebel uniforms were planting Claymore anti-personnel mines in the village.
Two rebels and one Government soldier were killed in the clash while four other soldiers escaped unhurt, he said.
However, military spokesman Brig. Prasad Samarasinghe accused the rebels of fabricating the incident and falsely accusing the soldiers of bearing arms in rebel territory -- a violation of a 2002 cease-fire agreement.
``This is totally fabricated,'' Samarasinghe said. ``We totally deny'' that armed soldiers were in the rebel-held village.
The government and the rebels have blamed each other for a recent spike in attacks that threatens the fragile truce.
Hundreds of government soldiers and dozens of Tamil Tigers have been killed since April, but both sides deny responsibility for the violence.
The Tamil Tiger rebels began fighting for a separate homeland in 1983, accusing the majority Sinhalese of discrimination. More than 65,000 people were killed before the cease-fire.
(http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/003200606141340.htm)
Soldier missing from Omanthai FDL since Tuesday
Claymore attack averted in Vanni, 3 dead in gunfire
The body of the SLA trooper was captured by the auxilliaries.
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission officials inspected the clash site and the body of the DPU trooper who was killed in the firefight.
Commander Velevan of the LTTE explained the details of the DPU planned Claymore attack that was averted.
The auxilliaries seized tools and ammunition used by the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) troops of the the Sri Lanka Army. LRRP is also known as Deep Penetration Unit.
(http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=18491)
Monday, June 12, 2006
Twenty one tamil tigers killed in mine attacks
At least 21 people were killed and 20 others injured in mine attacks carried out by government forces in the island's embattled north-east during the past six days, Tamil Tiger rebels have claimed.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) said government troops infiltrated areas held by the guerrillas and staged the devastating attacks, a claim rejected by the military.
However, there had been several reports of Claymore mine attacks in areas held by the Tigers.
Both sides had stepped up attacks and counter attacks in the past six months during which at least 680 people have been killed despite a truce that is in place since February 2002.
A government soldier was killed today in a mine attack the military blamed on the Tiger rebels.
(http://www.daijiworld.com/home.asp)
LTTE political official sniped and killed in Batticaloa
The Sri Lanka Army sniper had targeted the LTTE official from the SLA controlled area beyond the lagoon, from Murakkoddanchenai.
Captian Ramanitharan (Vadivel Kangatharan), 28, is from Thihiliveddai.
Ramanitharan's body was taken in procession from Thihiliveddai to the burial site at Tharavai Heroes' cemetary and burried with military honours Sunday evening, Daya Mohan said.(http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=18477)
Vavuniya North DS wounded, driver killed in Claymore attack
The Divisional Secretary, Mr. Pathmanathan, was wounded.
Meanwhile, a Claymore attack targeted devotees traveling to Vatrapalai temple festival on Nedunkerny Mulliavalai Road around 12:50 p.m. Monday. No casualties were reported.
The escalating Sri Lankan penetration attacks have targeted civilian travellers inside LTTE controlled territory.(http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=18478)
LTTE Injures Tamil Asst. Divisional Secretary and Four Others in MULLAITTIVU
LTTE Terrorist has exploded yet another claymore mine in un-cleared areas off NEDUNKERNI, MULLAITTIVU injuring a Tamil Assistant Divisional Secretary, his driver and three others Monday (12th June) morning around 9.15 a.m.
The victims were traveling in a double cab when the terrorists exploded the mine in NEDUNKERNI.
The most seriously injured were KADIRAMALANADAN PASANTHAMAN, Assistant Divisional Secretary, NEDUNKERNI and his driver who were rushed to COLOMBO for further treatment.
It is suspected that the terrorists set off the mine after they identified the vehicle as one that does not belong to them.
The incident has exposed the Tiger policy of killing anyone entering "their" territory and shifting the blame on the Security Forces.
(http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20060612_04)
A claymore mine explosion killed two civilians, SLMM reports MANNAR police
SLMM has informed MANNAR police that two civilians were killed due to a claymore mine explosion at PERIYAMADU in the LTTE dominated area today (08th) around 12.50 p.m. The two victims include an engineer who had been employed in an irrigational project in the area. However, the police came to know about the incident as the SLMM reports received around 7.30p.m. (08th).
Further, the SLMM sources confirmed that LTTE was planning to hand over the two dead bodies to Government Agent in MANNAR tomorrow (09th).
(http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20060608_10)Pro LTTE media comes up with its latest innovation: Deep penetration unit (DPU) of Sri Lanka Army by Kalayani Diyasena
Having failed in their previous strategies i.e; Para Military Issue and then the alleged Extra Judicial Killings; the innovative minds behind Pro Terror media have come up with their latest innovation- a "Deep Penetration Unit "to Sri Lanka Army. This latest addition to Sri Lanka Army have been created by Pro LTTE media as a measure for avoiding the responsibility coming to the parent organization of the recent wave of attacks .
Unfortunately, the behaviors of the LTTEs Political wing headed by Mr. Thamiselvan, Military wing headed by Mr. Prabhakaran (or possibly Mr. Soosai) and Intelligence wing headed by Mr. Pottu Amman do not seem to provide any support to the Pro Terror media strategies, in their painful struggle to prevent the reality of the LTTE coming out.
After reaching to OSLO whilst enjoying VIP treatments offered by the government, LTTE political heads, now hesitate to negotiate with the government. Perhaps they might not know what to negotiate when their military leaders are out of control in Wanni. But for obvious reasons the LTTE political delegation would love to stay in Oslo than to go back to Wanni; where they know the "Maniac" waiting for them.
Mr. Pottu Amman, the master mind behind LTTE's "intelligent" operation and the " man behind the scene" of all pro LTTE media, operating overseas and in the country itself (including the "Head" media network and "Leader" publishers), seems to lost in old world war II stories on covert operations. Having failed to locate Colonel Karuna, Mr. Amman and his mob go on berserk killing everyone that has a different view form LTTE's, calling them to be pro Karuna people. His well planned dramas of "Manthivu Killings" and "Allaippidy massacre" also failed to yield sufficient results as they could not get the support of the Tamil civilians in the area. Mr. Aman has a personal war to fight, thus he has very little interest in bringing peace to Tamil community.
Mr. Soosai, the happiest man in the world since Colonel Karuna estranged, has begun to emulate his beloved role model, Adolph Hitler. Hoarding innocent civilians by the rule of the bullet, ordering them to run few miles and arm them with clubs , Mr. Soosai and his mob train them how to smash a child's head when they are sent on future " Mission" in Sinhalese or Muslim villages . Mr. Soosai has become so belligerent it seems; his mobs continue with small scale attacks to the FDL and carryout out claymore explosion using innocent civilians but without success and with heavy losses. Mr. Soosai has no interest in achieving lasting peace, he only needs the ceasefire, since it gives him more opportunity to score more marks from the leadership. Why should he worry about the lives of the Tamil people, he never goes to war anyway. Recently at one of his ridiculous ceremony of graduating innocent civilians with clubs and red head bands, he boasted "The Sinhalese will not understand when you say something normally, but if you make the Sinhalese to understand in the proper way then they will begin to understand."
Many claymore mines were exploded and many were killed in both government controlled areas and in the LTTE dominated areas, just after LTTE delegation left OSLO. Ironically, LTTE accuses security forces for all these crimes. Of course, the security forces must bear the responsibility for their inability to prevent such attacks in the areas under their control, but how they can possibly stop the violence in LTTE dominated areas, when the present cease fire agreement does not allow security forces to enter in to those areas.
Above all, if Sri Lanka Army can proceed to those locations far behind the LTTE defence line as they(LTTE) accuse, the deterioration of the command structure of LTTE is much more than ever anticipated by the defence analysts.
(http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20060609_04)





