A WALK INSIDE THE INDIAN’S CAMP (www.mavcsog.com)

Forward: This story is dedicated to the MACV-SOG soldiers. It was written by Alfred C. Friend, SGM, deceased, known as "Al" to his friends. Al was a former SFA and SOA member. He spent many hours writing of his experiences in Vietnam to pass on to the future generations of the Special Forces community. The manuscript was given to his Special Forces buddy, SGM Ben (Bennie) Dunakoskie, Ret.. After Al’s passing, the manuscript came into the possession of SGM Bert Moore, Ret., also a MACV-SOG veteran, who has passed them on to me to have them published on the MACV-SOG website in his honor. Photographs and notes added by Robert L. Noe.

Edited and submitted by Cpt. Robert L. Noe, (MACV-SOG) whose brother, Frank Ray Noe, also a SOG vet, who was killed in action---in memory of those who served.

Special appreciation to Randy Goodfriend for assisting me in the final edit and proof reading in this endeavor.

"What kind of man volunteered for SOG?", and "Why would a man volunteer for SOG?" Although there seemed to be no single reason for placing ones-self in jeopardy, there were some obvious reasons which explained the steady stream of volunteers flowing into SOG. Some volunteered for this most hazardous duty because of a deep sense of patriotism and devotion to duty; others, volunteered for their own personal reasons which defied explanation and some soldiers, returning home after a tour in Vietnam, found themselves divorced, deserted, or betrayed by their wives, they returned to Vietnam to fight their own inner battles. There are a number of spouses who could not or would not understand the reason why their men "went off to war to protect them." These SOG volunteers accepted their responsibilities with the knowledge they would probably die within the coming year. Death was an ever present companion of every reconnaissance man, it keep him company throughout his tour, in his loneliness and fear. "Every SOG mission (regardless of type) was fraught with inherent dangers which were above and beyond the call of duty," that went routinely unrewarded and without recognition due to the classified nature of the various missions- to each and every man, this nation owes a great debt of gratitude.

Harve Saal, SOG, MACV Studies and Observation Group (Behind Enemy Lines), Volume III, Pg 7 & 8. Edward Brothers, Inc., 1990

One afternoon, after a hard day’s training in the jungle heat, several of the training cadre and students were in the club relaxing having a couple of beers when Woody (SSGT Jason T Woodworth) of FOB-2 asked, Al, you and Ben have already taken a team out, what’s it like, I mean as compared to the patrols we’ve taken out from our other camps? I considered this for a few minutes then responded with as much seriousness as I could muster. Well, for one thing, you're in Indian country. (In the middle of hostile territory.)

You're like a mouse trying to tiptoe through a room full of sleeping cats. You know if one wakes up it's going to be a fight and if he catches you, that's it! You also know that if they catch you it's going to go hard on an American1. As an American, you have a certain intelligence value, not to mention a hostage value, and almost certainly will endure a visit to one of their POW camps, if they don’t execute you on the spot. But for the Viet's (Vietnamese) and Nungs (ethnic Chinese), it's certain death - a long hard one! Once you’ve crossed the border and are detected by a superior enemy force, you’re in for the fight for your life. You can certainly relate to the entire emotional range that General Custer’s men felt with all those hostile Indians trying to forcefully evict them, with all the means at their disposal, from what they feel is their territory. These factors do come to mind every now and then when you’re inside the Indian’s camp, checking them out, they aren’t too happy with you being there!

You and one or two other Americans have a seven or eight man team in the middle of thousands of North Vietnamese and if you stir them up, they're like a hive of mad hornets. If you’re not shot out of the air trying to get in or out, from the time you get off of the chopper until you get picked up, you're on your own. You live with a tight ass the whole time, get little or no sleep and when you do come out, there's no "atta boy" you weren't there in the first place. Other than that, it's a piece of cake2.

Ben and I, with Sgt Gene Williams ran the fifth SOG mission into Laos. SGM Charles "Slat" Petry, SFC William Card and SFC Jim "Halo" Smith ran the first two missions with similar results. That's why we stress your team selection and training so much. If you come upon a bad apple, you've got to throw it out. Just one can screw the whole operation up. Let me tell you about our mission, when we were trying to get this thing off the ground. It'll give you a good idea of how screwed up things can get on both sides and it taught us a lot of lessons we can pass on to you.

We were staging out of Kham Duc in late 1965 in the mountains close to the Lao border, Southwest of Da Nang. It used to be Emperor Dao Dai’s hunting lodge, but we've got Detachment A-105 there now and I don't envy them one bit. If you don't know where it's at, don't worry, you soon will. It's our Forward Operating Base - FOB, we call it - in

I Corps and the arm pit of all SF camps in Vietnam. You can walk out the front gate and get ambushed before you get to the runway. The team before the one that's in there now laid out a minefield, but the grass has grown so high, nobody knows where the mines are located, so the grass just keeps growing higher and nobody wants to go out into the field because they’re not to hot on the idea of being blown to hell by American mines.

Our target was a possible storage area in the mountains across the border in Laos and we had been waiting a week for the rain to let up. I had just about given up hope when the clouds lifted. COL Call (LTC Raymond "Cherokee" Call) in Da Nang shot the helicopters right up to Kham Duc to take advantage of the weather break and I was a little antsy about going in with that marginal weather. If it closes in after you get in your operational area, there's no way to get you out, except to walk. But MACV was pushing to get the program moving, so we went in.

We got off the landing zone with no problem, but just as I had feared, the weather socked back in right after we started moving. Rain was really coming down. It was really miserable slogging through the underbrush and elephant grass, some of it ten to twelve feet high and water logged with about a week's rain and every time we brushed up against a bush or the grass, we got showered.

Finally, we decided that the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) weren't on the trails in this lousy weather so we decided to make as much time as we could on the trails until the weather cleared. We were still in our black pajamas, since we were soaked already, we were not going to change them. Our three best Nungs were on point and Ski (SFC Bennie ‘Ben’ Dunakoskie), the Vietnamese Lieutenant and I were in the back of the column. The Viet was not too bad, but a little flaky. I had to watch him like a hawk so I kept him in a position where he couldn't cause too much serious trouble.

Well, we’re smoking up that trail and didn't run into anyone so when the rain let up we decided to push on a little further, then move back into the brush. We were a little strung out and the trail twisted and turned quite a bit so we couldn't keep the point in view all of the time. Our point men came around one curve and saw an NVA patrol coming down the trail right at them and passed a signal back to alert us, but somehow it didn't get passed back to us. Well, it was the damnest thing you ever saw! When we came around our part of the curve, we could see our point on the trail ahead jacking jaws with the NVA patrol like they were old friends.

I signaled for everybody to hold back, so we could see what was going to happen, but our Viet sort of came unglued when he came around the corner and saw what was going on. Before I could get back to him, he cocked his "K" (a Swedish Submachine gun) and shot a burst into the NVA. Then all hell broke loose.

The point men picked up on it right away and they cut down whatever NVA they could see and started backing down the trail towards us, firing as they came. As more NVA came up the trail, we opened fire on them to let the point get back to us then started a fire and fall back maneuver to get into the brush. Luckily the NVA held their position, firing into the bush where we had gone. My point man said the NVA they had ran into was the point for a company-size unit. I peeked out of the grass and saw that the NVA were standing there arguing, probably trying to make a decision as to whether to go into the bush after us or wait for reinforcements.

We moved a little further back in the brush, then got everybody together. I noticed that Lon, one of the point men, had caught a round in the shoulder so I dressed it the best I could and then put the point at the rear of the column, with me and Ski now on the point. We started hauling ass out of there, back towards our Landing Zone (LZ). After we had moved as fast as we could for about an hour, we stopped and checked everybody out. A couple more of the Nungs had slight wounds and we patched them up so they wouldn't leave blood trails and started out again. The adrenaline from the fire fight had worn off and was replaced with a sort of cold fear. I knew that when they found our trail and got organized, they would be coming after us and I wanted to put as much distance as possible between us and them before darkness fell. We didn't worry too much about noise as we crashed through the dense brush. We stopped every once in awhile to shoot azimuths and check our maps to try to find our exfiltration LZ; the brush was so thick we couldn't see any terrain features to locate ourselves and just hoped we were going in the general direction. We discovered some trails, probably made by natives of the area hunting, that cris-crossed the area and I decided we might use one of them to move faster. We had a scheduled radio contact with the Control Team to make, but that was more than two hours off, so we just shot azimuths and followed them.

I could faintly hear the NVA in the distance hollering to each other, they sounded some distance off and scattered, but I knew that when they found our trail and sent their trackers after us, it wouldn't take them long to get the pursuit started. I stopped the team and got Ski, the Viet, and the point man together and told them we were going to do a step off from the trail, back into the bush. We had practiced it in training, so everybody knew the drill. See, we kept moving, but every few meters, starting with the point man, we stop and one man moves off the trail. The man stepping off the trail takes off his pack and other members part the brush for him so he can step off the trail and into the deep brush without leaving any sign of his departure. When he's in the bush, we pass his rucksack to him, then let the brush stand back in its normal position, clean up any marks that might be on the trail and begin our movement again. The man in the bush parallels us about six feet off the trail as we move up and repeat the process until the team is down to the last two men, these two men then do a "stutter step" to make about the same number of tracks as the entire team would have made on the trail until they get another few meters up the trail, then back down and move off. Hopefully the NVA would follow our tracks on up the trail until they stopped and then try to figure out what happened. It wouldn't fool them forever but would buy us enough time to put some distance between them and us.

By the time we got everybody together, it was almost time for our radio contact, we started moving faster, looking for a small clearing where we could get out from beneath the tree cover. We couldn't hear any voices behind us but knew that didn't mean they had given up. If they had moved off into another direction or further up the trail, they would soon realize that we had given them the slip and they would go back to the trail. Their trackers would be scouring every step of that trail until they found out where we left it.

This procedure allowed us to gain some time, hopefully enough to get out. About fifteen minutes before contact, we found a small clearing that could be seen from the air and put out our signal panels. I turned the radio on low and could hear Control calling us, using our calling sign. As soon as we could hear the aircraft, I started guiding him to our location by the sound of his engine. It took the aircraft a couple of passes before he finally saw our panels and gave us a grid coordinate on the location, then an azimuth to the nearest cleared area where helicopters could land, which was about three kilometers from our current position. He asked if we were under pressure and I gave him two clicks for ‘yes’ and he told us the next contact would be at nine the next morning since the clouds were rolling in and it’s now too late for the choppers to get there before night fall. I clicked for okay and he peeled off and began circling another location and talking to try to throw the NVA off of our location. We packed up and moved out to make as much time as we could before the darkness fell.

We ate on the move and just before dusk took a fifteen minute break to take a nap and get everything settled down. I checked Lon and his wound was still bleeding so I stuffed another bandage in under the old one and tightened it down to try to stop the flow of blood. Then we moved until it was almost too dark to go anymore. We found a pretty good clump of brush and crawled into it forming a circle, everybody lying in a circular formation, where each is within touching distance of a team member one at his feet and one at his head. That way we can wake somebody snoring, alert each other and wake the next guy up for guard duty. I don't think anybody really fell asleep. Like me, I guess they were waiting to see if we had really lost our trackers.

We laid there for about an hour, cold as hell and wet, when we heard automatic firing in the distance. The NVA were performing a tactical technique referred to as "reconnaissance by fire." I nudged Can (Nung) and told him to pass the word for everybody to keep the bolts on their K’s forward so they wouldn't go off accidentally and not to fire until I did. As the enemy’s firing and voices came closer, I could feel the hair on my neck rising and my guts were tightening. The shooting was sporadic, a burst or two, then another burst. I knew they were hoping we would spook and return fire and then they would have us. As they got closer, I got more nervous, hoping everybody would keep their cool. A few rounds zipped about seven or eight feet over our heads and I gripped the ankle of the Nung in front of me to tell him to keep his cool. This message was passed around the circle. Finally, I could see them about thirty yards in front of us carrying torches and searching the ground for tracks but the thick grass would pretty much have straightened out and erased our footprints. During one burst of fire, I eased the bolt on my K back and it sounded like a thunder clap to me, but was lost in their firing. They sprayed the clumps of bushes around them, including ours but the bullets were passing over or heads about 4-5 feet.

They stopped about thirty or forty feet from our place of hiding and held a pow wow. I thought they'd never leave, then Can reached up and patted my ankle softly.

I turned, but couldn't see him, but then saw the NVA heading off in the direction we had come from. Let me tell you, I was shaking like a leaf in a windstorm and it damn sure wasn't from the cold. We waited for about 45 minutes as the torches and voices died away, I then posted a guard and we caught a few winks.

Just before daylight, we ate some chow and pushed on, a few yards at a time, stopping every few minutes to listen for voices, then moving and listening again. Jungle sounds of birds and animals began again and we knew we had lost them. The clouds were still hanging over us and everything was a haze. I hoped, if the sun came up, it would burn some of the cloud cover off.

At about six thirty we found a small stream coming down off the mountain from the direction of where our exfiltration (Exfil) LZ was located and I decided we could move up it since it was heading in the right direction and would wash away our tracks. It was pretty fair moving, so about seven thirty we pulled up on the bank to rest which gave me a chance to check the wounds. Lon’s shoulder wasn't looking too good and the night on the ground hadn't helped it. I took off the old bandage, cleaned the wound the as best I could and put a new one on, tightening it down again to stop the flow of blood. The bullet was still in there and he had to grit his teeth to keep from screaming. I put a better bandage on it and tightened it down and gave him some tetracycline (tet) to fight a possible infection. Finally, I fashioned a sling to keep his arm up and we transferred most of his food and ammo to the other team members and got rid of his pack. The other two Nungs' wounds were minor, so I redressed them, gave them some "tet" and buried the old bandages. We took another twenty minutes to rest and when we stood up I reached for Lon's ‘K', but he shook his head and slung it over his good shoulder.

We stopped at eight to make radio contact and waited for thirty minutes, but didn't hear any aircraft. The weather was socked in and I didn't really expect anything to be flying and I can say we were all a little disappointed. During the 2nd mission, with SGM Petry, a CH-34 helicopter with Captain Thorne3, and a bird dog had crashed after inserting them because of the adverse weather, neither were ever recovered and assumed dead.

We must have been about 200 meters from the LZ when the point opened fire and all hell broke loose. Evidently we had zigged when we should have zagged and ran directly head on to one of the NVA’s search parties. The Nungs didn't hesitate, just charged into the NVA hooting and shooting. It took the enemy totally by surprise and I guess we pretty well wiped them out and broke for our exfil LZ as fast as we could. We knew our only hope now was to set up the exfil LZ and try to hold on until the air contact came in. We didn't get any more enemy fire and I figured the NVA had spread into small parties to check different areas to see if they could find us.

After we reached our LZ, I stopped the patrol and checked everybody out. I sent Ski and a couple of Nungs back to see if there were any more NVA still in the area. Three of the Nungs had minor wounds but they grinned weakly up to me and wrapped first aid packets around whatever was bleeding. I headed for Lon. He was slumped up against a small tree, his face pale and drawn from fatigue and pain. His black jacket was wet with blood down the right side and it was pretty evident he had lost a lot of it. l straightened him up and pried his "K" from his blood-stained fingers and opened his jacket. The bandage was completely soaked and blood was seeping down from under it. I took it off, applied a couple of compresses over the wound and applied a pressure pad over it and tightened it down as tight as I could. He almost passed out from the pain and I knew I was grinding that bullet down every time I tightened the bandage but I had to stop the bleeding. I lashed adhesive tape over the bandage to hold it down then gave him some aspirin and a dextroamphetamine to keep him moving. I knew it wasn't enough but that was all I could do under the circumstances. Lon was going nowhere and I knew we weren't either.

A burst of fire came from where Ski and Can had gone and bullets snapping over my head brought me out of my worry about Lon. I grabbed his "K," broke it open and threw the bolt in one direction and the rest of the gun in another so it couldn't be used. I then signaled two of the Nungs to come over and get Lon to his feet and head for our LZ. As Ski and Can backed into our position, three NVA came charging through the bushes into our gun sights and when they realized they had stumbled on to us, a look of total surprise and horror was etched onto their faces as our bullets impacted their bodies and they fell dead, but it was too late. Evidently, they were trying to get back to their buddies and weren't expecting to run into us because they had their AK's (Automatic Assault Rifle) slung over their shoulders. I cut down the first one and Ski got the other two. We backed up, covering the two Nungs carrying Lon and moved to the edge of our LZ. We pulled all of our people back into the brush, set up our perimeter and Ski crawled out to the middle of the LZ to set up our panels. Then he and Can moved to the other side of the LZ to secure it.

Everything moved down to a deathly silence on the LZ as I got out my books and began to make out a message. In the distance I could hear a couple of NVA calling back and forth to each other. I placed my hand on Lon's mouth and signaled silence with a finger across my lips, but he laid his hand on mine and shook his head. I knew it was killing him to keep from crying out loud but he realized he was going to have to put up with the pain. I got my radio out and turned it on low volume, waiting for a call from the recovery crew. We could hear random shooting in the distance but it soon started ebbing away until silence reigned on our LZ. I knew they hadn't given up the search, but were just moving it to other areas. It was getting pretty tight for us. If we didn't get evacuated out before they got reinforcements in they could organize a good sweep that would find us.

As the morning wore on, I started to get worried since the weather wasn't looking too good. I knew if air couldn't get in to us before the afternoon, we were finished, because the NVA wanted us bad and would use everything they had to find us. About ten o'clock, I heard the control AlE aircraft droning through the clouds and switched the air-ground radio on. I kept the volume as low as I could and still hear it. Pretty soon I heard COL Call's voice giving our call sign over and over. I clicked the speaker button on the radio twice, then repeated it to let him know we were on the air. Clicking the radio instead of talking lets the contact group know you're there but under enemy pressure. I didn't want to talk until the very last minute so we guided him over our LZ with clicks. Two meant he was going away from us and three he was headed for us. When he got close, I went under a poncho and went on voice to guide him right over us.

l read off my code sheet twice, to make sure he had it. COL Call gave me a "Roger" and flew off to decode it. About fifteen minutes later he flew back, staying a little off the LZ and circling. If the NVA were trying to track us by the plane's position, it would lead them away from us. While Call was gone, I checked Lon and the other Nungs. Lon's face was grey, the loss of blood was really beginning to tell. I knew we had to get him out fast. The other Nung’s wounds weren't quite as bad, but they were hurting. Still they faced outward from my temporary CP (Command Post) ready for anything that came our way.

Colonel Call finally got back on the air and said he was sending an evac (evacuation) aircraft for the wounded. "You people have only been out for three days. I want you to continue your recon (reconnaissance patrol) after the wounded are out!" That really pissed me off! There were only three of us not wounded. The NVA were almost on top of us and it was suicide to keep on with the mission after the wounded were out. "Negative!", I answered strongly, hoping to convince him, "We're all coming out. Mission is aborted!" "Negative that," Call came back. "The mission is scheduled for 5 days, continue on after the wounded are out!"

l exploded at that. "No Goddamn way! We wouldn't last another ten hours here. I'm not getting my ass waxed so your damn operations plan goes as scheduled. Get us out of here and now, or I swear to God I'll find my way back and blow your fucking brains out!" I was so damn mad I had stopped talking in code and had almost shouted the last part of the message.

The radio went silent for a few seconds, then Call finally came back on the air. "Roger that Al, are we going to need air to get you out?" That's a Charlie (Roger), all you can get. They're heavy around here and it won't take them long to get here. I told him to use "Shining Brass," our code word that told everybody that a Recon Team was in trouble, once we used that code, the Flying Command Center which controlled all aircraft in our area would stop any combat aircraft in the air and direct them to our location to support us. Call responded with "Roger that." and the Bird Dog flew off so he wouldn't give our location away.

So now we waited. Ski was still maintaining his position but I knew he had heard what went on. I knew that he was probably so damn mad by now that he probably had a few words for Call but he remained silent and continued his surveillance. I sent a note to him to tell him what was going on and for him to send a couple of Nungs out to the middle of the LZ to remove any obstructions to the helicopters landing. The grass was high and there couldn’t be anything under the grass that might damage the birds. We had to do everything on our hands and knees because we didn't want to stand up and possibly have some of the NVA spot us. We didn't have enough people to stand off an attack if they located us.

About twenty minutes later I heard an NVA patrol passing close to our position and heading down the hill away from us. They were joking and laughing and after they passed, one of the Nungs, grabbed my arm when they were out of view. Through the Viet, who interpreted for the Nungs, he said that the NVA soldiers were laughing about a "Tiger Hunt" that would take place when two more companies joined them from the West.

I crawled out toward the center of the LZ to check the weather. It had been cloudy all morning but now some deep and heavy stuff was moving in. By the looks of the clouds, I knew we were in for some heavy weather and didn't have too much time remaining before being locked in. I knew that even with fighter cover it was going to be an ass-kicking contest to get us out and the extraction may be by string, hooked up to a rope under a helicopter.

We hadn't heard anything and I was seriously making plans to E&E (Escape and Evade) if something didn't come in soon. Just as I had about decided we would have to bug out, I heard a blasting noise and a F-104 fighter zoomed over our position, the sonic boom trailing after it nearly deafening us. He slipped down the slope towards the NVA, then cut off to the right and went screaming back into the air. I heard my radio cracking and turned up the volume. It didn't matter how much noise we made now. The Flight Leader was calling over and over, "Shining Brass, Shining Brass, this is Lancer Leader, over."

Shouting with a big smile on my face, I broke in between his calls, "Lancer Leader, this is Shining Brass. Damn it's good to see you people!"

The pilot laughed. "Roger, understand you people have a little problem down there we can help you with. The chug-a-lugs are right behind us. Where do you want the stuff?"

I knew Call was going to have to coordinate the air while we were getting out so I told Lancer Leader I wanted him to do some clearing around the LZ before the choppers landed. "Everything 50 meters out from our panels is enemy." If you can spray those areas good, I can start getting ready for the evac. Lancer zoomed over us at about 400 feet and started his gun run to the West at about 100 meters from our LZ. He banked off to the right and roared back into the air. I called him, "Lancer, you drew gunfire just as you banked right. Don't bank the same way again."

"Roger little buddy he answered. I've got the cure for that." His radio blanked out for a few seconds and a flight of three F4's screamed over the hill and plastered the area with bombs and gunfire.

Ski came up to me while I was on the radio saying, "Lots of movement here Slats, I'm moving my people onto the LZ."

"Roger that." I called Lancer. "My people are moving onto the LZ from the Northwest, about 50 meters from the panels. They report lots of movement about 300 meters from the panels."

"Well, we'll take care of that little thing," Lancer replied and soon after another flight of F-104's streaked over us to hit the area. I was getting almost deaf from the gunfire and bombs, but damn glad to hear them.

Call came on the radio. "Al, Cowboy's4 ready to come in"

Lancer Leader stated, "I'll coordinate the air so get your people ready on the LZ." I called back "Roger" and told the Viet to have two of the Nungs carry Lon out to the panels and pick them up. I called Ski and he was on the way. I pointed to the LZ area saying to the other Nungs, Mau Lien, Mau Lien!' (Move fast!). They shouldered their K’s and headed out to the pick-up area. Two H-34 helicopters topped the ridge and dove straight towards the LZ.

About that time, Lancer was back on the air. "I'm following the choppers in, Little buddy, I'll make the first run, you give me corrections, let me have your smoke and identify." I grabbed a yellow smoke and tossed it into the middle of the field and called "Yellow!"

Lancer came back in, "Well, isn't that interesting. Just after you said Yellow another one popped off about 300 yards to your left. Guess we've got a smart ass down there Brass, but we'll take care of that." He banked left and headed to where I could see faint yellow clouds reaching into the air. Evidently the NVA were on our air frequency. Shortly behind Lancer came another flight of FA's. Lancer zoomed over the area and dropped a red marker into the middle of the yellow smoke and the other FA's dropped their ordnance on the red marker. Lancer called. "Now gimme another and identify." I threw a red and identified it.

"Well, that taught them a lesson," Lancer said. He called on his frequency, "Serves the little bastards right, lying to me. Okay gang, now let's get serious about this shit." Fighter bombers came screaming over the hill spraying both sides and the Western portions of the LZ. I could hear, through the exploding bombs and strafing, heavy automatic fire from the NVA and occasional thudding of a heavy machine gun.

Another flight of F104's zoomed over and I told them to move their strike zone to the edge of the LZ, since I could tell by the approaching light weapons fire that the NVA were trying to move closer to us to get away from the jet strikes. I yelled, "Now Ski!" over the radio and we started for the LZ. Moving through the high elephant grass was hell. It can slice you like a knife, but we didn't care. We got to the clearing in the middle of the LZ at the same time as Ski and his troops. I was glad to see Lon conscious, although in obvious pain, but lugging Lon and helping the other wounded took a lot out us. In the distance, I could hear the 'whup whup" of the helicopters chugging in. When Cowboy called and told us he had our panels in sight, we picked them up so they wouldn't fly up into his rotor blades and popped a green smoke so he wouldn't lose our position. I had two Nungs pick up Lon and pointed to three other Nungs and the Viet to go on the first chopper, the rest of us the second. Just as we were getting ready, some UH-lB helicopter gun ships came in, spraying the area around our LZ and I got worried when I heard return fire from the NVA. Cowboy slanted his helicopter toward the LZ, the downdraft from his helicopter blades blowing the grass down. He didn’t even touch the ground as we put Lon and the other Nungs into chopper and he waved his hand at me and really poured on the coals getting out of there.

Suddenly, I heard Call waving Mustachio (another Vietnamese helicopter pilot), off and calling the Hueys back in. There was about a platoon of NVA about 100 meters from us, moving in fast. The Hueys pored some real heavy fire into them and the NVA began to retreat through the Elephant grass. But we weren't home free yet. Ski and Canh both cut loose with their AK's as two NVA, who had outrun their buddies burst into the clearing. The Hueys came back in sprayed the area. Following them, Mustachio came in behind the Huey's, making a light touchdown. Ski and I tossed the Viet and two Nungs in and scrambled in behind them. The NVA firing seemed to have stopped but Mustachio took no chances. Instead of going straight up, he skimmed the grass towards the top of the hill and as he gained more altitude he really poured the coals to the bird and began to get more altitude. The Hueys remained in the area to keep the NVA down and then later joined us in convoy. Relieved, I sat in my canvas seat and watched our LZ begin to fade in the distance but as the LZ retreated from view, "Spooky," the AC-47 gun ship came in behind us and started working the area over with his mini-guns. These fire at the rate of about four thousand rounds a minute and the whole area erupted. I knew there wasn't much that could have survived that working over. As we chugged along towards Da Nang, I kept thinking about the title to a book, or maybe it was a movie "Hell In A Very Small Place." After returning to base, we had suffered one Vietnamese Killed in action, several wounded and one American wounded.

Lon was in pretty bad shape and it was touch and go for awhile. We sent the other wounded Nungs to the dispensary to get their wounds treated. I sent Ski to the club to get us a drink then headed over to the Headquarters. COL Call and I had a little heated session and straightened out our differences. I went to the club and Ski and I got half-blasted with Cowboy and Mustachio. There were about forty holes in Cowboy’s bird (helicopter) and he was really pissed off. Ski and I got on a C47 later that afternoon and flew down to Saigon to report to the Bull (Col Arthur D. "Bull" Simon). He likes the Americans to come directly down to report to him after a mission so he can get everything straight before we had to unload the results to MACV. He especially wants to know what problems we encountered so he can straighten them out before MACV debriefs us. Bull doesn't want us washing our dirty laundry with them, for instance like my wrangle with COL Call. I laid the whole thing out to Bull and he later got together with Call and straightened things out.

If you request an exfiltration, nobody will argue with you, you get out, but Bull will damn sure want to know why so your reason had better be damn good." He looked over at me. "You know the Bull (Arthur D. "Bull" Simon5), Al, he thinks that anyone only giving 150 percent is a slacker". We decided to break up the team. Sent the Viet back to his unit, retired Lon and absorbed the rest of the Nungs into our strike force here. After what they went through, we weren't sure how they'd react on another mission. We learned a lot on that run and hope it will be of use to you in setting your teams up and your training. If you have any problems, come see Ski or myself. He stood up, "Whew, that brought back a lot of memories, I'm going to bed and get my nightmares started. Good night!" I went out the door leaving Ben and my message to play back in their minds knowing their job was cut out for them.

NOTES

Note 1: By the end of the war, no American running special operations that had been lost in Laos was ever returned alive.

Note 2: By the end of the war, a relative small organization would lose a minimum of 400 Americans killed or missing in action performing across the border operations

Note 3: After inserting the first SOG Reconnaissance mission with SGM Petry, SFC Card, and Smith on 18 October 1995, Cpt Larry Alan Thorne of Norwalk, Conn, US Army Special Forces, FOB-1, Shining Brass, Kham Duc, along with a Vietnamese Pilot, C0-Pilot, and Door Gunner crashed returning from the insertion outside Da Nang aboard a CH-34, Kingbee helicopter. Also, Maj Harley B. Pile and Cpt Winfield W. Sisson, USMC, observer flying in an O-1E Bird Dog as Forward Air Controller for SOG operations 34, crashed and both listed as Missing in Action

Note 4: May 1968, Cowboy, a Vietnamese Captain (Real name unknown), Pilot of a CH-34, Kingbee helicopter from Nguyen Cal Ky’s 219th Air Force squadron, Ops 34, who later had volunteered to extract a SOG Reconnaissance team in trouble and need an emergency extraction in Laos when all US Helicopter pilots refused to attempt the extraction. Cowboy made the extraction, saving the entire team and delivered them to FOB-2, Kontum, when attempting to return to his base, became disoriented in the heavy overcast and crashed into a mountain and was killed in action. Cowboy left a young wife and child (boy). According to Harve Saal, who reported in one of his books, she later married an American airborne bachelor and when last seen, they were happy and expecting their own child.

Note 5: Col "Bull" Simon commanded Task Force Ivory Coast on 21 Nov 70 to conduct the raid on the North Vietnamese Prisoner of War compound known as "Son Tay Prison," 23 miles west of Hanoi in North Vietnam.

Great escape from Elephant Pass - Two soldiers relate their nine month ordeal (Courtesy of Sunday Times)

Eight commandos of Britain's elite Special Air Services (SAS) were air dropped into Iraqi territory by a Chinook helicopter during the 1991 Gulf War.

Their call sign for the secret operation was Bravo Two Zero. Their task – to relay ntelligence to the United States-led coalition forces and to destroy Iraq's fibre optics communications systems. Weerasinghe Devalage Weerasinghe (23) from Weuda, Mawathagama

The team was soon discovered by the Iraqis. Two commandos died from exposure to the sweltering heat during day and biting cold in the night. A third died in a firefight. The rest were captured and faced gruelling torture. The only exception was Chris Ryan, who, on the run behind enemy lines, trekked 300 miles in seven days to cross the river Euphrates into Syria. During his arduous walkathon, he ate nothing but two packets of biscuits and drank hardly any water
An internationally reputed regiment like the SAS, with the highest standards of physical fitness and an exacting military role, only enrolled in its ranks those tough men who passed gruelling selection and training procedures. They were formulated with the singular objective of eliminating the unsuitable and the marginally suitable. An internationally reputed regiment like the SAS, with the highest standards of physical fitness and an exacting military role, only enrolled in its ranks those tough men who passed gruelling selection and training procedures. They were formulated with the singular objective of eliminating the unsuitable and the marginally suitable.

Those qualifying thereafter were ones possessing the physical and mental qualities essential for success in operations – physical strength and endurance, mental toughness and resilience, a moral character that included determination, and the intelligence to allow a man to work his way through a problem however dire the situation. Those were text book definitions of the rigorous selection and training procedure to turn a soldier of the British Army into a trouper of the SAS. Only the best would do for them.

Chris Ryan's heroism and endurance was the result of this tough training. Walking exercises with a personal weapon and a Bergen (also known as haversack or back pack) weighing up to 25 kilos (55 pounds) culminating in a 60 kilometre (37-mile) endurance march were routine for him.

Well known defence writer James Adams, with whom I had the opportunity of working (as their Colombo Correspondent),when he was the then Managing Editor of The Sunday Times, London once noted that 25 years ago, feats of the likes of Chris and Bravo Two Zero would have remained a secret only to be shared over a beer between the small band of brothers that form the Special Forces community. But times have changed, he says. Today is the era of kill and tell, when any story or collection of tales (provided they are accompanied by the letters SAS) are certain to bring fame and fortune, he points out. Chris achieved both with his book Bravo Two Zero.

If Chris Ryan's epic is now a benchmark of bravery and endurance in contemporary warfare, the saga of two village lads from the backwoods of Sri Lanka, will equal if not surpass, the experience of the celebrated SAS commando.

Fame and fortune are a distant dream for Sri Lanka's soldiers, the real heroes of the 19 year long separatist war. The valour and bravery they display daily in the battlefront are obscured by a far reaching censorship and a ban on media visits to operational areas. The only exceptions are the news releases of gains, enemy killings and conducted tours.

Yet the censorship and the ban on visits have not been able to hide some exceptional cases of bravery. On July 14, 1991, when LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran ordered attacks on the Elephant Pass Defence Complex and emulated Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein's words to call it "the mother of all battles," troops fought back. Soldier Gamini Kularatne lobbed a grenade into an LTTE bulldozer, improvised to look like a battle tank. It exploded killing not only the occupants but also the soldier. He was later honoured as the Hasalaka Veeraya or the hero from Hasalaka, his hometown. A statue in his memory still stands at the entrance to the Hasalaka town.

Now comes an incredible feat of two soldiers from the 9th Battalion of the Sri Lanka Sinha Regiment, incidentally, commanded by the present Military Spokesman, Brigadier Sanath Karunaratne. Like soldier Kularatne's encounter, the duo's tale of grit and determination comes from the battlefields of Elephant Pass. Soldiers Weerasinghe Devalage Weerasinghe (23) from Weuda, Mawathagama and Lunuwila Aratchige Mahinda Kumara alias Mahindasiri (20) from Mirigama, were among troops deployed in the forward defence lines at Soranpattu (north west of the Elephant Pass defences). They had been inducted only ten days before Tiger guerrillas launched attacks there on April 30, last year.

Weerasinghe counted four years in the Army and his colleague Mahinda Kumara just two years. Like the other troops in Alpha Company, they were given up for dead or bestowed the official euphemism - Missing In Action, after their camps came under heavy LTTE attack.

On February 10, this year, they turned up at the 55 Division Headquarters at Ussan in whose area of control the new defences at Muhamalai came. It is located five kilometres to the rear of the Muhamalai defence lines.

For 286 days or nine long months and ten days, the two men survived. They drank their own urine or ditch water. In between, only kurumba (young coconut water) refreshed them. The only solids they ate throughout were coconuts, the roots of young palmyrah trees and wild ginger (kele inguru). They crushed kohomba leaves using stones and applied it to their maggot-filled wounds.

Both soldiers were very weak and bore the scars of their nine month ordeal. Weerasinghe is still undergoing treatment at the Base Hospital in Palaly and was being debriefed regularly by senior officers. Mahinda Kumara, who was in poorer health than his colleague, was flown to Colombo and is now at the Army Hospital. It will take the authorities several weeks to compile a full account of their nine month ordeal. Since they are physically weak, great care is being exercised during the debriefing process.

The saga of the two soldiers began after Tiger guerrillas mounted attacks on Soranpattu beginning April 19. On that day, two Main Battle Tanks and two T63-II armoured personnel carriers were hit by Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and were damaged badly. Again on April 20, Tiger guerrillas launched a large-scale attack.

There was a heavy concentration of artillery/mortar fire backed by RPGs and machine guns. At least 200 Tiger guerrillas were reported to have been involved in this attack but it was repulsed. The attacks were resumed again on April 30.

Soldier Weerasinghe told his senior officers in Palaly "The LTTE attacked the defences at Pallai-Soranpattu. Lt. Perera was in charge of Alpha Company. There were 27 men. Our attempts to save the area failed. Except for three of us, Mahinda Kumara, Senadheera and myself, others were missing.

"For three days we remained in the jungle. We were trying to locate the positions of our colleagues. Senadheera was injured on the right shoulder, left leg and on the head. I crushed kohomba leaves and placed it on his wounds. Then we lost track of Mahinda Kumara. He had left us.

"I remained in that jungle patch for three days without meals. There was no water. I drank my own urine. Unable to bear the thirst, one night I crawled on my belly and reached a water hole. I drank water to my heart's delight. The next morning, I was thrilled to see Mahinda Kumara there," Weerasinghe said. However, Senadheera was not to be found.

Mahinda Kumara was both composed and relaxed when I spoke to him on Friday. Yet, the discomfort he encountered when the shooting pains in the body shook him was clearly evident. Every now and then, when he raised his left arm to check the time, he complained of great pain. The black, plastic-strapped Casio wristwatch, he said, was his second trusted companion after colleague Weerasinghe. It helped him keep track of dates and times.

He recalled how he remembered the dawn of the New Year in the wilds of the Wanni. Right at midnight, Tiger guerrillas in a nearby camp fired their rifles into the air and followed it up with artillery and mortar. He also heard the revelry of the boys and girls in the camp. They were singing songs and making loud cries.

Here are some of Mahinda Kumara's recollections during the nine months and ten days of his battle to survive, along with his colleague Weerasinghe.

On that fateful day of April 30 last year, Alpha Company men were at physical training. We were in shorts and T-shirts and the time was just past 2 p.m. Suddenly a burst of gunfire and exploding shells rent the air. Someone shouted that the LTTE was attacking us. We were ordered to get into our battle gear, fetch our weapons and take up position.

Most of us got into our fatigues over the shorts and T-shirts we wore. We took our weapons, positioned ourselves and were engaging the enemy. Soon we found ourselves scattered.

There were three of us. We crept into the nearby jungle. We tried to move out during the night and encountered a group of LTTE cadres. They fired at us. I thought the other two were killed but later met Weerasinghe. There was a cluster of palmyrah trees and we hid there. For three days we did not have anything to eat. The wounds we sustained during the LTTE attack caused pains. I had injuries on my left knee, left shoulder and at the back of the head. Weerasinghe was wounded in the left knee. We felt faint and could not move. That day we collected our urine in our hands and drank it.

"One night we crawled on our bellies for quite a distance and came across a water hole. We drank water there. Later, I climbed a coconut tree and plucked kurumba. We had got away from the cluster of palmyrah trees. In one open area, there were large holes, probably created by mortar fire. We got into one of them and covered ourselves with fallen palmyrah leaves. We remained there sometimes for a whole day.

"After about five to six days, we removed our uniforms, wrapped our weapons in them and hid them in a bush. It was too difficult to carry them. We were only in our shorts and T-shirts.

"We began to move during the nights and rest in jungle patches during the day. We would move an average of about 150 metres during a day. When we found it difficult to walk, we crawled on our bellies. Only one of us slept at any given time. The other kept awake keeping watch. When we spotted the A-9 (Jaffna-Kandy) highway to our left, we were encouraged. We knew we were moving in the right direction. But the sight of movement by LTTE cadres only a short distance away, jolted us.

"They were using military vehicles they seized during attacks in the Wanni. We saw a Navy bowser. We saw trucks, lorries and Jeeps carrying armed Tiger cadres. There were also groups going on foot patrol. We heard the noise of Air Force helicopters. Twenty days had passed by then.

"When we reached another spot, we were stuck there for over two months. We were down with malaria. During sleep, the condition of our wounds had worsened. There were maggots. We crushed kohomba leaves using stones and applied them. After days, there were no maggots and there was relief. During that time, we took turns climbing trees to pluck kurumba. Everytime we drank it, we felt we gained some strength.

There were a number of unforgettable and nerve wrecking experiences. Walking and crawling, mostly during nights, we came across an old security forces defence line. There were bunkers. We crept into one of them one afternoon.

We were shocked to see one man who appeared to be a senior LTTE cadre accompanied by two others walking towards the bunker. One of the two juniors was armed with a T-56 rifle. The second had an empty plastic aerated water bottle and was walking towards our bunker. I realised they were going from bunker to bunker collecting anything our soldiers may have left behind. My colleague immediately covered himself with dusty gunny bags which were there. I lay on the ground with a wooden plank above me.

The young man with the empty plastic bottle entered the bunker and saw me. I froze. He shouted loud asking the senior cadre who looked to be the leader, whether to hurl a grenade into the bunker. The man told him in Tamil (it was understood by Weerasinghe, who spoke the language) not to kill but to take me alive. I immediately crawled along the bunker line followed by Weerasinghe. We made good our escape.

"We hid in a thicket far off and saw them withdraw after a search of the bunker and surrounding areas. They appeared to be confused whether we were in fact there or whether it was some hallucination.

Another nervous moment came when we had to creep past two concertina wire fences. It was night and we managed to get in. Only when dawn broke did we realise that we had moved into a mine-field ahead of our own former defence lines. We had managed to sleep on a thin stretch and saw booby trapped grenades and other devices around us. We had set these booby traps. We trembled as we nervously moved out.

One night, as we were walking and crawling, we ran into something. We thought we were amidst a group of LTTE cadres waiting in ambush. We heard noises of them running in various directions only to discover later that they were a herd of wild boar. Another night, we saw a tank move and were overjoyed. We thought at last we have come close to our own troops. We moved closer very cautiously, almost a 100 yards from the MBT, to see Tiger cadres seated on top of this moving tank. (It was one captured from our troops).

The tank was on the outskirts of an LTTE camp which was lit by generators in the night. We heard sing songs every night from both boys and girls. There were several damaged houses in the vicinity. They were abandoned. In this area, we had to remain hidden during day time and only ventured out during the night.

"One day, we saw from a distance an Air Force Kfir jet drop bombs. We were literally buried under a pile of earth that fell on us. Several palmyrah trees collapsed. We moved away and hid ourselves in a jungle patch.

"We noticed LTTE cadres carrying new weapons. We say 'new' because the wooden butt of the rifles were well polished and shining. We saw them at close quarters on some occasions.

"At one point, we saw an abandoned well and tried to draw water. It had been booby trapped. A grenade exploded and we sustained injuries. We used crushed kohomba leaves again to treat our wounds.

"But the most happy occasion came only ten days after we had crossed another defence line, creeping under concertina wire fences and avoiding mines. We arrived at a village and were not sure whether LTTE cadres were present there. Weerasinghe climbed a coconut tree to see whether he could spot any LTTE movements. There was none.

On the tenth day, we were attracted to the smell of good food. My friend who climbed the coconut tree again, saw women drawing water from wells and children playing. We decided to go close to a small house. A woman came out, saw us and screamed. She ran and soon a group of villagers turned up. Weerasinghe asked them in Tamil whether there were any LTTErs there. We told them we were from the Army. We told them we had not eaten food for nine months. One elderly man ran into his house and brought us freshly baked rotis, our first decent meal since April 30 last year. Soon we learnt we had spent the last ten days in security forces controlled area. It was their new defences at Muhamalai that we had crossed. We soon arrived at the 55 Division Headquarters at Ussan.

"During those ten days Weerasinghe and I had torn our T-shirts and tied some coins (pandura) in a vow to the Gods. Our prayer was answered. If we had forgotten our near and dear ones after two months of our ordeal, and were pre-occupied with how to live the next day, they were now coming back to our minds. I was so thrilled to meet them in Colombo."

For the two soldiers from the backwoods, there was no specialised combat and survival training like their foreign counterparts who performed such heroic deeds. Yet they pulled through for nine months and ten days to cover a journey of 11 kilometres through treacherous enemy terrain.

They were not commandos either. Yet, they lived up to every word of the Sri Lanka Commando Regiment's motto – When the going gets tough, the tough get going."
The duo will undoubtedly win medals and their oft repeated tales of courage and heroism, their rightful due, however, should not be allowed to disguise the fact that their colleagues died because of mistakes that should not have been made.

Restructure our Intelligence Services by K. Godage

A very ‘local’ politician once asked me what has a Diplomat to do with ‘Intelligence’. My response was "everything". Yes it is indeed sad that our rulers do not often understand what ‘Intelligence’ is all about nor its importance. We have failed to understand the importance of the collation of information, its distillation into intelligence, its analysis and finally its dissemination to those who are authorized to act. Many situations could have been pre-empted if only we had realized the importance of ‘Intelligence’. We have paid a huge price for our ineptitude in this regard. We could learn a thing or two from Pottu Aman! It would be recalled that they even planted a bogus ‘Intel’ report on our so called Intelligence and trapped us.

In 1994, the new government pulled out the core of the NIB apparently on the basis of some statement by a servile police officer who had been rejected by the NIB but was able to worm his way into the confidence of a powerful politician. In subsequent years no government realized the importance of ‘Intelligence’ for our security.

Intelligence is the key: Not only to winning any war but, vitally, to keeping the peace. Unlike expensive munitions and armaments, an Intelligence Institution of thoroughly trained professionals would save lives through prior warning thus pre-empting disasters ensuring the security of the country. In this regard it should be stated that there are ‘Intel systems’ too that do not require replacement: you have it, you use it, you constantly build on it. The older it gets, the more effective it becomes. We do need to modernize our Intelligence structure.

The role of both internal and foreign intelligence grew in the seventies and eighties. Political subversion, the JVP and the Tamil insurgencies and the accompanying terrorism became serious problems. The National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) was an apex intelligence organization which coordinated the activities of both internal and foreign intelligence.

In the year 1998 with a view to improve foreign intelligence gathering, to meet the mounting threats and primarily to monitor LTTE activities abroad, the government accepted a new intelligence structure proposed by the DGSE, the overseas espionage arm of France, under which internal and foreign intelligence functions were separated from each other. This was the beginning of yet another disaster. A Directorate of Foreign Intelligence (DFI) was established although the recommendations specifically stated that the former NIB be converted as the DFI and a separate DII set up.

A former professional ‘Intel’ man wrote at the time "The newly formed DFI had to start from scratch and seek guidance and assistance from the NIB. To the consternation of many in the intelligence community, and to make matters worse the foreign intelligence functions once handled by regular officers of the NIB were relegated to four retired officers when the need was for full time intelligence professionals dedicated and committed to penetrating the LTTE organization abroad. This set in motion the decline of the foreign intelligence service in Sri Lanka. Today the DFI has become the most ridiculed service".

After that reference to our non security conscious culture, let me examine the nature of the work our officers were called upon to perform. Their primary responsibility was, after 1983 in particular, to keep a watch over Tamil militant activities abroad. In later years with the build up of a huge Tamil Diaspora, with one in every four Sri Lankan Tamils living overseas. They came to form the backbone of the LTTE’s support base for the separatist struggle. The Intelligence service had their work cut out for them... The LTTE had become the principal threat to the State-we had not only to keep a watch over the LTTE abroad, but also to cut their logistic lines. We certainly did not succeed. Today the LTTE Diaspora have established themselves brilliantly in the western countries that are a part of the Donor Group-they have offices staffed by men and women educated in those western countries, who have built up strong lobbies in each of those countries for their cause

To revert to our situation, with the establishment of a Directorate of Foreign Intelligence separate from the Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DII), new operatives were recruited, not creating a separate ‘Service’, but for ad hoc assignments. Such appointments were only an opportunity for someone to take ‘a break’ from the regular duties. Those sent could not be expected to have had any commitment to the Institution, in this instance the DFI, for they would not really be a part of an Intelligence Service and were not even expected to return to serve in the DFI; they would return to their substantive services. The work involved building strong personal contacts, creating a ‘contact bank’——and unless the succeeding officer belonged to the same Service such contacts are never passed on. Most important question of all was, whether they were trained men-At the outset, itself the DFI blundered by sending military officers not as Defence attaches but as intelligence officers. The men in charge did not know the difference between military intelligence, the work of Defence Attaches and trained intelligence cadres. For instance RAW, ISI, MI 6 and CIA do not have military personnel. I recall that they sent a ‘traffic cop’ as our Intel man to an important Asian station! We certainly must have Defence attaches in certain capitals but to appoint military men for intelligence work was to say the least, stupid.

Yes the DFI has been a disaster. This separation of the internal and external Intelligence Agencies has not been the best arrangement to protect our national security. It was also not practical; the DFI officers, who were not permanent Intelligence officers of an established Intelligence Service, were unable to obtain the cooperation of the ‘professional operatives’ with whom they had to work abroad. It is a known fact amongst intelligence operatives that they have their own code of conduct and honour; outsiders not trained in the ‘Grand Game’, and amateurs are scorned. Anyone with any interest in Intelligence work would be aware that those involved in "Kim’s Grand Game’, do not even trust their mothers.

The external intelligence services of the bigger countries have been established to safeguard their global interests. The CIA, for example, protects US interests overseas. Where countries do not have global interests, the Security Services would have other priorities, for instance in the case of India—-RAW would be keeping an eye on the supporters of Kashmir, abroad, and also watching what the ISI may be upto and visa versa of course. RAW and ISI operatives are often Diplomats trained in Intelligence work. Do we seek to establish such a service? But in that case we have a long way to go because we do not have trained operatives. Our problem is with us now and we do not have the luxury of training a new cadre for special duties-the lead-time would be two years at least. If the decision is however to have a separate Foreign Intelligence Service, then it should come under the President directly. Its budget must not be revealed in documents, but be submerged in a general vote. The names of its personnel should not appear in any telephone directories or office lists. They must be non persons at all times. The President should direct both internal and external intelligence organizations to operate on this basis.

Another option would be to revive the NIB and make it responsible both for internal and external security, as was the situation before. The difference should be that unlike the NIB of old, the new organization would need to be a specialized closed service. It would be nothing like the present NIB. Initially the new NIB should draw on the best talent available in the Police Service today, and recruit only those with a natural bent or flair for such work. I repeat,, it should be a non-transferable service. The organization would need to be multi-disciplinary, and entirely professional, the head of National Security must have security of tenure and must be wholly independent, answerable only to the Head of State and the National Security Council (reporting to even a very high level Parliamentary oversight committee could be risky, considering our unfortunate circumstances.). The head of the organization should not be required to report to any Secretary of a Ministry.

To support the work of our Intelligence Service, all Foreign Service Officers need to be trained for at least three to six months in the NIB before they go on posting. Today, but for a few, these officers do not do even basic information gathering on LTTE activities in the countries they serve in. Even non Diplomatic home based staff, should be given a two week immersion in security work at the NIB before they assume duties abroad, so that they would be security conscious. This is unfortunately significant by its absence today. I do hope the new batch of ‘Heads of Mission’ appointees would be required to undergo a measure of training.

If our Missions abroad are expected to support the peace process they do indeed have a role. They must obtain intelligence on the actions and intentions of the ‘enemy’, this is vital in taking considered negotiating positions. Otherwise negotiators can be operating ‘in the dark’. Good intelligence will bring greater effectiveness in negotiation and, most importantly, confidence in any settlement brought about. If peace comes, the investment is far from wasted. Good ‘Intelligence’ will continue to guarantee the integrity of the state.

Army Commander refutes allegations by Harischandra Gunaratna

Army Commander Lt. Gen. Shantha Kottegoda on wednesday dismissed LTTE’s allegations that the Sri Lanka Army is responsible for the killing of three LTTE cadres and wounding two of them in an isolated LTTE post in the uncleared area of Pullumalai close to Mahaoya in the East.

Lt. Gen. Kottegoda said" We don’t move into uncleared areas " and the army is not interested in the LTTE‘s internal problems.

He was addressing newsmen at the Army Cantonment at Panagoda.

"In fact when the LTTE cadrers were being gunned down in the East by the Karuna faction few months ago, they levelled charges that the army was supporting the Karuna faction. Before I became the Army commander on a request by the President, I went on a special mission to the east and convinced the LTTE Ampara - Batticaloa leader. Tambiraja Ramesh that the army had no hand in these killings which he accepted.

We are committed to a negotiated settlement to the North - East problem, "the Army Commander said". The LTTE is violating the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) at will and their actions are very provocative. Our soldiers have always acted with restraint and have abided by the CFA most of the time." If at all the army has violated the CFA, they have not repeated it a second time". The leadership has seen to it that it doesn’t happen again, "he said," but where the LTTE is concerned the CFA has been violated repeatedly and the Scandinavian facilitators have failed to force the LTTE to abide by the CFA regulations.

Since the CFA was signed the LTTE have violated it more than 3000 times.

"Once the LTTE tried to cross into the government controlled areas in the East to move to Wanni threatening the army but the truce monitors have failed to take any action against these violations of the CFA. "SLMM have no teeth to enforce the rules" he pointed out.

Explaining about the recent killings in the East and certain other areas he said the Army is not in a position to protect every individual in the country. The LTTE on the pretext of engaging in political activity launch other operations.

Intelligence operatives of any organisation will be targeted by the enemy and you should be aware of the fact, he added.

LTTE meets their ‘Waterloo’ by Ibrahim (Puttalam)

Gurunagar Jaffna was the "cradle" for the LTTE when they started the movement. A few days ago the LTTE tried their own medicine with the Gurunagar fishermen who taught them a lesson how to behave.

Recently these fishermen while fishing in the lagoon off Poonakari were shot at by the LTTE. The boat got burnt and a fisherman was seriously injured and was hijacked by the LTTE. This incident provoked the other fishermen and they organized a "Hartal" and forced the Jaffna LTTE office to be closed. The LTTE high-ups who came to pacify the Gurunagar fishermen were thrashed and turned away. Through fear of the people, the LTTE big men had to meet the Gurunagar fishermen in the "Vanni" for a compromise. Hats off to these brave men. If at all the Jaffna people rise against the high handed acts of the LTTE like the Gurunagar people, the LTTE will end their undemocratic acts or end their days in the peninsula.

Thambiah killing: Fear psychosis grips the region By our Batticaloa Correspondent (www.sundaytimes.lk/040530)

The killing of a well-respected academic from the Eastern University has heightened tension in the region which has been gripped by a new wave of fear-psychosis unleashed by the LTTE split.

Kumaravel Thambiah, Head of the Economics Department of the Eastern University in Vantharamullai, was the thirtieth victim of a wave of extra-judicial killings allegedly carried out by both sides of the LTTE since the split. Of the 30 victims, 22 were directly or indirectly connected to the LTTE, five were civilians and two were from the armed forces.

Mr. Thambiah was killed on Monday around 4. 30 p.m. -- about 15 minutes after he returned home from the university, which he joined in 1991. The two killers came on a motorbike. One waited on\ the main road at Gnanasuriam Square while the other walked up to the Thambiah residence and called, "Thambiah Sir".

When Mr. Thambiah came up to the door, the assassin pulled out a pistol from his waist, and fired at him. Sensing danger, Mr. Thambiah turned back to run inside. Two of the bullets hit him on the back and the shoulder while the third smashed the window of a neighbouring house.

The killer ran away leaving his slippers and fled on the motorbike towards the Kalliankadu cemetery and escaped. Mr. Thambiah was rushed to hospital but died on admission.

His body was kept at his residence 'Gnanasuriam' and later at the university for the public to pay their respects. On the next day his body was taken to Asikulam in Vavuniya for burial.

Mr. Thambiah had been away in Vavuniya and Colombo since April 12, just before Karuna fled his eastern stronghold. The SLMM and the police are carrying out separate investigations but the public say they have little faith in these investigations.

The people are also raising questions as to the stoic silence maintained by the university authorities.

PLOTE member shot dead
A supporter of the PLOTE was shot dead in Vavuniya town last morning, police said. They said the member identified as Arulanantham Arul Barath, 32, from Trincomalee was shot by a youth on a motorcycle along with an accomplice.

The victim was the brother of a former PLOTE member, Guru. The incident came in the wake of a poster campaign by the LTTE's Sangilian group, warning people to refrain from getting involved in criminal activities.

Farmer shot dead outside HSZ bund in Jaffna [TamilNet, September 10, 2004 02:14 GMT]

Mr. Arunasalam Muthiah, 75-year-old farmer and father of five children was shot dead Thursday evening when he was working in his agricultural plot by two unidentified men who came in a motorbike with helmets. The incident took place outside the high security zone bund at Punnaliakattiuwan north in Jaffna district, Police sources said. About four shots were fired at him, according to the Police.

Muthiah's body was handed over to the mortuary of the Chunnakam hospital by midnight by the Police after his relatives identified the body, sources said.

Police commenced investigation into the killing, sources said.

SBS training in Trinco - Situation Report By Iqbal Athas ( www.sundaytimes.lk/2004/07/25)

Trinco tinderbox
Peace process moves into make or break stage

From a distance they looked like four coconuts floating close to each other. Only within a few feet away from the shore were their faces, heavily daubed with camouflage cream and their heads covered with labancas (knitted headwear), became noticeable.

When they stood up on the beach, the white frothy waves sweeping past their boots, a fuller picture emerged. It seemed like a scene from a war movie. There were four tall men in black, clutching assault rifles (with grenade launchers) or light machine guns. Diving fins hung on long cords around their necks like garlands.

Taking cover behind thickets and rock, the men advanced towards their perceived target. One moved ahead with his American built M16 assault rifle on the ready whilst others followed. Their heads moved from one side to another with their prowling eyes closely observing the surroundings. Soon heavy gunfire erupted. The target was accomplished.

The scene was enacted, just before sunset, on the shores of a secluded cove in the Dockyard in Trincomalee, home for Sri Lanka Navy's Eastern Command. Moments earlier, the four were dropped off from an inflated dinghy in the deep blue sea some 500 metres away. They swam, each with kit weighing some 30 kilos, concealing under water everything except their heads, to reach the shore. Besides personal weapons, there was also a light anti tank missile in its original casing in one's kit.

The four men from the Navy's Special Boat Squadron (SBS) were demonstrating an insertion. After a sea borne landing, that was how they moved unobtrusively to attack a land based target. This elite unit, the Navy's equivalent of commandos in the Army, have remained in obscurity over the years. If they made their debut as a small group during an assault to capture areas lost during the Pooneryn military disaster in 1993, the SBS played a limited role in "Operation Jaya Sikurui." Their men blasted bridges and causeways to deny the enemy its use during this abortive offensive, the worst in Sri Lanka's military history.

If these were just limited roles from a small but elite group, the SBS has come of age. "They are now a fully fledged arm of the Navy," said its commander, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri. They are as good as any of their counterparts in other parts of the world, he said.

Seated on chairs on the beach with Commodore Jayanath Colombage, Deputy Commander of the Eastern Naval Area and cameraman Ishara S. Kodikara, barely an hour before nightfall, I watched men from the SBS show off many of their skills. The location was a secluded and heavily secured area in the Dockyard guarded day and night by armed, black clad SBS men.

"We need to maintain secrecy about our identities and what we do," said the Commanding Officer of the SBS. He agreed to speak only on grounds of anonymity. He said recruitment for SBS was totally voluntary. "On an average, if there are 400 applicants, only 80 succeeded. Of that number, in the course of training, which is arduous, a further 40 would drop out," he added. Among the criteria for selection was one's ability to run two miles at one stretch, swim 400 metres and pass an IQ test.

The SBS motto is "Fortune favours the brave." And those men who emerge through the rigorous training are experts in playing infantry roles, maritime warfare, diving, amphibious operations, marksmanship, explosive handling, parachute jumping and close quarter combat among others, the Commanding Officer said.

In another demonstration, four men in black, heads covered and armed with Israeli built Uzi sub machine guns, staged a hostage rescue operation. They stormed their way into a makeshift house. A live firing exercise got under way. The manoeuvres they engaged in was marked by clockwork precision. In yet another, a boat load of black clad men, carrying arms is dropped off in the sea for a land based assault.

Later after the mission is accomplished, they return to sea to float in a row, each some 20 feet away from the other and barely noticeable. It is only when the dinghy with an outboard motor closes in could one see them dart towards a rubber looping held by a colleague on board. They clasp this contraption, resembling the inflated tube of a tyre and jump on board as the dinghy speeds past non stop. Here again, in clockwork precision, the men get on board with their weapons to make a hurried exit from the scene.

Like these highly trained men from the SBS, most Navy personnel at the Dockyard, which overlooks one of the world's deepest natural harbours, have been going through their paces in the past 30 months. That is after the previous United National Front (UNF) Government entered into a Ceasefire Agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on February 22, 2002.

Like their compatriots, the Army and the Air Force, the Sri Lanka Navy too has been hit by many shortcomings. During peace times successive governments have ignored the need to maintain the armed forces on a higher level of battle preparedness. They have tended to divert expenditure needed for this purpose into developmental activity. As a result, leave alone the urgent need for spares or day to day requirements, acquisition of modern state of the art equipment to cope with new threat perceptions has been denied to them. It is under these restricted circumstances that the armed services are making the best of what is available.

But, there seems a strange paradox in this situation for the Navy. Just across the deep waters that form the Trincomalee Harbour, their one time arch enemy, the Tiger guerrillas are stepping up their own preparations. The fact that this activity began over a year or more and the former UNF administration chose to ignore it is no secret.

The Sunday Times (Situation Report - August 2, 2003) in a report titled "Tiger trap for Trinco siege" exclusively revealed details of the gradual transformation of the landscape around Trincomalee, particularly the harbour. The report revealed how Tiger guerrillas have opened up new military camps, re-occupied ones they abandoned and set up a string of satellite camps around bases that existed.

Newly recruited cadres, the report revealed, have been trained and moved in. New weaponry and communications equipment had been widely distributed. The report was accompanied by a detailed map giving both the LTTE military installations as well as those of the armed forces.

An immediate outcome of this disclosure then was a directive by the UNF leadership to investigate how The Sunday Times acquired the details, particularly the markings made on the map. Then Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, who probed the matter later, determined the map had been formulated by The Sunday Times on the basis of information obtained. Needless to say the threat to Trincomalee was one of the major issues that prompted President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to take over the defence portfolio (together with Interior and Media) on November 4, last year.

But since March, this year, advanced preparations by Tiger guerrillas have begun to worry the authorities. Cameraman Kodikara and I saw how these preparations have fallen into place. This was after the Ministry of Defence cleared a request by The Sunday Times.

As an Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) speeds its way southwards from the Dockyard, the coastline near the Mutur Jetty becomes gradually visible. Some 12 minutes later we reach the Jetty area and veer eastwards, almost hugging the coast along the southern rim. Barely have we moved a few hundred metres off the shores held both by the Army and the Navy, the landscape changes.

Catamarans and mechanised fishing boats lay beached. There are fisherman's huts with nets put out for cleaning as we pass Sampur area. Suddenly through the binoculars I see a group of guerrilla cadres emerging from a thicket. At least two have weapons in their hands. They run to the edge of the shore, weapons aimed at the IPC. It is presumably a warning to keep away or face gunfire.The IPC moves away from the shore. A while later we are back on track.

Nearby lay a bunker. As we move along, more bunkers appear at odd intervals. Some are located in lonely areas, just outside thick outgrowth, where no fishing vessels are present. At one point, just adjoining a fisherman's hut, lay another cadjan thatched structure. An LTTE flag is hoisted on a pole above the roof. The line of bunkers that faces the harbour mouth extends a few kilometres up to Foul Point. In one place, near a bunker, two large crates lay stacked one on top of the other. It was difficult to spot what types of weapons have been positioned in the bunkers or small patches of cleared jungles behind them.

The Army had dominated these stretches until the launch of “Operation Jaya Sikurui” (Victory Assured) in May 1997. They were forced to abandon them after more troops were required to conduct the operation along the Alpha Nine (A-9) highway that ran through the Wanni.

But a more disturbing picture of what these developments portend emerges in Colombo. The Sunday Times learnt from intelligence channels that Tiger guerrilla camps deep inside, behind some of these bunkers (see map on this page) posed a grave threat. Artillery and mortars there (130 mm and 122 mm) were positioned towards the harbour. In addition they believe there are 81 mm mortar positions near the bunkers along the coastline from Sampur towards Foul Point.

What does all this mean for the Navy? In the event of a confrontation, the Tiger guerrillas can immobilise the Trincomalee Harbour in just a matter of minutes. Firing artillery or mortars into the harbour mouth area will mean no vessel can either enter or leave the Trincomalee Port. That will mean naval vessels will be trapped in the Dockyard.

Even after the ceasefire, the importance of Trincomalee has continued as both a naval, political and economic centre. It still remains the life line for some 40,000 troops and policemen deployed in the Jaffna peninsula. It is only a few hundreds who travel in and out of the peninsula by aircraft daily.

The bulk moves about by ship from Trincomalee after traversing along the main Alpha Eight (A-8) highway. Military supplies and provisions for their sustenance barring fresh vegetables, meat or fish, take the same route. Hence, crippling Trincomalee Harbour can be fatal to troops in the peninsula.

The dangers posed by the new developments have not been lost on the UPFA Government of President Kumaratunga. In late March, she ordered troops to evict the guerrillas from the positions they had taken up. An Army column moved into the area but was later ordered to withdraw for fears that any confrontation may eventually lead to Eelam War 4.

During many sessions of the National Security Council thereafter, the new build up came in for close scrutiny. But the UPFA leadership were on the horns of a dilemma - any action to reverse the situation would have to be taken bearing in mind the need to ensure the peace process is not disrupted. That in reality meant the issue had to be resolved without recourse to any military action.

In fact, Defence Secretary Cyril Herath raised issue over the matter during his regular meetings with the Head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Gen. (retd.) Trond Furuhovde. The SLMM made clear the matter was beyond them. Unlike in the North, "controlled" or "uncontrolled" areas in the East were not defined. Hence, the issue had to be raised with the Norwegian facilitators.

Concerns over the new developments exacerbated after an incident in the seas off Sampur last month. A Naval craft with an SLMM representative on board was fired at some 1200 metres off the shores of Sampur. The SLMM raised issue with the LTTE only to be told that the firing was not intentional. There was a training camp for guerrilla cadres in the Sampur area and live firing practices had been going on.

On May 21, this year, Defence Secretary Herath chaired a top level conference at his Ministry. Armed forces chiefs who attended the meeting were of the view that the LTTE should be requested to move their positions at least three kilometres inland from the shores. This was not only because of the threat they posed to the country's premier naval establishment but also to merchant shipping that was increasing in view of development activity in the North and East.

Though the Government wants to raise issue over the matter with the Norwegian facilitators, it is now clear they would have to wait. An urgent priority has overshadowed all other events. That is the future of the 30 month old ceasefire and the Ceasefire Agreement itself. This dangerous situation was underscored this week by the Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat Jayantha Dhanapala during a briefing to senior Army officers at the Eastern Command Headquarters in Minneriya. He said the CFA was in jeopardy but emphasised that the Government was firmly committed to upholding it.

Norway's Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgessen arrives in Colombo today. Together with Ambassador Hans Brattskar they will fly tomorrow to Kilinochchi to meet LTTE leaders in a strong bid to ensure the ceasefire remains intact. On Tuesday they are due to brief President Kumaratunga on the guerrilla response.

Both sides, no doubt, have repeatedly made public pronouncements of their commitment to uphold the CFA. Yet, a war psychosis has begun to develop and a premier state intelligence agency has said so to the Government.

The coming weeks therefore will show whether the two sides are on a slippery slope towards war or not. But one thing remains clear in the meantime. The UPFA can no longer continue to blame only the previous UNF regime for all the ills and a "deteriorating security situation." They would have to take the greater part of the responsibility.

LTTE’s sentry point at Pullimalai, came under attack by Karuna’s men and several feared dead - Asian Tribune

According to a latest news break, it was reported that the front sentry point of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam’s (LTTE’s) Pullimalai camp came under severe attack and several cadres belonging to the Tamil rebel out were killed in the sudden attack.

In the news report received by the “Asian Tribune,” a pose of Colonel Karuna’s Amman’s armed cadres launched an attack on the front sentry point located in front of the LTTE’s camp at Pullimalai yesterday night at about 10.30 PM .

The report further said that rocket propellers and other small firearms were used in the one hour long attack against the LTTE men.

In the sudden attack by Karuna’s men it is feared that almost all the LTTE cadres in the sentry point were killed.

Details of the causality figures are sketchy at the time posting this news item.

Meanwhile Sri Lankan newspapers in today’s morning edition, carried a news item regarding the attack on the LTTE camp located at Ayithiyamalai in the East.

According to the newspapers it was reported that around 8 LTTE cadres were killed in that attack.

But the LTTE in a statement denied that no such attack took place on their camps yesterday, as reported in the Sri Lankan news papers.