The Sri Lanka Army arrested a village officer at his home in Jaffna Thursday morning around 7 a.m. Nagalingam Sunthararajah, 44 was arrested by a SLA special forces motorcycle unit which neither gave a receipt nor reason for his arrest, his relatives said. Sunthararajah is the village officer for section J.486 in Jaffna.
The SLA also arrested Vivekanadan Ramesh, 32, at a hardware shop in Jaffna Thursday morning. The army gave no reason for his arrest.
Another youth, Tharmakulasingham Thaasan, 17, was arrested Wednesday morning at his residence in KKS Road in Jaffna town.
Sunthararajah, Ramesh and Thaasan are being detained at the 51-2 brigade headquarters in Jaffna town, sources said. Their relatives have complained to the Human Rights Commission (HRC) in Jaffna.
Meanwhile, the mother of Saravanamuththu Rajeswaran, 22, complained to the HRC Thursday that he son has been missing from yesterday. She said that she is making inquiries whether her son too was arrested by the SLA.
Monday, September 06, 2004
Batticaloa leprosy hospital to close, SLA to move in [TamilNet, March 20, 2001 12:08 GMT]
Sri Lanka's first hospital for leprosy patients that was built on an island in the Batticaloa lagoon in 1926 is to be closed this month, health officials in the eastern town said Tuesday. Hospital officials said that the government is closing down the hospital so that the Sri Lanka army can take over the strategically located Maantheevu (Deer Island) and the buildings on it. They said that the SLA had recently inspected the structures on the island recently. The island overlooks the main entry point between the Batticaloa town and the districtÃs main hinterland, which is controlled by the Liberation Tigers. The British started the Maantheevu hospital with 250 patients 76 years ago. This island in the Batticaloa lagoon was selected for its salubrious condition and isolation. Access to Maantheevu is only by boat.
A patient in the hospital. Note: Tamilnet library photo. SLA does not allow cameras on the islandThe SLA's 23-3 brigade headquarters in Batticaloa town told the leprosy hospital officials Monday that all the patients in their care would be transferred to a medical facility in Ragama near Colombo on 28 March. The Health Ministry too informed the officials Monday that the inmates should be ready to leave the island and that a team of officials would be visiting the Maantheevu hospital on 23 March for finalising arrangements for the transfer. The Health Ministry sent circular in November 2000 that the Maantheevu hospital is to be closed down and that persons affected by leprosy should be treated as out patients in hospitals in the district. The Ministry officials had said that the transfer is necessary to ensure the security of fifteen Sinhala patients who are on treatment here. Tamil and Muslims inmates are objecting to the transfer. However, informed sources in Batticaloa said that the decision to close down was taken by the Ministry because the army wanted to take over the island for its strategic and secure location.
A patient in the hospital. Note: Tamilnet library photo. SLA does not allow cameras on the islandThe SLA's 23-3 brigade headquarters in Batticaloa town told the leprosy hospital officials Monday that all the patients in their care would be transferred to a medical facility in Ragama near Colombo on 28 March. The Health Ministry too informed the officials Monday that the inmates should be ready to leave the island and that a team of officials would be visiting the Maantheevu hospital on 23 March for finalising arrangements for the transfer. The Health Ministry sent circular in November 2000 that the Maantheevu hospital is to be closed down and that persons affected by leprosy should be treated as out patients in hospitals in the district. The Ministry officials had said that the transfer is necessary to ensure the security of fifteen Sinhala patients who are on treatment here. Tamil and Muslims inmates are objecting to the transfer. However, informed sources in Batticaloa said that the decision to close down was taken by the Ministry because the army wanted to take over the island for its strategic and secure location.
12 SLA soldiers killed at Sungawil -VoT [TamilNet, May 11, 2001 18:50 GMT]
Twelve Sri Lanka Army soldiers were killed in an ambush by the Liberation Tigers at Sungawil in the Polonnaruwa district around 6.40 a.m Thursday. The LTTE ambush unit recovered 3 bodies of the SLA soldiers killed in the attack, the Voice of Tigers (VoT) radio said Friday evening. The radio said the SLA troops were returning to their camp at Sungavil after night patrol when they were attacked. The LTTE ambush unit recovered following weapons, according to the radio: AK Light Machine Guns-02, 40 mm. Pistol-02, T-56 assault rifles-09, Communication equipment-01, Night Vision Glass -01, medium range rounds-2282, Binocular-01. Meanwhile the Liberation Tigers handed over a body of a SLA soldier to the International Committee of the Red Cross on Friday in the northern Vanni region, according to the radio. The soldier was killed in an ambush by the Tigers at Ceylon Theater in the Manal Aaru region Thursday morning. In a seperate incident the Liberation Tigers snipped and wounded a Sri Lanka Army soldier at Kiran, about 27 km. north of Batticaloa around 6 a.m. Friday, army sources in the eastern town said. The soldier was admitted at the Polonnaruwa hospital. Sources in Batticaloa said all transport through Kiran bridge was disrupted and some civilians were also assaulted by the soldiers.
SLA commando soldier killed [TamilNet, January 02, 1999 17:22 GMT]
A Special Forces (SF) commando of the SLA's motorcycle unit that was riding ahead of an army convoy was killed this afternoon around 1.15 p.m. at Saththurukkondaan, six kilometers north of Batticaloa town, on the main road when he was hit by an improvised explosive device (IED).
The rapid deployment motor cycle party rides ahead of large SLA convoys leaving Batticaloa when the threat is considered high on the main road to Valaichenai and thence to Polannaruwa.
The IED that killed the SF commando had been concealed in a tree said Sri Lankan Police sources.
Although recently purchased Chinese armoured personnel carriers (APCs), South African Buffles and British Unicorns guard the convoys, it has been felt that they are useless against the small groups of Liberation Tigers who set off claymores, fire on the vehicles hit by these mines and quickly melt away into the shrub jungle and villages by the road.
This was the case when another SLA unit was attacked at Aarumukaththaankudiyiruppu, seven kilometers further north of Saththurukkondaan, recently.
The Tigers had caused the damage and withdrawn before the APCs could effectively swing into action.
The motor cycle borne rapid deployment unit of the SF is considered were agile in dealing with such situations.
The rapid deployment motor cycle party rides ahead of large SLA convoys leaving Batticaloa when the threat is considered high on the main road to Valaichenai and thence to Polannaruwa.
The IED that killed the SF commando had been concealed in a tree said Sri Lankan Police sources.
Although recently purchased Chinese armoured personnel carriers (APCs), South African Buffles and British Unicorns guard the convoys, it has been felt that they are useless against the small groups of Liberation Tigers who set off claymores, fire on the vehicles hit by these mines and quickly melt away into the shrub jungle and villages by the road.
This was the case when another SLA unit was attacked at Aarumukaththaankudiyiruppu, seven kilometers further north of Saththurukkondaan, recently.
The Tigers had caused the damage and withdrawn before the APCs could effectively swing into action.
The motor cycle borne rapid deployment unit of the SF is considered were agile in dealing with such situations.
LTTE condemns SLA's intimidating behaviour in Jaffna [TamilNet, June 21, 2003 17:44 GMT]
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Saturday complained to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) that the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) soldiers are intimidating its members and public in Jaffna district, sources said.
The LTTE Jaffna district political office in its complaint said that when the head of the Vadamarachchi war memorial and members of public were clearing the memorial premises Friday morning eight armed SLA soldiers arrived in four field motorbikes at high speed, stopped at the entrance to the war memorial and threatened the members of the public.
The SLA soldiers left the area after spitting on the ground. They behaved indecently, LTTE Jaffna district political authorities told the SLMM.
"SLA soldiers are violating the spirit of the ceasefire agreement in Jaffna by intimidating members of LTTE and public in Jaffna district. We severely condemn this provocative act of the SLA soldiers, "said LTTE to the SLMM.
The LTTE Jaffna district political office in its complaint said that when the head of the Vadamarachchi war memorial and members of public were clearing the memorial premises Friday morning eight armed SLA soldiers arrived in four field motorbikes at high speed, stopped at the entrance to the war memorial and threatened the members of the public.
The SLA soldiers left the area after spitting on the ground. They behaved indecently, LTTE Jaffna district political authorities told the SLMM.
"SLA soldiers are violating the spirit of the ceasefire agreement in Jaffna by intimidating members of LTTE and public in Jaffna district. We severely condemn this provocative act of the SLA soldiers, "said LTTE to the SLMM.
SLA increases motorbike patrols in Vadamarachchi [TamilNet, July 17, 2003 10:49 GMT]
The Sri Lanka Army (SLA) has increased its field motorbike group patrols in Vadamarachchi division from Thursday, escalating tension and fear among the residents of the area, civil sources said.
Meanwhile, a fourteen-year-old boy Yogarajah Kalaichchelvam was knocked down by a speeding field motorbike patrol of the Sri Lanka Army Thursday morning around at nine a.m. near Supparmadam in Vadamarachchi division in Jaffna district, police said.
The boy was admitted at the Manthikai government hospital with serious injuries, sources said.
Meanwhile another report said that some army soldiers of the field motorbike group had gone to the house of the injured boy and threatened his parents not to report this accident to the Police.
Meanwhile, a fourteen-year-old boy Yogarajah Kalaichchelvam was knocked down by a speeding field motorbike patrol of the Sri Lanka Army Thursday morning around at nine a.m. near Supparmadam in Vadamarachchi division in Jaffna district, police said.
The boy was admitted at the Manthikai government hospital with serious injuries, sources said.
Meanwhile another report said that some army soldiers of the field motorbike group had gone to the house of the injured boy and threatened his parents not to report this accident to the Police.
SL soldiers charged in Chavakachcheri for traffic offence [TamilNet, February 13, 2004 16:41 GMT]
The Chavakachcheri Police Friday filed plaint against two soldiers of the Sri Lanka Army in the Magistrate’s court, charging them for causing injuries to a Tamil civilian by hitting him with their field motorbike on January 9th along the Post Office road in Chavakachcheri, legal sources said.
According to the complaint lodged at the Chavakachcheri Police Station, the injured civilian had stated that when he was cycling along the post office road two members of SLA field motor bike group came at a high speed from the camp and collided their motor bike with his cycle, causing him severe injuries, legal sources said.
The Magistrate, Mr.P.Subramaniam, who entertained the plaint directed the SL military police to furnish a report regarding this incident and put off further inquiry for March 5, legal sources said.
Meanwhile, civil sources Friday said the SLA has increased its field motorbike group patrol in the Jaffna peninsula and soldiers are seen frequently riding motorbikes at high speeds on the main roads, with their faces covered with black clothes.
According to the complaint lodged at the Chavakachcheri Police Station, the injured civilian had stated that when he was cycling along the post office road two members of SLA field motor bike group came at a high speed from the camp and collided their motor bike with his cycle, causing him severe injuries, legal sources said.
The Magistrate, Mr.P.Subramaniam, who entertained the plaint directed the SL military police to furnish a report regarding this incident and put off further inquiry for March 5, legal sources said.
Meanwhile, civil sources Friday said the SLA has increased its field motorbike group patrol in the Jaffna peninsula and soldiers are seen frequently riding motorbikes at high speeds on the main roads, with their faces covered with black clothes.
Two Tigers killed in ambush north of Batticaloa [TamilNet, August 20, 2004 11:13 GMT]
Mr. Bawa, a senior member of the Liberation Tigers from the Amparai District and an LTTE rehabilitation affairs official were killed in an ambush near a Sri Lanka army camp at Kayankerni, 36 kilometres north of Batticaloa, Friday around 2.15 p.m. Mr. Bawa was riding a motorbike with Mr. Yoga, an LTTE official in charge of rehabilitation work, when gunmen ambushed them triggering a claymore mine and opening fire at Pullaavi junction in Kayankerni, an area controlled by the Sri Lankan military. A female cadre travelling with them was seriously injured. She was earlier believed dead.
Mr. Bawa was formerly head of the LTTE political division for the Amparai District.
The Sri Lanka army has a regular day sentry at Pullaavi junction, residents in Kayankerni said.
The female cadre earlier believed killed is admitted to the Intensive Care Unit of the Batticaloa General Hospital with serious injuries.
The gunmen who ambushed the Tigers near the SLA camp got away, they said.
Mr. Bawa was formerly head of the LTTE political division for the Amparai District.
The Sri Lanka army has a regular day sentry at Pullaavi junction, residents in Kayankerni said.
The female cadre earlier believed killed is admitted to the Intensive Care Unit of the Batticaloa General Hospital with serious injuries.
The gunmen who ambushed the Tigers near the SLA camp got away, they said.
Tigers attack SLA ambush group [TamilNet, October 07, 2001 06:53 GMT]
A Sri Lanka army soldier was killed and two were wounded in a counter ambush by the Liberation Tigers at Miyankulam junction on the Batticaloa-Colombo highway Saturday night around 11 p.m. military sources in the eastern town said. The soldiers were in an ambush party that had set out from the Miyankulam SLA camp to interdict a crossing point used by the Liberation Tigers. The camp is one of the eight military detachments that guard A 16 – the SLA’s Main Supply Route to the district.
The wounded soldiers were taken to the Polannaruwa hospital.
The A16 runs through a large zone in the northern part of the district which is controlled by the Liberation Tigers.
Strapped for manpower, the SLA finds it increasingly difficult to interdict LTTE movements across the highway.
The wounded soldiers were taken to the Polannaruwa hospital.
The A16 runs through a large zone in the northern part of the district which is controlled by the Liberation Tigers.
Strapped for manpower, the SLA finds it increasingly difficult to interdict LTTE movements across the highway.
Tigers counter attack SLA ambush [TamilNet, September 12, 2001 13:20 GMT]
A Sri Lanka army soldier was killed and another was seriously wounded when a group of Liberation Tigers counter attacked a SLA ambush party at Adampan junction, eight kilometres south east of Mannar, Wednesday morning. A firefight erupted as the LTTE group walked into an ambush by three teams from the nearby SLA camp in Maanthai around 9 a.m. sources said. The Tigers had then taken up position to counter attack the SLA ambush teams, killing one and seriously injuring another.
The Liberation Tigers often cross the Adampan junction, although the SLA claims that the area is under its control. The military says that the Tigers and their supporters smuggle goods that are banned under Colombo’s harsh economic embargo on the Vanni through points on the Main Supply Route to Mannar (the western sector of the A14 highway) such as the Adampan junction.
The SLA and the Special Task Force deployed along the MSR to Mannar seek to control the smuggling and interdict logistical runs by the Tigers by setting up ambushes in suspected crossing points on the A14.
The Liberation Tigers often cross the Adampan junction, although the SLA claims that the area is under its control. The military says that the Tigers and their supporters smuggle goods that are banned under Colombo’s harsh economic embargo on the Vanni through points on the Main Supply Route to Mannar (the western sector of the A14 highway) such as the Adampan junction.
The SLA and the Special Task Force deployed along the MSR to Mannar seek to control the smuggling and interdict logistical runs by the Tigers by setting up ambushes in suspected crossing points on the A14.
Two soldiers wounded in LTTE ambush [TamilNet, July 18, 2001 20:33 GMT]
Two Sri Lanka Army (SLA) soldiers were wounded, one of them seriously in an ambush by the Liberation Tigers at Vaarikuddiyoor, 16 km. northwest of Vavuniya, around 5.15 p.m. Wednesday, army sources in the northern town said.
The soldiers, a sergeant and a lieutenant, were cycling when they were fired at by the Tigers, who had taken up positions behind a bush, the sources said.
The Army lieutenent is reported to be in a serious condition, according to the sources.
Soldiers from a nearby sentry post rushed to the scene and commandeered a public transport bus to transport the wounded colleagues to Anuradhapura hospital. The bus was later brought to the Pampaimadhu SLA camp.
The troops conducted a search operation in the area.
The soldiers, a sergeant and a lieutenant, were cycling when they were fired at by the Tigers, who had taken up positions behind a bush, the sources said.
The Army lieutenent is reported to be in a serious condition, according to the sources.
Soldiers from a nearby sentry post rushed to the scene and commandeered a public transport bus to transport the wounded colleagues to Anuradhapura hospital. The bus was later brought to the Pampaimadhu SLA camp.
The troops conducted a search operation in the area.
Tiger ambush behind SLA lines [TamilNet, November 04, 1997 23:59 GMT]
The Liberation Tigers ambushed a group of Special Forces Commandos travelling in a tractor at Nayinamadu killing five and wounding several others last evening around 5.30 p.m.
The LTTE exploded a claymore mine in the ambush. The commandos belonged to the 53 division.
Sources close to the army in Vavuniya said that the Jayasikurui commanders were very alarmed that the LTTE has been able to launch this daring attack in the heart of an area dominated by the army.
The LTTE exploded a claymore mine in the ambush. The commandos belonged to the 53 division.
Sources close to the army in Vavuniya said that the Jayasikurui commanders were very alarmed that the LTTE has been able to launch this daring attack in the heart of an area dominated by the army.
Tigers ambush SLA patrols [TamilNet, November 10, 1997 23:59 GMT]
The Liberation Tigers attacked a Sri Lankan army patrol near Vathiri junction in Jaffna around 10 a.m this morning killing four soldiers.
The LTTE had set off a claymore mine in the ambush. The attack was in the vicinity of Thevarazhiyan Hindu College.
In another incident, The Liberation Tigers attacked a Sri Lankan army patrol with grenades in the Nediyakaadu area in Valvettithurai this morning around 8.15 a.m. Heavy gunfire was reported in the area following the grenade attack.
Casualties on either side was not known.
A bystander identified as Navaratnam Soundari was injured in the crossfire. She was admitted to the Manthikai hospital.
The Liberation Tigers ambushed another SLA patrol in Alvai east in a place called Mayakkai yesterday. The Ministry of Defence acknowledged this afternoon that one soldier was killed in the LTTE attack.
The LTTE had set off a claymore mine in the ambush. The attack was in the vicinity of Thevarazhiyan Hindu College.
In another incident, The Liberation Tigers attacked a Sri Lankan army patrol with grenades in the Nediyakaadu area in Valvettithurai this morning around 8.15 a.m. Heavy gunfire was reported in the area following the grenade attack.
Casualties on either side was not known.
A bystander identified as Navaratnam Soundari was injured in the crossfire. She was admitted to the Manthikai hospital.
The Liberation Tigers ambushed another SLA patrol in Alvai east in a place called Mayakkai yesterday. The Ministry of Defence acknowledged this afternoon that one soldier was killed in the LTTE attack.
SLA clears verges over ambush fears [TamilNet, November 04, 1997 23:59 GMT]
The Sri Lankan army has asked residents in Kokkuvil and Kalviankaadu to cut down trees along the road side and inside lanes. The people in these areas have also been ordered not to thatch the lower side of their fences by the lanes and roads.
This follows the detection of four Improvised Explosive Devises attached to and hidden in trees by the side of some lanes and roads in Kokkuvil and Kalviankaadu frequented by the army.
The military intelligence in Jaffna has informed Sri Lankan troops that an LTTE unit in these areas is preparing to launch a series of small scale ambushes using the IEDs in the smaller lanes which are sometimes used by the army's foot patrols.
The Sri Lankan army has asked residents in certain parts of Valigamam and Vadamaradchi also to do the same.
This follows the detection of four Improvised Explosive Devises attached to and hidden in trees by the side of some lanes and roads in Kokkuvil and Kalviankaadu frequented by the army.
The military intelligence in Jaffna has informed Sri Lankan troops that an LTTE unit in these areas is preparing to launch a series of small scale ambushes using the IEDs in the smaller lanes which are sometimes used by the army's foot patrols.
The Sri Lankan army has asked residents in certain parts of Valigamam and Vadamaradchi also to do the same.
Razeek group displays two bodies [TamilNet, December 18, 1997 23:59 GMT]
The Razeek group which went to Thalavai yesterday returned to their camp in Batticaloa town this afternoon with the bodies of two youths whom the group had shot dead in an ambush in the early hours of the morning today.
The Razeek group claims that the boys were LTTE operatives working in the Thalavai area and that a grenade was recovered from the possession of one of them.
The Razeek group claims that the boys were LTTE operatives working in the Thalavai area and that a grenade was recovered from the possession of one of them.
The public passing by the camp are being shown the two bodies which are on display in Razeek's camp.
Sources in Batticaloa said this evening that the bodies would be handed over to the Batticaloa hospital nearby tomorrow after they begin to decompose tonight. The hospital will then hand them over to the ICRC.
The Razeek group is doing this to create fear among potential young recruits said the sources who were sceptical that the two boys killed in Thalavai are members of the LTTE.
The Razeek group claims that the boys were LTTE operatives working in the Thalavai area and that a grenade was recovered from the possession of one of them.
The Razeek group claims that the boys were LTTE operatives working in the Thalavai area and that a grenade was recovered from the possession of one of them.
The public passing by the camp are being shown the two bodies which are on display in Razeek's camp.
Sources in Batticaloa said this evening that the bodies would be handed over to the Batticaloa hospital nearby tomorrow after they begin to decompose tonight. The hospital will then hand them over to the ICRC.
The Razeek group is doing this to create fear among potential young recruits said the sources who were sceptical that the two boys killed in Thalavai are members of the LTTE.
Razeek group member shot dead [TamilNet, December 17, 1997 23:59 GMT]
The Liberation Tigers shot dead a member of the Razeek group this morning at Thalavai, about fifteen kilometers north of Batticaloa town. The dead youth, identified as M. Kunaratnam 24, was part of fully armed platoon of the Razeek group which had set an ambush on the Liberation Tigers who frequent the Thalavai area from the early hours of the morning.
Two civilians Kandhaiah Thangavel 37, and his wife Sumithra, on their way to collect firewood had walked into the ambush area and were caught by the ambush party, tied up, blind folded and were left in the custody of Kunaratnam.
The Tigers, however, outmanoeuvred the Razeek group's ambush party and shot dead Kunaratnam who was standing guard to the Thangavel couple. The others of the Razeek group ambush party took to their heels, abandoning Kunaratnam's body in Thalavai.
The civilian couple were injured in the cross fire. Two bus load of armed cadres of the Razeek group who are working as soldiers with the SLA have gone to the Thalavai area from their camp in the Batticaloa town following the incident said informed sources close to the group.
They had not returned until evening sources said.
Two civilians Kandhaiah Thangavel 37, and his wife Sumithra, on their way to collect firewood had walked into the ambush area and were caught by the ambush party, tied up, blind folded and were left in the custody of Kunaratnam.
The Tigers, however, outmanoeuvred the Razeek group's ambush party and shot dead Kunaratnam who was standing guard to the Thangavel couple. The others of the Razeek group ambush party took to their heels, abandoning Kunaratnam's body in Thalavai.
The civilian couple were injured in the cross fire. Two bus load of armed cadres of the Razeek group who are working as soldiers with the SLA have gone to the Thalavai area from their camp in the Batticaloa town following the incident said informed sources close to the group.
They had not returned until evening sources said.
STF patrol ambushed [TamilNet, January 14, 1998 23:59 GMT]
The Liberation Tigers ambushed a Special Task Force patrol last evening near the Thuraineelavanai junction, about 26 kilometers south of Batticaloa, killing a military informant identified only as Kannan. None of the STF personnel in the patrol were injured, said sources today.
Kannan was a youth who, according to sources, had been associated with the LTTE in the area. He was captured by the STF two days ago at the nearby village of Periyaneelavanai.
Kannan had offered to point out the LTTE's positions in the stronghold of Thuraineelavanai to the STF.
Hence, sources say, the STF was taking him to Thuraineelavanai when it was ambushed yesterday.
Meanwhile the Counter Subversive Unit (CSU), the dreaded security intelligence arm of the Sri Lankan Police, launched a sudden operation in the Batticaloa town to thoroughly check all motorcycles and their owners in the town this morning. Sources said this was done on a tip off.
The Sri Lankan Police said that they had arrested two members of the Liberation Tigers around 2 a.m. this afternoon in the Batticaloa town.
They said two hand grenades had been found in the possession of the arrested youth.
Indpendent sources in Batticaloa, however, said that it could not be confirmed wether the arrested youth were Tigers or not.
Kannan was a youth who, according to sources, had been associated with the LTTE in the area. He was captured by the STF two days ago at the nearby village of Periyaneelavanai.
Kannan had offered to point out the LTTE's positions in the stronghold of Thuraineelavanai to the STF.
Hence, sources say, the STF was taking him to Thuraineelavanai when it was ambushed yesterday.
Meanwhile the Counter Subversive Unit (CSU), the dreaded security intelligence arm of the Sri Lankan Police, launched a sudden operation in the Batticaloa town to thoroughly check all motorcycles and their owners in the town this morning. Sources said this was done on a tip off.
The Sri Lankan Police said that they had arrested two members of the Liberation Tigers around 2 a.m. this afternoon in the Batticaloa town.
They said two hand grenades had been found in the possession of the arrested youth.
Indpendent sources in Batticaloa, however, said that it could not be confirmed wether the arrested youth were Tigers or not.
Eight LTTE fighters killed [TamilNet, May 11, 1998 23:59 GMT]
Seven LTTE fighters died in two different accidental explosions yesterday in the Vanni said Voice of Tigers (VOT) in its night transmisssion today.
Six LTTE fighters were killed in one of blasts said the radio, naming them as:
Lieutenant Nilamakal (Palanivel Chitrathevi, Jaffna), Captain Uruthra (Sinnathamby Thevakala, Jaffna), Captain Kayatkodi (Tharmathevan Vanaja, Jaffna), Arulvani (Tharmarajah Jeyatharshini, Trincomalee) and Thamilmangai (Sivakuru Rajakuru, Kandy) and Sujita (Arokiyanathar Judenathar) Jaffna.
One LTTE fighter, Ilamaran (Pooventhan Manivel, Trincomalee), died in the other explosion the radio said.
Meanwhile, one LTTE fighter, Ltd. Naren also known as Poovalahu (Selvaratnam Rajan, Jaffna) died in a SLA ambush, said VoT.
Six LTTE fighters were killed in one of blasts said the radio, naming them as:
Lieutenant Nilamakal (Palanivel Chitrathevi, Jaffna), Captain Uruthra (Sinnathamby Thevakala, Jaffna), Captain Kayatkodi (Tharmathevan Vanaja, Jaffna), Arulvani (Tharmarajah Jeyatharshini, Trincomalee) and Thamilmangai (Sivakuru Rajakuru, Kandy) and Sujita (Arokiyanathar Judenathar) Jaffna.
One LTTE fighter, Ilamaran (Pooventhan Manivel, Trincomalee), died in the other explosion the radio said.
Meanwhile, one LTTE fighter, Ltd. Naren also known as Poovalahu (Selvaratnam Rajan, Jaffna) died in a SLA ambush, said VoT.
Link between Karuna and military intelligence in killing ( sundayleader.lk/20040905 )
A possible link between the Karuna faction and military intelligence in the murder of Ramalingam Padmaseelan alias Lt. Col. Senathiraja, the former Batticaloa political head of the LTTE has surfaced during investigations conducted in the east.
A military intelligence operative had picked up Kanapathipillai Mahendran alias Satchi Master from the Batticaloa Prison, according to investigation reports and accompanied him on a motorcycle for the hit.
Thereafter, Satchi Master had shot Senathiraja in Batticaloa town on July 5 at around 9.15 a.m. Senathiraja succumbed to his injuries on July 13th. Soon after the murder, the LTTE launched a clinical assault on Karuna supporters in the east and in Colombo.
The investigations have also revealed that according to Senathiraja's colleague who was with him on a motorbike, the LTTE leader had said that the two persons approaching them on a bike appeared familiar just before they were shot.
The police in Batticaloa and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) are aware of the new developments, but The Sunday Leader learns that so far very little headway is being made in the investigation, as no one, including senior police officers are willing to provide details.
Prison guards and others with information on the incident have so far refused to give statements to the SLMM for fear of reprisals.
Satchi Master was murdered inside the Batticaloa prison by LTTE cadre Mahendran Pulidaran on July 15. Satchi Master was a former LTTE member who was expelled from the organisation for misappropriation of funds.
The LTTE had charged that he was functioning as the spokesperson for Karuna from within the jail before Satchi Master was gunned down. He was arrested on May 31 by the Kathankudy Police and remanded for possession of weapons.
He and two other Karuna supporters in the jail were provided with cooking facilities, phones, money and even weapons, according to evidence provided at the magisterial inquiry into the Satchi Master murder.
Senathiraja had summoned a prison guard to the LTTE office at Thamaraikerny and inquired about the privileges being extended to Satchi Master and others inside the prison four days before he was shot.
Pulidaran had later told investigators that he had shot Satchi Master because he felt betrayed by the Karuna defection. The 9mm pistol that was later recovered from the cell where the shooting took place is believed to have belonged to Satchi Master.
Police also recovered magazines and two hand grenades inside the cell. Pulidaran had frequented the cell to give Satchi Master head massages. Investigators also believe that the murder was a revenge killing for the assassination of Senathiraja.
The Senathiraja murder has been shrouded in controversy. Soon after the murder, family members privately confided that he was not transferred to a hospital with better facilities by the Tigers, despite recommendations by doctors.
A military intelligence operative had picked up Kanapathipillai Mahendran alias Satchi Master from the Batticaloa Prison, according to investigation reports and accompanied him on a motorcycle for the hit.
Thereafter, Satchi Master had shot Senathiraja in Batticaloa town on July 5 at around 9.15 a.m. Senathiraja succumbed to his injuries on July 13th. Soon after the murder, the LTTE launched a clinical assault on Karuna supporters in the east and in Colombo.
The investigations have also revealed that according to Senathiraja's colleague who was with him on a motorbike, the LTTE leader had said that the two persons approaching them on a bike appeared familiar just before they were shot.
The police in Batticaloa and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) are aware of the new developments, but The Sunday Leader learns that so far very little headway is being made in the investigation, as no one, including senior police officers are willing to provide details.
Prison guards and others with information on the incident have so far refused to give statements to the SLMM for fear of reprisals.
Satchi Master was murdered inside the Batticaloa prison by LTTE cadre Mahendran Pulidaran on July 15. Satchi Master was a former LTTE member who was expelled from the organisation for misappropriation of funds.
The LTTE had charged that he was functioning as the spokesperson for Karuna from within the jail before Satchi Master was gunned down. He was arrested on May 31 by the Kathankudy Police and remanded for possession of weapons.
He and two other Karuna supporters in the jail were provided with cooking facilities, phones, money and even weapons, according to evidence provided at the magisterial inquiry into the Satchi Master murder.
Senathiraja had summoned a prison guard to the LTTE office at Thamaraikerny and inquired about the privileges being extended to Satchi Master and others inside the prison four days before he was shot.
Pulidaran had later told investigators that he had shot Satchi Master because he felt betrayed by the Karuna defection. The 9mm pistol that was later recovered from the cell where the shooting took place is believed to have belonged to Satchi Master.
Police also recovered magazines and two hand grenades inside the cell. Pulidaran had frequented the cell to give Satchi Master head massages. Investigators also believe that the murder was a revenge killing for the assassination of Senathiraja.
The Senathiraja murder has been shrouded in controversy. Soon after the murder, family members privately confided that he was not transferred to a hospital with better facilities by the Tigers, despite recommendations by doctors.
Link between Karuna and military intelligence in killing ( sundayleader.lk/20040905 )
A possible link between the Karuna faction and military intelligence in the murder of Ramalingam Padmaseelan alias Lt. Col. Senathiraja, the former Batticaloa political head of the LTTE has surfaced during investigations conducted in the east.
A military intelligence operative had picked up Kanapathipillai Mahendran alias Satchi Master from the Batticaloa Prison, according to investigation reports and accompanied him on a motorcycle for the hit.
Thereafter, Satchi Master had shot Senathiraja in Batticaloa town on July 5 at around 9.15 a.m. Senathiraja succumbed to his injuries on July 13th. Soon after the murder, the LTTE launched a clinical assault on Karuna supporters in the east and in Colombo.
The investigations have also revealed that according to Senathiraja's colleague who was with him on a motorbike, the LTTE leader had said that the two persons approaching them on a bike appeared familiar just before they were shot.
The police in Batticaloa and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) are aware of the new developments, but The Sunday Leader learns that so far very little headway is being made in the investigation, as no one, including senior police officers are willing to provide details.
Prison guards and others with information on the incident have so far refused to give statements to the SLMM for fear of reprisals.
Satchi Master was murdered inside the Batticaloa prison by LTTE cadre Mahendran Pulidaran on July 15. Satchi Master was a former LTTE member who was expelled from the organisation for misappropriation of funds.
The LTTE had charged that he was functioning as the spokesperson for Karuna from within the jail before Satchi Master was gunned down. He was arrested on May 31 by the Kathankudy Police and remanded for possession of weapons.
He and two other Karuna supporters in the jail were provided with cooking facilities, phones, money and even weapons, according to evidence provided at the magisterial inquiry into the Satchi Master murder.
Senathiraja had summoned a prison guard to the LTTE office at Thamaraikerny and inquired about the privileges being extended to Satchi Master and others inside the prison four days before he was shot.
Pulidaran had later told investigators that he had shot Satchi Master because he felt betrayed by the Karuna defection. The 9mm pistol that was later recovered from the cell where the shooting took place is believed to have belonged to Satchi Master.
Police also recovered magazines and two hand grenades inside the cell. Pulidaran had frequented the cell to give Satchi Master head massages. Investigators also believe that the murder was a revenge killing for the assassination of Senathiraja.
The Senathiraja murder has been shrouded in controversy. Soon after the murder, family members privately confided that he was not transferred to a hospital with better facilities by the Tigers, despite recommendations by doctors.
A military intelligence operative had picked up Kanapathipillai Mahendran alias Satchi Master from the Batticaloa Prison, according to investigation reports and accompanied him on a motorcycle for the hit.
Thereafter, Satchi Master had shot Senathiraja in Batticaloa town on July 5 at around 9.15 a.m. Senathiraja succumbed to his injuries on July 13th. Soon after the murder, the LTTE launched a clinical assault on Karuna supporters in the east and in Colombo.
The investigations have also revealed that according to Senathiraja's colleague who was with him on a motorbike, the LTTE leader had said that the two persons approaching them on a bike appeared familiar just before they were shot.
The police in Batticaloa and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) are aware of the new developments, but The Sunday Leader learns that so far very little headway is being made in the investigation, as no one, including senior police officers are willing to provide details.
Prison guards and others with information on the incident have so far refused to give statements to the SLMM for fear of reprisals.
Satchi Master was murdered inside the Batticaloa prison by LTTE cadre Mahendran Pulidaran on July 15. Satchi Master was a former LTTE member who was expelled from the organisation for misappropriation of funds.
The LTTE had charged that he was functioning as the spokesperson for Karuna from within the jail before Satchi Master was gunned down. He was arrested on May 31 by the Kathankudy Police and remanded for possession of weapons.
He and two other Karuna supporters in the jail were provided with cooking facilities, phones, money and even weapons, according to evidence provided at the magisterial inquiry into the Satchi Master murder.
Senathiraja had summoned a prison guard to the LTTE office at Thamaraikerny and inquired about the privileges being extended to Satchi Master and others inside the prison four days before he was shot.
Pulidaran had later told investigators that he had shot Satchi Master because he felt betrayed by the Karuna defection. The 9mm pistol that was later recovered from the cell where the shooting took place is believed to have belonged to Satchi Master.
Police also recovered magazines and two hand grenades inside the cell. Pulidaran had frequented the cell to give Satchi Master head massages. Investigators also believe that the murder was a revenge killing for the assassination of Senathiraja.
The Senathiraja murder has been shrouded in controversy. Soon after the murder, family members privately confided that he was not transferred to a hospital with better facilities by the Tigers, despite recommendations by doctors.
Sea Tigers attack SLN patrol - VoT [TamilNet, February 19, 1999 16:46 GMT]
(CORRECTION) The Voice of Tigers (VoT) said in its 8.00 a.m. news broadcast today that the Leopard commandos of the Sea Tigers attacked a Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) Special Forces Unit patrolling the Jaffna lagoon off Kilaly on Friday morning at 12.30 a.m..
An Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) was captured in the attack, said the broadcast.
A 12.7 mm 85 type automatic anti-aircraft gun, SM .50 Browning M12 Machine Gun 01, PKLMG -03, T56 -02, CIS 40 mm Grenade launcher -01, Radar 01, Communications set 01, Night Vision Glass 02 and other military equipment were also captured, said the VoT.
The radio said that the Leopard Commandos of the Sea Tigers had recovered a decomposed body of a SLN Commando and cremated it.
The VoT's night transmission was not clear last night as the army interrupted it.
The Tigers had attacked SLN positions on the Kilaly shore as well but, according to the radio, casualties and damages sustained by the Navy in this attack are not known.
The VoT said that the Leopard unit that carried out the attack and suffered no casualties.
The Sri Lankan forces involved in the engagement are thought to be members of the navy's Special Boat Squadron, which has been trained by the US Navy's SEALs.
Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan Security Forces Headquarters at Palaly in Jaffna issued a press note 10 minutes after the VoT broadcast that said, "Further to information on LTTE members' attack on the Naval detachment at Kilaly on February 18, one water jet which was damaged due to confrontation is to be sunk. Two naval radngs (ratings) were wounded and another is reported to be missing"
The Palaly SLA statement also said that two soldiers were injured when an anti-personnel mine blew up on them in Kokkuvil in Jaffna yesterday.
CORRECTION: It was reported earlier that the Tigers had sunk a Dvora Fast Attack Craft (FAC).
An Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) was captured in the attack, said the broadcast.
A 12.7 mm 85 type automatic anti-aircraft gun, SM .50 Browning M12 Machine Gun 01, PKLMG -03, T56 -02, CIS 40 mm Grenade launcher -01, Radar 01, Communications set 01, Night Vision Glass 02 and other military equipment were also captured, said the VoT.
The radio said that the Leopard Commandos of the Sea Tigers had recovered a decomposed body of a SLN Commando and cremated it.
The VoT's night transmission was not clear last night as the army interrupted it.
The Tigers had attacked SLN positions on the Kilaly shore as well but, according to the radio, casualties and damages sustained by the Navy in this attack are not known.
The VoT said that the Leopard unit that carried out the attack and suffered no casualties.
The Sri Lankan forces involved in the engagement are thought to be members of the navy's Special Boat Squadron, which has been trained by the US Navy's SEALs.
Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan Security Forces Headquarters at Palaly in Jaffna issued a press note 10 minutes after the VoT broadcast that said, "Further to information on LTTE members' attack on the Naval detachment at Kilaly on February 18, one water jet which was damaged due to confrontation is to be sunk. Two naval radngs (ratings) were wounded and another is reported to be missing"
The Palaly SLA statement also said that two soldiers were injured when an anti-personnel mine blew up on them in Kokkuvil in Jaffna yesterday.
CORRECTION: It was reported earlier that the Tigers had sunk a Dvora Fast Attack Craft (FAC).
LTTE attack on Kilaly repulsed [TamilNet, April 20, 1999 10:33 GMT]
Sri Lankan security sources said that government forces have repulsed an attack by the Liberation Tigers on the Kilaly base, about 35 km. south of Jaffna, in the early hours of the morning today.
The sources said the Liberation Tigers came in about ten boats and launched an attack that lasted for more than three hours.
The troops did not suffer any casualties, they added.
The security sources also said that details of the damage that they inflicted on the LTTE are not yet available.
The jetty at Kilaly is under the command of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), the elite special forces wing of the Sri Lanka SLN, modelled after the US Navy SEALS.
The sources said the Liberation Tigers came in about ten boats and launched an attack that lasted for more than three hours.
The troops did not suffer any casualties, they added.
The security sources also said that details of the damage that they inflicted on the LTTE are not yet available.
The jetty at Kilaly is under the command of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), the elite special forces wing of the Sri Lanka SLN, modelled after the US Navy SEALS.
5 Naval personnel injured [TamilNet, April 15, 1998 23:59 GMT]
Five Special Boat Squadron (SBS) commandos in the Kilaly Navy camp were wounded in a mortar attack by the Liberation Tigers last night around 9.15 p.m. said SLA sources in Chavakachcheri. They said that the Tigers came in water jet craft (captured from the SLN in 1993) across the Kilaly lagoon.
The SLN retaliated with heavy mortar fire towards the Kilaly area. Casualties on the LTTE side are not known.
This is the third attack by the LTTE on the Kilaly SBS base in Kilaly this year.
The earlier attacks, according to the Liberation Tigers, had been carried out by their Leopard commando unit.
The SLN retaliated with heavy mortar fire towards the Kilaly area. Casualties on the LTTE side are not known.
This is the third attack by the LTTE on the Kilaly SBS base in Kilaly this year.
The earlier attacks, according to the Liberation Tigers, had been carried out by their Leopard commando unit.
LTTE allays shipping fears [TamilNet, September 12, 1997 00:00 GMT]
TamilNet, September 12, 1997 00:00 GMT] On Thursday, the LTTE allayed international concern over its recent attack on a cargo ship. The Tigers said their destruction of the ship, the 'MV Cordiality', which had been hired by the Sri Lankan government, was intended to prevent the stripping of the Tamil people's mineral resources. The Tigers said that the attack should not be considered 'prejudicial to international trade or shipping'.
The LTTE said in a press communique yesterday that their troops had attacked and destroyed the Chinese-crewed, Panamanian registered cargo ship as it was being used to move Ilmenite ore from the (traditional Tamil) Pulmoddai area for sale abroad.
On 9 September, the 'MV Cordiality' was completing the loading of an estimated 15 million dollars worth of Ilmenite off the Pulmoddai coast, as Sri Lankan Special Forces troops and Sri Lankan navy gunboats provided protection.
LTTE commandos from the Leopard Brigade and Sea Tiger units launched an attack on the flotilla. Firing RPGs and heavy machine guns, the Sea Tiger boats punched through the Sri Lankan naval screen, allowing the Leopard commandos to board the cargo ship.
At least 3 Sri Lankan navy boats were sunk in the assault, according to the LTTE reports (which were privately confirmed by Sri Lankan officers). One navy boat was captured by the Sea Tigers.
The Tiger boarding party captured the cargo ship after bitter hand-to-hand fighting with Sri Lankan commandos on board. The Tigers had blasted the vessel with explosives.
At least 15 Sri Lankan commandos were killed in the furious fire-fight, along with some of the Chinese crew and locally hired labourers who got caught in the cross-fire on board. Most of the crew and hired hands jumped overboard, swimming to safety, but a handful are still unaccounted for.
The LTTE said they "deeply regret that these lives [of the labourers and crew] were lost in this manner", but said that "a war rages on the sea and on the land".
The Sri Lankan military claimed they had fought back and sunk several LTTE boats and killed an 'estimated' 25 Tigers. However, other reports said that the heavily armed Dvora-class craft of the SLN had fled the area, leaving the ship's defenders to fend for themselves. The LTTE said they suffered no casualties.
Pulmoddai is part of the traditional Tamil homelands, located between Mullaitivu and Trincomalee. Its mineral sands are particularly valuable (see box), making the region strategically important to the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE.
The Sri Lankan government has embarked on a strategic project to secure the area. A large Sinhala colony was established in the nearby Manal Aru region (since given a Sinhala name, Weli Oya) by driving out the Tamils living there. There is a significant Sri Lankan military presence in the Weli Oya area and in the villages around Pulmoddai.
The LTTE has persistently frustrated the Sri Lankan government's attempts to secure the Pulmoddai region. Tiger commandos launch repeated harassment raids in the area, hitting the heavily defended police stations and army patrols.
The Ilmenite is a valuable source of foreign revenue for the Sri Lankan government, and the LTTE have said they intend to prevent the 'plundering' of the Tamil region's wealth by the Sri Lankan government, particularly as the proceeds are being used to arm the predominantly Sinhalese Sri Lankan army.
The LTTE hit another cargo vessel, the 'MV Princess Wave' last August. A large explosion caused by a sea mine or an underwater charge ripped a hole in the vessel as it was loading Ilmenite of Pulmoddai.
The LTTE statement issued yesterday explained their reasons for the two attacks, and said that the Sri Lankan government had ignored the warning served by the first strike. The Tigers also said that the attack "should not be construed as an act of hostility directed towards any particular trade or shipping organisation".
The Tiger statement is clearly intended at blunting Sri Lankan government efforts to rope in the international community's support by projecting the LTTE as a threat to general shipping in the region.
LTTE operations in the proximity of Pulmoddai
28 January 96SLA camp is overrun and 14 soldiers killed.
14 February 96LTTE command detonated mine injures 9 SLA soldiers.
25 March 96SLA patrol is ambushed and 15 soldiers are killed.
09 August 96Sri Lankan hired cargo ship 'MV Princess Wave' is badly damaged by underwater blast.
09 October 96LTTE unit overruns a Sri Lankan police post, killing 5 armed policemen.
27 April 97SLA patrol is ambushed and 22 soldiers are killed, six wounded survive.
18 June 97SLA patrol is ambushed and 25 soldiers are killed.
09 September 97Sri Lankan hired cargo ship 'MV Cordiality' is destroyed and 15 soldiers killed.
P U L M O D D A I Pulmoddai has one of the richest deposits of Titanium ore in the world. The sands in the area contain ilmenite and rutile, raw materials for manufacturing Titanium Dioxide.
Almost 5 million tons of ilmenite are known to be in the region, which can theoretically be mined at the rate of 150,000 tons a year. In addition, rutile and zircon can be mined at the rates of 10,000 tons and 6,000 tons respectively.
However, in practice, Sri Lanka can only produce 50,000 tons of ilmenite and 3000 tons of rutile annually. 70,000 tons of crude zircon are exported, mainly as over 200,000 tons were stockpiled when the Sri Lankan government lost its ability to refine it when an LTTE assault cut off supplies of fresh water.
The port at Pulmoddai is said to be vulnerable to weather, and can be used by shipping only between April and October. Any foreign ships moving mineral sands have heavy Sri Lankan naval escort.
The Sri Lankan government's main customers for Ilmenite are Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha Ltd. (Japan), ACI (US), Derby & Co (British), Currumbin Minerals Ltd. (Australia), and Rare Earth's Ltd. (India's state-owned firm).
The LTTE said in a press communique yesterday that their troops had attacked and destroyed the Chinese-crewed, Panamanian registered cargo ship as it was being used to move Ilmenite ore from the (traditional Tamil) Pulmoddai area for sale abroad.
On 9 September, the 'MV Cordiality' was completing the loading of an estimated 15 million dollars worth of Ilmenite off the Pulmoddai coast, as Sri Lankan Special Forces troops and Sri Lankan navy gunboats provided protection.
LTTE commandos from the Leopard Brigade and Sea Tiger units launched an attack on the flotilla. Firing RPGs and heavy machine guns, the Sea Tiger boats punched through the Sri Lankan naval screen, allowing the Leopard commandos to board the cargo ship.
At least 3 Sri Lankan navy boats were sunk in the assault, according to the LTTE reports (which were privately confirmed by Sri Lankan officers). One navy boat was captured by the Sea Tigers.
The Tiger boarding party captured the cargo ship after bitter hand-to-hand fighting with Sri Lankan commandos on board. The Tigers had blasted the vessel with explosives.
At least 15 Sri Lankan commandos were killed in the furious fire-fight, along with some of the Chinese crew and locally hired labourers who got caught in the cross-fire on board. Most of the crew and hired hands jumped overboard, swimming to safety, but a handful are still unaccounted for.
The LTTE said they "deeply regret that these lives [of the labourers and crew] were lost in this manner", but said that "a war rages on the sea and on the land".
The Sri Lankan military claimed they had fought back and sunk several LTTE boats and killed an 'estimated' 25 Tigers. However, other reports said that the heavily armed Dvora-class craft of the SLN had fled the area, leaving the ship's defenders to fend for themselves. The LTTE said they suffered no casualties.
Pulmoddai is part of the traditional Tamil homelands, located between Mullaitivu and Trincomalee. Its mineral sands are particularly valuable (see box), making the region strategically important to the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE.
The Sri Lankan government has embarked on a strategic project to secure the area. A large Sinhala colony was established in the nearby Manal Aru region (since given a Sinhala name, Weli Oya) by driving out the Tamils living there. There is a significant Sri Lankan military presence in the Weli Oya area and in the villages around Pulmoddai.
The LTTE has persistently frustrated the Sri Lankan government's attempts to secure the Pulmoddai region. Tiger commandos launch repeated harassment raids in the area, hitting the heavily defended police stations and army patrols.
The Ilmenite is a valuable source of foreign revenue for the Sri Lankan government, and the LTTE have said they intend to prevent the 'plundering' of the Tamil region's wealth by the Sri Lankan government, particularly as the proceeds are being used to arm the predominantly Sinhalese Sri Lankan army.
The LTTE hit another cargo vessel, the 'MV Princess Wave' last August. A large explosion caused by a sea mine or an underwater charge ripped a hole in the vessel as it was loading Ilmenite of Pulmoddai.
The LTTE statement issued yesterday explained their reasons for the two attacks, and said that the Sri Lankan government had ignored the warning served by the first strike. The Tigers also said that the attack "should not be construed as an act of hostility directed towards any particular trade or shipping organisation".
The Tiger statement is clearly intended at blunting Sri Lankan government efforts to rope in the international community's support by projecting the LTTE as a threat to general shipping in the region.
LTTE operations in the proximity of Pulmoddai
28 January 96SLA camp is overrun and 14 soldiers killed.
14 February 96LTTE command detonated mine injures 9 SLA soldiers.
25 March 96SLA patrol is ambushed and 15 soldiers are killed.
09 August 96Sri Lankan hired cargo ship 'MV Princess Wave' is badly damaged by underwater blast.
09 October 96LTTE unit overruns a Sri Lankan police post, killing 5 armed policemen.
27 April 97SLA patrol is ambushed and 22 soldiers are killed, six wounded survive.
18 June 97SLA patrol is ambushed and 25 soldiers are killed.
09 September 97Sri Lankan hired cargo ship 'MV Cordiality' is destroyed and 15 soldiers killed.
P U L M O D D A I Pulmoddai has one of the richest deposits of Titanium ore in the world. The sands in the area contain ilmenite and rutile, raw materials for manufacturing Titanium Dioxide.
Almost 5 million tons of ilmenite are known to be in the region, which can theoretically be mined at the rate of 150,000 tons a year. In addition, rutile and zircon can be mined at the rates of 10,000 tons and 6,000 tons respectively.
However, in practice, Sri Lanka can only produce 50,000 tons of ilmenite and 3000 tons of rutile annually. 70,000 tons of crude zircon are exported, mainly as over 200,000 tons were stockpiled when the Sri Lankan government lost its ability to refine it when an LTTE assault cut off supplies of fresh water.
The port at Pulmoddai is said to be vulnerable to weather, and can be used by shipping only between April and October. Any foreign ships moving mineral sands have heavy Sri Lankan naval escort.
The Sri Lankan government's main customers for Ilmenite are Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha Ltd. (Japan), ACI (US), Derby & Co (British), Currumbin Minerals Ltd. (Australia), and Rare Earth's Ltd. (India's state-owned firm).
Clash in Jaffna Lagoon [TamilNet, December 31, 1999 15:07 GMT]
A Sri Lankan Naval boat was sunk and three other boats were damaged in a sea battle between the Liberation Tigers and a commando unit of the Sri Lanka (SLN) in the Jaffna Lagoon, around 9.30 a.m. yesterday morning, the Tamil Eelam Vaanoli, the Commercial Service of the VoT radio said this evening.
The radio said all members of the sunken water jet crew were also killed.
A black Tiger, identified as Capt. Arivarasan (Muthulingam Jaanakan of Jaffna), died in the battle, according to the radio.
The jetty at Kilaly, on the western coast of the Thenmaradchi, is under the command of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), the elite special forces wing of the Sri Lanka Navy.
The radio said all members of the sunken water jet crew were also killed.
A black Tiger, identified as Capt. Arivarasan (Muthulingam Jaanakan of Jaffna), died in the battle, according to the radio.
The jetty at Kilaly, on the western coast of the Thenmaradchi, is under the command of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), the elite special forces wing of the Sri Lanka Navy.
SLN boat destroyed in commando raid - Radio [TamilNet, February 26, 1998 23:59 GMT]
The Voice of Tigers (VoT) said this evening that the Sea wing of the Leopards special unit of the Liberation Tigers had destroyed a Water Jet and killed five soldiers in a commando raid on the SLN's jetty at Kilaly, in Jaffna late last night around 11.50 p.m.
The radio said that the Leopards had also burnt supply depot in the SLN base and damaged two Out Board Mootor fitted speed boats.
Two more water jets which are engaged in patrolling the Jaffna lagoon had withdrawn west to the Elephant Pass base according to the VoT.
The jetty at Kilaly is under the command of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), the elite special forces wing of the Sri Lanka SLN, modelled after the US Navy SEALS. The SBS was raised after the PA government came to power.
The radio said that the Leopards had also burnt supply depot in the SLN base and damaged two Out Board Mootor fitted speed boats.
Two more water jets which are engaged in patrolling the Jaffna lagoon had withdrawn west to the Elephant Pass base according to the VoT.
The jetty at Kilaly is under the command of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), the elite special forces wing of the Sri Lanka SLN, modelled after the US Navy SEALS. The SBS was raised after the PA government came to power.
Tigers attack Kilali [TamilNet, May 01, 2000 17:18 GMT]
The Sri Lanka army's Kilali base on the Jaffna lagoon's southeastern coast is being attacked by the Liberation Tigers said the Voice of Tigers (VoT) radio in its night news broadcast today.
The radio said that the Kilali SLA base is the Headquarters of the 52-3 Brigade. A unit of the Sri Lanka Navy's Special Boat Squadron (SBS), a unit of the SLA's 53 division commandos and a section of the 54 division which withdrew from the Elephant Pass base are stationed at Kilali garrison, according to the radio. (The SBS is trained by the US Navy Seals).
The VoT said that ten fighters of the LTTE were killed in the fighting for Pallai yesterday.
The radio said that the Kilali SLA base is the Headquarters of the 52-3 Brigade. A unit of the Sri Lanka Navy's Special Boat Squadron (SBS), a unit of the SLA's 53 division commandos and a section of the 54 division which withdrew from the Elephant Pass base are stationed at Kilali garrison, according to the radio. (The SBS is trained by the US Navy Seals).
The VoT said that ten fighters of the LTTE were killed in the fighting for Pallai yesterday.
Fighting close to SLA garrisons [TamilNet, September 28, 2000 06:37 GMT]
Fighting close to SLA garrisons[TamilNet, September 28, 2000 06:37 GMT] Fighting raged close to the defence perimeters of the Sri Lanka army bases in Eluthumadduval and Kilali through the early hours of Thursday morning as troops of the Liberation Tigers that had overwhelmed several layers of the SLA's forward defence localities in this sector pressed on with their multi-pronged assault. The commanders of the SLA, Sri Lanka Air Force and Navy flew to Jaffna to co-ordinate efforts to re-organise defences and to regain some of the key forward defence localities captured by the Tigers Tuesday.
The forward defence zone of the main camps of SLA's 52-3 brigade in Eluthumadduval and Kilali had a depth of 2-3 kilometers, fortified by a string of bunkers, look out posts and minor camps, an army source in the north said.
Tiger troops have managed to breach this zone to its full depth in some key sectors, according to them.
The 52-3 brigade's camp at Kilali was beefed up with elements of the 54 division that were withdrawn from the Elephant Pass garrison in April this year and some Special Forces (SF) units of the SLA's elite 53 division.
Tigers fire 152mm artillery piece Photo:LTTE The Sri Lanka Navy's commando arm, the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) too has a base on the lagoon coast in Kilali. (The 53 division's troops are trained by US army Special Forces and the SBS is trained by US Navy SEALs)
The SLA's current area of control in the Thenmaradchi division of Jaffna is defended by the 52-3 camps and a main base at Kodikamam, a strategic junction straddling the A9 highway and the only supply route to this sector from the other army held parts of the peninsula.
The second supply route to the SLA controlled part of Thenmaradchi is through the Sarasalai junction which is immediately north of Chavakachcheri town connecting the A9 to the Jaffna town-Pt.Pedro road at Puttur junction.
Although the army claimed earlier in the week that this supply route has been recaptured from the Liberation Tigers, it is yet to open the road due to difficulties in clearing large mine fields and the threat posed by LTTE units operating in the hinterland.
The A9 is cut off between Jaffna town and the western environs of Chavakachcheri as the Tigers hold about 10 kilometers of the highway from Chemmani to Nunanvil west.
Sri Lankan army tanks in Thenmaradchi Photo:Reuters/Sri Lanka Army Handout Therefore the Kodikamam-Puloli (Pt.Pedro) road through Varani currently remains the only supply route open to the army fighting the Tiger offensive in the Kodikamam-Eluthumadduval sector (see map). Securing this route while fending off the LTTE attack on the 52-3 brigade the army's top priority now said SLA sources in Colombo.
The Main Supply Route (MSR) to the SLA's 52-5 brigade in Nagar Kovil is from Eluthumadduval which links the A9 highway to the old road on Jaffna's southeastern coast. Any serious threat to the SLA base at Eluthumadduval could disrupt this MSR too. (The old coastal road from Pt.Pedro to Nagar Kovil was considered unsafe for use as the 52-5's MSR due to LTTE infiltration in the interior lagoon)
The SLA, meanwhile, is unable to use its newly acquired Multi-Barrel Rocket launchers effectively to push back the attackers for fear of causing casualties among its own troops as the fighting is very close to and, in some places, inside the defence perimeters of its camps in Kilali and Eluthumadduval.
The problem is compounded by the fact that the battle zone is more than 50 kilometers from the location of the MBRL's, the effective range of which is about 35-40 kilometers. The MBRLs that were hurriedly purchased by the Sri Lankan government from Pakistan and Czechoslovakia in June this year are kept in fire bases in the northwestern sector of the Jaffna peninsula for safety. Artillery and air support could also cause casualties among own troops that are now engaged in close quarter battles with the LTTE on the Eluthumadduval-Kilali axis said military sources in Jaffna.
However, Army officers in Jaffna said that they are confident that despite the odds the SLA is now in a position to push back the LTTE.
The forward defence zone of the main camps of SLA's 52-3 brigade in Eluthumadduval and Kilali had a depth of 2-3 kilometers, fortified by a string of bunkers, look out posts and minor camps, an army source in the north said.
Tiger troops have managed to breach this zone to its full depth in some key sectors, according to them.
The 52-3 brigade's camp at Kilali was beefed up with elements of the 54 division that were withdrawn from the Elephant Pass garrison in April this year and some Special Forces (SF) units of the SLA's elite 53 division.
Tigers fire 152mm artillery piece Photo:LTTE The Sri Lanka Navy's commando arm, the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) too has a base on the lagoon coast in Kilali. (The 53 division's troops are trained by US army Special Forces and the SBS is trained by US Navy SEALs)
The SLA's current area of control in the Thenmaradchi division of Jaffna is defended by the 52-3 camps and a main base at Kodikamam, a strategic junction straddling the A9 highway and the only supply route to this sector from the other army held parts of the peninsula.
The second supply route to the SLA controlled part of Thenmaradchi is through the Sarasalai junction which is immediately north of Chavakachcheri town connecting the A9 to the Jaffna town-Pt.Pedro road at Puttur junction.
Although the army claimed earlier in the week that this supply route has been recaptured from the Liberation Tigers, it is yet to open the road due to difficulties in clearing large mine fields and the threat posed by LTTE units operating in the hinterland.
The A9 is cut off between Jaffna town and the western environs of Chavakachcheri as the Tigers hold about 10 kilometers of the highway from Chemmani to Nunanvil west.
Sri Lankan army tanks in Thenmaradchi Photo:Reuters/Sri Lanka Army Handout Therefore the Kodikamam-Puloli (Pt.Pedro) road through Varani currently remains the only supply route open to the army fighting the Tiger offensive in the Kodikamam-Eluthumadduval sector (see map). Securing this route while fending off the LTTE attack on the 52-3 brigade the army's top priority now said SLA sources in Colombo.
The Main Supply Route (MSR) to the SLA's 52-5 brigade in Nagar Kovil is from Eluthumadduval which links the A9 highway to the old road on Jaffna's southeastern coast. Any serious threat to the SLA base at Eluthumadduval could disrupt this MSR too. (The old coastal road from Pt.Pedro to Nagar Kovil was considered unsafe for use as the 52-5's MSR due to LTTE infiltration in the interior lagoon)
The SLA, meanwhile, is unable to use its newly acquired Multi-Barrel Rocket launchers effectively to push back the attackers for fear of causing casualties among its own troops as the fighting is very close to and, in some places, inside the defence perimeters of its camps in Kilali and Eluthumadduval.
The problem is compounded by the fact that the battle zone is more than 50 kilometers from the location of the MBRL's, the effective range of which is about 35-40 kilometers. The MBRLs that were hurriedly purchased by the Sri Lankan government from Pakistan and Czechoslovakia in June this year are kept in fire bases in the northwestern sector of the Jaffna peninsula for safety. Artillery and air support could also cause casualties among own troops that are now engaged in close quarter battles with the LTTE on the Eluthumadduval-Kilali axis said military sources in Jaffna.
However, Army officers in Jaffna said that they are confident that despite the odds the SLA is now in a position to push back the LTTE.
Tigers interdict Kilali supply route [TamilNet, September 28, 2000 16:23 GMT]
The supply route to the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) and the Sri Lanka Navy base at Kilali from Eluthumadduval is unusable due to the fighting in the area sources in Jaffna said Thursday night. A Sri Lanka army official in Jaffna, however, said that Kilali is now linked to the A9 highway by an alternative road from Mirusuvil; and that the army and the SLN's Special Boat Squadron (SBS) are resisting assaults by the troops of the Liberation Tigers on their positions at Kilali.
He said that 118 soldiers were killed and 412 were wounded in the P-1, P-2 categories, meaning that the condition of the majority was serious.
Meanwhile, the TamilNet correspondent in Vadamaradchi east said that civilians attempting to leave the village of Amban, north of the SLA base in Nagar Kovil, were turned back by troops Thursday. He said that the LTTE and the SLA in Nagar Kovil continued to trade artillery fire through the day.
The SLA camp on the road between Eluthumadduval and Nagar Kovil has been isolated by LTTE troops that overwhelmed most of the army positions along this supply route sources said. But the military in Jaffna claimed that the coastal road from Pt.Pedro to the Nagar Kovil is open for supplies to the coastal garrison.
Sources in Amban said that the army camp on the road linking Nagar Kovil and Eluthumadduval is under heavy attack by LTTE troops that have advanced into the southern environs of this supply route.
He said that 118 soldiers were killed and 412 were wounded in the P-1, P-2 categories, meaning that the condition of the majority was serious.
Meanwhile, the TamilNet correspondent in Vadamaradchi east said that civilians attempting to leave the village of Amban, north of the SLA base in Nagar Kovil, were turned back by troops Thursday. He said that the LTTE and the SLA in Nagar Kovil continued to trade artillery fire through the day.
The SLA camp on the road between Eluthumadduval and Nagar Kovil has been isolated by LTTE troops that overwhelmed most of the army positions along this supply route sources said. But the military in Jaffna claimed that the coastal road from Pt.Pedro to the Nagar Kovil is open for supplies to the coastal garrison.
Sources in Amban said that the army camp on the road linking Nagar Kovil and Eluthumadduval is under heavy attack by LTTE troops that have advanced into the southern environs of this supply route.
US teams train Sri Lanka navy, army [TamilNet, August 04, 2002 11:30 GMT]
A team from the US Navy special forces, the SEALS, will provide combat training for Sri Lankan Navy commandos this month whilst a US Army team has completed a course for Sri Lanka Army troops, the state-owned Sunday Observer reported this week.
The course for the SLN from be held from August 5 to 24 at Hambantota and Uva Kuda-Oya, the Sunday Observer reported. The SEALs (named because they conduct operation from sea, air and land) will conduct a course on combat and sniper firing.
Twenty five Sri Lankan Navy personnel including officers have been selected to undergo the course, which will be an annual feature, defence sources told the paper.
The SLN’s commando force, the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), has largely been trained by the US Navy.
Meanwhile, soldiers from the SLA 53 Division have successfully completed a course in Colombo conducted by the US Army on psychological operations and civil affairs , the Sunday Observer reported.
The elite 53 Division was established under the guidance of the US Special Forces and operates under the latter’s tutelage. Comprising special forces commandos, an air mobile and a mechanized infantry unit, the 53 Division has spearheaded all major offensive operations against the Liberation Tigers.
The course for the SLN from be held from August 5 to 24 at Hambantota and Uva Kuda-Oya, the Sunday Observer reported. The SEALs (named because they conduct operation from sea, air and land) will conduct a course on combat and sniper firing.
Twenty five Sri Lankan Navy personnel including officers have been selected to undergo the course, which will be an annual feature, defence sources told the paper.
The SLN’s commando force, the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), has largely been trained by the US Navy.
Meanwhile, soldiers from the SLA 53 Division have successfully completed a course in Colombo conducted by the US Army on psychological operations and civil affairs , the Sunday Observer reported.
The elite 53 Division was established under the guidance of the US Special Forces and operates under the latter’s tutelage. Comprising special forces commandos, an air mobile and a mechanized infantry unit, the 53 Division has spearheaded all major offensive operations against the Liberation Tigers.
The United Kingdom's Special Boat Squadrons
The Special Boat Service (SBS) is a naval special forces group. They are a branch of Great Britain's Royal Marines; and are considered one of the best naval special forces teams in the world. There is a minimum requirement of two years service in the Royal Marines before being eligable for SBS service.
Like many other teams, the SBS are proficient at demolitions, diving, and parachuting; unlike other teams, much of the above is done with the two-man Klepper canoe (one of the training events is a timed five mile run with a disassembled canoe, with each operator carrying about a 60 pound load).
The SBS are organized into at least three groups; C, M, and S Squadron. C Squadron is responsible for swimmer/canoe operations. M Squadron is the antiterrorist and shipboard operations. Within M Squadron is the small Black Group--the counter-terrorist team that uses heliborne assaults. S Squadron specializes in small water borne craft and minibsub insertions and operations.
The SBS use many weapons in their daily operations; many are common in other teams. Assault rifles include the Heckler and Koch MP-5 family and the M-16A2.
The Special Boat Service was formed originally during World War Two to satisfy the need for maritime special operations.
Following the war little need was seen for Special Operations, but the idea still had merit. Various teams were combined or shut down until all that remained was the Royal Marines "Combined Operations Beach and Boats Section" (COBBS). In 1948 there was another name change, to "Small Raids Wing of the Royal Marines Amphibious School" and a deployment to Palestine, to aid in the British blockade. Members were responsible for ordinance destruction and the removal of limpet mines planted by the fledgling state of Israel.
The Small Raids Wing name began to fade when the Soviet Union began to threaten the Allied occupation of Berlin. A new unit was drawn up as part of the Royal Navy Rhine Flotilla and was shortly named the 2 SBS. 3 SBS was formed in 1951 and the SRW school section at Eastney was renamed the Special Boat Wing later that year.
The SBS served during the Korean War as part of the UN forces defending South Korea after it was invaded. The SBS performed raids along the North Korean coast, attacking targets such as railways using their signature two-man canoes or from submarines like the USS Perch.
Squadrons of the SBS continued to see some action after the Korean War. In 1952 they conducted a survey or part of the Egyptian coastline in preparation for an evacuation of British citizens. Later, during the Suez crisis of 1956, 1 and 6 SBS were mobilized for potential action. 1 SBS was to cut any cables strung across the Suez canal to block ships and 6 SBS was mobilized to scout potential landing sites in Egypt, alhtough their mission was cancelled before they could deploy. Members of the SBS were also active in anti-guerrilla operations in Indonesia between 1961 and 1971 where they kept tabs on geurilla activity.
6 SBS was stationed in the Mediterranean sea to support NATO in the event that Soviet Submarines escaped from the Black Sea in time of War, but they also managed to survey coastlines for landings and gather intelligence. Later, they sent a detachment to Bahrain; this basing was made permanent in 1961 with the treat of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This team surveyed landing areas as well as spending time training Iran's SBS.
The SBS took part in a highly publicized mid-ocean drop when a bomb threat was called in on the Queen Elizabeth 2. Although the threat was proved to be a hoax, the quickness and effectiveness of the jumpMembers of the SBS took part in the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. They were involved in the beginning days, taking part in amphibious landings on the Al-Faw Peninsula near the port of Umm Qasr. Later, teams were inserted into Northern Iraq to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage missions. One such group of around thirty to forty SBS members was dropped into position near Mosul where they split into individual teams. One team of ten operators was ambushed and their land rovers taken under fire by heavy weapons.
Like many other teams, the SBS are proficient at demolitions, diving, and parachuting; unlike other teams, much of the above is done with the two-man Klepper canoe (one of the training events is a timed five mile run with a disassembled canoe, with each operator carrying about a 60 pound load).
The SBS are organized into at least three groups; C, M, and S Squadron. C Squadron is responsible for swimmer/canoe operations. M Squadron is the antiterrorist and shipboard operations. Within M Squadron is the small Black Group--the counter-terrorist team that uses heliborne assaults. S Squadron specializes in small water borne craft and minibsub insertions and operations.
The SBS use many weapons in their daily operations; many are common in other teams. Assault rifles include the Heckler and Koch MP-5 family and the M-16A2.
The Special Boat Service was formed originally during World War Two to satisfy the need for maritime special operations.
Following the war little need was seen for Special Operations, but the idea still had merit. Various teams were combined or shut down until all that remained was the Royal Marines "Combined Operations Beach and Boats Section" (COBBS). In 1948 there was another name change, to "Small Raids Wing of the Royal Marines Amphibious School" and a deployment to Palestine, to aid in the British blockade. Members were responsible for ordinance destruction and the removal of limpet mines planted by the fledgling state of Israel.
The Small Raids Wing name began to fade when the Soviet Union began to threaten the Allied occupation of Berlin. A new unit was drawn up as part of the Royal Navy Rhine Flotilla and was shortly named the 2 SBS. 3 SBS was formed in 1951 and the SRW school section at Eastney was renamed the Special Boat Wing later that year.
The SBS served during the Korean War as part of the UN forces defending South Korea after it was invaded. The SBS performed raids along the North Korean coast, attacking targets such as railways using their signature two-man canoes or from submarines like the USS Perch.
Squadrons of the SBS continued to see some action after the Korean War. In 1952 they conducted a survey or part of the Egyptian coastline in preparation for an evacuation of British citizens. Later, during the Suez crisis of 1956, 1 and 6 SBS were mobilized for potential action. 1 SBS was to cut any cables strung across the Suez canal to block ships and 6 SBS was mobilized to scout potential landing sites in Egypt, alhtough their mission was cancelled before they could deploy. Members of the SBS were also active in anti-guerrilla operations in Indonesia between 1961 and 1971 where they kept tabs on geurilla activity.
6 SBS was stationed in the Mediterranean sea to support NATO in the event that Soviet Submarines escaped from the Black Sea in time of War, but they also managed to survey coastlines for landings and gather intelligence. Later, they sent a detachment to Bahrain; this basing was made permanent in 1961 with the treat of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This team surveyed landing areas as well as spending time training Iran's SBS.
The SBS took part in a highly publicized mid-ocean drop when a bomb threat was called in on the Queen Elizabeth 2. Although the threat was proved to be a hoax, the quickness and effectiveness of the jumpMembers of the SBS took part in the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. They were involved in the beginning days, taking part in amphibious landings on the Al-Faw Peninsula near the port of Umm Qasr. Later, teams were inserted into Northern Iraq to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage missions. One such group of around thirty to forty SBS members was dropped into position near Mosul where they split into individual teams. One team of ten operators was ambushed and their land rovers taken under fire by heavy weapons.
Saturday, September 04, 2004
ICRC transfers bodies of LTTE killed by STF [TamilNet, June 05, 2001 11:35 GMT]
The bodies of 11 Liberation Tigers who were killed Monday in an attack by Special Task Force commandos in Kanjikudichcha Aaru, 84 kilometres south of Batticaloa, were handed over to the ICRC Tuesday Mr.Harasha Gunawardene, the press officer of the ICRC in Colombo told Tamilnet. All the bodies were transferred to the LTTE today, he said. He added that the body of a Tiger trooper was handed over to the LTTE Monday.
The 12 Tigers were killed in an attack by the STF in the Kanjikudichcha Aaru area Tuesday.
Kanjikudichcha Aaru is a large tract of dry zone jungle on the southeastern part of the island.
The 12 Tigers were killed in an attack by the STF in the Kanjikudichcha Aaru area Tuesday.
Kanjikudichcha Aaru is a large tract of dry zone jungle on the southeastern part of the island.
Massacre at Hue (Excerpt from the Viet Cong Strategy of Terror, Douglas Pike, p. 23-39)
The city of Hue is one of the saddest cities of our earth, not simply because of what happened there in February 1968, unthinkable as that was. It is a silent rebuke to all of us, inheritors of 40 centuries of civilization, who in our century have allowed collectivist politics-abstractions all-to corrupt us into the worst of the modern sins, indifference to inhumanity.
What happened in Hue should give pause to every remaining civilized person on this planet. It should be inscribed, so as not to be forgotten, along with the record of other terrible visitations of man's inhumanity to man which stud the history of the human race.
Hue is another demonstration of what man can bring himself to do when he fixes no limits on political action and pursues incautiously the dream of social perfectibility.
What happened in Hue, physically, can be described with a few quick statistics. A Communist force which eventually reached 12,000 invaded the city the night of the new moon marking the new lunar year, January 30, 1968. It stayed for 26 days and then was driven out by military action.
In the wake of this Tet offensive, 5,800 Hue civilians were dead or missing. It is now known that most of them are dead. The bodies of most have since been found in single and mass graves throughout Thua Thien Province which surrounds this cultural capital of Vietnam.
Such are the skeletal facts, the important statistics. Such is what the incurious word knows any thing at all about Hue, for this is what was written, modestly by the word's press. Apparently it made no impact on the world's mind or conscience. For there was no agonized outcry. No demonstration at North Vietnamese embassies around the world.
In a tone beyond bitterness, the people there will tell you that the world does not know what happened in Hue or, if it does, does not care
The Battle
The Battle of Hue was part of the Communist Winter-Spring campaign of 1967-68. The entire campaign was divided into three phases:
Phase I came in October, November, and December of 1967 and entailed "coordinated fighting methods," that is, fairly large, set-piece battles against important fixed installations or allied concentrations. The battles of Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province, Dak To in Kontum Province, and Con Tien in Quang Tri Province, all three in the mountainous interior of South Vietnam near the Cambodian and Lao borders, were typical and, in fact, major elements in Phase I.
Phase II came in January, February, and March of 1968 and involved great use of "independent fighting methods," that is, large numbers of attacks by fairly small units, simultaneously, over a vast geographic area and using the most refined and advanced techniques of guerrilla war. Whereas Phase I was fought chiefly with North Vietnamese Regular (PAVN) troops (at that time some 55,000 were in the South), Phase II was fought mainly with Southern Communist (PLAF) troops. The crescendo of Phase II was the Tet offensive in which 70,000 troops attacked 32 of South Vietnam's largest population centres, including the city of Hue.
Phase III, in April, May, and June of 1968, originally was to have combined the independent and coordinated fighting methods, culminating in a great fixed battle somewhere. This was what captured documents guardedly referred to as the "second wave". Possibly it was to have been Khe Sanh, the U.S. Marine base in the far northern corner of South Vietnam. Or perhaps it was to have been Hue. There was no second wave chiefly because events in Phases I and II did not develop as expected. Still, the war reached its bloodiest tempo in eight years then, during the period from the Battle of Hue in February until the lifting of the siege of Khe Sanh in late summer.
American losses during those three months averaged nearly 500 killed per week; the South Vietnamese (GVN) losses were double that rate; and the PAVN-PLAF losses were nearly eight times the American loss rate.
In the Winter-Spring Campaign, the Communists began with about 195,000 PLAF main force and PAVN troops. During the nine months they lost (killed or permanently disabled) about 85,000 men.
The Winter-Spring Campaign was an all-out Communist bid to break the back of the South Vietnamese armed forces and drive the government, along with the Allied forces, into defensive city enclaves. Strictly speaking, the Battle of Hue was part of Phase I rather than Phase II since it employed "co-ordinated fighting methods" and involved North Vietnamese troops rather than southern guerrillas. It was fought, on the Communist side, largely by two veteran North Vietnamese army divisions: The Fifth 324-B, augmented by main forces battalions and some guerrilla units along with some 150 local civilian commissars and cadres.
Briefly the Battle of Hue consisted of these major developments:
The initial Communist assault, chiefly by the 800th and 802nd battalions, had the force and momentum to carry it across Hue. By dawn of the first day the Communists controlled all the city except the headquarters of the First ARVN Division and the compound housing American military advisors. The Vietnamese and Americans moved up reinforcements with orders to reach the two holdouts and strengthen them. The Communists moved up another battalion, the 804th, with orders to intercept the reinforcement forces. This failed, the two points were reinforced and never again seriously threatened.
The battle then took on the aspects of a siege. The Communists were in the Citadel and on the western edge of the city. The Vietnamese and Americans on the other three sides, including that portion of Hue south of the river, determined to drive them out, hoping initially to do so with artillery fire and air strikes. But the Citadel was well built and soon it became apparent that if the Communists' orders were to hold, they could be expelled only by city warfare, fighting house by house and block by block, a slow and costly form of combat. The order was given.
By the third week of February the encirclement of the Citadel was well under way and Vietnamese troops and American Marines were advancing yard by yard through the Citadel. On the morning of February 24, Vietnamese First Division soldiers tore down the Communist flag that had flown for 24 days over the outer wall and hoisted their own. The battle was won, although sporadic fighting would continue outside the city. Some 2,500 Communists died during the battle and another 2,500 would die as Communists elements were pursued beyond Hue. Allied dead were set at 357.
The Finds
In the chaos that existed following the battle, the first order of civilian business was emergency relief, in the form of food shipments, prevention of epidemics, emergency medical care, etc. Then came the home rebuilding effort. Only later did Hue begin to tabulate its casualties. No true post-attack census has yet been taken. In March local officials reported that 1,900 civilians were hospitalized with war wounds and they estimated that some 5,800 persons were unaccounted for.
The first discovery of Communist victims came in the Gia Hoi High School yard, on February 26 ; eventually 170 bodies were recovered.
In the next few months 18 additional grave sites were found, the largest of which were Tang Quang Tu Pagoda (67 victims), Bai Dau (77), Cho Thong area (an estimated 100), the imperial tombs area (201), Thien Ham (approximately 200), and Dong Gi (approximately 100). In all, almost 1,200 bodies were found in hastily dug, poorly concealed graves.
At least half of these showed clear evidence of atrocity killings: hands wired behind backs, rags stuffed in mouths, bodies contorted but without wounds (indicating burial alive). The other nearly 600 bore wound marks but there was no way of determining whether they died by firing squad or incidental to the battle.
The second major group of finds was discovered in the first seven months of 1969 in Phu Thu district-the Sand Dune Finds and Le Xa Tay-and Huong Thuy district-Xuan Hoa-Van Duong-in late March and April. Additional grave sites were found in Vinh Loc district in May and in Nam Hoa district in July.
The largest of this group were the Sand Dune Finds in the three sites of Vinh Luu, Le Xa Dong and Xuan 0 located in rolling, grasstufted sand dune country near the South China Sea. Separated by salt-marsh valleys, these dunes were ideal for graves. Over 800 bodies were uncovered in the dunes.
In the Sand Dune Find, the pattern had been to tie victims together in groups of 10 or 20, line them up in front of a trench dug by local corvee labour and cut them down with submachine gun (a favourite local souvenir is a spent Russian machine gun shell taken from a grave). Frequently the dead were buried in layers of three and four, which makes identification particularly difficult.
In Nam Hoa district came the third, or Da Mai Creek Find, which also has been called the Phu Cam death march, made on September 19, 1969. Three Communist defectors told intelligence officers of the 101st Airborne Brigade that they had witnessed the killing of several hundred people at Da Mai Creek, about 10 miles south of Hue, in February of 1968. The area is wild, unpopulated, virtually inaccessible. The Brigade sent in a search party, which reported that the stream contained a large number of human bones.
By piecing together bits of information, it was determined that this is what happened at Da Mai Creek: On the fifth day of Tet in the Phu Cam section of Hue, where some three-quarters of the City's 40,000 Roman Catholics lived, a large number of people had taken sanctuary from the battle in a local church, a common method in Vietnam of escaping war. Many in the building were not in fact Catholic.
A Communist political commissar arrived at the church and ordered out about 400 people, some by name and some apparently because of their appearance (prosperous looking and middle-aged businessmen, for example). He said they were going to the "liberated area" for three days of indoctrination, after which each could return home.
They were marched nine kilometres south to a pagoda where the Communists had established a headquarters. There 20 were called out from the group, assembled before a drumhead court, tried, found guilty, executed and buried in the pagoda yard. The remainder were taken across the river and turned over to a local Communist unit in an exchange that even involved banding the political commissar a receipt. It is probable that the commissar intended that their prisoners should be re-educated and returned, but with the turnover, matters passed from his control.
During the next several days, exactly how many is not known, both captive and captor wandered the countryside. At some point the local Communists decided to eliminate witnesses: Their captives were led through six kilometres of some of the most rugged terrain in Central Vietnam, to Da Mai Creek. There they were shot or brained and their bodies left to wash in the running stream.
The 101st Airborne Brigade burial detail found it impossible to reach the creek overland, roads being non-existent or impassable. The creek's foliage is what in Vietnam is called double-canopy, that is, two layers, one consisting of brush and trees close to the ground, and the second of tall trees whose branches spread out high above. Beneath is permanent twilight. Brigade engineers spent two days blasting a hole through the double-canopy by exploding dynamite dangled on long wires beneath their hovering helicopters. This cleared a landing pad for helicopter hearses. Quite clearly this was a spot where death could be easily hidden even without burial.
The Da Mai Creek bed, for nearly a hundred yards up the ravine, yielded skulls, skeletons and pieces of human bones. The dead had been left above ground (for the animists among them, this meant their souls would wander the lonely earth forever, since such is the fate of the unburied dead), and 20 months in the running stream had left bones clean and white.
Local authorities later released a list of 428 names of persons whom they said had been positively identified from the creek bed remains. The Communists' rationale for their excesses was elimination of "traitors to the revolution." The list of 428 victims breaks down as follows: 25 per cent military: two officers, the rest NCO's and enlisted men; 25 per cent students; 50 per cent civil servants, village and hamlet officials, service personnel of various categories, and ordinary workers.
The fourth or Phu Thu Salt Flat Finds came in November, 1969, near the fishing village of Luong Vien some ten miles east of Hue, another desolate region. Government troops early in the month began an intensive effort to clear the area of remnants of the local Communist organization. People of Luong Vien, population 700, who had remained silent in the presence of troops for 20 months apparently felt secure enough from Communist revenge to break silence and lead officials to the find. Based on descriptions from villagers whose memories are not always clear, local officials estimate the number of bodies at Phu Thu to be at least 300 and possibly 1,000.
The story remains uncompleted. If the estimates by Hue officials are even approximately correct, nearly 2,000 people are still missing. Re-capitulation of the dead and missing
After the battle, the GVN's total estimated civilian casualties resulting from Battle of Hue 7600
Wounded (hospitalized or outpatients) with injures attributable to warfare -1900 subtotal 5700
Estimated civilian deaths due to accident of battle -844
subtotal 4756
First finds-bodies discovered immediately post battle, 1968 -1173
subtotal 3583
Second finds, including Sand Dune finds, March-July, 1969 (est.) -809
subtotal 2774
Third find, Da Mai Creek find (Nam Hoa district) September, 1969 -428
subtotal 2346
Fourth Finds-Phu Thu Salt Flat find, November, 1969 (est.) -300
subtotal 2046
Miscellaneous finds during 1969 (approximate) -100
TOTAL YET UNACCOUNTED FOR 1946
[1] SEATO: South East Asia Organization.
[2] PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam, soldiers of North Vietnam Army serving in the South, number currently 105,000.
[3] PLAF: People's Liberation Armed Force, Formerly called the National Liberation Front Army.
Communist Rationale
The killing in Hue that added up to the Hue Massacre far exceeded in numbers any atrocity by the Communists previously in South Vietnam. The difference was not only one in degree but one in kind. The character of the terror that emerges from an examination of Hue is quite distinct from Communist terror acts elsewhere, frequent or brutal as they may have been.
The terror in Hue was not a morale building act-the quick blow deep into the enemy's lair which proves enemy vulnerability and the guerrilla's omnipotence and which is quite different from gunning down civilians in areas under guerrilla control. Nor was it terror to advertise the cause. Nor to disorient and psychologically isolate the individual, since the vast majority of the killings were done secretly. Nor, beyond the blacklist killings, was it terror to eliminate opposing forces.
Hue did not follow the pattern of terror to provoke governmental over-response since it resulted in only what might have been anticipated-government assistance. There were elements of each objective, true, but none serves to explain the widespread and diverse pattern of death meted out by the Communists.
What is offered here is a hypothesis which will suggest logic and system behind what appears to be simple, random slaughter. Before dealing with it, let us consider three facts which constantly reassert themselves to a Hue visitor seeking to discover what exactly happened there and, more importantly, exactly why it happened. All three fly in the face of common sense and contradict to a degree what has been written. Yet, in talking to all sources-province chief, police chief, American advisor, eye witness, captured prisoner, hoi chanh (defector) or those few who miraculously escaped a death scene-the three facts emerge again and again.
The first fact, and perhaps the most important, is that despite contrary appearances virtually no Communist killing was due to rage, frustration, or panic during the Communist withdrawal at the end. Such explanations are frequently heard, but they fail to hold up under scrutiny. Quite the contrary, to trace back any single killing is to discover that almost without exception it was the result of a decision rational and justifiable in the Communist mind. In fact, most killings were, from the Communist calculation, imperative.
The second fact is that, as far as can be determined, virtually all killings were done by local Communist cadres and not by the ARVN troops or Northerners or other outside Communists. Some 12,000 ARVN troops fought the battle of Hue and killed civilians in the process but this was incidental to their military effort. Most of the 150 Communist civilian cadres operating within the city were local, that is from the Thua Thien province area. They were the ones who issued the death orders.
Whether they acted on instructions from higher headquarters (and the Communist organizational system is such that one must assume they did), and, if so, what exactly those orders were, no one yet knows for sure.
The third fact is that beyond "example" executions of prominent "tyrants", most of the killings were done secretly with extraordinary effort made to hide the bodies. Most outsiders have a mental picture of Hue as a place of public executions and prominent mass burial mounds of fresh-turned earth. Only in the early days were there well-publicized executions and these were relatively few. The burial sites in the city were easily discovered because it is difficult to create a graveyard in a densely populated area without someone noticing it. All the other finds were well hidden, all in terrain lending itself to concealment, probably the reason the sites were chosen in the first place.
A body in the sand dunes is as difficult to find as a seashell pushed deep into a sandy beach over which a wave has washed. Da Mai Creek is in the remotest part of the province and must have required great exertion by the Communists to lead their victims there. Had not the three hoi chanh led searchers to the wild uninhabited spot the bodies might well remain undiscovered to this day. A visit to all sites leaves one with the impression that the Communists made a major effort to hide their deeds.
The hypothesis offered here connects and fixes in time the Communist assessment of their prospects for staying in Hue with the kind of death order issued. It seems clear from sifting evidence that they had no single unchanging assessment with regard to themselves and their future in Hue, but rather that changing situations during the course of the battle altered their prospects and their intentions.
It also seems equally clear from the evidence that there was no single Communist policy on death orders; instead the kind of death order issued changed during the course of the battle. The correlation between these two is high and divides into three phases. The hypothesis therefore is that as Communist plans during the Battle of Hue changed so did the nature of the death orders issued. This conclusion is based on overt Communist statements, testimony by prisoners1 and hoi chanh, accounts of eyewitnesses, captured documents and the internal logic of the Communist situation.
Thinking in Phase I was well expressed in a Communist Party of South Vietnam (PRP) resolution issued to cadres on the eve of the offensive:
Be sure that the liberated ... cities are successfully consolidated. Quickly activate armed and political units, establish administrative organs at all echelons, promote (civilian) defence and combat support activities, get the people to establish an air defence system and generally motivate them to be ready to act against the enemy when he counterattacks..."
This was the limited view at the start - held momentarily. Subsequent developments in Hue were reported in different terms. Hanoi Radio on February 4 said: "After one hour's fighting the Revolutionary Armed Forces occupied the residence of the puppet provincial governor (in Hue), the prison and the offices of the puppet administration... The Revolutionary Armed Forces punished most cruel agents of the enemy and seized control of the streets... rounded up and punished dozen of cruel agents and caused the enemy organs of control and oppression to crumble...
During the brief stay in Hue, the civilian cadres, accompanied by execution squads, were to round up and execute key individuals whose elimination would greatly weaken the government's administrative apparatus following Communist withdrawal. This was the blacklist period, the time of the drumhead court. Cadres with lists of names and addresses on clipboards appeared and called into kangaroo court various "enemies of the Revolution."
Their trials were public, usually in the court-yard of a temporary Communist headquarters. The trials lasted about ten minutes each and there are no known not-guilty verdicts. Punishment, invariably execution, was meted out immediately. Bodies were either hastily buried or turned over to relatives. Singled out for this treatment were civil servants, especially those involved in security or police affairs, military officers and some non-commissioned officers, plus selected non-official but natural leaders of the community, chiefly educators and religionists.
With the exception of a particularly venomous attack on Hue intellectuals, the Phase I pattern was standard operating procedure for Communists in Vietnam. It was the sort of thing that had been going on systematically in the villages for ten years. Permanent blacklists, prepared by zonal or inter-zone party headquarters have long existed for use throughout the country, whenever an opportunity presents itself.
However, not all the people named in the lists used in Hue were liquidated. There were a large number of people who obviously were listed, who stayed in the city throughout the battle, but escaped. Throughout the 24-day period the Communist cadres were busy hunting down persons on their blacklists, but after a few days their major efforts were turned into a new channel.
Hue: Phase II
In the first few days, the Tet offensive affairs progressed so well for the Communists in Hue (although not to the south, where party chiefs received some rather grim evaluations from cadres in the midst of the offensive in the Mekong Delta) that for a brief euphoric moment they believed they could hold the city. Probably the assessment that the Communists were in Hue to stay was not shared at the higher echelons, but it was widespread in Hue and at the Thua Thien provincial level. One intercepted Communist message, apparently written on February 2, exhorted cadres in Hue to hold fast, declaring; "A new era, a real revolutionary period has begun (because of our Hue victories) and we need only to make swift assault (in Hue) to secure our target and gain total victory."
The Hanoi official party newspaper, Nhan Dan, echoed the theme:
"Like a thunderbolt, a general offensive has been hurled against the U.S. and the puppets... The U.S.-puppet machine has been duly punished. The puppet administrative organs... have suddenly collapsed. The Thieu-Ky administration cannot escape from complete collapse. The puppet troops have become extremely weak and cannot avoid being completely exterminated."
Of course, some of this verbiage is simply exhortation to the faithful, and, as is always the case in reading Communist output, it is most difficult to distinguish between belief and wish. But testimony from prisoners and hoi chanh, as well as intercepted battle messages, indicate that both rank and file and cadres believed for a few days they were permanently in Hue, and they acted accordingly.
Among their acts was to extend the death order and launch what in effect was a period of social reconstruction, Communist style. Orders went out, apparently from the provincial level of the party, to round up what one prisoner termed "social negatives," that is, those individuals or members of groups who represented potential danger or liability in the new social order. This was quite impersonal, not a blacklist of names but a blacklist of titles and positions held in the old society, directed not against people as such but against "social units."
As seen earlier in North Vietnam and in Communist China, the Communists were seeking to break up the local social order by eliminating leaders and key figures in religious organizations (Buddhist bonzes, Catholic priests), political parties (four members of the Central Committee of Vietnam), social movements such as women's organizations and youth groups, including what otherwise would be totally inexplicable, the execution of pro-Communist student leaders from middle and upper class families.
In consonance with this, killing in some instances was done by family unit. In one well-documented case during this period a squad with a death order entered the home of a prominent community leader and shot him, his wife, his married son and daughter-in-law, his young unmarried daughter, a male and female servant and their baby. The family cat was strangled; the family dog was clubbed to death; the goldfish scooped out of the fish-bowl and tossed on the floor. When the Communists left, no life remained in the house. A "social unit" had been eliminated.
Phase II also saw an intensive effort to eliminate intellectuals, who are perhaps more numerous in Hue than elsewhere in Vietnam. Surviving Hue intellectuals explain this in terms of a long-standing Communist hatred of Hue intellectuals, who were anti-Communist in the worst or most insulting manner: they refused to take Communism seriously. Hue intellectuals have always been contemptuous of Communist ideology, brushing it aside as a latecomer to the history of ideas and not a very significant one at that.
Hue, being a bastion of traditionalism, with its intellectuals steeped in Confucian learning intertwined with Buddhism, did not, even in the fermenting years of the 1920s, and 1930s, debate the merits of Communism. Hue ignored it. The intellectuals in the university, for example, in a year's course in political thought dispense with Marxism-Leninism in a half hour lecture, painting it as a set of shallow barbarian political slogans with none of the depth and time-tested reality of Confucian learning, nor any of the splendor and soaring humanism of Buddhist thought.
Since the Communist, especially the Communist from Hue, takes his dogma seriously, he can become demoniac when dismissed by a Confucian as a philosophic ignoramus, or by a Buddhist as a trivial materialist. Or, worse than being dismissed, ignored through the years. So with the righteousness of a true believer, he sought to strike back and eliminate this challenge of indifference. Hue intellectuals now say the hunt-down in their ranks has taught them a hard lesson, to take Communism seriously, if not as an idea, at least as a force loose in their world.
The killings in Phase II perhaps accounted for 2,000 of the missing. But the worst was not yet over.
Hue: Phase III
Inevitably, and as the leadership in Hanoi must have assumed all along, considering the forces ranged against it, the battle in Hue turned against the Communists. An intercepted PAVN radio message from the Citadel, February 22, asked for permission to withdraw. Back came the reply: permission refused, attack on the 23rd. That attack was made, a last, futile one. On the 24th the Citadel was taken.
That expulsion was inevitable was apparent to the Communists for at least the preceding week. It was then that Phase III began, the cover-the-traces period. Probably the entire civilian underground apparat in Hue had exposed itself during Phase II. Those without suspicion rose to proclaim their identity. Typical is the case of one Hue resident who described his surprise on learning that his next door neighbour was the leader of a phuong (which made him 10th to 15th ranking Communist civilian in the city), saying in wonder, "I'd known him for 18 years and never thought he was the least interested in politics." Such a cadre could not go underground again unless there was no one around who remembered him.
Hence Phase III, elimination of witnesses.
Probably the largest number of killings came during this period and for this reason. Those taken for political indoctrination probably were slated to be returned. But they were local people as were their captors; names and faces were familiar. So, as the end approached they became not just a burden but a positive danger. Such undoubtedly was the case with the group taken from the church at Phu Cam. Or of the 15 high school students whose bodies were found as part of the Phu Thu Salt Flat find.
Categorization in a hypothesis such as this is, of course, gross and at best only illustrative. Things are not that neat in real life. For example, throughout the entire time the blacklist hunt went on. Also, there was revenge killing by the Communists in the name of the party, the so-called "revolutionary justice." And undoubtedly there were personal vendettas, old scores settled by individual party members.
The official Communist view of the killing in Hue was contained in a book written and published in Hanoi:
"Actively combining their efforts with those of the PLAF and population, other self-defence and armed units of the city (of Hue) arrested and called to surrender the surviving functionaries of the puppet administration and officers and men of the puppet army who were skulking. Die-hard cruel agents were punished."
The Communist line on the Hue killings later at the Paris talks was that it was not the work of Communists but of "dissident local political parties". However, it should be noted that Hanoi's Liberation Radio April 26, 1968, criticized the effort in Hue to recover bodies, saying the victims were only "hooligan lackeys who had incurred blood debts of the Hue compatriots and who were annihilated by the Southern armed forces and people in early Spring." This propaganda line however was soon dropped in favour of the line that it really was local political groups fighting each other.
12 soldiers killed, 21 wounded in Tiger ambushes [TamilNet, May 18, 2001 07:51 GMT]
Twelve Sri Lanka Army soldiers were killed and 21 were wounded in two separate attacks by the Liberation Tigers Friday morning, said army sources in the northern town of Vavuniya. Earlier in a claymore mine blast on the Vavuniya-Mannar road, a SLA soldier was killed and another was wounded.
Seven soldiers were killed and 11 were wounded when the Liberation Tigers attacked an army vehicle with Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) at Sector 15 on the Mannar-Vavuniya road at 11.50 a.m., the sources said.
Five soldiers were killed and 4 others were wounded when Liberation Tigers ambushed an army patrol after setting off a powerful claymore mine, on the interior road from Mylankulam to Aaasikkulam, about 12 km. south-east of Vavuniya around 11.30 a.m., the sources said.
The wounded soldiers have been transported to military hospital in Anuradhapura, hospital sources in Vavuniya said.
Seven soldiers were killed and 11 were wounded when the Liberation Tigers attacked an army vehicle with Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) at Sector 15 on the Mannar-Vavuniya road at 11.50 a.m., the sources said.
Five soldiers were killed and 4 others were wounded when Liberation Tigers ambushed an army patrol after setting off a powerful claymore mine, on the interior road from Mylankulam to Aaasikkulam, about 12 km. south-east of Vavuniya around 11.30 a.m., the sources said.
The wounded soldiers have been transported to military hospital in Anuradhapura, hospital sources in Vavuniya said.
Feared militia commander shot dead [TamilNet, February 18, 1998]
Rasasingham Seevaraththinam, 27, alias Sinnavan, one of the most feared Tamil ex-militants working for the Sri Lankan security forces in the Batticaloa district, was shot dead this morning around 8.30 a.m. near the Manmunai Special Task Force (STF) camp. The STF blamed the Liberation Tigers for the killing.
He had gone to pluck temple flowers in the camp's vicinity when he was shot dead, said Police sources in Batticaloa.
Sinnavan has been attached to the Manmunai STF camp for more than five years.
This camp is on the eastern shore of the Batticaloa lagoon at the ferry to Kokkaddicholai, a large village in the western hinterland which is under the control of the Liberation Tigers.
The Manmunai ferry is about 10 kilometers south of Batticaloa town. The STF has a camp and checkpoint here. The ferry carries the greater part of the traffic to and from the western shore (Paduvaankarai).
People passing through the ferry checkpoint, according to sources in Batticaloa, were screened by Sinnavan.
There have been regular complaints from civilians that he was engaged in extortion.
Local human rights activists have held him responsible for torturing civilians during cordon and search operations by the STF in nearby villages and during detention at the Manmunai STF camp.
The STF, however, claims that he was very effective in preventing LTTE infiltration into the government controlled parts of Batticaloa through the Manmunai ferry point.
The Liberation Tigers, according to the STF, had made several unsuccessful attempts to assassinate Sinnavan.
A miniature bomb concealed in a cigarette blew up on his face once but failed to kill him.
Sinnavan was a member of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Front (EPRLF) and worked with the Indian army from 1987 to 1990.
However it was widley believed by the public passing through Manmunai that he was a TELO member.
Sources in Batticaloa said he was one of the EPRLF cadres who led the conscription drive by the EPRLF in Batticaloa for the Tamil National Army which was raised under the Indian Peace Keeping Force in 1989.
The conscription made the EPRLF extremely unpopular in the Tamil areas of the island.
Sinnavan followed the Indian army to India when it was pulled out from Sri Lanka in early 1990.
He returned, according to local EPRLF sources, in early 1991 after the Sri Lankan army had moved into and consolidated its position in the Batticaloa town and the eastern coastal areas of the district.
Since then he has been working with the army and later with the STF they said. Sinnavan is from the village of Kokkaddicholai.
He had gone to pluck temple flowers in the camp's vicinity when he was shot dead, said Police sources in Batticaloa.
Sinnavan has been attached to the Manmunai STF camp for more than five years.
This camp is on the eastern shore of the Batticaloa lagoon at the ferry to Kokkaddicholai, a large village in the western hinterland which is under the control of the Liberation Tigers.
The Manmunai ferry is about 10 kilometers south of Batticaloa town. The STF has a camp and checkpoint here. The ferry carries the greater part of the traffic to and from the western shore (Paduvaankarai).
People passing through the ferry checkpoint, according to sources in Batticaloa, were screened by Sinnavan.
There have been regular complaints from civilians that he was engaged in extortion.
Local human rights activists have held him responsible for torturing civilians during cordon and search operations by the STF in nearby villages and during detention at the Manmunai STF camp.
The STF, however, claims that he was very effective in preventing LTTE infiltration into the government controlled parts of Batticaloa through the Manmunai ferry point.
The Liberation Tigers, according to the STF, had made several unsuccessful attempts to assassinate Sinnavan.
A miniature bomb concealed in a cigarette blew up on his face once but failed to kill him.
Sinnavan was a member of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Front (EPRLF) and worked with the Indian army from 1987 to 1990.
However it was widley believed by the public passing through Manmunai that he was a TELO member.
Sources in Batticaloa said he was one of the EPRLF cadres who led the conscription drive by the EPRLF in Batticaloa for the Tamil National Army which was raised under the Indian Peace Keeping Force in 1989.
The conscription made the EPRLF extremely unpopular in the Tamil areas of the island.
Sinnavan followed the Indian army to India when it was pulled out from Sri Lanka in early 1990.
He returned, according to local EPRLF sources, in early 1991 after the Sri Lankan army had moved into and consolidated its position in the Batticaloa town and the eastern coastal areas of the district.
Since then he has been working with the army and later with the STF they said. Sinnavan is from the village of Kokkaddicholai.
AMBUSH
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