Great escape from Elephant Pass - Two soldiers relate their nine month ordeal (Courtesy of Sunday Times)

Eight commandos of Britain's elite Special Air Services (SAS) were air dropped into Iraqi territory by a Chinook helicopter during the 1991 Gulf War.

Their call sign for the secret operation was Bravo Two Zero. Their task – to relay ntelligence to the United States-led coalition forces and to destroy Iraq's fibre optics communications systems. Weerasinghe Devalage Weerasinghe (23) from Weuda, Mawathagama

The team was soon discovered by the Iraqis. Two commandos died from exposure to the sweltering heat during day and biting cold in the night. A third died in a firefight. The rest were captured and faced gruelling torture. The only exception was Chris Ryan, who, on the run behind enemy lines, trekked 300 miles in seven days to cross the river Euphrates into Syria. During his arduous walkathon, he ate nothing but two packets of biscuits and drank hardly any water
An internationally reputed regiment like the SAS, with the highest standards of physical fitness and an exacting military role, only enrolled in its ranks those tough men who passed gruelling selection and training procedures. They were formulated with the singular objective of eliminating the unsuitable and the marginally suitable. An internationally reputed regiment like the SAS, with the highest standards of physical fitness and an exacting military role, only enrolled in its ranks those tough men who passed gruelling selection and training procedures. They were formulated with the singular objective of eliminating the unsuitable and the marginally suitable.

Those qualifying thereafter were ones possessing the physical and mental qualities essential for success in operations – physical strength and endurance, mental toughness and resilience, a moral character that included determination, and the intelligence to allow a man to work his way through a problem however dire the situation. Those were text book definitions of the rigorous selection and training procedure to turn a soldier of the British Army into a trouper of the SAS. Only the best would do for them.

Chris Ryan's heroism and endurance was the result of this tough training. Walking exercises with a personal weapon and a Bergen (also known as haversack or back pack) weighing up to 25 kilos (55 pounds) culminating in a 60 kilometre (37-mile) endurance march were routine for him.

Well known defence writer James Adams, with whom I had the opportunity of working (as their Colombo Correspondent),when he was the then Managing Editor of The Sunday Times, London once noted that 25 years ago, feats of the likes of Chris and Bravo Two Zero would have remained a secret only to be shared over a beer between the small band of brothers that form the Special Forces community. But times have changed, he says. Today is the era of kill and tell, when any story or collection of tales (provided they are accompanied by the letters SAS) are certain to bring fame and fortune, he points out. Chris achieved both with his book Bravo Two Zero.

If Chris Ryan's epic is now a benchmark of bravery and endurance in contemporary warfare, the saga of two village lads from the backwoods of Sri Lanka, will equal if not surpass, the experience of the celebrated SAS commando.

Fame and fortune are a distant dream for Sri Lanka's soldiers, the real heroes of the 19 year long separatist war. The valour and bravery they display daily in the battlefront are obscured by a far reaching censorship and a ban on media visits to operational areas. The only exceptions are the news releases of gains, enemy killings and conducted tours.

Yet the censorship and the ban on visits have not been able to hide some exceptional cases of bravery. On July 14, 1991, when LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran ordered attacks on the Elephant Pass Defence Complex and emulated Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein's words to call it "the mother of all battles," troops fought back. Soldier Gamini Kularatne lobbed a grenade into an LTTE bulldozer, improvised to look like a battle tank. It exploded killing not only the occupants but also the soldier. He was later honoured as the Hasalaka Veeraya or the hero from Hasalaka, his hometown. A statue in his memory still stands at the entrance to the Hasalaka town.

Now comes an incredible feat of two soldiers from the 9th Battalion of the Sri Lanka Sinha Regiment, incidentally, commanded by the present Military Spokesman, Brigadier Sanath Karunaratne. Like soldier Kularatne's encounter, the duo's tale of grit and determination comes from the battlefields of Elephant Pass. Soldiers Weerasinghe Devalage Weerasinghe (23) from Weuda, Mawathagama and Lunuwila Aratchige Mahinda Kumara alias Mahindasiri (20) from Mirigama, were among troops deployed in the forward defence lines at Soranpattu (north west of the Elephant Pass defences). They had been inducted only ten days before Tiger guerrillas launched attacks there on April 30, last year.

Weerasinghe counted four years in the Army and his colleague Mahinda Kumara just two years. Like the other troops in Alpha Company, they were given up for dead or bestowed the official euphemism - Missing In Action, after their camps came under heavy LTTE attack.

On February 10, this year, they turned up at the 55 Division Headquarters at Ussan in whose area of control the new defences at Muhamalai came. It is located five kilometres to the rear of the Muhamalai defence lines.

For 286 days or nine long months and ten days, the two men survived. They drank their own urine or ditch water. In between, only kurumba (young coconut water) refreshed them. The only solids they ate throughout were coconuts, the roots of young palmyrah trees and wild ginger (kele inguru). They crushed kohomba leaves using stones and applied it to their maggot-filled wounds.

Both soldiers were very weak and bore the scars of their nine month ordeal. Weerasinghe is still undergoing treatment at the Base Hospital in Palaly and was being debriefed regularly by senior officers. Mahinda Kumara, who was in poorer health than his colleague, was flown to Colombo and is now at the Army Hospital. It will take the authorities several weeks to compile a full account of their nine month ordeal. Since they are physically weak, great care is being exercised during the debriefing process.

The saga of the two soldiers began after Tiger guerrillas mounted attacks on Soranpattu beginning April 19. On that day, two Main Battle Tanks and two T63-II armoured personnel carriers were hit by Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and were damaged badly. Again on April 20, Tiger guerrillas launched a large-scale attack.

There was a heavy concentration of artillery/mortar fire backed by RPGs and machine guns. At least 200 Tiger guerrillas were reported to have been involved in this attack but it was repulsed. The attacks were resumed again on April 30.

Soldier Weerasinghe told his senior officers in Palaly "The LTTE attacked the defences at Pallai-Soranpattu. Lt. Perera was in charge of Alpha Company. There were 27 men. Our attempts to save the area failed. Except for three of us, Mahinda Kumara, Senadheera and myself, others were missing.

"For three days we remained in the jungle. We were trying to locate the positions of our colleagues. Senadheera was injured on the right shoulder, left leg and on the head. I crushed kohomba leaves and placed it on his wounds. Then we lost track of Mahinda Kumara. He had left us.

"I remained in that jungle patch for three days without meals. There was no water. I drank my own urine. Unable to bear the thirst, one night I crawled on my belly and reached a water hole. I drank water to my heart's delight. The next morning, I was thrilled to see Mahinda Kumara there," Weerasinghe said. However, Senadheera was not to be found.

Mahinda Kumara was both composed and relaxed when I spoke to him on Friday. Yet, the discomfort he encountered when the shooting pains in the body shook him was clearly evident. Every now and then, when he raised his left arm to check the time, he complained of great pain. The black, plastic-strapped Casio wristwatch, he said, was his second trusted companion after colleague Weerasinghe. It helped him keep track of dates and times.

He recalled how he remembered the dawn of the New Year in the wilds of the Wanni. Right at midnight, Tiger guerrillas in a nearby camp fired their rifles into the air and followed it up with artillery and mortar. He also heard the revelry of the boys and girls in the camp. They were singing songs and making loud cries.

Here are some of Mahinda Kumara's recollections during the nine months and ten days of his battle to survive, along with his colleague Weerasinghe.

On that fateful day of April 30 last year, Alpha Company men were at physical training. We were in shorts and T-shirts and the time was just past 2 p.m. Suddenly a burst of gunfire and exploding shells rent the air. Someone shouted that the LTTE was attacking us. We were ordered to get into our battle gear, fetch our weapons and take up position.

Most of us got into our fatigues over the shorts and T-shirts we wore. We took our weapons, positioned ourselves and were engaging the enemy. Soon we found ourselves scattered.

There were three of us. We crept into the nearby jungle. We tried to move out during the night and encountered a group of LTTE cadres. They fired at us. I thought the other two were killed but later met Weerasinghe. There was a cluster of palmyrah trees and we hid there. For three days we did not have anything to eat. The wounds we sustained during the LTTE attack caused pains. I had injuries on my left knee, left shoulder and at the back of the head. Weerasinghe was wounded in the left knee. We felt faint and could not move. That day we collected our urine in our hands and drank it.

"One night we crawled on our bellies for quite a distance and came across a water hole. We drank water there. Later, I climbed a coconut tree and plucked kurumba. We had got away from the cluster of palmyrah trees. In one open area, there were large holes, probably created by mortar fire. We got into one of them and covered ourselves with fallen palmyrah leaves. We remained there sometimes for a whole day.

"After about five to six days, we removed our uniforms, wrapped our weapons in them and hid them in a bush. It was too difficult to carry them. We were only in our shorts and T-shirts.

"We began to move during the nights and rest in jungle patches during the day. We would move an average of about 150 metres during a day. When we found it difficult to walk, we crawled on our bellies. Only one of us slept at any given time. The other kept awake keeping watch. When we spotted the A-9 (Jaffna-Kandy) highway to our left, we were encouraged. We knew we were moving in the right direction. But the sight of movement by LTTE cadres only a short distance away, jolted us.

"They were using military vehicles they seized during attacks in the Wanni. We saw a Navy bowser. We saw trucks, lorries and Jeeps carrying armed Tiger cadres. There were also groups going on foot patrol. We heard the noise of Air Force helicopters. Twenty days had passed by then.

"When we reached another spot, we were stuck there for over two months. We were down with malaria. During sleep, the condition of our wounds had worsened. There were maggots. We crushed kohomba leaves using stones and applied them. After days, there were no maggots and there was relief. During that time, we took turns climbing trees to pluck kurumba. Everytime we drank it, we felt we gained some strength.

There were a number of unforgettable and nerve wrecking experiences. Walking and crawling, mostly during nights, we came across an old security forces defence line. There were bunkers. We crept into one of them one afternoon.

We were shocked to see one man who appeared to be a senior LTTE cadre accompanied by two others walking towards the bunker. One of the two juniors was armed with a T-56 rifle. The second had an empty plastic aerated water bottle and was walking towards our bunker. I realised they were going from bunker to bunker collecting anything our soldiers may have left behind. My colleague immediately covered himself with dusty gunny bags which were there. I lay on the ground with a wooden plank above me.

The young man with the empty plastic bottle entered the bunker and saw me. I froze. He shouted loud asking the senior cadre who looked to be the leader, whether to hurl a grenade into the bunker. The man told him in Tamil (it was understood by Weerasinghe, who spoke the language) not to kill but to take me alive. I immediately crawled along the bunker line followed by Weerasinghe. We made good our escape.

"We hid in a thicket far off and saw them withdraw after a search of the bunker and surrounding areas. They appeared to be confused whether we were in fact there or whether it was some hallucination.

Another nervous moment came when we had to creep past two concertina wire fences. It was night and we managed to get in. Only when dawn broke did we realise that we had moved into a mine-field ahead of our own former defence lines. We had managed to sleep on a thin stretch and saw booby trapped grenades and other devices around us. We had set these booby traps. We trembled as we nervously moved out.

One night, as we were walking and crawling, we ran into something. We thought we were amidst a group of LTTE cadres waiting in ambush. We heard noises of them running in various directions only to discover later that they were a herd of wild boar. Another night, we saw a tank move and were overjoyed. We thought at last we have come close to our own troops. We moved closer very cautiously, almost a 100 yards from the MBT, to see Tiger cadres seated on top of this moving tank. (It was one captured from our troops).

The tank was on the outskirts of an LTTE camp which was lit by generators in the night. We heard sing songs every night from both boys and girls. There were several damaged houses in the vicinity. They were abandoned. In this area, we had to remain hidden during day time and only ventured out during the night.

"One day, we saw from a distance an Air Force Kfir jet drop bombs. We were literally buried under a pile of earth that fell on us. Several palmyrah trees collapsed. We moved away and hid ourselves in a jungle patch.

"We noticed LTTE cadres carrying new weapons. We say 'new' because the wooden butt of the rifles were well polished and shining. We saw them at close quarters on some occasions.

"At one point, we saw an abandoned well and tried to draw water. It had been booby trapped. A grenade exploded and we sustained injuries. We used crushed kohomba leaves again to treat our wounds.

"But the most happy occasion came only ten days after we had crossed another defence line, creeping under concertina wire fences and avoiding mines. We arrived at a village and were not sure whether LTTE cadres were present there. Weerasinghe climbed a coconut tree to see whether he could spot any LTTE movements. There was none.

On the tenth day, we were attracted to the smell of good food. My friend who climbed the coconut tree again, saw women drawing water from wells and children playing. We decided to go close to a small house. A woman came out, saw us and screamed. She ran and soon a group of villagers turned up. Weerasinghe asked them in Tamil whether there were any LTTErs there. We told them we were from the Army. We told them we had not eaten food for nine months. One elderly man ran into his house and brought us freshly baked rotis, our first decent meal since April 30 last year. Soon we learnt we had spent the last ten days in security forces controlled area. It was their new defences at Muhamalai that we had crossed. We soon arrived at the 55 Division Headquarters at Ussan.

"During those ten days Weerasinghe and I had torn our T-shirts and tied some coins (pandura) in a vow to the Gods. Our prayer was answered. If we had forgotten our near and dear ones after two months of our ordeal, and were pre-occupied with how to live the next day, they were now coming back to our minds. I was so thrilled to meet them in Colombo."

For the two soldiers from the backwoods, there was no specialised combat and survival training like their foreign counterparts who performed such heroic deeds. Yet they pulled through for nine months and ten days to cover a journey of 11 kilometres through treacherous enemy terrain.

They were not commandos either. Yet, they lived up to every word of the Sri Lanka Commando Regiment's motto – When the going gets tough, the tough get going."
The duo will undoubtedly win medals and their oft repeated tales of courage and heroism, their rightful due, however, should not be allowed to disguise the fact that their colleagues died because of mistakes that should not have been made.

Restructure our Intelligence Services by K. Godage

A very ‘local’ politician once asked me what has a Diplomat to do with ‘Intelligence’. My response was "everything". Yes it is indeed sad that our rulers do not often understand what ‘Intelligence’ is all about nor its importance. We have failed to understand the importance of the collation of information, its distillation into intelligence, its analysis and finally its dissemination to those who are authorized to act. Many situations could have been pre-empted if only we had realized the importance of ‘Intelligence’. We have paid a huge price for our ineptitude in this regard. We could learn a thing or two from Pottu Aman! It would be recalled that they even planted a bogus ‘Intel’ report on our so called Intelligence and trapped us.

In 1994, the new government pulled out the core of the NIB apparently on the basis of some statement by a servile police officer who had been rejected by the NIB but was able to worm his way into the confidence of a powerful politician. In subsequent years no government realized the importance of ‘Intelligence’ for our security.

Intelligence is the key: Not only to winning any war but, vitally, to keeping the peace. Unlike expensive munitions and armaments, an Intelligence Institution of thoroughly trained professionals would save lives through prior warning thus pre-empting disasters ensuring the security of the country. In this regard it should be stated that there are ‘Intel systems’ too that do not require replacement: you have it, you use it, you constantly build on it. The older it gets, the more effective it becomes. We do need to modernize our Intelligence structure.

The role of both internal and foreign intelligence grew in the seventies and eighties. Political subversion, the JVP and the Tamil insurgencies and the accompanying terrorism became serious problems. The National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) was an apex intelligence organization which coordinated the activities of both internal and foreign intelligence.

In the year 1998 with a view to improve foreign intelligence gathering, to meet the mounting threats and primarily to monitor LTTE activities abroad, the government accepted a new intelligence structure proposed by the DGSE, the overseas espionage arm of France, under which internal and foreign intelligence functions were separated from each other. This was the beginning of yet another disaster. A Directorate of Foreign Intelligence (DFI) was established although the recommendations specifically stated that the former NIB be converted as the DFI and a separate DII set up.

A former professional ‘Intel’ man wrote at the time "The newly formed DFI had to start from scratch and seek guidance and assistance from the NIB. To the consternation of many in the intelligence community, and to make matters worse the foreign intelligence functions once handled by regular officers of the NIB were relegated to four retired officers when the need was for full time intelligence professionals dedicated and committed to penetrating the LTTE organization abroad. This set in motion the decline of the foreign intelligence service in Sri Lanka. Today the DFI has become the most ridiculed service".

After that reference to our non security conscious culture, let me examine the nature of the work our officers were called upon to perform. Their primary responsibility was, after 1983 in particular, to keep a watch over Tamil militant activities abroad. In later years with the build up of a huge Tamil Diaspora, with one in every four Sri Lankan Tamils living overseas. They came to form the backbone of the LTTE’s support base for the separatist struggle. The Intelligence service had their work cut out for them... The LTTE had become the principal threat to the State-we had not only to keep a watch over the LTTE abroad, but also to cut their logistic lines. We certainly did not succeed. Today the LTTE Diaspora have established themselves brilliantly in the western countries that are a part of the Donor Group-they have offices staffed by men and women educated in those western countries, who have built up strong lobbies in each of those countries for their cause

To revert to our situation, with the establishment of a Directorate of Foreign Intelligence separate from the Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DII), new operatives were recruited, not creating a separate ‘Service’, but for ad hoc assignments. Such appointments were only an opportunity for someone to take ‘a break’ from the regular duties. Those sent could not be expected to have had any commitment to the Institution, in this instance the DFI, for they would not really be a part of an Intelligence Service and were not even expected to return to serve in the DFI; they would return to their substantive services. The work involved building strong personal contacts, creating a ‘contact bank’——and unless the succeeding officer belonged to the same Service such contacts are never passed on. Most important question of all was, whether they were trained men-At the outset, itself the DFI blundered by sending military officers not as Defence attaches but as intelligence officers. The men in charge did not know the difference between military intelligence, the work of Defence Attaches and trained intelligence cadres. For instance RAW, ISI, MI 6 and CIA do not have military personnel. I recall that they sent a ‘traffic cop’ as our Intel man to an important Asian station! We certainly must have Defence attaches in certain capitals but to appoint military men for intelligence work was to say the least, stupid.

Yes the DFI has been a disaster. This separation of the internal and external Intelligence Agencies has not been the best arrangement to protect our national security. It was also not practical; the DFI officers, who were not permanent Intelligence officers of an established Intelligence Service, were unable to obtain the cooperation of the ‘professional operatives’ with whom they had to work abroad. It is a known fact amongst intelligence operatives that they have their own code of conduct and honour; outsiders not trained in the ‘Grand Game’, and amateurs are scorned. Anyone with any interest in Intelligence work would be aware that those involved in "Kim’s Grand Game’, do not even trust their mothers.

The external intelligence services of the bigger countries have been established to safeguard their global interests. The CIA, for example, protects US interests overseas. Where countries do not have global interests, the Security Services would have other priorities, for instance in the case of India—-RAW would be keeping an eye on the supporters of Kashmir, abroad, and also watching what the ISI may be upto and visa versa of course. RAW and ISI operatives are often Diplomats trained in Intelligence work. Do we seek to establish such a service? But in that case we have a long way to go because we do not have trained operatives. Our problem is with us now and we do not have the luxury of training a new cadre for special duties-the lead-time would be two years at least. If the decision is however to have a separate Foreign Intelligence Service, then it should come under the President directly. Its budget must not be revealed in documents, but be submerged in a general vote. The names of its personnel should not appear in any telephone directories or office lists. They must be non persons at all times. The President should direct both internal and external intelligence organizations to operate on this basis.

Another option would be to revive the NIB and make it responsible both for internal and external security, as was the situation before. The difference should be that unlike the NIB of old, the new organization would need to be a specialized closed service. It would be nothing like the present NIB. Initially the new NIB should draw on the best talent available in the Police Service today, and recruit only those with a natural bent or flair for such work. I repeat,, it should be a non-transferable service. The organization would need to be multi-disciplinary, and entirely professional, the head of National Security must have security of tenure and must be wholly independent, answerable only to the Head of State and the National Security Council (reporting to even a very high level Parliamentary oversight committee could be risky, considering our unfortunate circumstances.). The head of the organization should not be required to report to any Secretary of a Ministry.

To support the work of our Intelligence Service, all Foreign Service Officers need to be trained for at least three to six months in the NIB before they go on posting. Today, but for a few, these officers do not do even basic information gathering on LTTE activities in the countries they serve in. Even non Diplomatic home based staff, should be given a two week immersion in security work at the NIB before they assume duties abroad, so that they would be security conscious. This is unfortunately significant by its absence today. I do hope the new batch of ‘Heads of Mission’ appointees would be required to undergo a measure of training.

If our Missions abroad are expected to support the peace process they do indeed have a role. They must obtain intelligence on the actions and intentions of the ‘enemy’, this is vital in taking considered negotiating positions. Otherwise negotiators can be operating ‘in the dark’. Good intelligence will bring greater effectiveness in negotiation and, most importantly, confidence in any settlement brought about. If peace comes, the investment is far from wasted. Good ‘Intelligence’ will continue to guarantee the integrity of the state.

Army Commander refutes allegations by Harischandra Gunaratna

Army Commander Lt. Gen. Shantha Kottegoda on wednesday dismissed LTTE’s allegations that the Sri Lanka Army is responsible for the killing of three LTTE cadres and wounding two of them in an isolated LTTE post in the uncleared area of Pullumalai close to Mahaoya in the East.

Lt. Gen. Kottegoda said" We don’t move into uncleared areas " and the army is not interested in the LTTE‘s internal problems.

He was addressing newsmen at the Army Cantonment at Panagoda.

"In fact when the LTTE cadrers were being gunned down in the East by the Karuna faction few months ago, they levelled charges that the army was supporting the Karuna faction. Before I became the Army commander on a request by the President, I went on a special mission to the east and convinced the LTTE Ampara - Batticaloa leader. Tambiraja Ramesh that the army had no hand in these killings which he accepted.

We are committed to a negotiated settlement to the North - East problem, "the Army Commander said". The LTTE is violating the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) at will and their actions are very provocative. Our soldiers have always acted with restraint and have abided by the CFA most of the time." If at all the army has violated the CFA, they have not repeated it a second time". The leadership has seen to it that it doesn’t happen again, "he said," but where the LTTE is concerned the CFA has been violated repeatedly and the Scandinavian facilitators have failed to force the LTTE to abide by the CFA regulations.

Since the CFA was signed the LTTE have violated it more than 3000 times.

"Once the LTTE tried to cross into the government controlled areas in the East to move to Wanni threatening the army but the truce monitors have failed to take any action against these violations of the CFA. "SLMM have no teeth to enforce the rules" he pointed out.

Explaining about the recent killings in the East and certain other areas he said the Army is not in a position to protect every individual in the country. The LTTE on the pretext of engaging in political activity launch other operations.

Intelligence operatives of any organisation will be targeted by the enemy and you should be aware of the fact, he added.

LTTE meets their ‘Waterloo’ by Ibrahim (Puttalam)

Gurunagar Jaffna was the "cradle" for the LTTE when they started the movement. A few days ago the LTTE tried their own medicine with the Gurunagar fishermen who taught them a lesson how to behave.

Recently these fishermen while fishing in the lagoon off Poonakari were shot at by the LTTE. The boat got burnt and a fisherman was seriously injured and was hijacked by the LTTE. This incident provoked the other fishermen and they organized a "Hartal" and forced the Jaffna LTTE office to be closed. The LTTE high-ups who came to pacify the Gurunagar fishermen were thrashed and turned away. Through fear of the people, the LTTE big men had to meet the Gurunagar fishermen in the "Vanni" for a compromise. Hats off to these brave men. If at all the Jaffna people rise against the high handed acts of the LTTE like the Gurunagar people, the LTTE will end their undemocratic acts or end their days in the peninsula.

Thambiah killing: Fear psychosis grips the region By our Batticaloa Correspondent (www.sundaytimes.lk/040530)

The killing of a well-respected academic from the Eastern University has heightened tension in the region which has been gripped by a new wave of fear-psychosis unleashed by the LTTE split.

Kumaravel Thambiah, Head of the Economics Department of the Eastern University in Vantharamullai, was the thirtieth victim of a wave of extra-judicial killings allegedly carried out by both sides of the LTTE since the split. Of the 30 victims, 22 were directly or indirectly connected to the LTTE, five were civilians and two were from the armed forces.

Mr. Thambiah was killed on Monday around 4. 30 p.m. -- about 15 minutes after he returned home from the university, which he joined in 1991. The two killers came on a motorbike. One waited on\ the main road at Gnanasuriam Square while the other walked up to the Thambiah residence and called, "Thambiah Sir".

When Mr. Thambiah came up to the door, the assassin pulled out a pistol from his waist, and fired at him. Sensing danger, Mr. Thambiah turned back to run inside. Two of the bullets hit him on the back and the shoulder while the third smashed the window of a neighbouring house.

The killer ran away leaving his slippers and fled on the motorbike towards the Kalliankadu cemetery and escaped. Mr. Thambiah was rushed to hospital but died on admission.

His body was kept at his residence 'Gnanasuriam' and later at the university for the public to pay their respects. On the next day his body was taken to Asikulam in Vavuniya for burial.

Mr. Thambiah had been away in Vavuniya and Colombo since April 12, just before Karuna fled his eastern stronghold. The SLMM and the police are carrying out separate investigations but the public say they have little faith in these investigations.

The people are also raising questions as to the stoic silence maintained by the university authorities.

PLOTE member shot dead
A supporter of the PLOTE was shot dead in Vavuniya town last morning, police said. They said the member identified as Arulanantham Arul Barath, 32, from Trincomalee was shot by a youth on a motorcycle along with an accomplice.

The victim was the brother of a former PLOTE member, Guru. The incident came in the wake of a poster campaign by the LTTE's Sangilian group, warning people to refrain from getting involved in criminal activities.

Farmer shot dead outside HSZ bund in Jaffna [TamilNet, September 10, 2004 02:14 GMT]

Mr. Arunasalam Muthiah, 75-year-old farmer and father of five children was shot dead Thursday evening when he was working in his agricultural plot by two unidentified men who came in a motorbike with helmets. The incident took place outside the high security zone bund at Punnaliakattiuwan north in Jaffna district, Police sources said. About four shots were fired at him, according to the Police.

Muthiah's body was handed over to the mortuary of the Chunnakam hospital by midnight by the Police after his relatives identified the body, sources said.

Police commenced investigation into the killing, sources said.

SBS training in Trinco - Situation Report By Iqbal Athas ( www.sundaytimes.lk/2004/07/25)

Trinco tinderbox
Peace process moves into make or break stage

From a distance they looked like four coconuts floating close to each other. Only within a few feet away from the shore were their faces, heavily daubed with camouflage cream and their heads covered with labancas (knitted headwear), became noticeable.

When they stood up on the beach, the white frothy waves sweeping past their boots, a fuller picture emerged. It seemed like a scene from a war movie. There were four tall men in black, clutching assault rifles (with grenade launchers) or light machine guns. Diving fins hung on long cords around their necks like garlands.

Taking cover behind thickets and rock, the men advanced towards their perceived target. One moved ahead with his American built M16 assault rifle on the ready whilst others followed. Their heads moved from one side to another with their prowling eyes closely observing the surroundings. Soon heavy gunfire erupted. The target was accomplished.

The scene was enacted, just before sunset, on the shores of a secluded cove in the Dockyard in Trincomalee, home for Sri Lanka Navy's Eastern Command. Moments earlier, the four were dropped off from an inflated dinghy in the deep blue sea some 500 metres away. They swam, each with kit weighing some 30 kilos, concealing under water everything except their heads, to reach the shore. Besides personal weapons, there was also a light anti tank missile in its original casing in one's kit.

The four men from the Navy's Special Boat Squadron (SBS) were demonstrating an insertion. After a sea borne landing, that was how they moved unobtrusively to attack a land based target. This elite unit, the Navy's equivalent of commandos in the Army, have remained in obscurity over the years. If they made their debut as a small group during an assault to capture areas lost during the Pooneryn military disaster in 1993, the SBS played a limited role in "Operation Jaya Sikurui." Their men blasted bridges and causeways to deny the enemy its use during this abortive offensive, the worst in Sri Lanka's military history.

If these were just limited roles from a small but elite group, the SBS has come of age. "They are now a fully fledged arm of the Navy," said its commander, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri. They are as good as any of their counterparts in other parts of the world, he said.

Seated on chairs on the beach with Commodore Jayanath Colombage, Deputy Commander of the Eastern Naval Area and cameraman Ishara S. Kodikara, barely an hour before nightfall, I watched men from the SBS show off many of their skills. The location was a secluded and heavily secured area in the Dockyard guarded day and night by armed, black clad SBS men.

"We need to maintain secrecy about our identities and what we do," said the Commanding Officer of the SBS. He agreed to speak only on grounds of anonymity. He said recruitment for SBS was totally voluntary. "On an average, if there are 400 applicants, only 80 succeeded. Of that number, in the course of training, which is arduous, a further 40 would drop out," he added. Among the criteria for selection was one's ability to run two miles at one stretch, swim 400 metres and pass an IQ test.

The SBS motto is "Fortune favours the brave." And those men who emerge through the rigorous training are experts in playing infantry roles, maritime warfare, diving, amphibious operations, marksmanship, explosive handling, parachute jumping and close quarter combat among others, the Commanding Officer said.

In another demonstration, four men in black, heads covered and armed with Israeli built Uzi sub machine guns, staged a hostage rescue operation. They stormed their way into a makeshift house. A live firing exercise got under way. The manoeuvres they engaged in was marked by clockwork precision. In yet another, a boat load of black clad men, carrying arms is dropped off in the sea for a land based assault.

Later after the mission is accomplished, they return to sea to float in a row, each some 20 feet away from the other and barely noticeable. It is only when the dinghy with an outboard motor closes in could one see them dart towards a rubber looping held by a colleague on board. They clasp this contraption, resembling the inflated tube of a tyre and jump on board as the dinghy speeds past non stop. Here again, in clockwork precision, the men get on board with their weapons to make a hurried exit from the scene.

Like these highly trained men from the SBS, most Navy personnel at the Dockyard, which overlooks one of the world's deepest natural harbours, have been going through their paces in the past 30 months. That is after the previous United National Front (UNF) Government entered into a Ceasefire Agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on February 22, 2002.

Like their compatriots, the Army and the Air Force, the Sri Lanka Navy too has been hit by many shortcomings. During peace times successive governments have ignored the need to maintain the armed forces on a higher level of battle preparedness. They have tended to divert expenditure needed for this purpose into developmental activity. As a result, leave alone the urgent need for spares or day to day requirements, acquisition of modern state of the art equipment to cope with new threat perceptions has been denied to them. It is under these restricted circumstances that the armed services are making the best of what is available.

But, there seems a strange paradox in this situation for the Navy. Just across the deep waters that form the Trincomalee Harbour, their one time arch enemy, the Tiger guerrillas are stepping up their own preparations. The fact that this activity began over a year or more and the former UNF administration chose to ignore it is no secret.

The Sunday Times (Situation Report - August 2, 2003) in a report titled "Tiger trap for Trinco siege" exclusively revealed details of the gradual transformation of the landscape around Trincomalee, particularly the harbour. The report revealed how Tiger guerrillas have opened up new military camps, re-occupied ones they abandoned and set up a string of satellite camps around bases that existed.

Newly recruited cadres, the report revealed, have been trained and moved in. New weaponry and communications equipment had been widely distributed. The report was accompanied by a detailed map giving both the LTTE military installations as well as those of the armed forces.

An immediate outcome of this disclosure then was a directive by the UNF leadership to investigate how The Sunday Times acquired the details, particularly the markings made on the map. Then Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, who probed the matter later, determined the map had been formulated by The Sunday Times on the basis of information obtained. Needless to say the threat to Trincomalee was one of the major issues that prompted President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to take over the defence portfolio (together with Interior and Media) on November 4, last year.

But since March, this year, advanced preparations by Tiger guerrillas have begun to worry the authorities. Cameraman Kodikara and I saw how these preparations have fallen into place. This was after the Ministry of Defence cleared a request by The Sunday Times.

As an Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) speeds its way southwards from the Dockyard, the coastline near the Mutur Jetty becomes gradually visible. Some 12 minutes later we reach the Jetty area and veer eastwards, almost hugging the coast along the southern rim. Barely have we moved a few hundred metres off the shores held both by the Army and the Navy, the landscape changes.

Catamarans and mechanised fishing boats lay beached. There are fisherman's huts with nets put out for cleaning as we pass Sampur area. Suddenly through the binoculars I see a group of guerrilla cadres emerging from a thicket. At least two have weapons in their hands. They run to the edge of the shore, weapons aimed at the IPC. It is presumably a warning to keep away or face gunfire.The IPC moves away from the shore. A while later we are back on track.

Nearby lay a bunker. As we move along, more bunkers appear at odd intervals. Some are located in lonely areas, just outside thick outgrowth, where no fishing vessels are present. At one point, just adjoining a fisherman's hut, lay another cadjan thatched structure. An LTTE flag is hoisted on a pole above the roof. The line of bunkers that faces the harbour mouth extends a few kilometres up to Foul Point. In one place, near a bunker, two large crates lay stacked one on top of the other. It was difficult to spot what types of weapons have been positioned in the bunkers or small patches of cleared jungles behind them.

The Army had dominated these stretches until the launch of “Operation Jaya Sikurui” (Victory Assured) in May 1997. They were forced to abandon them after more troops were required to conduct the operation along the Alpha Nine (A-9) highway that ran through the Wanni.

But a more disturbing picture of what these developments portend emerges in Colombo. The Sunday Times learnt from intelligence channels that Tiger guerrilla camps deep inside, behind some of these bunkers (see map on this page) posed a grave threat. Artillery and mortars there (130 mm and 122 mm) were positioned towards the harbour. In addition they believe there are 81 mm mortar positions near the bunkers along the coastline from Sampur towards Foul Point.

What does all this mean for the Navy? In the event of a confrontation, the Tiger guerrillas can immobilise the Trincomalee Harbour in just a matter of minutes. Firing artillery or mortars into the harbour mouth area will mean no vessel can either enter or leave the Trincomalee Port. That will mean naval vessels will be trapped in the Dockyard.

Even after the ceasefire, the importance of Trincomalee has continued as both a naval, political and economic centre. It still remains the life line for some 40,000 troops and policemen deployed in the Jaffna peninsula. It is only a few hundreds who travel in and out of the peninsula by aircraft daily.

The bulk moves about by ship from Trincomalee after traversing along the main Alpha Eight (A-8) highway. Military supplies and provisions for their sustenance barring fresh vegetables, meat or fish, take the same route. Hence, crippling Trincomalee Harbour can be fatal to troops in the peninsula.

The dangers posed by the new developments have not been lost on the UPFA Government of President Kumaratunga. In late March, she ordered troops to evict the guerrillas from the positions they had taken up. An Army column moved into the area but was later ordered to withdraw for fears that any confrontation may eventually lead to Eelam War 4.

During many sessions of the National Security Council thereafter, the new build up came in for close scrutiny. But the UPFA leadership were on the horns of a dilemma - any action to reverse the situation would have to be taken bearing in mind the need to ensure the peace process is not disrupted. That in reality meant the issue had to be resolved without recourse to any military action.

In fact, Defence Secretary Cyril Herath raised issue over the matter during his regular meetings with the Head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Gen. (retd.) Trond Furuhovde. The SLMM made clear the matter was beyond them. Unlike in the North, "controlled" or "uncontrolled" areas in the East were not defined. Hence, the issue had to be raised with the Norwegian facilitators.

Concerns over the new developments exacerbated after an incident in the seas off Sampur last month. A Naval craft with an SLMM representative on board was fired at some 1200 metres off the shores of Sampur. The SLMM raised issue with the LTTE only to be told that the firing was not intentional. There was a training camp for guerrilla cadres in the Sampur area and live firing practices had been going on.

On May 21, this year, Defence Secretary Herath chaired a top level conference at his Ministry. Armed forces chiefs who attended the meeting were of the view that the LTTE should be requested to move their positions at least three kilometres inland from the shores. This was not only because of the threat they posed to the country's premier naval establishment but also to merchant shipping that was increasing in view of development activity in the North and East.

Though the Government wants to raise issue over the matter with the Norwegian facilitators, it is now clear they would have to wait. An urgent priority has overshadowed all other events. That is the future of the 30 month old ceasefire and the Ceasefire Agreement itself. This dangerous situation was underscored this week by the Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat Jayantha Dhanapala during a briefing to senior Army officers at the Eastern Command Headquarters in Minneriya. He said the CFA was in jeopardy but emphasised that the Government was firmly committed to upholding it.

Norway's Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgessen arrives in Colombo today. Together with Ambassador Hans Brattskar they will fly tomorrow to Kilinochchi to meet LTTE leaders in a strong bid to ensure the ceasefire remains intact. On Tuesday they are due to brief President Kumaratunga on the guerrilla response.

Both sides, no doubt, have repeatedly made public pronouncements of their commitment to uphold the CFA. Yet, a war psychosis has begun to develop and a premier state intelligence agency has said so to the Government.

The coming weeks therefore will show whether the two sides are on a slippery slope towards war or not. But one thing remains clear in the meantime. The UPFA can no longer continue to blame only the previous UNF regime for all the ills and a "deteriorating security situation." They would have to take the greater part of the responsibility.

LTTE’s sentry point at Pullimalai, came under attack by Karuna’s men and several feared dead - Asian Tribune

According to a latest news break, it was reported that the front sentry point of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam’s (LTTE’s) Pullimalai camp came under severe attack and several cadres belonging to the Tamil rebel out were killed in the sudden attack.

In the news report received by the “Asian Tribune,” a pose of Colonel Karuna’s Amman’s armed cadres launched an attack on the front sentry point located in front of the LTTE’s camp at Pullimalai yesterday night at about 10.30 PM .

The report further said that rocket propellers and other small firearms were used in the one hour long attack against the LTTE men.

In the sudden attack by Karuna’s men it is feared that almost all the LTTE cadres in the sentry point were killed.

Details of the causality figures are sketchy at the time posting this news item.

Meanwhile Sri Lankan newspapers in today’s morning edition, carried a news item regarding the attack on the LTTE camp located at Ayithiyamalai in the East.

According to the newspapers it was reported that around 8 LTTE cadres were killed in that attack.

But the LTTE in a statement denied that no such attack took place on their camps yesterday, as reported in the Sri Lankan news papers.

Two Sri Lanka military intelligence operatives arrested says LTTE [TamilNet, August 01, 2004 10:55 GMT]

Liberation Tigers in Batticaloa said that they arrested two persons working with the Sri Lankan military intelligence Sunday morning in Periyapullumalai, on the A-5 highway, close to the Amparai District border.

''We recovered two T-56 assault rifles and mobile phones from them. We also arrested a collaborator identified as Gunabanda Sinnavan, 38, with a Self Loading Rifle'', an LTTE official in Batticaloa said.

He identified the persons accused of working with the Sri Lankan military intelligence as Mr. Arumugam Ravichandran, 30 and Mr. Sellathurai Santhirasekeram, 27 of Iluppadichenai in Karadiyanaaru, 22 kilometres northwest of Batticaloa.

Sri Lanka army behind attack on border post- LTTE [TamilNet, September 08, 2004 04:50 GMT]

An attack by a group of heavily armed men suspected to be Sri Lanka army commandos on the Liberation Tigers' border post in Pullumalai, 65 kilometres from Batticaloa, Tuesday night around 10.15 p.m. was repulsed, a senior LTTE official in Batticaloa said. "Two men in the group were killed in our counter fire according to mine clearing workers in the area who were forced by the attackers to carry their wounded across the border last night", he said after visiting the scene of attack Wedenesday morning.

"Two attackers were wounded in our counter attack.There were 34 well armed men in the group. The SLA commandos were assisted by some armed paramilitary cadres. Local mine clearing workers from MAG who were forced by the attackers to carry their wounded told us that an injured paramilitary cadre identified as 'Nagulan' died while being carried back to the Sri Lanka armed forces camp in Tempitiya", the LTTE official said.

MAG is a British mine clearing organisation.

The attackers had severely assaulted the MAG mine clearing workers to make them carry the wounded,according to a local village official who was in Pullumalai Wednesday morning.

"MAG workers told us that the attackers allowed them to leave when they got close to the Sri Lankan armed forces camp in Tempitiya", the LTTE official said. He dismissed reports reaching Colombo as "silly fabrications planted by Sri Lankan intelligence".

Meanwhile Mr. E. Kousalyan, head of the LTTE's political division for Batticaloa-Amparai, speaking to TamilNet from Kilinochchi Wednesday said: "This is a very serious development. We are studying the matter".

Three Tiger cadres killed - By Senaka De Silva

At least three Tiger cadres are reported to have been killed, when a group of Karuna loyalists launched a surprise attack on the LTTE sentry point in Pullumalai, some 65 kilometres from Batticaloa, on Tuesday night.

"According to reports we have received three LTTE cadres had been killed in the attack" an Army spokesman told the Daily Mirror.

The attack had been carried out around 10.30 p.m. The pro-Karuna Asia Tribune yesterday reported that rocket propelled grenades and small arms were used in the one-hour long attack against the LTTE cadres.

Meanwhile the pro-LTTE Tamil Net quoted a senior LTTE cadre as alleging that the Sri Lanka Army had helped Karuna's men to carry out the attack.

"There were 34 well armed men in the group (attackers)" the LTTEer was quoted as saying. However the Army denied any involvement in the attack.

"The fight was between LTTE cadres and Karuna's men. The Army did not have anything to do with it" the Army spokesman said.

"This is a very serious development. We are studying the matter", Tamilnet quoted LTTE Political Wing leader for Batticaloa-Ampara, Kaushalyan commenting on the attack.

Meanwhile soldiers defused a time bomb this morning which had been planted opposite a shop in Trincomalee road, Batticaloa. It had been spotted by a labourer who had come to sweep the road.

LTTE suspects army link in Batticaloa Killings - By D. B. S. Jeyaraj

The mysterious yet gruesomekilling of seven Tiger cadres - four of them disabled - by a group of "unknown" assassins on the night of Sunday, April 25 in Batticaloa has received widespread condemnation.

Though a concerted campaign is on to pin the blame on the renegade Tiger faction led by former LTTE eastern commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna for these killings, the LTTE is not rushing to do so.

While the Tigers have not ruled out the involvement of cadres belonging to Karuna's group in the killing, the LTTE is looking at other possible alternatives too instead of buying the glib explanation trotted out by interested parties.

One line of thought is that the killing could be the work of other ex-militant Tamil groups functioning as para-militaries in the east under army auspices. The other of course is that remnants of Karuna's forces now under army protection could have done so. The third is that it was a combined operation undertaken by erstwhile Karuna followers, ex - militant cadres and military intelligence operatives.

The perpetrators of these killings are only perceived as 'instruments.' The sinister hand of the army, presumably its military intelligence division, is suspected to be behind the crime.

The LTTE cancelled a scheduled meeting between the military top brass and the eastern Tiger hierarchy led by Karuna's successor Col. Ramesh Thambirajah on April 28th night.

Detailed complaint

Instead a detailed complaint was provided to Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Head Gen. Trond Furuhovde by LTTE political wing chief S.P. Tamilselvan at a meeting held on April 29 at Kilinochchi.

Though the LTTE was unable to pinpoint the culprits specifically, the Tigers were able to convey their seemingly well-founded suspicions.

Apart from asking the SLMM to take up this issue in detail with the government, the LTTE also promised to provide the monitors with all updated information on the subject as and when they get them. Apparently a team of LTTE intelligence operatives is currently engaged in unravelling the mystery behind the killings.

Even before meeting the SLMM Chief, Tamilselvan had written to him complaining about the incident and describing it as a ceasefire violation.

There is a contradiction here. When the LTTE launched a full scale attack on Karuna and his followers several ceasefire provisions were violated in letter and spirit.

Around 175 of Karuna's cadres were massacred in Verugal, Vaaharai, Kattumurivukkulam and Kathiravely.

Around 90 Tigers who fought on the side of Karuna and later surrendered to the LTTE have been taken to the Wanni for intensive interrogation by Pottu Amman's intelligence wing. Five of these were senior deputies of Karuna.

The LTTE is also engaged in a massive campaign to compel ex-Karuna cadres to re-join the movement.

A witch hunt has also been launched to arrest those civilians supporting Karuna and indulging in acts like burning effigies and destroying pictures etc.

The SLMM that kept mum and accepted the LTTE version that the Karuna affair was an internal matter not concerning the monitors at the time of conflict is keeping quiet even now about those matters.

A different set of standards however for the seven LTTE cadreskilled by unknown persons. There is no doubt that the killings were horrible and the perpetrators deserve punishment.

It is the SLMM attitude that is hypocritical. Any complaint by the LTTE is given full attention. Any complaint against the LTTE is neglected. The LTTE is to be kept happy no matter what the cost.

In the perennial struggle between the powerful and the powerless there is no doubt as to which side of the battle lines the monitors are on. This stems not because of the fault of the individual monitors themselves but due to a fundamental conflict of interests facing Oslo the mediator and Oslo the monitor.

The contrasting response of the SLMM to these killings and towards other incidents cannot take away the fact that Sunday's killings were indeed brutal and despicable.

According to the information available a bunch of assassins numbering seven (two in sarong, two in civvies, three in uniform) had proceeded from the direction of the Vavunatheevu army camp on the Aayithiyamalai road in a white van.

Vavunatheevu is on the western shore of the Batticaloa lagoon. Three Tigers manning the sentry post about 800 metres from the army camp forward line were shot dead. The sentry post was at a place called Puliyam- adhu near the Mullamunai junction.

Known Tiger

The three Tigers killed were Nadarasa Suresh alias Capt. Thiyaneswaran of Eravur; Lieut. Sellathurai Jaseetharan alias Thanesan of Mankerni; Second Lt. Sethunathapillai Pirabhu alias Selvaveeran of Sittandy. They were shot dead at point blank range.

It is assumed that someone known to the dead cadres had been in the van and that the Tigers had no reason to suspect anything till the killings began. Interestingly all seven cadres killed had been with Karuna during the split and later rejoined the movement. These killings took place at about 11. 35 p.m.

Thereafter the vehicle had proceeded along the Aayithiyamalai Road till it reached what was known as the Maayawaadi camp. The place belonged to a landowner known as Mayappodi and was known as Mayaa's Wadi.The nearby village is Ponnankanichenai.

This was about five kilometers from the Vavunatheevu camp. While two old men working as civilian watchers ran away, the assailants shot dead the four Tiger cadresat the site. Those killed were all disabled due to the war.

The Mayawadi camp had been an agricultural farm cum tax collection centre before the Karuna crisis erupted. It was also a rehabilitation centre for Tiger cadres maimed or disabled in the war. It had been a pet project ofKaruna himself. Even computers had been installed here.

When the attack took place only four cadres were staying there. The others had dispersed after Karuna disbanded his units and vacated the Batticaloa District.

The four persons killed by the assassins were Capt. Sasikumar or Kanapathipillai Thiruppatham from Periyaporatheev, Capt. Vaamakaanth or Ganesan Linganathan from Kiran; Lt. Vinoranjan or Selliah Mohanraj of Senkalladdy and Second Lt. Tharanan or Theivanayagam Santhirakumar of Aayithiyamalai.

Sasikumar and Vaamakaanth had lost both legs; Vinoranjan was blind in both eyes while Tharanan had lost one leg.

Vaamakaanth was from Krishnan Kovil Street in Kiran, the native place of Karuna himself. Vaamakaanth was a particular favourite of Karuna. He was a very good writer in Tamil and had authored several articles, short stories, plays , poems etc. for various Tiger media organs over the past years. He was also well versed in computers.

Apart from killing the four Tigers, the assassins had damaged 10 tractors, three motor cycles, one threshing machine and other agricultural equipment. They also damaged the computers and set fire to some buildings. The assassins left the place around 12. 30 a.m.

"Credible evidence"

The vehicle had returned the way it came and allegedly went out of sight in the vicinity of the army camp at Vavunatheevu.

The LTTE apparently has "credible evidence" of army complicity in the attack. They are still not sure of who exactly did the killings but are sure that they were "Tamil men" in league with the military.

There are three ex-militant groups now working with the army in Batticaloa as para-militaries or intelligence operatives. They are the Varathan group of TELO; Razeek group of EPRLF; and the Mohan group of the PLOTE.

Varathan and Razeek were killed by the LTTE but members continue to function. Mohan was moved to a South East Asian country by military intelligence to protect him after the ceasefire. His group is the deadliest of all three factions.

The LTTE targeted some of these men in the East and in Colombo after the ceasefire. These men along with the Mahattaya group comprise the nucleus of hit squads known as deep penetration squads or long range reconnaissance patrols.

The Mahattaya group consists of about 40 to 50 ex-Tiger cadres who surrendered to the army at various stages after former LTTE deputy leader Gopalswamy Mahendrarajah alias Mahattaya was detained and executed by the LTTE on charges of treason.

A witch hunt was conducted on a staggered basis against those cadre considered to be Mahattaya loyalists. Some escaped and went over to the enemy.

The state kept the Mahattaya group a closely guarded secret in view of its utility value and in the interests of their security.

The LTTE also did not publicise it because it was considered a "shame" for the Tigers that members of such a disciplined group could join the armed forces.

Most of the deep penetration squad hits in the north were done by the Mahattaya group while those in the east were done by the Mohan, Razeek and Varathan groups.

Logistical support

Though several "persons" in the south claim credit for these successes the actual risks and work was done by the Tamil groups. Those who provided logistical support now pretend to be the real McCoys for reasons of their own.

After Karuna's debacle several of his cadres took refuge in military camps in the east and Polonnaruwa District. Some of these men are being moulded into a new group known as Karuna group.

Karuna reportedly is not with these men but staying elsewhere in the south with around 150 men.

The LTTE suspects that the Maayawaadi killings were done by members of the ex-militant groups or the Karuna group or both.

Whatever the identities of the actual perpetrators, the Tigers regard the army or its military intelligence division as being responsible. Geographically it is impossible for anyone to pass through that road without the army knowing, alleges the LTTE. It also dismisses charges against the Karuna group alone.

"We are afraid that putting aside this incident as one carried out by elements closer to Karuna may be too simplistic. Making use of the Karuna factor, any para-military groups working alongside the Sri Lanka Army (SLA), whether with the blessing of the SLA or otherwise, may continue to act in this manner and create havoc and confusion" wrote Tamilselvan to the SLMM.

The army has officially denied any involvement in the incident. Military Spokesperson Col. Sumedha Perera has pointed out that the killings took place in Tiger controlled territory and not in government controlled areas.

This revives earlier memories of killings by the LTTE in government controlled areas after the ceasefire. Tamilselvan disclaimed responsibility then and said the killings had not occurred in LTTE territory. What was sauce for the goose then is now sauce for the gander.

The LTTE suspects that a campaign is on to create an impression that a massive confrontation is going on between Karuna's men and the LTTE in all parts of the island.

There have been several incidents in the recent past.One Tamil from Naavatkudah in Batticaloa died in a mysterious explosion in Kurunegala; two youths from Valaichenai and Eravur were shot dead by unknown persons in Maligawatte, Colombo. One died and the other is hospitalised.

Deliberate pattern

In another incident, a man and his wife were hacked with swords in Kallady, Batticaloa. The 53 year old man was a draftsman in the Irrigation Department and staying with his wife in the irrigation quarters. They were from Jaffna. The woman was the sister of former LTTE leader Kumarappah who at one time was Batticaloa Tiger commander.

The LTTE thinks there is a deliberate pattern to all these incidents including the Maayawaadi killings. The Tigers believe a sinister plot is being hatched to provoke them into rash action. Only time will tell whether LTTE suspicions are true or not.

LTTE political head for Batticaloa and Amparai, Kausalyan has issued a vehement denial to news reports that there was a shoot out between Karuna's cadres and the LTTE in the Thoppigala jungles. He says that Karuna has no one of any consequence with him who is knowledgeable of the jungle routes known as the Beirut trail.

It may also be that the LTTE is 'shy' to admit that segments of Karuna forces are alive and kicking in the Tharavai-Kudumbimalai-Vadamunai jungles.

For one thing the LTTE boasted that Karuna was a single man and that he was now isolated; Tiger propagandists claimed that Karuna and his men were terrorised by special Tiger forces who attacked and then melted back to the Wanni.

One story is about how the special forces penetrated Thoppigala and did two strikes near Karuna's secret camp. Apparently these made Karuna panic and throw in the towel. If this is indeed true, the simple question demanding an answer is the reason for not eliminating Karuna then and there instead of scaring him.

The LTTE also claimed that all of Karuna's cadres had deserted him and joined the LTTE again. This again is not true. Only about 600 to 800 cadres have rejoined the LTTE. The rest numbering around 3500 to 4000 have returned home, fled elsewhere, gone with Karuna or taken refuge in army camps. The Tigers are now trying to reinduct cadres.

LTTE propagandists also spread stories of Karuna fleeing to Australia. Tiger radio stated firmly that Karuna was now in Brisbane.

The truth is that the LTTE hierarchy simply does not know where Karuna is now.

Internal matter

To admit that and the fact that some members at least of the Karuna faction have taken to arms against the parent body is infra dig for the LTTE. Besides if recent developments are indeed intra-Tiger friction then the SLMM cannot be asked to intervene in an internal LTTE matter. It may also encourage further dissension in Batticaloa.

The LTTE also suspects that deep penetration squads will start targeting LTTE leaders again. The explanation will be that Karuna's men are doing so.

The LTTE and Karuna averted a lot of bloodshed by coming to an agreement to end the fighting. It appears now that both sides had ulterior motives for doing so. Bloodshed in installments is on the cards.

In any event the LTTE is of the view that Karuna has forfeited any right to clemency after the murders of LTTE intelligence personnel in his custody including Lt. Col Neelan Sinnathamby. Karuna was required to release them without harm.

The LTTE is now going all out for Karuna. At the same time the Tigers will not fail to avenge the killings of the seven in Batticaloa.

The recent editorial of the London based Tamil Guardian dated April 28th indicates the LTTE mindset. Relevant excerpts sound ominous indeed!

"The SLA's claim that Karuna loyalists are responsible for the attack, meanwhile, must be viewed in the light of the Sri Lankan government providing sanctuary for the renegade commander and his associates. Karuna's own cold-blooded killing of several LTTE intelligence officers before his flight from Batticaloa has already placed him beyond the pale, as far as the Tamil people are concerned. Colombo's sanctuary and the attack on Sunday must therefore be viewed in the light of the LTTE's warning soon after Karuna's rebellion began: 'We should let it be known to his contacts that they will cause irreparable damage to the peace process if they exploit Karuna's dissent.'

"As such, the ramifications of the attack go beyond the seven deaths. Those seeking to provoke a vehement reaction from the LTTE are deliberately seeking to reignite a cycle of violence which will eventually plunge the island back into a bloody war. The revulsion and outrage Sunday's killings have sparked in the Tamil community and, no doubt, in the LTTE is no less for recognition of their purpose. As this newspaper and other advocates of a negotiated solution have repeatedly argued, it is in the volatile Eastern Province that agent provocateurs have the greatest chance of success. Conscious of the objective of Sunday's attack, the LTTE is, for now, raising the matter through the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). Having said that, of course, those familiar with the LTTE's ethos on such matters know full well that the file on this matter will remain open for a long time. That four particularly helpless cadres who were amongst the victims will give particular impetus to its closure."

STF to ensure maximum security for their informants - by Asanga Warnakulasuriya (Wednesday, 8 September 2004)

The Special Task Force (STF) has decided to carry out a special threat assessment programme to analyse threats faced by STF informants with the aim of safeguarding them from being targeted by the LTTE.

"This programme will be followed up by a strategic plan that will ensure maximum security for informants who work for the STF," Commandant STF DIG Nimal Lueke told the Daily News yesterday.

Commenting on the recent informant killings, the DIG said that each and every informant of the Armed Forces is under threat and it is the duty of the respective armed force to look into the security of informants.

"Its my duty to look after my people because they are working under me," the DIG said. "But at the same time the informant should also be aware of the threat faced by him and take precautionary measures."

The STF Commandant also pointed out that the if the informant is made aware of the security threat and the respective armed force provides him with adequate security and still he is negligent and fails to take precautionary measures, no one can be blamed.

The DIG further said that the STF is planning strengthen security in Ampara district with a new proposed base complex to avoid abundant natural resources in the district getting into the "wrong hands".

Police raid exposes a secret Sri Lankan army assassination squad - By W.A. Sunil (WSWS)

A police raid on an army “safe house” in Colombo on January 2 has provided a revealing glimpse into the dirty operations of the Sri Lankan military. The luxury home situated in the Millennium City housing complex on the outskirts of the capital was the base for a secret army hit squad ostensibly to carry out attacks behind the lines on the leadership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Police acting on a tip off arrested an army captain, four soldiers and a former LTTE member and seized a large cache of sophisticated weapons. These included 10 anti-personnel mines, 20 land mines, four light anti-tank weapons, automatic rifles and ammunition, LTTE uniforms, explosives and related material, and thermobaric weapons.

The unit, which was officially part of the army’s Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP), operated under the auspices of the Directorate of Military Intelligence. Details of its function, whereabouts and operations were known only to a handful of top-level army officers. The revelation of its existence has provoked outrage from the military and its apologists who have accused the police of compromising a top state secret.

Although the military police were involved in the raid on the safe house, the military hierarchy, including the army commander Lionel Balagalla, were apparently not informed. Balagalla immediately contacted the Inspector General of Police (IGP) to prevent those arrested from being interrogated and to obtain their release.

However, the army’s attempt at damage control was blocked by Internal Security Minister John Amarathunge. The soldiers were held at a police station under the country’s Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) which provides broad powers of detention without trial. They were only finally released on January 13, after Balagalla issued a public statement declaring that the unit had not been engaged in political assassinations but were used in covert operations as part of the long-running war against the separatist LTTE.

Balagalla’s statement was aimed at quelling widespread media speculation that the military squad had been connected to President Chandrika Kumaratunga and her Peoples Alliance (PA) which was defeated in national elections in December. It was even suggested that the unit was set up by army officers sympathetic to the PA to assassinate the newly elected Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe.

The very fact that the army chief was compelled to officially deny that his troops are involved in political violence in Colombo speaks volumes. The recent election was one of the most violent on record with 2,247 incidents officially reported, including 46 deaths. Both the PA and the United National Party (UNP) routinely use gangs of thugs to intimidate and terrorise their opponents and also have close connections to the military and police top brass. In the course of the campaign, UNP leader Wickremesinghe claimed to have information about plans by a group of soldiers to murder him using thermobaric weapons.

The UNP government appears to have accepted Balagalla’s explanation. Indeed the newly appointed Defence Minister Tilak Marapana ordered the release of all members of the unit, except the ex-LTTE fighter, and expressed his anger over the police raid. A media campaign is underway to defend the unit and criticise the police for exposing its operations.

Defence analyst Iqbal Athas, for instance, who has close connections to the military hierarchy, has written several lengthy comments in the English language Sunday Times criticising the police involved in the raid. In the latest article entitled “The great betrayal,” he berated the “blind fanatics of the [police] department” for the “humiliating ordeal” suffered by “the national heroes” and called for a public apology to the army and the soldiers.

It should be pointed out that the treatment of these soldiers during their short stay in police custody was comparatively mild compared to the abuse and torture routinely meted out to hundreds of Tamils who are held without trial as “LTTE suspects” for months and years under the country’s draconian anti-terrorist legislation. All of this is defended as absolutely essential to national security by Athas and others of his ilk.

Unanswered questions

Despite the attempts to sweep the matter under the carpet, a number of serious questions about this covert unit remain unanswered.

No one in the political establishment—either the government or opposition—has questioned the legitimacy of the military maintaining a secret assassination squad. Athas reveals, with pride, that one of the squad’s “most prized accomplishments” was the murder of LTTE military intelligence leader Thambirasa Kuhasanathan. Sri Lankan politicians regularly brand the LTTE as “terrorists” yet the army retains the services of a group of professional assassins.

The LTTE’s Tamil Net website provided an extensive report on January 8 that confirmed that the army’s LRRP units had killed Thambirasa Kulashanthan, as well as Colonel Shanker, a close confident of LTTE leader Prabhakaran. It accused the army of two abortive attempts on the life of Thamil Chelvam, the leader of its political wing.

The LTTE also alleged that the LRRP units were involved in a series of attacks on civilians living in LTTE-controlled areas: the kidnapping of two civilians last April 2, the seizure of six farmers including three women on April 25, the gunning down of two people in May at Batticaloa North, and the disappearance of another three near Mathurankerny.

The army claims that its hit squads only operate behind enemy lines but the manner in which those arrested operated raises doubts. Why were they living in a “safe house” with a huge cache of weapons rather than in military barracks? Why were their activities known only to a handful of top officers in the Directorate of Military intelligence?

While no official explanation has been forthcoming, the army’s apologist Athas offers a series of excuses that raise more questions than they answer. He writes: “A plethora of them [safe houses] existed under the police and security forces when they combated the violence of the then outlawed Janatha Vikukthi Permuna (JVP) in the late 1980s. Suspected were arrested and grilled at these safe houses not to mention the complaints it drew from human rights groups of torture. In the later years, major state intelligence agencies had their safe houses to detain and question Tiger guerrilla suspects.”

In other words, the use of “safe houses” by the military special squads is a longstanding practice, not only in the war against the LTTE but also against political opposition in the south. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the security forces targetted the chauvinist JVP as part of a far broader operation to intimidate and terrorise layers of discontented rural youth in the south. An estimated 60,000 rural youth were brutally killed or simply “disappeared” during the period.

Significantly, the JVP, has since made peace with the political establishment in Colombo. The party, which falsely claims to be Marxist, is among the most extreme advocates of the war against the LTTE and denying basic democratic rights to the Tamil minority. In response to the revelations about the safe house, the JVP has been one of the loudest in the defence of the army and its use of military assassination squads that a decade ago were used against JVP supporters and rural youth.

Covert military and paramilitary units such as the Black Cats and Green Tigers were engaged in wholesale torture and murders. The infamous Batalanda torture camp was one such safe house where high-level interrogations took place. The same compound housed leading members of the then UNP government, including the current prime minister Wickremesinghe.

Wickremesinghe may not have been a target of the arrested LRRP unit but one feature of the case points to a possible connection to other election-related violence. It is not entirely clear how the police came to know of the “safe house”. Athas points out that the unit had only taken up residence in mid-December and its existence was only known to select officers in the Directorate of Military Intelligence. He claims that the information was leaked by dissident members of the directorate but fails to answer the obvious question—why? At the very least, such divisions point to bitter feuding, possibly political, in the ranks of military.

The police superintendent in charge of the raid, Kulasiri Udugampola, came to know of the safe house through an apparently unrelated investigation. He was in charge of investigating the worst case of election violence—the cold-blooded murder of 10 supporters of Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC) at Pallethalawinna in the Kandy district on election day, December 5.

The survivors of the attack alleged that thugs connected to the former PA minister Anurudhdha Ratwatte, including two of his sons, were responsible. The PA was particularly bitter about the SLMC which had switched to the opposition and precipitated the crisis that eventually forced the election.

Among the suspects detained were 30 soldiers, including an army captain, from Vijayaba Infantry Regiment stationed at Boyagane in the Kurunegala District. The police claim that it was from one of these soldiers that the information about the safe house was obtained. According to some media reports, one of Ratwatta’s sons, Chanuka, was a frequent visitor to the Millennium City safe house.

Both the government and opposition are now engaged in attempting to whitewash the military. Neither the UNP nor the PA want a serious investigation into such military units as such an inquiry would potentially expose their own systematic involvement in political thuggery. But working people should take a sharp warning from this whole episode—such squads can also be used against the working class, particularly as opposition and protests develop against the attacks being prepared on jobs, living standards and democratic rights.

Irresponsible police actions created unwarranted situation - Former Senior DIG - by Asanga Warnakulasuriya (Thursday, 13 March 2003)

Former Senior DIG of Crime and Criminal Intelligence, H.M.G.B. Kotakadeniya who appeared before the Presidential Commission inquiring into the Police raid on the Safe House at the Athurugiriya Millennium City yesterday said that irresponsible actions among the Police hierarchy had created this unwarranted situation.

Kotakadeniya said that if he had conducted the raid, he would have obtained the search warrant from the Teldeniya Magistrate and would have proceeded with the inquiry at the Safe House. Besides if I found the legitimacy of the Safe House, I would have informed the Magistrate without resorting to another offence, he said.

Former Judge of Court of Appeal D. Jayawickrema presided the Commission. Giving further evidence, the DIG said he was summoned by the Minister of Interior to carry out a separate inquiry in addition to the investigation carried out by ASP Udugampola. Since it was a matter of security, he had asked for CID assistance for the investigation.

Accordingly, a special team headed by SSP S.L.M. Samarathunga of CID was appointed by the Minister. When the question was raised by the judge about the necessity of two separate inquiries, the DIG said that, there were allegations against ASP Udugampola for being incompetent.

Answering the question raised by the judge whether the DIG was aware of a conspiracy theory behind the Safe House to assassinate the Prime Minister, he said that it was not known until the media alleged that there was such an attempt.

The senior DIG also blamed the Police for not taking any disciplinary action against ASP Udugampola , although Kotakadeniya had complained to the IGP stating that the ASP had acted in a malicious manner to bring the Army into disrepute.

The evidence was led by the State Counsel, Riyaz Hamza.

Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate Athurugiriya Safe House raid - by Deepal Warnakulasuriya (Sunday, 21 December 2003)

The Government last week countered the damning Presidential Commission report on the Athurugiriya Millennium City Safe House details with a statement that a Parliamentary Select Committee would be appointed to investigate the same incident. The Select Committee will be appointed next month through a resolution passed in Parliament and will comprise no more than 12 members, Cabinet Spokesman G. L. Pieris revealed last week.

A team of police directed by ASP Udugampola raided the Army safe house at No. 844, Kaduwela road, Athurugiriya on January 02, 2002 without a court order to search the place. The safe house was used by Army intelligence personnel (Directorate of Military Intelligence) for covert action to infiltrate LTTE cadres and eliminate some of the LTTE leadership.

However, the police team subsequent to the raid, revealed the media that a number of weapons, explosives, and other military equipment which were in the house, claiming them to be illegal and unsafe.

They also had later confessed that they raided the place with a tip off of an assassination attempt on former Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe.

The Presidential Commission report revealed last week deemed the raid on the safe house by ASP Kulasiri Udugampola and several others as illegal.

The one member Commission chaired by retired Supreme Court judge D. Jayawickreme in his report had said that the ASP had rejected the statement of the Army Commander about the safe house functioning under his approval and had proceeded on the legal course of action. Therefore, the Commission Report said that 'The action taken by ASP Udugampola in the manner he did in taking into custody several Army personnel was illegal, immoral and in violation of all the rules and regulations of the police'.

The Commission had also said that "the Government, the Prime Minister and the ministers concerned, the then Inspector General of Police L. Kodituwakku, his successor T. E. Anandarajah and all other senior officers should be held responsible for the illegal act of ASP Udugampola".

The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) team, housed at the Kohuwala Army Camp and was relocated to Athurugiriya in December 2001. When the safe House was raided the LRRP team led by Captain Nilam had conducted a number of Deep Penetration operations in the North and had accounted for nine LTTE high rankers including Mano and Ganesh. They have also killed another 10 regional level leaders.

The Commission to probe into the incident was appointed in August 16, 2002 by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. However, the requested equipment had been provided the Commission in September.

A government lawyer had been released in October after several requests and enough police officers had not been provided by the government till March this year.

Subsequent to the exposure of the safe house in Athurugiriya, a pistol gang was created by the LTTE to hunt down and kill Army informants. Allegations were made that, exposing the activities carried out from the safe house, would have also exposed covert intelligence operations and operators enabling the LTTE to identify the informants.

Several informants were killed in Batticaloa, Trincomalee and even at Dehiwala, Pepiliyana and Mount Lavinia. One informant, Pulendrarasa was killed on January 03 in Batticaloa and Vidayakaran and Nimalan were killed in Batticaloa on January 16 and 21 respectively by the LTTE pistol gang. Raghupathi Kadiragamnathan and Devarasa Lingasamai were killed in Colombo in April.

The Presidential Commission Report also said that the arbitrary action of the police had jeopardized the security of the State and neutralised the Military strategy. It also said that since, the raid more than 23 informants and civilians had been killed by the LTTE and a number of persons had been seriously injured.